

1 A Workshop on Religion in Global Civil Society

2 South-Southeast Asia Focus

3 January 15, 2011

4 Loma Pelona Center UCSB

5 **Welcome, Introductory Comments, Workshop Goals**

6 **Mark Juergensmeyer** This is a series of workshops that are part of a project sponsored by the  
7 Luce Foundation, which is in turn, a part of a larger initiative on Religion and International  
8 Affairs that the Luce Foundation again promoted several years ago. It funds projects in a dozen  
9 schools, primarily of International Affairs around the country – Columbia, Kennedy School,  
10 Princeton – a variety of schools where International Affairs is taught. We are included within this  
11 circle of projects, not because we have a School of International Affairs, but because we have a  
12 program in Global and International Studies that focuses on leadership training for people going  
13 in international NGO work. That was a niche that was of a particular concern to the Luce  
14 Foundation, which has training for policy and business and journalism, and other aspects of  
15 International Affairs, which are considered increasingly important to the NGO sector around the  
16 world, which is becoming a very important part of global civil society. Training for that  
17 leadership, of course, requires an awareness of what is going on in the world, the culture of the  
18 world, and religion requires an awareness in a way in which traditional training Schools of  
19 International Affairs have not been well-equipped to deal with.

20 So it's this *lacuna*, the sense that there's an absence of knowledge about religion and the  
21 importance of religion in international affairs that propelled the Luce Foundation into this  
22 project. They've also funded a series of books that the Social Science Research Council in New  
23 York City is involved with and I've been involved with one of those projects as well. So we're  
24 very proud to be a part of this circle of projects funded by Luce and aware of this relationship  
25 and delighted that we have a good working relationship with some of the other projects funded  
26 by Luce, including the one at Georgetown. Katherine Marshall, Lord bless her, despite her  
27 unbelievable and hectic schedule, has been able to be with us for most of the workshops that  
28 we've had thus far, and provide a real link between the program with the Berkley Center for  
29 Religion and Public Policy. Is that right, Katherine?

30

31 **Katherine Marshall:** “Religion, Peace, and World Affairs”.

32

33 **Mark Juergensmeyer:** Oh there you go, “Religion, Peace, and World Affairs” at Georgetown  
34 University. Katherine is formerly with the World Bank, has been the head of that project and also  
35 our staunch ally and colleague and we’re delighted to have Katherine with us again. So that’s the  
36 basic idea of the project. We have these workshops as a way of generating ideas. Now I turn to  
37 the format because it may be a little unsettling if you’re used to having formal paper  
38 presentations where everybody sits around stonely as people drone on in their fashion and then  
39 there’s a few minutes left for frenzied conversation after the paper. Well, that’s not the way we  
40 work. We discovered over the years that the frenzied conversation after the papers is really the  
41 best part, so we’ve just done away with the papers, and what we’ve asked instead is for you to  
42 have a few thoughts in mind to help kick off the conversation. We’ve also discovered over the  
43 years that one day is pretty much enough. After a day of this kind of conversation, there’s not  
44 going to be much more productivity in the second or third day. So we’ve tried to engineer these  
45 conversations, by having one day of an intensive and productive encounter. It’s based on your  
46 thoughts and your creative response to what other people have said in response to the questions  
47 that we pose. And this [picks up a report] will be the product of this workshop. We have this  
48 recorded for this purpose, the comments are transcribed and edited into a little report like this  
49 one that just came off the press last night which was of the earlier workshop. We usually have  
50 two workshops a year, one in the region that we’re focusing on which this year is South and  
51 Southeast Asia, and so we met in Delhi in September and we’re able to bring people from the  
52 region into that workshop and then, of course, this workshop here. So if you’re curious of what  
53 we do and how we do it, this is it [points to report]. Again, if you’re expecting a sort of report  
54 that laboriously goes from the first panel to the last and tries to sink everything into a very linear  
55 fashion, you’re going to be surprised and I hope not disappointed, to discover that’s not the way  
56 we work. We try to write this the way most people read reports, they kind of flip through it and  
57 look for something that leaps out that they are interested in. So that’s what we’ve tried to do,  
58 design a non-linear report that simply encapsulates little chunks of information and comments  
59 that we thought were particularly relevant. So that as you flip through the thing, if you see  
60 something that interests you, captures your eye, you’ll spend a little bit more time with it. But we  
61 don’t assume that people will sit down and read this laboriously from beginning to the end

62 because, quite frankly, I don't think that ever happens with reports.

63

64 So the end product of this will be some kind of resource product, and I'm hedging my words on  
65 that because initially we thought it was being a printed, paper, handbook for courses in  
66 International Affairs, on the role of religion in international NGOs. And there may be something  
67 like that, but we might also, and this is where Paul and the videotapes will help out, because  
68 we're preparing a series on YouTube of clips from the workshops, from the comments and from  
69 our other field studies that might also be useful as a film repository for people to use in classes or  
70 to consult with. As well, there will be a website, with the comments on cyberspace, in addition to  
71 a printed version. So there may be three different kinds of formats in which this material will be  
72 available ultimately for people in classes, as well as a whole range of other materials. Again,  
73 we're trying to work with the Berkley Center in Georgetown and other institutions who are  
74 working in the same area, and the website at Berkley, by the way, is fantastic, they have  
75 wonderful resources and the kind of work that Katherine has done with the interviews and so  
76 forth has been additional resources in this area. You should check it out.

77 So that's what we do, we're trying to raise large issues of religion and public life, and by that we  
78 mean not just political life, but what we're describing loosely as "global civil society", a kind of  
79 the "world of citizen" efforts to try to improve relations and the life standards of people around  
80 the word and the humanitarian relief agencies in human rights organizations that are poised  
81 towards meeting the same goals, and the international community of people involved with it. But  
82 whenever you get a community of people, you get different cultural assumptions, the whole  
83 baggage of religious, as well as ideological, positions. So it's to tease out those kinds of issues  
84 that emerge in those conditions of cultural confrontation that we have these discussions and try  
85 to produce some movement towards the reconciliation where contestation seems particularly  
86 difficult.

87 You're welcome in the conversation, by the way, to tell stories and to give examples, not just  
88 make didactic points and lead the conversation - let the conversation lead wherever it wants to.  
89 We have somewhat arbitrarily asked a series of questions that we're interested in. We don't  
90 expect that all of our comments will be talking about *only* those things and only those sessions.

91 So we're not going to worry if the topic strays in a somewhat different direction, and you  
92 shouldn't be worried either.

93 I've introduced the project. I'd like all of us to introduce ourselves. I'm Mark Juergensmeyer,  
94 I'm the Director for the Orfalea Center for Global and International Studies, but in my real life, I  
95 am also a scholar, deeply committed to South Asia and concerns with religion and politics which  
96 have been part of my academic career.

97 So would each of you just take a minute to introduce yourself? Tell us not only about your own  
98 research work, but with the institution that you're associated with and anything that might be  
99 useful about your background that would help us in our conversations this morning.

100 **Surichai Wun'gao:** Thank you Mark. My name is Surichai Wun'gao, I'm a sociologist  
101 teaching at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok. I'm now running a center called The Center  
102 for Peace and Conflict Studies on campus. Until last year I have been Asia Rural Sociological  
103 Association president in my region, research and rural studies. So I'm very happy to be here.

104 **Mark Juergensmeyer:** Surichai has just come from Bangkok, so we're delighted that you've  
105 come and we hope that you have overcome jetlag...we promise to be stimulating and keep you  
106 awake!

107 **Ria Shibata:** My name is Ria Shibata and I'm currently enrolled in the graduate program of  
108 Global Studies at Sophia University in Tokyo, Japan. My thesis is on the role of religion in  
109 global civil society, a topic that was actually inspired by Professor Juergensmeyer's book  
110 *Religion in Global Civil Society*, which was used as a textbook in our classes. So I will be  
111 focusing my research on two prominent international Buddhist NGOs, Soka Gakkai and Rissho  
112 Kosei-kai and so that's what I will be talking about.

113 **William Headley:** Good morning, everybody! My name is Bill Headley. Presently I'm the Dean  
114 of the Joan B. Kroc School of Peace Studies at the University of San Diego. We have two  
115 institutes, a transporter institute and an Institute of Peace and Justice, and a growing master's  
116 degree program in Peace Studies. Prior to coming to the University of San Diego, about three  
117 and a half years ago, I found myself with Catholic Relief Services - a very large relief and  
118 development agency in the Catholic Church. I was councilor to the president, and if you know

119 the Catholic system at all you'll know Brian Hare, a very famous "political theologian" out of  
120 Boston. I said to them at that time, that in getting me to replace Brian they got twice the hair and  
121 half the brains. I am a member of the Spiritan community, sometimes called the Holy Ghost  
122 Fathers, and I'm delighted to be here.

123 **James Donahue:** My name is Jim Donahue. I'm the president of the Graduate Theological  
124 Union in Berkeley, Professor of Social Ethics, and I am a friend of Mark Juergensmeyer. I first  
125 got to know Mark in his Berkeley days, when he was both in UC Berkeley as well as the  
126 Graduate Theological Union. The GTU, as we refer to the Graduate Theological Union, is a  
127 graduate university and a consortium of ten theological institutions that focuses on inter-religious  
128 research, conversation, and programs; the topic of global civil society and the role of religion is  
129 central to what we do. My own area of research and interest is in religion and politics. It has a  
130 decidedly American focus, but I've spent a fair amount of time in my role as president of GTU in  
131 Asia, not so much of South/ Southeast Asia, but in Asia. I'm just delighted to be here.  
132 The GTU is a place we have 1300 students in graduate programs, PhD, and Master's programs  
133 that will be going off into the world as academics, ministers, or whatever - that is, a *global* world  
134 and to understand the role of religion in the context of their work, whatever that might be, is  
135 absolutely critical. So I come to this meeting -and I'm just delighted to be part of this project -  
136 with an interest in thinking about, "What does it mean to educate the next generations of leaders  
137 that will be going into global civil society with a particular focus on religion?" I'm delighted to  
138 be here. I look forward to our time together.

139 **Mary Zurbuchen:** Good morning, my name is Mary Zurbuchen and I am the Director for Asia  
140 and Russia programs at the Ford Foundation International Fellowships Program. The  
141 headquarters is in New York, although I'm currently based here in Santa Barbara. I've been  
142 working for almost one decade with this IFP program, which is dedicated to expanding access  
143 and equity in post-graduate education for people from developing countries. We have supported  
144 over 4,000 people at the MA and PhD level who are selected on the basis of their social  
145 commitment as well as their academic talent.

146 I've spent almost 20 years working with Ford Foundation programs in South and Southeast Asia,  
147 primarily in Indonesia, but also in India. I'm delighted to be here and to participate in this  
148 particular dialogue. My research interests have been Humanities and Southeast Asian Studies

149 and I have spent time teaching Southeast Asian Studies and Indonesian Language and Literature  
150 in UCLA and Berkeley in the past. Recently, I headed a project to study historical memory and  
151 legacies of conflict in Indonesia. Thank you.

152 **Barbara Metcalf:** I'm Barbara Metcalf, and in keeping with remembering our links with Mark,  
153 mine goes back to fellow graduate student days at Berkeley when we taught our first course  
154 together. My career has been within university teaching, not in any of these more active kinds of  
155 organizations, and I have focused on the history, primarily, of Muslim renewal movements, on  
156 the organization of the educational system in the colonial period, and on a range of individual  
157 thinkers and movements. I particularly have worked on reformists who are known as Deobandis  
158 who have brought me everything from the Taliban to Tablighi Jamaat, which if you hadn't heard  
159 of before is in Lamia's little paragraph which she circulated to us.

160

161 One of the ways I've tortured my students, over the years, is to persuade them never to use the  
162 word "religion" but to always say something more precise – are they talking about  
163 communitarian interests, are they talking about ritual practice and so forth - and always to kind  
164 of "X" out the word Islam and try to press them on whether or not what they're talking about is  
165 the Islamic invasion of Iberia or something about Bedouins or something about North Africa. So  
166 that's my annoying perspective on the larger question.

167 **Katherine Marshall:** I'm Katherine Marshall and I'm now at the Berkley Center, which Mark  
168 introduced earlier. It's four and a half years old coming up to five at Georgetown University,  
169 which of course is a Jesuit University. The idea of the Berkley Center, and by the way, it's  
170 Berkley without one "e," so it's Berkley as in the person. People are always confused as to where  
171 this place is, but it is in Washington [DC]. Bill Berkley gave a grant for the initial start-up and it  
172 deals with religion, peace, and world affairs. I do the global development side that I'm going to  
173 talk to you in about a second. I also head an NGO, which is called the World Faiths  
174 Development Dialogue, which is a piece of my history and how I got here. I am a practitioner, a  
175 newbie in the world of the academy, and I start very much from international development,  
176 social justice, and problems of poverty in the world. So, I tumbled from graduate school, which  
177 was multi-disciplinary, where actually Richard Falk, who's not here yet, was one of my  
178 professors in the Woodrow Wilson School in Princeton.

179

180 After some consulting at the World Bank, where I spent more than half of my life, 35 years of  
181 working mostly on Africa, but I also, in the context here, lived through the East Asia Crisis. I  
182 was responsible for social policy in the governments during that period. But at that point, Jim  
183 Wolfensohn, who was the president of the World Bank at that time, got together - we're not quite  
184 sure how these two boys got together - with George Carey when he was Archbishop of  
185 Canterbury and decided that in the whole development field, religion was completely invisible or  
186 if it was not invisible, it was subject to tremendous tension. It was part of the globalization  
187 movements and people throwing tomatoes...bitter, bitter conflicts whether it was over debt or  
188 structural adjustment or whatever, but their idea was that this made no sense to have these worlds  
189 apart because the objectives were basically the same, which was to address the issues of poverty.  
190 So they got together an inter-faith group, first of all at Lambeth Palace in England and then the  
191 US, and decided to set-up an NGO: the World Faiths Development Dialogue.

192 What's interesting and relevant about this, well partly it's the irony that it was the World Bank  
193 and the whole sort of global development that was first in this, which was completely the facet of  
194 individual leadership. The other thing was that all hell broke loose and Wolfensohn was always  
195 proud of saying that it was 184 countries engaged, reaching out to this world of religion, which is  
196 an exaggeration and there's a whole story around that. But the point was that trying to bring  
197 religion into the discussions on global poverty was, and remains, very difficult with a whole set  
198 of tensions around it. But, it persisted. And this very small NGO was way under the radar screen,  
199 and was moved from the UK to the US a few years ago. The World Bank, meanwhile,  
200 marginalizes this work as far as it can. I eventually moved to Georgetown after [inaudible] there.

201 We also are the proud beneficiaries of Luce grants, I think both of us go back to the beginning of  
202 the Luce program. What we're doing on development is what we call "mapping," which is really  
203 trying to figure out who's doing what and where around development. We've done that  
204 geographically, and what's relevant for us here is that for the past year and a half we focused on  
205 Southeast Asia first and South Asia. I've just returned from a consultation on South and Central  
206 Asia in Dhaka, earlier this week. So we've been doing a very similar parallel effort to try to  
207 understand, though we look at it through development, what issues are that emerge. So we can  
208 discuss those later.

209 We also are doing “issues mapping.” Most recently we did tuberculosis and malaria, looked at  
210 corruption, and looked at gender issues. There’s a lot of interesting gender issues and obviously  
211 religion is associated with it, though not necessarily, shall we say, positive dimensions of  
212 religion. With the WFDD, we’re doing a host of other things, just to mention two: first the USIP,  
213 the US Institute of Peace, which asked us to look at women, religion, and peace and conflict.  
214 Second, the Gates Foundation has asked us to look at religion and agriculture. It’s always sort of,  
215 “Okay we’re working on agriculture, we’re working on this, what’s religion got to do with it?  
216 What does it have to offer?” We are also doing a lot of work on Cambodia, and the view on  
217 Cambodia was that you can’t get serious about these topics until you look at a country and  
218 actually look at how does this work, how does it play through...that again, is another story.

219 **Thomas Uthup:** My name is Thomas Uthup and I’m with the UN Alliance of Civilizations. I  
220 assume Mark is going to talk about our programs later during lunch time? That’s what the  
221 program says...for now, I will just stick to why I am interested in this subject. I think part of it  
222 has to do with personal reasons. I come from an extremely multi-civilizational background. My  
223 ancestors are supposedly this Jewish community that converted to Christianity in the first century  
224 in Yemen and then migrated to India in 352 AD. So I grew up in a largely Hindu country, raised  
225 Catholic, came to the United States, studied Islam as part of my dissertation, which was on  
226 religious values and public policy with a focus on Islam and development, and I’m married to a  
227 woman of Slovak-German descent, who’s a third generation Midwesterner. I went to Baylor  
228 University, a Baptist university, for a Journalism degree, and before that I was at a Jesuit  
229 undergraduate institution and then got my PhD at a state institution. In terms of interests, my  
230 interests are really in how religion affects politics, but in a very broad sense, but specifically how  
231 do religious values affect policy actions, whether it is in the formulation of goals, whether it’s in  
232 the instruments that I use to accomplish those goals, or how the population evaluates public  
233 policy goals and means. Obviously religion plays a very interesting role in affecting those  
234 perceptions.

235

236 Just a brief introduction on what the Alliance is doing, and hopefully we’ll talk a little bit more  
237 about that at lunch, but religion obviously plays a great deal in what we are trying to do, because  
238 what we are essentially going to do is bridge the divides between cultures, with a special focus  
239 on the so-called “Islam-West divide” and counter-polarization and extremism. So we’re the UN



240 platform for many activities having to do with religion. I'd like to think we're probably the only  
241 UN Organization that actually explicitly views religion as an issue and there are many UN  
242 organizations working with faith-based groups...we can talk about that.

243 **Muhamad Ali:** Hi, good morning everyone. My name is Muhamad Ali. I am an Assistant  
244 Professor in the Religious Studies Department at UC Riverside and also Southeast Asian Studies  
245 and we are also working on a minor in Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies. Also I'm still in  
246 contact with Global Studies and Islam, and they bring different things and I try to affiliate with  
247 different programs that I'm interested in. I've been working on Southeast Asia, specifically  
248 Islam, although I teach religions in Asia and Southeast Asia; the interactions between religion in  
249 Southeast Asia. I've been working on, for example, Muslim and Christian conflicts in the  
250 Maluku. I published a book about multi-culturalism and pluralism and now I'm working on the  
251 history of pluralism in Indonesia. I'm very delighted to be here and a participant of this  
252 wonderful conference. I'm so glad and I know I will learn much from everyone. Thank you.

253 **Caroline Meyer White:** Hi, I'm Caroline Meyer White and I'm based in Denmark. I work  
254 currently with Engineers without Borders as a Project Manager of relief work in Pakistan. I've  
255 been in Pakistan a couple of times, working for three different organizations, Engineers without  
256 Borders, a local NGO the Development Foundation, and a Pakistani-Californian NGO  
257 PAKSBAB, which builds straw-made houses in Pakistan. All the work has been very small  
258 projects, but I've been in the field working with our beneficiaries and our local staff. At home in  
259 Denmark I am still finishing my Engineering degree, and I have a small business together with a  
260 couple of friends where we build contracted straw-made houses. Yes, I'm very delighted to be  
261 here, I feel that I'm already learning a lot, learning to understand what it is that I'm doing.

262 **Elizabeth Collins:** My name is Elizabeth Collins, I teach at Ohio University in Classics and  
263 World Religions and also in the Southeast Asian Studies Program. I do most of my scholarly  
264 work with Malaysia and Indonesia. I consider my field of interest to be religion, politics, and  
265 development so I'm really excited about the kinds of conversations that will emerge today. I  
266 work with an NGO in Indonesia that I helped to found, called Yayasan Nurani Dunia, that started  
267 working with refugees from the conflicts between Muslims and Christians in the Eastern part of  
268 the country. We moved on to working with the victims of the Marriot bombing, projects with the  
269 American Embassy, and then to the tsunami and earthquake relief in Yogya[karta] and Padang

270 and elsewhere. We have also been drawn into development work by trying to build schools in  
271 refugee camps so that the children don't drop out and so that the conflict doesn't get carried  
272 down to the next generation. So we've built I think 20 schools, working on participatory  
273 development, on small projects and, again, with local communities. We've actually worked with  
274 Catholic Relief Services on compiling a directory of groups working on conflict resolution in  
275 Indonesia. So, I'd like to say something for "engaged scholarship", which turns out to be really  
276 fun.

277 **Philip Oldenburg:** I'm Phil Oldenburg and I'm going to start by just updating this particular  
278 note. I was Director and Associate Director of the Southern Asian Institute. Since leaving the  
279 South Asia Institute at Columbia University, where I still teach occasionally, teaching courses on  
280 South Asian politics, I've just recently published a book called *India, Pakistan, and Democracy*  
281 which I have a chapter on whether the difference in religion explains why India's a democracy  
282 and Pakistan is not. My research interests have tended to be on grassroots governments working  
283 in the old city of Delhi, a mixed religious area in the countryside of the state of U.P., on what I  
284 would call "participatory development," programming land consolidation in U.P. So I've been  
285 concerned about the nitty-gritty of politics and governments at the grass roots level, but I have  
286 never been particularly involved in doing anything about it.

287 **Mark Woodward:** Good morning, everyone, my name is Mark Woodward. I am alternatively  
288 from Arizona State, Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta in Indonesia, and Sunan Kalijaga  
289 State Islamic University also in Yogyakarta, where I've been for three years. I'm primarily  
290 interested in the politics of Islam, both in Indonesia and now globally. At the moment I'm  
291 specifically looking at what could be called counter-extremist discourse and praxis, and I want to  
292 emphasize "practice" there as much as discourse.

293 My experience with NGOs comes primarily from the bottom-up because I know a lot of people  
294 who work with various international NGOs in Indonesia and elsewhere in Islamic Southeast  
295 Asia, and it looks a little bit different when you're looking at the project from a standpoint of the  
296 local people who are putting it into practice than when you are looking at it from New York or  
297 Washington. I could tell you lots of stories about what people don't like about the World Bank at  
298 the local level, for example, some of which may reflect lack of understanding, and some of

299 which has to do with the difference between looking at the economy from micro and macro  
300 levels.

301 **Lamia Karim:** Hi, I'm Lamia Karim. I am an Associate Professor of Anthropology at the  
302 University of Oregon, in Eugene, and also the Associate Director of the Center for the Study of  
303 Women in Society, and I'm delighted to be invited back. I was here last spring, when the  
304 Mohanty's were here for the workshop on microfinance.

305 My work is on globalization, social movements, and gender. The work I did, *Microfinance and*  
306 *its Discontents: Women in Debt in Bangladesh*, is coming out in March through the University of  
307 Minnesota Press, and interestingly it was posted on the Huffington Post as one of the most  
308 anticipated books of 2011. That book and my research really de-mystifies many of the myths  
309 behind the micro-credit miracle in Bangladesh and it's 98% rate of recovery. I hope some of you  
310 will have a chance to read it. I have moved on from there to a new project, and one is to look at,  
311 "How does religion translate at the level of everyday life?" I'm an ethnographer, so that's what I  
312 try to understand - the texture of religion in everyday life The way people practice religion in  
313 various cultural contexts is very different from the scriptures. So that's the work I did with a  
314 group of women belonging to the Tablighi Jamaat, and I hope that I will be able to have a chance  
315 to speak about it today. The other new project I am embarking on is called the "New Silk Road."  
316 It's of the cultural politics of the Asian highway, the part that's coming into Bangladesh from  
317 Kunming, China, through Northeast India and Burma. This project, which I will start next year,  
318 brings many of my interests together – globalization and social movements. As you know, India  
319 has separatists movements in all of the seven sister states. The Wahhabi, what we call the  
320 Wahhabi belt in Bangladesh which is on the coastal area on the Bay of Bengal, that as well as the  
321 two Asian giants, India and China, are both struggling for hegemony and dominance in that area  
322 and access to land routes, and seagoing lines. So that's my project.

323 **Victor Faessel:** Hi, everyone, my name is Victor Faessel. I'm the Program Director of the  
324 Orfalea Center for Global and International Studies. I work mainly in the coordinative capacity  
325 with the various projects and faculty running through the Orfalea Center. I've been involved with  
326 this project from the beginning working together with Dinah, who deserves the credit for putting  
327 this workshop together. It's my pleasure to see old friends and new faces today.

328 **Juan Campo:** I'm Juan Campo, and am chairing the first panel this morning. I'm a member of  
329 the UCSB Religious Studies Department and my area is Islamic Studies primarily. I just  
330 published an *Encyclopedia of Islam*, a five-year project that they wanted done in two years, but  
331 it's one volume and meant for the general public. My other research has been in the area of  
332 global pilgrimages and comparative perspectives. I'm just finishing a book dealing with that  
333 focusing on the *Hajj* and a pilgrimage in South India - which was just in the headlines because a  
334 hundred people died in a stampede in Sabarimala - and then the Guadalupe pilgrimage, which are  
335 my three focal points. I'm also the UCSB Campus Director for the Education Abroad Program.  
336 I'm proud to say that we sent abroad this year 1000 undergraduate students to about 30 different  
337 countries. We lead all the other UC campuses and we are very proud of this. We also have  
338 received about 500 students through reciprocity agreements every year. So that's another sort of  
339 activity, NGO participants and candidates in the making, I think. I welcome input from you. if  
340 you know of opportunities for internships in countries abroad, I'd love to hear about them,  
341 because more and more students are wanting to engage in internship type of activities when they  
342 go study abroad. Lastly, in terms of my own involvement with NGOs, I am a participant  
343 observer with respect to the Fethullah Gulen Movement and their NGO activities, in Turkey, in  
344 Central Asia, and Africa, especially for the building of schools. They also have quite a presence,  
345 I understand, in Southeast Asia.

346 **Mark Juergensmeyer:** And you were Director of the EAP Program in Hyderabad...

347

348 **Juan Campo:** Right, in Hyderabad and Delhi.

349 **Mark Juergensmeyer:** We see what a great group we have and how we've tried to balance  
350 various things, not just regions of the world, but people with general expertise on religion, people  
351 with very specific regional knowledge, practitioners, scholars, and some of us,  
352 practitioner/scholars. A word of confession, as a young guy I spent a year with the Gandhian  
353 Sarvodaya movement doing famine relief in the state of Bihar before I started at graduate school.  
354 So even though some of us are mired in our academic work, we've also had some experience in  
355 the real world in the areas that others of you have now dedicated your lives.

356

357 In addition to the people around the table, we've got a great bunch of graduate students, scholars,

358 and research scholars with the Orfalea Center. I'm not going to introduce everybody, but I hope  
359 you'll have a chance to mingle during lunch. I want to add my word of thanks to Dinah for her  
360 wonderful work in organizing all of this as well as to Jack Ucciferri, and Paul Lynch, two former  
361 MA students in our MA program in Global and International studies who are doing great stuff in  
362 the real world.

363 **First Session: *What transformative role have religious institutions played in civil society?***

364 **Juan Campo:** Welcome back, this is the first session for today's workshop and the question that  
365 we're organized around is that of the transformative role that religious institutions have played in  
366 civil society. What we'll do is have our presenters give a short presentation of about five minutes  
367 and then we'll enter into a more general discussion. Our first panelist and discussant is Muhamad  
368 Ali.

369 **Muhamad Ali:** Thank you. What I'm going to talk about is just five points about why Islam, in  
370 particular, has been so public, including in civil society and also the state. There must be  
371 something in the core of Islam that makes it public in many, many different ways. And, I give  
372 five points here.

373

374 First, Islam and religion in general, I would assume, provides practical beliefs – so belief *and*  
375 practice, *iman* and *amal*, for example, not only belief. People want to believe something, but they  
376 want to *act* according to the beliefs. I think that is quite crucial in understanding why, for  
377 example, many Muslims want to act, not simply believe in something. For example, the notion of  
378 *khairat*, the Arabic word for, “goodness.” *Fastabiqul khairat*, the notion that they have to  
379 compete in goodness. I think that's quite prevalent in many Muslim organizations, for example,  
380 in Indonesia and Malaysia.

381

382 Second point that I would like to make is that Islam as a religion, has to be understood in its own  
383 terms, and how religion is so embedded in many public lives. Islam, in particular, emphasizes  
384 collective commitment and organization. So the notion of *jama'ah* and *jama'ah ihya*, a notion of  
385 collectivity - it's not about individuality, it's about collective commitment. You want to act as a  
386 collective group. And *jama'ah ihya* itself, which means organization, - so why, for example,  
387 Islam paves a way of making organizations, networking, NGOs and so on? I think part of this is

388 because Islam itself offers the possibility of making a collective commitment and organization.  
389 Notions that are stressed in this particular point, for example, the notion of *taghyeer*, which  
390 means to change. For example, God would not change a community of people before they  
391 change themselves. This is used by different organizations, different NGOs, especially Muslims.  
392 So you have the notion of *taghyeer*, and then you have the notion of reform, *islaah*, *ijtihad*,  
393 *jihad*, all are within the core concept of change. That is the second point that I'm going to make.

394

395 The third point, I think, would be helpful in understanding how and why Islam has been so  
396 embedded in public life. It serves as both a unifying and dividing force at the same time; religion  
397 is divisive as well as unifying. You cannot see religion as simply a unifying factor - it can be also  
398 very divisive, not only against other religions, but also within religions. The potentiality of  
399 religion being a unifying and dividing force, homogenizing and diversifying force or liberating  
400 force, I think, is quite crucial. That's why you have the notion of emancipation or liberation, for  
401 example, for Muslims to adopt and adapt it - like liberation theology. I think it's quite interesting  
402 why they are interested in adopting and adapting liberation, because they see in Islam also the  
403 notion of liberation and emancipation. You have women's emancipation, you have liberation of  
404 the *mustad'afin*, for example, the oppressed, the marginalized and so on. So that's the third point  
405 I would like to make.

406 The fourth point I would like to make is that Islam itself provides internal mechanisms of  
407 addressing so-called worldly or seculars issues and problems. In other words, Islam doesn't  
408 differentiate religion and world, religion and secularism, for example. For example, the notion of  
409 *dunya*, this world, and *akhirah*, the here-after. This kind of conflation of world and religion is  
410 quite key in understanding Islam being a religion of, according to most of them, the problem-  
411 solver. That's the fourth point - that's why they have, for example, the notion of *shurah*, *bahtsul*  
412 *masail*, *bahtsul* means discuss the problems within each NGO and community. The notion of  
413 *ummah*, for example, is not the global Islamic community, that is one interpretation of *ummah*.  
414 *Ummah* has been also defined as organization. So for example, when they read the Qur'an, the  
415 *ummah* forbid evil and enjoying the good. *Ummah* itself means to them that its their organization  
416 - my Muhammadiyah, my NU (Nahdlatul Ulama), my PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera), have to  
417 participate in this *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar*, the enjoining of good and forbidding of evil. There  
418 *ummah* is not global, it's really localized and it becomes organizational. You have for example,

419 the notion of philanthropy, Islamic philanthropy, as a result of that; a humanitarianism of Islam  
420 because of that, which has so many networks, including *zakaat* and welfare and so on. That's the  
421 fourth point.

422 The last point I would like to make is that Islam itself provides multi-interpretations. This multi-  
423 interpretability, the ability and flexibility within religion, and its exposure to social, political, and  
424 cultural, circumstances, allow checks and balances. For example, if you have a so-called  
425 fundamentalist movement, then you will also have a non or anti-fundamentalist movement, a  
426 counter-movement of fundamentalism. You always have this movement and counter-movement.  
427 Islam, itself, allows these multi-interpretations, to have a movement and then to counter the same  
428 movement, both in the name of Islam. So everyone talks about Islam and how to pursue Islam,  
429 because Islam itself allows that kind of difference and conflicts. I think I should end with that. So  
430 five points, thank you.

431 **Ria Shibata:** Hello, like I said earlier, my thesis is on how religion interacts in global civil  
432 society and my focus is on two Japanese Buddhist NGOs, Soka Gakkai and Rissho Kosei-kai. In  
433 the book, *Religion and Global Civil Society*, there's a contributor by the name of An-Na'im, and  
434 he mentions that the key issue, when we think about what kind of role religion can play in global  
435 civil society, is whether it will enter as a kind of tactical cooperation or reluctant partnership, or  
436 whether religion will resist global civil society and persist standing outside it.

437  
438 I became interested in these two Japanese Buddhist NGOs, the Soka Gakkai and Rissho Kosei-  
439 kai, because they seem to have been quiet successful in playing an extremely active role as  
440 alliance partners to the decision-makers in global civil society. What I really wanted to know was  
441 how they actually enter the public sphere, what is the decision-making process that actually goes  
442 on internally, and what are the hurdles and obstacles that they have confronted when  
443 participating as an active alliance partner to these non-religious NGOs, governments, and various  
444 UN agencies. In terms of the scope of their civil society activities and in terms of the size of their  
445 membership, Soka Gakkai International and Rissho Kosei-kai are both considered extremely  
446 prominent players amongst Japanese Buddhist groups. What is interesting is that both Soka  
447 Gakkai and Rissho Kosei-kai base their activities on Mahayana Buddhism with a particular focus  
448 on *The Lotus Sutra*. However, the strategies and the processes that they have chosen in order to

449 pursue their goals are quite different.

450

451 Soka Gakkai, for example, has focused on public education, on grassroots level education,  
452 probably because of the vast human global network of believers that they have, the very strong  
453 local organizations that they have built in each nation. Whereas Rissho Kosei-kai, from a very  
454 early stage, has really stressed the importance on inter-religious cooperation and I think they  
455 were involved in the founding of WCRP, today known as Religions For Peace. I think it's one of  
456 the founding members. They stress a lot of importance on inter-religious coalitions and lobbying  
457 methods. Like I mentioned earlier, Soka Gakkai's strength lies in it's vast network of believers  
458 and the strong local organizations that they have on the ground and I think their engagement in  
459 civil society activities can be seen at three different levels.

460

461 One is through millions of individual SGI members trying to interact with their families, in their  
462 own workplaces, and societies, and very much motivated by Buddhist ideals in order to express,  
463 for example, compassion in society. So, here we see religion playing a role in really inspiring  
464 and empowering individuals to actually go out there and take action. The second level is through  
465 local organizations. The Soka Gakkai and Rissho Kosei-kai are very active in promoting various  
466 humanitarian activities on the ground, whether it be disaster relief, for example, with Rissho  
467 Kosei-kai providing blankets to African nations and so on. At the second level, the individual  
468 countries undertake these two humanitarian projects on the ground. The third level is the  
469 international level. For example, the Soka Gakkai has dedicated offices in New York, Geneva,  
470 and Vienna, and these are like liaison offices and they have these elite NGO experts representing  
471 the organization to actually lobby with the UN agencies. They will determine what kind of  
472 activities the SGI will undertake internationally, for example, to contribute to a political  
473 discourse on nuclear disarmament.

474 What I have realized, based on this research is that the process is not that simple. For example,  
475 the reason why the SGI was able to grow this extensively worldwide was because they enabled  
476 each local organization to have the autonomy to make decisions as to what kind of topics, or  
477 causes, that they would like to take up. In other words, even if the international body of SGI may  
478 make some kind of declaration as to its support of efforts to abolish nuclear weapons, the SGI  
479 organization headquarters in Tokyo cannot really force that upon each local organization. The



480 process with which these local organizations come to adopt and participate in this type of  
481 campaign was very interesting. Twice a year about 300 local representatives, leaders of different  
482 countries, gather in Tokyo. In this meeting, the Office of Public Information from SGI would  
483 introduce various activities that these local organizations are free to support and they are willing  
484 to provide resources, educational tools. The Tokyo headquarters would create, for example, a  
485 very impressive exhibit which can tour different countries, and the local organizations, who will  
486 raise their hand, will then look for alliance partners in their own country who would be willing to  
487 support this campaign together. This is how the message gets disseminated across the globe, and  
488 what has really helped was enabling local organizations to give their experiences in front of these  
489 leaders representing this worldwide network. For example, in Japan - because you know Japan is  
490 usually the organization that initiates a lot of these petition campaigns for abolition of nuclear  
491 weapons, of course because of Hiroshima and Nagasaki - they would give examples of how local  
492 groups were able to utilize various resources like DVDs. Communication is a very strong  
493 element in SGI's activities, so they would use a medium, like DVDs, with testimonials, let's say  
494 from victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, that they were able to compile. They would also create  
495 a website in order to provide all these educational tools and resources online and give examples  
496 of how they were able to work with NGO partners in that local region in order to utilize these  
497 resources, and to create some kind of a public information campaign. That would inspire other  
498 countries to follow suit or think of other creative ways in order to really express their Buddhist  
499 ideals, together with secular NGO partners. I didn't have time to go over Rissho Kosei-kai but  
500 this is the kind of research I'm undertaking right now.

501 **Katherine Marshall:** What I thought would be most useful is to try to come up with some of the  
502 conclusions and findings from the parallel meetings that we've been running, first in Southeast  
503 Asia, and most recently in South and Central Asia. I have ten conclusions, but we'll get through  
504 as many as I can.

505

506 I want to start with a brief comment. I'm sort of staring at this question, and it raises a host of  
507 questions about definition. I agree with Barbara very much that talking about "religion," and  
508 particularly trying to divide the world into people of faith and people not of faith, is ridiculous  
509 and gets you nowhere. However, it is very much part of the discourse at this point. Part way  
510 through our journey around the world, we actually transformed our vocabulary from "faith-

511 based” organizations to “faith-inspired” organizations, and that was part of a specific focus on  
512 the Muslim world where a lot of groups are very hesitant to identify themselves as religious or  
513 Islamic, partly because of the Islamists. So, the Aga Khan Development Network, for example,  
514 will not accept faith-based, but *will* accept faith-inspired, and the same is true of a lot of others.  
515 We have this huge “galaxy” of organizations, and part of what we’re dealing with is large  
516 knowledge gaps. Now listening to everyone here, there’s a huge amount of knowledge, so it’s  
517 not that people don’t know, but there’s a tremendous issue of translating that knowledge into  
518 terms that those who are operating at many different levels can use.

519

520 I also just want to mention an important source particularly for South Asia: the British  
521 Development Agency, DFID, which financed a five-year research program that was carried out  
522 by the University of Birmingham that has just wound up - they actually just had a conference in  
523 July. They focused on four countries, Tanzania, Nigeria, Pakistan and India. There’s a slew of  
524 stuff coming out on the University of Birmingham’s Religion and Development website. They  
525 focus particularly on the political dimensions and I can talk at lunch a little bit more about our  
526 approach, but basically we have one meeting that focused on Southeast Asia and then this week  
527 on South and Central.

528

529 Four things I think that are worth mentioning, coming out of the Southeast Asia. First the issue  
530 of coordination is a huge one. In other words, there are organizations all over the place that are  
531 largely off the radar screens, with the exception of the Catholic Relief Services and Islamic  
532 Relief and so on. But a huge amount of activity is therefore not part, if we’re talking about  
533 transformation, of the aid coordination, the working groups etc. Just trying to figure out who’s  
534 doing what is, of course, an extraordinary issue. The groups all feel that nobody cares about what  
535 they say and some of them like to be independent - lots of issues around coordination.

536

537 Secondly, an issue that came out of meetings in both South and South East Asia, is proselytizing.  
538 In other words, what are the boundaries, what are the codes of ethics, and tremendous divisions  
539 among communities? The Catholics identify themselves quite separately, particularly some of  
540 the US and Korean evangelical groups there and that are coming in. A lot of huge issues around  
541 proselytizing - in some cases people say religion, and you think, “proselytizing.” That’s the

542 primary identification.

543

544 Third, is a very specific issue which I actually did a presentation on in Malaysia last summer. I

545 was intrigued that this was what grabbed people's attention, debates around orphanages.

546 Tremendous debate, particularly in Cambodia, going on about orphanages - are orphanages a

547 good thing? Are they subject to abuse? Something I never even have heard of, "orphan tourism"

548 is a big issue. Again it's within religious groups where people are saying, "No, community care

549 is the way to go." It's a very tangible issue, where people can look at the religious obligations

550 and religious traditions. The other fact is that, we, of course, don't know who's really taking care

551 of orphans in the world. The guess is that 90% is through religious groups of some kind. In other

552 words, very few others are really doing very much about orphans besides the religious groups.

553 So that was an issue.

554

555 The fourth, and this is very much an Obama administration focus and also of others, is inter-

556 faith. In other words, people are looking all over for practical examples of inter-faith

557 cooperation. Just to mention one that we're quite interested in, out of Southeast Asia - a lot of the

558 people talked about how fantastic the inter-faith cooperation was in the reconstruction of Aceh.

559 That Islamic Relief and Catholic Relief Services, the Salvation Army, NU, everybody was

560 working together, and Aceh clearly is much better off today than it was after the tsunami and

561 during the period of conflict. But there's an alternative narrative, and the alternative narrative is

562 that these groups came in, siphoned off all of the moderates, paid them large salaries and that

563 that accounts in part for the growing extremism in Aceh. So again, it's unintended consequences

564 are very interesting. I would love to find a way to pursue this as a case study, because on the one

565 hand it's a case study for inter-faith cooperation and action and results, but it's also a rather

566 complex story of how these things actually play out, when you look at them on the ground.

567

568 So those are the four things coming out of Southeast Asia. In South Asia and Central Asia, given

569 the enormity of this part of the world, these huge movements, groups, different religions etc., we

570 focused on three issues: education, gender, and peace and conflict. There were three other issues,

571 just to mention them, that are obvious and very important in the area that we did keep coming

572 back to. One of them is what are religious groups doing about action on climate change? In other

573 words, where is this situated and where is this going? I'd love to know the science of this, but the  
574 narrative the people tell in Bangladesh is that climate change is here, sea levels have risen, and  
575 people are moving from the coast into Dhaka. Climate change is a current reality - certainly  
576 that's the way people are living and experiencing it.

577

578 The second is governance and corruption issues all over the place. I'm part of the International  
579 Anti-Corruption Conference, and one of the dramatic things about the integrity alliances,  
580 whether it's TI, the civil society movement, is that religion is not part of it except very  
581 marginally and very indirectly. So the question of what the religious groupings are doing, how  
582 they're dealing with both the complexity of corruption, but also the ethical imperatives - and the  
583 ethical complexities in corruption - these are big issues. So that's second. I've lost the third  
584 issue, one of the points we didn't discuss. The ones we did discuss, education: huge role, huge  
585 challenges, and South and Central Asia and religious groups being a major part of it was a major  
586 focus. The thing people talk about most is "value education" as they call it; it is values based. It's  
587 the sense that the public education systems are failing and that they're failing in part because  
588 they've lost any ethical grounding. So the question arises, "What do you do about that?" There's  
589 also an awareness of the massive crisis of education in that part of the world. As we talked about  
590 last night, there is lots of interesting work being done on curriculum, but simply, when you  
591 compare South Asia and China or South Asia and Korea and some of the other places, it's hard  
592 to look to 20 years from now without deep concern about the poor quality of education for the  
593 masses. So, there is a lot of interest in education.

594

595 Gender is very much a part of the issues. One of the most interesting things going into these  
596 groups, where people start from a religious perspective, is that there's almost a confidence in  
597 gender that obviously religious groups are on the leading edge on gender issues. If you go into  
598 secular civil society discussions, there is first a major division, particularly among feminists and  
599 non-religionists, but the sense is that religion *is* the problem. So you have first of all a very  
600 different narrative and not much awareness, it seems, in these groups regarding the tensions. My  
601 sense is that the single issue that's most significant in the hesitations of UN agencies, bi-lateral  
602 agencies, multi-lateral banks, to deal with religion on anything, on any issue, is the perception  
603 first of all that it's all boys, the religious hierarchies, the sort of last bastion of patriarchy, but it's

604 also the insensitivity and unwillingness to deal with violence against women etc. But you had  
605 some interesting alternative narratives. One is the women in Bangladesh taking on a theological  
606 re-interpretation of Islam, seeing it as a source of empowerment. So, a lot of interesting issues I  
607 think around gender, a lot to discuss.

608 I will mention a final issue that interested me before I finish. First, there's peace building,  
609 development and conflict resolution. In Georgetown, at least, they're totally separate programs.  
610 But if you actually start to discuss it, it's very hard to see what the boundaries are because if  
611 you're talking about peace building, which I guess Bill will be talking about, it is about  
612 communities, it is about offering people hope and a future. It's exactly the same as development.  
613 So, there's a real need, I think, to try to bring these fields and perspectives together. But in any  
614 event, we did have a good number of people who are actively involved, like Swami Agnivesh,  
615 who's actually mediating with the Maoists and mediating in Kashmir, he's involved in  
616 communal disputes in India, and a number of people from Nepal. But I was struck in South and  
617 Central Asia, by the lack of a coherent discourse about conflict resolution. I mean you get a lot  
618 of, "Conflict is about inner peace." Okay, we all agree with that, and we all agree that it starts in  
619 the family, but how does that translate into the kinds of tensions that are going on, the pull of  
620 fundamentalism - how do you deal with it? So, the discussion of that topic was all over the place  
621 and very hard to draw any coherent thread. So that's a very, sort of immediate, take on some of  
622 those issues coming out of a two-day discussion that we had earlier this week.

623 **Mark Woodward:** Thank you, I'd like to second everything that my colleague, Muhammad Ali,  
624 not the boxer, said about Indonesia. I want to point to briefly some things both about Indonesia  
625 and Malaysia, which are in one sense, very similar societies that are culturally and historically  
626 closely related. However, in terms of the way in which their modern states are organized, they  
627 are exceptionally different.

628 First about Indonesia, I think it's important to keep in mind that really to the extent that we can  
629 talk about civil society in Indonesia, it is religious civil society. The major groups...and civil  
630 society is not necessarily only people who are motivated by liberal types of ideas, there are also  
631 civil society groups, for example, the Integrated Islamic Schools Movement, which is Muslim  
632 Brotherhood based. So you know, we need to keep in mind that civil society does not always  
633 translate into pluralistic liberal values and there's too often an assumption that it does. Of course

634 it's that side of civil society in Indonesia that I really know best because that's who my friends  
635 are.

636

637 You do see a very wide number of groups - I really like the word faith-inspired, rather than faith-  
638 based, I think that's a really good shift in terminology - most of the groups that do large-scale,  
639 effective programming, are either directly faith-inspired or they are composed of people who are  
640 coming from very deeply-seeded and very powerful and personal faith commitments. Now some  
641 of these, for example, the various groups associated with the two largest Muslim organizations,  
642 Muhammad'iyah and NU, have a very clear religious foundation. There are others where this is  
643 less clear, and it's here where some of them get to be informally inter-faith based, because you  
644 will see that in groups that are mobilized around particular issues - again here I'm thinking very  
645 much also of gender issues - that you'll see Muslims and Christians in the same group. Although,  
646 it doesn't formally have a designation, but when people are talking in forums like this they are  
647 speaking *as* Muslims or *as* Christians. So that's a very important thing to keep in mind when  
648 talking about Indonesia.

649

650 More specifically, in terms of local Indonesian groups working together with outside  
651 organizations - and I want to just use the word "outside" organization because activists on the  
652 ground often do not make a really clear distinction between an international NGO, a UN-based  
653 organization, and something like USAID or AUSAID. They are all sort of put in the same box,  
654 because it's funding that supports local projects and it has a foreign source, and, you know it's  
655 the funding that really matters. The problem that was mentioned about these international  
656 organizations being hesitant to work with religious groups, and you should add religious  
657 individuals, is very apparent to people on the ground. Many people in Indonesia, and probably  
658 Indonesian feminists as much as anyone else if not more so, have very ambivalent feelings about  
659 the international donor community because there is a sense that they want to dictate the agenda,  
660 that they don't work closely enough with locally-organized groups. The notion that this sort of  
661 hidden perception that "religion is a problem," shows through very quickly in the attitudes of  
662 many of the representatives of international organizations who are on the ground in Indonesia.  
663 Again, Western secular feminists here are a real problem because they very much have a  
664 proselytizing agenda, every bit as much as American evangelical Christians. And I know that in

665 many cases this is deeply resented, especially by Islamic feminists. I have worked very closely  
666 with the Center for Women's Studies at the Islamic University in Yogya, and this is a constant  
667 sub-text to discussions there. Moving quickly to comparisons, I would say civil society  
668 institutions in Indonesia are very, very strong, and very important when you include groups like  
669 Muhammad'iyah and NU to the mix of civil society. In many cases, they're much more effective  
670 than the government. If you want to get something done in East Java, don't talk to the Indonesian  
671 government, talk to NU because they have much deeper roots in the local communities than any  
672 of the government organizations.

673

674 Malaysia is a very different place. In a number of ways, Malaysia is a much stronger state than  
675 Indonesia is, certainly when it comes to religion and particularly when it comes to Islam in  
676 Malaysia, you don't see the religious diversity that you see in Indonesia. You do not have large  
677 mass-based Islamic organizations and you have a great deal of control and regulation of Islam by  
678 the state. What we've seen in the last 20-25 years in Malaysia, is that the Islamization of society  
679 is state-driven. It's not only driven by the political parties, trying to show which one can be more  
680 Islamic than the other, it's also driven by a very large religious bureaucracy, which actively  
681 seeks out ways to Islamize whatever falls within their domain, whether it's education, health  
682 care, whatever. They want to find a way to make it more Islamic. Now obviously, Mahathir was  
683 part of the driving force behind that, but he's not the exclusive driving force. Again, Malaysia  
684 just does not have the types of civil society organizations that Indonesia does by a very, very  
685 large measure.

686

687 Third country in the mix, in the Malay world of Southeast Asia: Singapore. Religious, civil  
688 society institutions are incredibly important in Singapore because the state does not...as  
689 powerful as the state is and as prosperous as Singapore is, questions of things like care for  
690 orphans, care for old people, care for chronically sick people, the government doesn't do very  
691 much. Singapore is not a welfare state. Singapore is a laissez-faire, capitalist state, and all of  
692 those public welfare functions have been moved off on to civil society organizations, a very large  
693 number of which are religious. There are incredibly important Buddhist civil society  
694 organizations in Singapore, Christian groups, and Muslims to a much lesser extent because the  
695 country is only 15% Muslims and Muslims tend to be the economically disadvantaged.

696

697 So we have three neighboring different countries in this part of the world where the context for  
698 the operation of global civil society groups, be they government, be they private foundations, be  
699 they UN based or other international organizations - the local contexts are really very different. I  
700 am certain that this has a substantial impact on the ability of global civil society groups to  
701 operate in the region and also how they need to localize their own agendas to maximize their  
702 effectiveness. What will work in Indonesia, will not work in Malaysia. Civil society groups have  
703 a lot more freedom of operation in Indonesia because they aren't running up against a strong  
704 state bureaucracy the way they would be in Malaysia and, of course, in Singapore – which has an  
705 even stronger state than Malaysia.

706 **Juan Campo:** Okay, we've heard a variety of perspectives here on this subject, ranging from the  
707 level of organization through which NGOs participate in society and the relationship on the level  
708 of organization to global non-religious organizations. We've looked at specific kinds of contexts  
709 in South Asia and Southeast Asia particularly in the case of Bangladesh in South Asia and Aceh  
710 in Southeast Asia, as well as Japan in East Asia. We've had a look at comparative perspectives  
711 from Southeast Asia as well, between Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. We have also had a  
712 presentation of key concepts that might be mobilized, particularly in an Islamic framework, for  
713 bringing about transformation in civil society. Joining this range of topics, there has also been  
714 more specific issues, such as the role of religious-based or religious-inspired NGOs in regard to  
715 education, transformation of the status of gender (women in particular), peace and conflict  
716 resolution, and disarmament. Quite a range of topics have come up as well as specific religious  
717 traditions – Buddhist and Islamic I think have come to the floor, but we've also heard some  
718 reference as well to Christians in this context.

719

720 I think first of all we'd like to see if there are any comments or elaborations that our panelists  
721 would like to make with their respective presentations and questions that they might want to pose  
722 to each other, and then we can open it up more generally to the audience. Do the panelists have  
723 any further elaborations or questions that they'd like to raise or have comments on other  
724 presentations?



725 **Katherine Marshall:** I just remembered the tenth point...when you deal with the international,  
726 whether it's civil society or whatever, in a way the most logical entry point for religion is health,  
727 which is a huge area whether it's HIV/AIDS or malaria, tuberculosis, or vaccines or whatever.  
728 So that is also a big issue in this region and some of the more interesting case studies of both  
729 faith-linked and inter-faith are coming out of health.

730 **Ria Shibata:** I ran out of time so I didn't mention anything about Rissho Kosei-kai, so I would  
731 like to mention just one interesting point about their effort to promote religious cooperation.  
732 Recently both the Soka Gakkai and the Rissho Kosei-kai launched a petition campaign against  
733 usage of nuclear weapons. Whereas Soka Gakkai used its own network of human resources,  
734 encouraging its own youth members to go out into their local communities, have dialogue with  
735 other young people to talk about nuclear abolition and to have them sign a petition. What the  
736 Rissho Kosei-kai did, because it lacks that kind of vast human network - this was a case study in  
737 Japan, through their office of WCRP in Japan - was to contact different religious groups, new  
738 religions, for example, Kurozumikyo, or even established religious traditions like the Shinto  
739 association Jinja Honjo, and asked them to participate in this campaign called, "Arms Down."  
740 The reason why I thought this was interesting is because the religious market is very competitive  
741 in Japan, as I'm sure it is around the world, but the organizations are having difficulty trying to  
742 capture the interest of the young people to remain active in these religious groups. Smaller  
743 organizations or religious groups who do not have much experience in dealing with outreach  
744 activities, don't have the resources or the know-how or the skill in order to launch their own  
745 campaign. So what happened was many smaller new religious groups like Kurozumikyo jumped  
746 on the band wagon very happily because they said that, "This is great, we wanted to create  
747 something for our youth members!" It's very important that these religious groups appeal to the  
748 younger public, that they *are* doing these activities so that they will look appealing so that more  
749 young people will be interested to come to the meetings. So, in that sense, I thought Rissho  
750 Kosei-kai contributed greatly by enabling these smaller groups to participate in a larger public  
751 discourse campaign, because they wouldn't be able to have done so otherwise.

752

753 **Juan Campo:** We can have wider discussion now...

754 **Elizabeth Collins:** I'd like to ask Katherine Marshall a question. You mentioned Cambodia,  
755 where Buddhist institutions connecting up with Thailand and Sumatra have done a great deal to  
756 rebuild society, to rebuild village *wats*, and to organize society around them. At the same time,  
757 there was this very strong Christian evangelization activism. How do the international  
758 organizations come into this kind of situation to work with faith-inspired organizations?

759

760 **Philip Oldenburg:** I just wanted to say, I find "faith-inspired" to be a happier term than faith-  
761 based. But, for South Asia it seems to me the faith-inspired organizations are political  
762 organizations, and all very important. Whereas religion is famously in Hinduism and Buddhism a  
763 matter of practice, we talk about the short [inaudible]. We don't talk about orthodoxy in  
764 Hinduism, we only have [inaudible] and I think that's something that is lost in "faith" into this  
765 category. I think about this when I think about South Asia in terms of religion. It's true that it has  
766 a problem in terms of dealing with the organizations on the spot...[inaudible]

767 **Lamia Karim:** This is a question to Mark Woodward, I wanted you to map for us what kind of  
768 shifts you see on the ground in Indonesia, in terms of the Islamic movements pre-1990's, pre-  
769 market deregulation, and post 9-11 the "war on terror" environment. Do you currently see some  
770 shifts in the way their practices have changed?

771 **Barbara Metcalf:** There was just so much going on in what everyone said and the issue of  
772 proselytization, seems to me, is really front and center. In fact, these questions link back to a  
773 code of conduct, and important work by somebody like Nandini Sundar on the tribal areas of  
774 India, insisting left, right and center that what the RSS and the key organizations are doing *is*  
775 conversion, whereas only Christians are usually targeted in a negative way with conversion.  
776 Those issues are so critical in the larger context of the state - what isn't legal, what is illegal, and  
777 what kind of laws are put in this case. I think that's really a subject that is important when  
778 thinking about the work many of these groups do.

779 **Mark Juergensmeyer:** I want to get one issue on the table, which is what Muhammad Ali said  
780 on his fifth point that there is great diversity of interpretations of say Islam. But isn't that one  
781 problem? The role that religious institutions play in civil society, increasingly, is this rigidity, the  
782 increasing effort to try to define what true Islam is. Even movements like Muhammad'iyah, you  
783 can see it become more rigid and, for example, the treatment of the Ahmadiyah in Indonesia.

784 There is a kind of “rigidification.” Of course, you see it in Christianity in this country and the  
785 impact that that has on political life as well as civil society. Isn’t that an increasing problem?  
786 And I don’t know why that’s the case, whether it’s the kind of narrowness in general in public  
787 life, in an era of globalization or cultural retreat, but we seem to be kind of hunkering down to  
788 our own narrow identities, and with narrow definitions of what those identities are and that’s  
789 where religious institutions sometimes play, it seems to me, a very dangerous role.

790 **Mark Woodward:** Well, let me address your question quickly here. The critical date for  
791 Indonesia, in terms of an absolute sea change, is the 21<sup>st</sup> of May 1998, which was the resignation  
792 of Former President Suharto who had kept his thumb, or two thumbs, or both feet, on top of  
793 everything for 33 years. Everything else, the expansion of neo-liberal economics, 9-11,  
794 everything else pales by comparison. It was the democratic transition, we could argue about how  
795 democratic it is, but it was the political transition that really opened everything up in Indonesia.  
796 All sorts of new religious movements, many of them not particularly civil, such as the Islamic  
797 Defenders Front and groups like the Justice and Prosperity Party. Very conservative types of  
798 Islam came to occupy a place in public life where that had not been possible for 30 years. There  
799 was also the opening up of people on the more liberal part of the Islamic spectrum as well. It was  
800 really that political change more than anything else, which has shaped the direction that  
801 Indonesia has gone in in the last couple of years.

802  
803 And Mark’s point about the rigidity of identities - yes this is true in some cases, and I don’t quite  
804 understand why, because I know of plenty of other cases in Indonesia where people will say, “Oh  
805 well, you know we have a common interest in this, and yeah, you may be a Baptist and you may  
806 be a Catholic, and I may be NU and she may be from Muhammad’iya, but for these purposes  
807 we’re going to put those differences aside.” I don’t have that kind of personal experience in  
808 South Asia, but I think that this is probably a significant contrast and one that really merits a lot  
809 of careful attention: what are the contexts which encourage people to put those religious  
810 differences aside and what are the contexts where people are really inclined to hunker down on  
811 that core identity and say that because of this identity compromise or cooperation is not possible?  
812 I don’t know what the answer to that question is, but I think that it would be a very important  
813 research topic.

814 **Katherine Marshall:** One of the big issues that we're all grappling with is the relationship of the  
815 state to civil society, and that's coming to Barbara's point which is to what extent is it regulated,  
816 etc. But there is one particular dimension, which Cambodia illustrates graphically, and which I  
817 think is present in parts of South and Southeast Asia, though it's much more an African  
818 phenomenon, which is the "bottom billion." In other words, this is the paradigm that a lot of the  
819 development world is coming to, that we're not talking about "developed," "developing," we're  
820 not talking about "third world," "first world," or "second world." We're talking about a world  
821 where there's a billion people who are left behind, in maybe 25-50 different countries, which are  
822 in the "close-to-failed state" conflict category. One of the phenomenon that happens, and  
823 Cambodia is a vivid illustration, is that the NGOs go completely haywire after a peace  
824 settlement, and they come in and basically they divide up the country in many ways and have a  
825 tremendously important role to provide education, health, etc. But then there comes a time when  
826 the government has enough power, if not real capacity, to object, and that's happening in  
827 Cambodia right now - there's NGO laws, there's efforts to regulate, they still have not been very  
828 effective, but the general view in Cambodia is that we're headed for troubled waters. You're also  
829 seeing that in Mozambique, it's heavy in Ethiopia and a lot of other countries where you are  
830 seeing that. I'm not sure where else it would be in South and Central Asia. But it does come to  
831 this question of, "What is the role of civil society? How is civil society seen? And how is this  
832 galaxy of religious institutions being seen in that?"

833

834 So, I think that that is something worth having in mind. Now clearly in South and Central Asia,  
835 the politicization of these religious groups and their integration into political parties is another  
836 narrative, but the degree to which these institutions are providing the basic welfare functions and  
837 are running schools and health centers and raising issues of land rights and all those human  
838 rights, that's the area that I'm more interested in.

839

840 On the Buddhist side, we've done a lot of work and I can share the Cambodia focus work. The  
841 role of the Buddhist *sangha* now is very unclear in Cambodia. It's clearly different and the fact  
842 that it was coming from almost nothing is a part of the story. It's very decentralized as a result,  
843 and the monks and all the different *wats* are playing very different roles. The two areas where  
844 you are seeing the most intersection at this point are on HIV/AIDS where UNICEF has had a big

845 program that covers Southeast Asia generally, and particularly Thailand, but a lot of good work  
846 is going on in Cambodia. The second area where there is a lot of excitement is around  
847 environmental protection at the community level. There's one of the big red schemes, they  
848 avoided deforestation - actually it's a California company – and they actually have monks  
849 running around with GPS' to try to monitor whether or not the forests are being cut. In general,  
850 the development community is very curious about all these monks wondering around in orange,  
851 what are they doing and how can we use them? We have two people over there in Cambodia this  
852 year who are trying to get a better idea of what these institutions and people are. From  
853 Cambodia, the general sense is that all these young monks don't even begin to understand  
854 Buddhism, much less have any kind of direction.

855 On the proselytizing, I'm going to tell you one story that came out of the Bangladesh meeting to  
856 get us started. A very distinguished person from Sri Lanka, whose name escapes me right now,  
857 pulled out a book and put it on the table. It was by a guy named Paul Hattaway, from World  
858 Vision, and it's about Buddhist communities. It's a study of Buddhist communities all over Asia,  
859 and at the bottom of each page it has a chart that shows evangelization. The basic reaction was,  
860 "Look World Vision, you know that's what they're about, that's their purpose. They may be  
861 building wells and doing other things, but the real purpose of World Vision is to convert to  
862 Christianity." There was a horrified reaction, needless to say, from everyone and I've had a  
863 fascinating exchange with someone from World Vision since. World Vision, is huge, it has  
864 44,000 people working for them worldwide, and they have huge money coming from the US  
865 government. They feel that they've changed, but they aren't in a position to change the way that  
866 people on the field are behaving. It's a very vivid illustration of the complexity of  
867 proselytizing/proselytization.

868 **Muhamad Ali:** Thank you. There are many ways to respond to your comment, about the rigidity  
869 of religious interpretations. One way is that the way they construct values, changes for example.  
870 The Muhammad'iya, the so-called modernists, reformists, or puritanist Muslims, there are some  
871 changes in their construction of theology as well, about true Islam and so on. For example, the  
872 notion of tolerance, the different *taji*, different "councils", they have conferences every year and  
873 try to adapt to political circumstances. For example, the notion of true Islam before 1912 talks  
874 about Wahhabism more, and less later on after Wahhabism becomes more and more widely

875 contested in Indonesia, the relationship between Wahhabism and radicalism. So they try to get  
876 away from Wahhabism and the notion of *wasatiyyah* is then emphasized. *Wasatiyyah* means  
877 moderation, so you have moderate Wahhabism, moderate Salafism, for example. The adjective  
878 of moderate to the so-called Wahhabiyya is quite an interesting construction of how they don't  
879 want to be seen as rigid as before.

880

881 The second way of seeing this issue is they try to differentiate between faith and ethics. So  
882 *aqidah* and *mumana* or *muamalah*, for example, the notion of, "Well, we cannot compromise in  
883 terms of faith - you believe in Jesus, and you believe in Buddha, we believe in God", and so on  
884 and so on – that is *our* problems. That is our own issues with God, for example. But in ethical  
885 matters, we *can* cooperate. In trying to construct this in ways that can be very rigid on one hand  
886 but, at the same time, very cooperative on the other hand.

887

888 The third way of seeing this problem is the difference between cultural and political. When they  
889 said that different organizations, like Muhammad'iya is political, then they are considered  
890 dangerous. That's why Muhammad'iya doesn't want to participate in practical politics. They  
891 want to keep away from politics and they want to remain cultural. So in the field of culture it is  
892 easy for Muhammad'iya to cooperate with other religious organizations, Muslims and non-  
893 Muslims. So cultural Islam becomes another concern, so that Muhammad'iya is more tolerant  
894 and also more effective in solving problems.

895

896 Lastly, is the notion of innovation, because in Islamic theology there is the notion of *bid'ah*,  
897 innovation. There is good *bid'ah* and bad *bid'ah*, so bad innovation and good innovation. If it is  
898 good innovation, then you can do anything and it's very, very practical. But if it is bad *bid'ah* or  
899 bad innovation... in their understanding bad innovation is saying Ahmadiyya is Islamic, for  
900 example, because Ahmadiyya is a very controversial movement in Indonesia today. I've been  
901 working on that issue, particularly about Ahmadiyya and the notion of religion and Islam in  
902 relation to the so-called "enemy" within Islam. Anyways, I have so many comments about that,  
903 but I just want to keep with that. There is some attempt to deal with this internal contradiction in  
904 theology and practice - in theology and faith and action, politics and culture, and also innovation.

905 **Luce Conference – Session II**

906 **Eve Darian Smith:** It is a marvelous chance for me to be here as a relatively new member of the  
907 Global and International Studies Program. This is one of the exciting aspects of being with such  
908 wonderful colleagues such as Mark Juergensmeyer. Thank you very much for the opportunity to  
909 be here.

910

911 **Mark Juergensmeyer:** Tell them about your book that is coming out.

912

913 **Eve Darian Smith:** I have just published a book called *Religion Race, Rights and Landmarks in*  
914 *the History of Modern Anglo-American Law*, which really starts with the Reformation and goes  
915 right up to post 9-11 and looks at major developments in the history of British based law, as it  
916 were, but also looks at the dynamics between the religion and race narratives and how they are  
917 very much part of the development of what we often think of as secular western law.

918

919 It's my delight to be part of the second panel today. The question that is specifically going to  
920 guide our conversation right now is: Do religious institutions play a positive role in supporting  
921 humanitarian activities? Do they also possibly play a negative role? There seems to be a  
922 quandary there. Without further ado I'm going to ask Elizabeth Collins, a professor of Classics  
923 and World Religions at Ohio University, to be our first speaker please.

924 **Elizabeth Collins:** In the interest of coherence I've decided to organize my remarks around five  
925 points. The first is that religious organizations have a very long history of being involved in  
926 humanitarian activity in Southeast Asia. In the Buddhist countries the "Engaged Buddhism"  
927 movement emerged first in Sri Lanka but it is widespread and played an important role in  
928 Thailand, with Maha Ghosananda in Cambodia, and with the monks non-violent protests against  
929 the military regime in Burma. They have worked for flood relief, across the board on  
930 environmental issues, and development primarily. In Indonesia, as you've already heard, both  
931 Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul Ulama both have very important programs. Muhammadiyah  
932 particularly, has programs in health and education, school building, hospital building, and  
933 supporting clinics. NU also has a whole series of NGO's that have been working on development  
934 issues and gender. There's a long history there that goes back to the colonial period when it was  
935 religious organizations that were virtually the only part of civil society that the colonial regime  
936 couldn't control and direct. Of course there is a whole host of new organizations that have

937 emerged in Indonesia. I would argue that many of these, both religious and secular, are a  
938 response to the impact of globalization and development policies that did not deal with increased  
939 poverty among certain groups. There was NGO movements that emerged in the 70's and 80's  
940 that have, in some cases, linked up with these religious organizations. There has been a strong  
941 connection in the last 50 years between the impact of economic globalization and the emergence  
942 of civil society organizations and the role of religion and, I would argue, the politicization of  
943 religion.

944

945 The second point is that the humanitarian involvements of religious organizations become  
946 problematic when they are perceived to be a form of evangelization and/or proselytization. This  
947 is particularly clear in Indonesia right now, where there's a backlash against what's called  
948 "Christianization." It is mainly Christians who are blamed for evangelization, but there *has been*  
949 some very aggressive and secretive, illegal Christian evangelization in Indonesia. Of course, this  
950 was a problem in Aceh with the tsunami. Many of the organizations there were seen to be  
951 evangelizing under the cover of aid, so there's a real line that needs to be drawn there and an  
952 issue that we really need to discuss because it constantly emerges.

953

954 My third point is about the complexity of this kind of aid or work with refugees, in my case,  
955 victims of natural or social disasters. Here I would like to tell one story. The organization I work  
956 with was building schools for refugees and we were also building sanitation systems and  
957 minimal housing. We very quickly discovered in Manado, for instance, where the refugees were  
958 primarily Muslim in a Christian area, that there were poor communities surrounding the refugee  
959 camps that were feeling that these people were benefiting and they were not benefiting at all. We  
960 were actually increasing the tensions between these two religious groups and we very quickly  
961 had to move to begin a dialogue in which we began to attend to the needs and demands of the  
962 local Muslim community that was poor. We learned that we can't work with one refugee  
963 community without looking at the surrounding situation.

964 In another case, in Koso, we were promoting school building, participatory development projects  
965 where we could in eastern Indonesia, trying to bring Muslim and Christian communities together  
966 in the building projects so they actually worked together on the project. We were successfully  
967 building a school in Koso when the project was attacked by a radical group that did not want to



968 see Christians and Muslims working together cooperatively. So the issues are really complex and  
969 they demand a lot of very sensitive on-the-ground knowledge. You have to have local partners  
970 who really know the politics, knowing their biases and their interests is an important part of this  
971 work. These make it very difficult for international organizations to be successful, without  
972 stirring up these kinds of issues. My third point is about the complexity and difficulty of this kind  
973 of work, and I've only been involved in very small projects. We have in fact, been reluctant to  
974 get involved in extrapolating our projects to other areas, where we don't have reliable local  
975 partners and haven't felt a strong relation with them for fear that we'll be getting entangled in  
976 exactly these kinds of issues.

977

978 My fourth point would be that we have done a lot of work with conflict resolution. We've set up  
979 centers in universities for research on "intergroup relations" as we call it, so that we will have  
980 local partners that know the local issues if a conflict emerges and if we have to work there. But  
981 interfaith dialogue often doesn't even when you get it going, attend to the economic issues that  
982 underlie conflicts that are called "religious," but have other dimensions. So simply having  
983 Christians and Muslims talk across a table often neglects the more complex issues of the  
984 economic difference between communities and their histories and how you can attend to those.

985

986 Lastly, there's been an effort in Indonesia to make *zakaat* more effective by bureaucratizing it;  
987 by setting up systems so that there will be no corruption, there won't be politics around how it  
988 gets distributed. However, this is often seen as an effort by the state to co-opt the *zakaat* and to  
989 use it for its own purposes. There's a whole other set of issues about how you deal with these  
990 problems of corruption and the role of the state in regulating organizations of this sort.

991

992 **Eve Darian Smith** Thank you very much. Our second speaker is Bill Headley, Dean of the Kroc  
993 School of Peace Studies, University of San Diego.

994 **William Headley:** I will try to stay pretty close to our script so I can say everything I really want  
995 to say. In 1992, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the then Secretary General of the United Nations, used  
996 the term "peace building" as distinguished from other peace related activities in his agenda for  
997 peace. Admittedly the term itself, and I think Katherine brought this out, gives this emerging  
998 discipline another term to fuss over and struggle with and, indeed, it is fussing. I follow the likes

999 of John Paul Lederach, Abu-Nimer, Scott Appleby, and others of religious orientation to give a  
1000 very broad understanding of this. This understanding of peace building, and I quote, “Gathers the  
1001 range of practices essential to the building of a sustainable and just peace over time.” This is both  
1002 helpful and convenient for our discussion as peace building digs in and tries to make a  
1003 contribution to the ever even wider understanding of humanitarian activities, our focus here.  
1004 Understood in this way, peace building cuts a broad cloth and includes such things as conflict  
1005 resolution, peace keeping, and post-war reconstruction. The cut is indeed broad. But what makes  
1006 religious peace building, that is Buddhist, or Muslim or Protestant or Catholic etc.? Certainly not  
1007 simply that it is performed by someone who is born or converted or moves into a certain faith.  
1008 Rather, it is a faith-inspiration that is taken and applied as fundamental to a rather nuanced  
1009 understanding of peace building. If taken this way, it offers a buffet of teachings, practices,  
1010 sensibilities and sensitivities from each of the faiths. Let me rush to say what Appleby calls  
1011 “authoritative,” so that we might have it as particularly authoritative for our faith perspective but,  
1012 if presented in non-theological language, can be presented to other people of goodwill and be  
1013 useful to them in their understanding. It will be both valuable to religious peace building and  
1014 helpful to the larger humanitarian task if someone would take all of these buffets, so-to-speak,  
1015 and make one huge one. David Smock tried to do that once out of the United States Institute of  
1016 Peace. It’s time to do it again. In this brief time I’d like to address one particular approach, if you  
1017 will. Powers says that religious bodies and peace-building are the envy of the CIA, or maybe  
1018 major international NGOs, because of their vertical and horizontal integration of societies. Think  
1019 of a large pyramid, if you will. Lederach, a Mennonite, speaks of themselves as having  
1020 hierarchical envy of the ubiquitous presence of some faith communities. Let me use then my own  
1021 church to make the point, though, in doing this, it’s not so much to be chest thumping, but rather  
1022 to think about making a contribution to the construction of cohesive and transformative roles, to  
1023 use some of the language that we have here. Vertically in terms of the Catholic system it has  
1024 clear leadership, it has on the ground institutions where there are local schools or hospitals or  
1025 social service agencies and churches at all levels of societies. There is a fairly consistent  
1026 teaching, even if certain rigidity is in certain areas, and it has an organized authority. Someone  
1027 said recently that what you can do in a Catholic system in a small developing country,  
1028 particularly in Africa, is that a Bishop in the morning could have coffee with the President of the  
1029 country and then go out to the village and, in fact, perform a confirmation. So he has that ability

1030 to move up and down the social pyramid if you will. Now think horizontally, think of moving  
1031 across the societal pyramid: lower class to lower class, middle class to middle class, upper class  
1032 to upper class, where ethnicity and racial mixings of society are important. This institutional  
1033 dimension is seen perhaps best when consideration is shown for the poor or those in conflicted  
1034 situations. These connections can be institutionalized or brought together internationally.

1035 I use easy examples, again focusing largely on Asia: A decision is taken in Yangon among the  
1036 Bishops Conference in Myanmar, I left this conference last year to go there and priests were  
1037 gathered from all over the country to go to a peace building workshop. Or, a particular troubled  
1038 Diocese has the same, or the bishop's conference for the entire country gathers. The tsunami  
1039 occurs in Banda Aceh, Indonesia and the computer systems crash from the onslaught of  
1040 donations in the CRS offices in Baltimore. The Vatican based Caritas Internationalis serves the  
1041 charitable needs of developing countries worldwide, a Sri Lankan is one of the eight key  
1042 representatives at the table. This embedding, both vertically and horizontally, helps humanitarian  
1043 actors achieve that tricky, yet essential, balance between deeply embedded ties to cultural,  
1044 ethnic, and national identities that gives religion its influence in a particular conflict situation,  
1045 and the larger, cosmopolitan or universal elements that gives religion its moral credibility and  
1046 transnational reach. Powers puts it still another way: religious individuals and institutions are  
1047 especially effective peace builders because they are acculturated, that is, deeply rooted in their  
1048 own communities. Maybe all we're saying, really, is use what is there already. If I had to look at  
1049 a research area that gives me some encouragement, it's a new Catholic-Islamic *détente*, captured  
1050 in a new project called *Contending Modernities*, where both Islam and Catholicism look together  
1051 at modernities and a policy effort from the Chicago council in its engaging religious  
1052 communities abroad where it addresses, rather concretely, the US government and society and  
1053 how it might approach religions in other countries. Thank you

1054

1055 **Eve Darian Smith:** Our third speaker is Caroline Mayer White

1056 **Caroline Meyer White:** First I want to tell you that I will be talking on my experience, which is  
1057 from the northern part of Pakistan. I have solely worked in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which was  
1058 known as the North-West Frontier Province, and it's from here that I'll give this presentation.  
1059 My very first experience in Pakistan was as a young woman. I came after the "Muhammad

1060 Cartoons” had been at their heights, and I had decided to go and introduce straw bale  
1061 construction as a response to the 2005 Kashmir earthquake. I came to teach two workshops, with  
1062 a total of 53 male students between the ages of 18 and 55 years over four weeks in the summer of  
1063 2006, in the towns of Mansehra and Balakot. I was the only non-Pakistani working in the  
1064 organization Dosti Development Foundation at the time. The background of the students in my  
1065 workshops was anything from unskilled to university degrees. I wanted to dress in a manner that  
1066 would not seem offensive, but at the same time I was not used to the Pakistani clothing. When I  
1067 started my first workshop I needed to feel a little bit of authority to be on a building site. I always  
1068 need that because I am just a very small woman, so I chose to wear my jeans and my shirt from  
1069 home. There was absolutely no problem, I was fully accepted like that. The experience became  
1070 one of great curiosity from mine, as well as my students, side. At lunch I would sit with the ten  
1071 teachers and chat about anything that had our interest: we discussed politics, religion, culture,  
1072 development, birds, songs and what not. Amongst my students in the second workshop, were a  
1073 handful of young men from a village named Banna in Allai Valley, a very remote area around 12  
1074 hours drive north-west of Islamabad, where the culture has not changed much in a very long  
1075 time. That is my experience - to travel in Pakistan is like traveling in time. In the large cities you  
1076 can find the elements of modern urban life, in the villages and the mountains of the Himalayas,  
1077 for example Banna in Allai Valley, most residents will not travel further than where their donkey  
1078 can take them. Interaction with other groups is not very common. The culture changes extremely  
1079 slowly and life can, in many ways, be compared to life in Europe 700 or 800 years ago. Above  
1080 30% of the population are still tenants to landlords who own the land that they work. These  
1081 people are not free to move, not free to choose whether their children should be put in school or  
1082 not, not free to build up money to buy their own land or house. The landlords are the powerful  
1083 politicians at the national, regional, and district levels. There is a Tenant’s Act, which should  
1084 provide basic rights for tenants, but as there is no one to enforce it, it is not necessarily followed.  
1085 I have found that this is very important to understand, because we were able to interact with  
1086 these people and land rights are very crucial.

1087

1088 A man from this community will typically never keep company with any women other than his  
1089 mother and sister, not even female cousins. This doesn’t apply to every part of Pakistan but it  
1090 does to Allai and it did to my students. So I experienced that we had a mutual situation: How do

1091 I interact with this person in front of me? They were very polite, very kind and mostly just very  
1092 shy. At the same time I was being polite and keeping my codes of conduct which I thought were  
1093 appropriate. I would look them straight in their eyes when I talked to them as I normally do,  
1094 which is not considered appropriate for a Pakistani woman, but they understood that this was  
1095 natural to me and they found it fine. There was one man from the organization, before I  
1096 understood all this, who would never look me in the eye. In the beginning, I just thought he was  
1097 very arrogant and as time passed I thought he was really very unpleasant until I learned that he  
1098 was performing the greatest way of respect for me because he was unmarried and I was  
1099 unmarried and to look me in the eye would have been very disrespectful. I'm often asked about  
1100 my experiences of working in Pakistan, if it's not difficult being a woman. My answer is no. I  
1101 know that I am culturally sensitive and that I do adapt myself, but the different cultural and  
1102 religious rules that are put on women do not apply to a foreigner who is coming to do a job. I  
1103 experienced that people understand that I have another set of rules with me. Most of the rules  
1104 have to do with the honor of the family. So as long as I'm not connected with a Pakistani family,  
1105 none of these rules are forced on me.

1106 Now, having said that, *living* in Pakistan is extremely difficult. There are lots of things to deal  
1107 with, but I can't point my finger and say that they are based on religion. They are more based on  
1108 our education being different. When I say we meet at 8 o'clock, we don't meet at 8 o'clock etc.  
1109 It's difficult for me to distinguish whether a behavior should be categorized as being based on  
1110 religion, culture, tradition, or security issues. For example, regarding restrictions put on women,  
1111 are they interpretations of religion by illiterate priests based on thousand years old traditions, not  
1112 relating to any particular religion - the way for simple people to try to protect themselves, their  
1113 wives, and their daughters in a lawless society? Or is it social control, as much implemented by  
1114 women themselves, as by their husbands and fathers? Or a mix? The few times I went up to this  
1115 village, Bana in Allai, to see how the project was coming I wore a scarf as I had taught myself to  
1116 wear it, where only your eyes look out. You can see everything but you cannot be looked at- that  
1117 was due to a security issue. I found that that way you can't be seen, because foreigners are not  
1118 welcomed by everybody. Also I knew that I wouldn't be insulting any of our beneficiaries who I  
1119 didn't have any contact with otherwise.

1120

1121 When we talk about religious institutions, there is the example of the *madrasahs*. When I hear

1122 the term *madrasah* I still, today, have to remember how infected my mind is with negativity  
1123 related to certain terms because of the influence of the mainstream media where I have gotten my  
1124 information so far. When understood by a Pakistani, these terms are not negative. An example is  
1125 when I asked my friend, a straw bale colleague in Pakistan, Saleem, to hear his understanding of  
1126 the Taliban in Pakistan. He said to me, “Caroline, you and me are Taliban. We both believe that  
1127 we can create a better world, to have such idealistic beliefs and to study how to reach it, is to be a  
1128 Taliban.” Saleem is fully aware that there are terrorist groups calling themselves Taliban and that  
1129 they are bombing away his fellow countrymen, even in mosques on Fridays, but he wanted to  
1130 make the point clear to me that in Pakistan this term does not only apply to these criminal  
1131 organizations. It’s a term that also applies to non-criminal people and it means to be an idealistic  
1132 student. Similarly, *madrasah*, in my mind, had become only associated with extremists,  
1133 brainwashing children into hating Westerners through their teachings, which they hide behind  
1134 calling it Islam. But a *madrasah*, by a Pakistani, is mostly conceived as a positive thing – as a  
1135 way for poor children to actually get some kind of schooling.

1136 Besides this, I could have added all what Mohammed Ali gave in his presentation to my  
1137 presentation: my experience in Pakistan is that peoples understanding of their belief is leading  
1138 them to be very helpful, to always be welcoming, always give food to a needy person etc.,. That’s  
1139 how I feel the public of this part of Pakistan, at least, identifies as Muslim. Thank you.

1140 **Mary Zurbuchen:** Thank you. I’d like to also add my comments to this question of whether  
1141 religious institutions play a positive role in supporting humanitarian activities. I think that its  
1142 already been suggested by earlier speakers this morning that we need to question what we’re  
1143 talking about when we say “religious institutions.” I’d also like to question what we’re talking  
1144 about when we say “humanitarian activities,” because this is also a very large and diverse sector  
1145 of engagement involving everything from providing emergency relief, basic social services, such  
1146 as health and education, community development with medium-term or long-term objectives, or  
1147 agendas of advocacy, such as around topics of social justice and what constitutes a good and fair  
1148 society. I’d like to problematize both ends of the question that we’re talking about, and I want to  
1149 speak about Indonesia specifically. While there are many philanthropic or communitarian  
1150 traditions among all religious groups in Indonesia, whether those are Protestant, Catholic,  
1151 Buddhist, Hindu, Balinese, Animist or whatever, what I’d like to focus on are the Islamic

1152 organizations here because 88% of Indonesia's 240 million people are, in fact, Muslim. It was  
1153 already mentioned by Mark Woodward this morning how important the watershed of 1998 was  
1154 in Indonesia in enabling a whole host of civic organizational energies to be mobilized in new  
1155 ways as citizens of all kinds were renegotiating their relationship with the state in a new political  
1156 environment. I'd also like to say that new philanthropic energies were released in the time since  
1157 1998. Philanthropy is a very interesting topic in Indonesia, both for cultural, religious, legalistic  
1158 and all kinds of other reasons. Two points are that, of course, Muslims, by virtue of their faith,  
1159 are obliged to give *zakaat* and *sadaqah* and other terms that refer to providing alms or *tithing* as  
1160 it's referred to in Christian tradition. In the realm of organizing, president Suharto himself was  
1161 once the largest individual practitioner of philanthropy in all of Indonesia. He and his family had  
1162 at least seven private organizations under their control with vast resources, which came from  
1163 different sources.

1164

1165 Looking at the Islamic religious institutional landscape today, I'd like to just very briefly  
1166 mention three rough categories of humanitarian or social engagement as follows: one has already  
1167 been mentioned by Elizabeth and others as the traditional mass organizations, Mohammadiya  
1168 and Nahdlatul Ulama, who have literally tens of millions of members across the country. These  
1169 are very well established traditional religious organizations that have been, for more than a  
1170 century, involved in civic engagement and social services of different kinds. Mohammadiya first  
1171 responded to a volcano disaster with relief in 1910, so this legacy of humanitarianism in these  
1172 two organizations is well established and has built their credibility on the ground for decades.  
1173 Particularly in the case of Mohammadiya there has been a more recent professionalization and  
1174 commercialization of their activities in the health and education sectors to generate resources and  
1175 run for-profit. Mohammadiya now runs 345 clinics and hospitals around the country as well as  
1176 nursing and medical schools. It has a robust women's auxiliary called Aisha, which is very, very  
1177 active in towns and villages promoting women's livelihoods, health, education and reproductive  
1178 health and rights. So these organizations are certainly there looming on the landscape, but they  
1179 are sometimes perceived to have very well established hierarchies and perhaps not to be as  
1180 flexible and creative in responding to changes in cultural and market forces that are so evident in  
1181 Indonesia.

1182

1183 In this context, there is a whole set of newer organizations established under the rubric of  
1184 Lembaga Amil Zakaat, or professional *zakaat* agencies. Elizabeth refers to these as well on the  
1185 government side, but there is also a non-government side of these *zakaat* agencies, which  
1186 provide low cost and free medical care to the poor, although they also are active in education.  
1187 Some of them emerged partly in response to the perceived commercialization of the  
1188 Mohammadiya hospitals and also to the lack of adequate service provision on the part of the  
1189 government health care system. The Lembaga Amil Zakaat are established by private interests,  
1190 they can be accredited by either the government or religious institutions. They draw their patients  
1191 from urban slum areas, providing services the poor cannot obtain. They provide free services in  
1192 many cases, which are not provided by the Mohammadiya hospitals, and they are extremely  
1193 creative and cutting edge in terms of their advertising strategies and fundraising techniques. They  
1194 have trained solicitors in malls throughout the country, and they use social networking tools. You  
1195 can make your *zakaat* donation via Pay Pal on their website and you can check your donation on  
1196 your cell phone. In this connection I should say that Indonesia is the second largest market for  
1197 Facebook in the world with more than 30 million users and the third largest market for Twitter.  
1198 So social media, new ways of communicating, new ways of participating as part of groups who  
1199 are motivated by religion and driven to have civic engagement, is very interesting in the context  
1200 of these highly successful and professional groups. There needs to be more research on what the  
1201 proportion of *zakaat* funds that they actual collect and distribute, is in the larger national setting,  
1202 but it is a trend that is extremely fascinating to look at from the standpoint of what is happening  
1203 in the realm of philanthropy.

1204

1205 Finally, there's also a trend where more overtly doctrinaire, perhaps more rigid Islamic groups,  
1206 some of which are influenced by *salafi* and *jihadi* currents of thought, are active in the social  
1207 service realm as well. Some of these groups are vociferously intolerant of other faiths and even  
1208 within Islam promote an anti-pluralist agenda. They are able to take advantage of a growing  
1209 number of conflicts around perceived apostasy on the part of Christian evangelicals, which has  
1210 also been mentioned. This enables groups that are actually quite extreme and hardline to recruit  
1211 new members who are, perhaps, from a less hardline background. But the issue of *murtad*, of  
1212 apostasy, the fact that for some Muslims the idea of prolonged exposure to Christians could be  
1213 dangerous, is leading these groups to have a certain kind of authority and pull and there have



1214 even been violent confrontations. Recently in Bekasi, on the outskirts of Jakarta, there was a case  
1215 where a Christian congregation was violently attacked. Humanitarian activities through these  
1216 Christian associations are also protested by these groups. In the recent eruption of Gunung  
1217 Merapi in Yogyakarta, a group called Forum Jihad Indonesia pressured evacuees from the  
1218 eruption area who had lost everything and were completely destitute and had been given shelter  
1219 in a churchyard. The Forum Jihad Indonesia pressured the local authorities to actually physically  
1220 remove these people and put them in a local government officials' house because they said that  
1221 this was a dangerous example of potential conversion on the part of evangelical Christians. The  
1222 Forum, which has its own website, later posted its success in preventing apostasy with appeals  
1223 for funding for its community relief activities. So you can contribute to community relief and  
1224 prevent Christianization at the same time via this one website.

1225 A few observations: for Indonesian Muslims, *zakaat* giving is not just a form of Islamic worship,  
1226 which is sometimes the traditional definition. Rather, the obligation of the devout to share their  
1227 wealth is a way of sharing in a particular kind of socio-economic or political system. There's a  
1228 variety of these on the Indonesian landscape. It's a channel for forming and expressing a  
1229 particular social identity within the larger *ummah*. *Zakaat* fundraising is an arena where, as I  
1230 said, different kinds of organizations operate and where innovations in mobilizing resources and  
1231 creativity in branding are clearly important. The dominant mass organizations, Muhammadiyah  
1232 etc., face new competition from these groups in an era that demands more professional,  
1233 accountable, and philanthropic practice. It remains to be seen, however, whether these newer  
1234 forums such as the Lembaga Amil Zakaat, which I just mentioned, and their distribution of  
1235 resources, will go beyond charity. Will they go beyond just direct provision of services to  
1236 defining longer term goals of community development? It's one thing to help women have free  
1237 childbirth, it's another thing to look at a poor community and say, for example, "How can there  
1238 be an insurance scheme for people's health care?" Or whether or not you're promoting a social  
1239 justice advocacy agenda, which other religious groups such as Aisha, as I mentioned earlier, are  
1240 good in doing.

1241

1242 I focused on direct charitable activities in these comments, but political changes ongoing in  
1243 Indonesia have also led young Muslims from student groups or Qur'an reading associations to  
1244 transform their organizations into groups such as voter education, NGOs, anti-corruption

1245 movements, and other kinds of advocacy. More research is needed on what's happening in places  
1246 like Aceh and central Java and others, where there is a lot of activity. A lot of research is also  
1247 needed to understand how ordinary Indonesians perceive the various Muslim philanthropic  
1248 groups. Preliminary studies indicate that many Indonesians continue to favor giving their *zakaat*  
1249 to religious intuitions closely associated with the local mosque, for example. As I mentioned,  
1250 some of these disturbing trends within the hardline NGOs, linking social service provision with  
1251 anti-pluralist activities, is worrisome to many Indonesians. There is a concern that disaster relief  
1252 can be used as an entry point for promoting political Islam. Some groups maintain that there is an  
1253 erosion of tolerance in Indonesia because of the activities of such groups. I cite all this as part of  
1254 the overall landscape of what's going on in philanthropic activities in Indonesia today.

1255 **Eve Darian Smith:** I am now going to open it up, and I think we might take a range of  
1256 questions, but before I do I just wanted to say both from this panel and the previous panel, as a  
1257 trained cultural anthropologist the detail and the sensitivity to local sites, and the complexities  
1258 and long histories that inform everyone's work, is extremely appreciated because we are asking  
1259 big, generalized, questions. But, of course, we always have to bring it down to the specifics, and  
1260 then hopefully from the specifics and the case studies that all of us obviously are in involved in.  
1261 How then can we answer these big generalized questions with some consensus or at least  
1262 thinking through these questions in some more generalized way? However, I greatly appreciate  
1263 the detail and the grounded work from which your responses are emerging. Perhaps now we will  
1264 open it up and I'll take a first swath of questions and then give the panelists a chance to respond  
1265 or to perhaps add to their points amongst themselves.

1266 **Thomas Uthup:** Thank you very much - fascinating comments. I just had two very specific  
1267 questions/comments addressed to Bill and Mary. To Bill – when you talked about the advantage  
1268 of the Catholic model, in the sense of having this vertical and horizontal relationship, and this  
1269 issue of proselytization, one thing that I have found growing up in India was that even though at  
1270 the hierarchical level, at the level of the Vatican, and perhaps even at the level of the bishops,  
1271 there is a lot of stress on evangelization and making yourself out to be [indistinct] through a push  
1272 towards conversion. At the grass roots level, when the priests are working, there actually is not  
1273 that much of an emphasis - so you have Jesuits priests who are out working with the fisherman in  
1274 Kerala, or with landless peasants in Bihar, and they are trying to organize them into trade unions

1275 or to others, but they are not trying to convert them. In fact, one of the issues has been that a lot  
1276 of people conflate Catholics with Christianity, so they see Christians who are converting people  
1277 and it becomes a point of attack against local Catholics. I wonder if that is an advantage from the  
1278 Catholic Church's perspective or whether it's just the way things happen? We talked earlier  
1279 about World Vision, where the hierarchy wants to do something and doesn't want to just  
1280 emphasize proselytization, but sometimes the local chapters do.

1281 To the comment about the exposure to Christianity and the fear that, to Mary, would lead to the  
1282 abandonment of Islam because of the fear: one of the projects that we have is a project on  
1283 education about religion and beliefs. What occurred to me was that in this very liberal enclave of  
1284 Wellesley, Massachusetts, a teacher decided to take the students to a Muslim mosque. There was  
1285 huge controversy because the parents immediately thought that the children were going to  
1286 become Muslims just by going to a mosque. This was unbelievable to me, but the same thing has  
1287 happened in England where there's a very comprehensive program of education about religions,  
1288 which is called Religious Education. When there was a group of students who were asked to pray  
1289 like Muslims in the classroom, just as an educational tool, I think the teacher was actually fired  
1290 from that. So, it works both ways and I think one of the things which would be very useful would  
1291 be to see, particularly in South Asia and in Southeast Asia, which are areas that have a  
1292 multiplicity of religions and where NGO's or schools are teaching about different religions; does  
1293 that then lead people, to the students, abandoning their religion or being more tolerant or  
1294 accepting of religions?

1295 **Lamia Karim:** This is a question to Mary, perhaps you all actually, in the context that I know  
1296 and have studied, which is Bangladesh: developmental NGO's and religious groups often come  
1297 into contestation over rural adherence, right? And often NGO's and religious groups  
1298 manufacture conflict because they want to bring attention to certain issues. So I would like you  
1299 to address if you find these kinds of contestations going on between NGO's that work primarily  
1300 in development and religious institutions. The second question, to Mary, is: what are the  
1301 transnational flows of capital to these religious institutions such as Mohammadiya? Is it  
1302 primarily from within Indonesia or do they have other networks?

1303 **Philip Oldenburg:** I have a question on my mind about the proselytization issue: as I look at  
1304 India in particular, one of the things that strikes me as I look back 150 years or so, is how

1305 unsuccessful all these incredible efforts at proselytization have been. They just don't get  
1306 anywhere! Under the colonial regimes, Christians came in and said "Look at these heathens!  
1307 They're heathens! There's multiple idols everywhere, they don't convert!" Then come the  
1308 institutions of learning, where there's supposed to be dedicated religious teachers and so forth -  
1309 again very few conversions. The question, it seems to me...but at the same time the symbolism  
1310 of conversion has such great leverage that it is a very tempting thing to talk about. Yet there  
1311 doesn't seem to me to be the smoke of this, and the fire is tiny. Ironically, what slips under the  
1312 radar is what Barbara was mentioning - that the RSS, the Hindus going around and converting  
1313 tribals without making any waves whatsoever.

1314 **Katherine Marshall:** First, the question of definitions comes up again, on what is humanitarian?  
1315 I was struck that you all had implicitly very different definitions. Within the international world,  
1316 it's pretty clear - humanitarian is emergencies and disasters. It's WFP, UNHCR, and there's a  
1317 line there. But several of you were including education and health. From an institutional  
1318 perspective, I think historically it's interesting that so many NGOs started with emergencies,  
1319 whether that is care, which was for CRS I think, and others started with actual famine relief. And  
1320 then people say, "We don't just want to be band-aids, we want to get into transformation." It's  
1321 interesting that for some people they are very clear definitions and for others they are not. It is an  
1322 evolutionary process. To me, education and basic health care are not in the humanitarian basket,  
1323 but it's clear that it is fuzzy. It is interesting for the humanitarian that, at least in theory, most  
1324 people would agree that any kind of proselytization, or linking, or conditionality, in humanitarian  
1325 relief situations is both illegal and unethical. Red Cross has all these provisions, whereas when  
1326 you get into development it's much fuzzier, much more subject to national law and national  
1327 customs. So, I'm curious as to whether distinguishing humanitarian from development, or  
1328 something else, is something that you all focused on.

1329 **Barbara Metcalf:** A thread that ran through the earlier panel, and also this one, is I think you  
1330 used this expression "unintended consequences" in all kinds of activities, that include inter-faith  
1331 activities and a number of others that have come up this morning. I am struck by how many of  
1332 these unintended consequences, maybe that's not the right word here, in fact entail the state and  
1333 nationalism. Even while we're interested in global issues, so much comes back to the state. In a  
1334 sense, one of the major services that Christian activities have provided in India - though they

1335 pale in comparison to the Muslims, but I'll say it just because of the comment about the Jesuits  
1336 working with the lower orders or Mary's examples of opposition to Christians - is the service  
1337 that these groups have provided is an opportunity to give people grounds for making claims to  
1338 speak for majoritarian nationalism or for solidarity against uppity lower class people. Both of  
1339 those, I think, work together. So, a lot of what passes as anti-Christian or anti-Muslim activity is  
1340 a way of building Hindu solidarity or it is a way of competing among Hindus or Muslims, in the  
1341 case of Indonesia, by being more ferocious against the enemies or more ferocious against the  
1342 Christians or more ferocious to claim to be able to speak as the voice of the nation or something  
1343 like that. There have been a lot of other things about unintended consequences, one of which  
1344 turns this one upside down, and they came out in Mark's comments earlier, and that is to the  
1345 extent to which development, especially international funds going to development organizations  
1346 fundamentally weakens the state, a big issue in Pakistan, where money pours in and goes... Who  
1347 would want to deal with that state? Who would want to deal with the Indonesian state?

1348 **James Donahue:** This is an observation, I will raise the issue you raised earlier – I think it's a  
1349 little bit imprecise to talk about a Christian understanding of humanitarian efforts or whatever.  
1350 There is a lot of different cuts and parses on religion in general. I'll put my theologians hat on  
1351 here, and Bill, you got me thinking about this. In the Catholic tradition you have a very clear  
1352 sense of how analogy works, a thing from David Tracy's book, *The Analogical Imagination*. The  
1353 Catholic tradition, and it might seem counter-intuitive, has an easier way of thinking about  
1354 "similar to," "as if," "like this," so it can jump into an ethical mode easier than say evangelical  
1355 Protestantism, like World Vision, which has a very difficult time of getting into religious  
1356 pluralism and ethics. You can see why proselytization and conversion would be more central to  
1357 some theological traditions than others. Islam and Judaism has many different cuts as well. Some  
1358 of them, it seems to me, are more inclined to a kind of proselytization, while others, and I think  
1359 the Catholics are a good example of this, have a much easier time, theologically, of engaging in  
1360 efforts that engage all sorts of other non-religious opportunities. Thomas your point of the Jesuits  
1361 is a great example, the Jesuits have no problem, as a Roman Catholic institution. So moving into  
1362 areas which are non-theological, in a sense, because there is an analogous mentality that is  
1363 internal to the tradition. So I would not parse Christianity in one way, nor would I assume certain  
1364 things about Islam or Judaism or different types of Protestants...[audio cuts off]

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1365 **Surichai Wun'gao:** I have just one simple observation on the definition of humanitarian  
1366 activities: in the context of this way of posing questions, it seems it is so complicated and  
1367 dynamic. I'm thinking about the case of Burma, where the spaces of engagement are very limited  
1368 and there it seems the only entry point would be humanitarian activities engagement. In that  
1369 sense, it can be the dynamicity of the situation, but in a limited space of engagement, so many  
1370 kinds of activities are put under that type. It would be dangerous, I would say, to see the  
1371 direction of this question into just one direction. My sense is that, while the question is relevant,  
1372 with the positive and negative, but in such a situation it seems that we only have to try and  
1373 understand how different actors and engagement, intent, and whatever other unintended  
1374 consequences there may be. But still we need to be grounded in the context. For example,  
1375 Buddhist monks...all humanitarian emergency issues are more related to religious circles. In  
1376 some, quite related to democratization efforts in different directions. I just wanted to make an  
1377 observation on that.

1378

1379 **Eve Darian Smith:** So perhaps I'll let the panelists respond to a range of extremely interesting  
1380 questions, and then we can open it up for more conversation once again.

1381

1382 **William Headley:** Thank you. I'd like to address Tom's question to me directly, but I hope on  
1383 the way to bump into Phil's question about proselytization, and also respond a little bit to  
1384 Barbara. The question to us was about evangelization: it seems that the bishops are stressing it,  
1385 but when you look on the ground...while the priest might be doing the liturgical and sacramental  
1386 life, what you see often times is that he is doing development efforts, schools and others. That's  
1387 what I thought you were saying. Rather interesting, there has been developments in the Catholic  
1388 system, and it has in fact come from Asia and has affected the rest of the church. It now speaks  
1389 of inter-religious dialogue and speaks of it in four types: one is theological, and that's connected  
1390 with the evangelical, and that was stressed much before. But the others are spirituality - where  
1391 people like monks like Thomas Merton will go from Gethsemani Monastery over to Asia and die  
1392 in the process of that - assistance in the development area, and daily living. And if I think  
1393 anything, we've moved down the scale of those, away from that at the top, and much more at the  
1394 other three types. I think that offers some real hope for inter-religious dialogue, particularly  
1395 coming from the Catholic system, and the inspiration has come from the Asian bishops.

1396

1397 I'd like to touch also on Phil's thought about proselytization: is it ever successful? I'm not too  
1398 familiar enough totally, but I might say that I would be a little careful, a little more nuanced  
1399 about that. I've been told recently, within a relatively short time there will be a very strong  
1400 Islamic effort in China - who would have thought 10 years ago? Christianity in Africa right now,  
1401 the Western experience of Christianity has turned on its head, so that we were originally taking  
1402 the Gospel, if you will, to Africa. Now it's completely reversed, there will be far more in the  
1403 south. So the southernization of Christianity in North America and the West is upon us. Yet you  
1404 could question it in Asia - the Catholic system has been very unsuccessful there, as you said.

1405

1406 To touch finally on Barbara's anti-Christian thing...you got me thinking Barbara, just the way  
1407 that you phrased that, about two interesting situations, one in Myanmar and the other in Pakistan.  
1408 I remember being in a Catholic church in Pakistan and asking people what they were doing. One  
1409 after another I learned that they were street cleaners. It was very interesting to ask this, and what  
1410 you got here is that the dominant religion decides to cast off certain segments of people. So it's  
1411 not so much your going in there at night and stealing people from them, but your picking up the  
1412 people a society dominated by a certain religion will not accept. Switch to Myanmar - I was  
1413 amazed when I went there this time last year, and found out how the Catholic church has been  
1414 successful not among the Brahmins, but among the tribal groups on the outskirts that they [the  
1415 dominant society] didn't want somehow. This is a very nuanced discussion I think, I'm sorry but  
1416 I hope I would pick up on three different areas. Thank you.

1417 **Mary Zurbuchen:** I'm not sure I kept good track of all the questions, but I think it's interesting  
1418 just on the issue of essentializing Christian responses. In Indonesia Protestantism and  
1419 Catholicism are two different religions officially. There's very much some contestations and  
1420 differentiation between those communities. In fact, some observers have said that a lot of the so  
1421 called conversion that people are worrying about is actually people switching denominations  
1422 within the larger Protestant or Catholic communities rather than people being converted from  
1423 Islam. There is also, depending on where you are in Indonesia - as always, what you see depends  
1424 on where you sit - there are places in Indonesia where there are Christian majorities, in Eastern  
1425 Indonesia particularly. In these communities, aggressive moves to build mosques and privileging

1426 of Islamic groups is seen as a danger in the opposite way, the opposite conversion flow. In terms  
1427 of flow of money, Mohammadiya and NU are not the groups that are absorbing the donations  
1428 from the Saudi's and other advocates of more Salafi oriented perspectives in Indonesia. Those  
1429 tend to be smaller groups, the groups that are using para-military types of organization and  
1430 training often for their members that are getting trans-national flows of money. But the money  
1431 isn't even as important as the information flows I think. The amount of publishing of translations  
1432 of works from the Middle East and the new expression of hardline perspectives in Indonesia  
1433 through this vast publishing industry is much more important and widespread I think.

1434

1435 In terms of definitions, humanitarianism versus other kind of social activities, I mean my  
1436 response to the question took as a starting point that if you want to know what religious  
1437 institutions are doing you have to understand how they see themselves. I think all of these  
1438 groups, across South and Southeast Asia, are shaped by the injunctions within their own faiths to  
1439 share resources and alleviate poverty and suffering, and that takes different shapes and forms at  
1440 different points in time. So I don't think there is a clear line for them, between the international  
1441 NGO agenda of humanitarian relief and other kinds of engagement.

1442

1443 **Caroline Meyer White:** I'd like to make a comment, and it's really just out of line maybe, but  
1444 it's to take things out of this context because we all know my example Pakistan, how it's very  
1445 much going towards extremists at the moment and how the political situation is very unstable.  
1446 When I sit here and listen to all of this knowing all of that - but when you are there and you meet  
1447 people one to one, then the experience is really depending on the personal interaction and it  
1448 really depends on how you are perceived and your motivation. I've very often been met with the  
1449 comment that "you're Muslim because of how you act." I'm not wearing a head scarf, I'm not  
1450 trying in any way to act as if I am a Muslim, but...so what I'm trying to say is that even though  
1451 there are all these tendencies in Pakistan, and in a pool it will come out like that, but when you  
1452 meet a person he will act differently given the situation. I mean it's very obvious, but I just felt I  
1453 had to bring it up.

1454

1455 **Elizabeth Collins:** I've also been told I'm Muslim in Indonesia because of the way I act, it is a  
1456 common experience, I think, for those of us who've lived there and worked with people who are



1457 more thoughtful about their Islam and what the values represent. I just wanted to respond to the  
1458 one thing that got lost, and I wonder what Mary would say as well, about Lamia's question on  
1459 manufactured incidence. I wanted to emphasize that a lot of the conflict over  
1460 proselytization...it's a confused issue because there are certain groups that aggressively  
1461 evangelize, but often the political conflicts occur around *perceived* proselytization which isn't  
1462 real at all - they are manufactured incidence. Groups expect to benefit by recruiting new  
1463 members. I think the biggest concern is that the state is taking no position on these kind of  
1464 manufactured images, it allows the rioting, it allows the attacks, and then doesn't prosecute the  
1465 perpetrators. This enhances the problem and perpetuates it, and I think that's a major issue right  
1466 now in Indonesia.

1467  
1468 **Ria Shibata:** This is pertaining to the proselytization issue from the stand point of the religious  
1469 institution: in the case of the organization that I was studying, the Soka Gakkai, tremendous  
1470 efforts were made over the past 40 years to educate the local actors and the leaders to work with  
1471 the non-religious NGO's and UN agencies. Part of the reason is Soka Gakkai is well known for  
1472 its culture of aggressive proselytization. First of all, the members have to be really educated  
1473 about what is the connection between these outreach activities and their own faith. Years of  
1474 educational efforts, training efforts, were made especially when these leaders visited Japan.  
1475 Various successful case studies are introduced to the local leaders, and the "do's and don'ts" are  
1476 also very much emphasized in these training courses for local leaders, because the biggest hurdle  
1477 that they had to overcome in the initial stage was the skepticism and suspicion that the non-  
1478 religious NGO's have when working with religious groups like the Soka Gakkai. I think they've  
1479 really learned through trials and errors, for example, there was this one time they worked with  
1480 and NGO called the Earth...**[Recording ends]**

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1481  
1482 **Katherine Marshall:** Just to mention three specific things, there is, of course, the Red Cross  
1483 code of conduct, which people refer to...I mean the two issues are how much you link  
1484 distributing Bibles or Qur'ans with delivering assistance. It's against that you make it any way  
1485 conditional - that's part of Red Cross. The other issue is - are you exclusive? In other words, do  
1486 you only deal with your own community or do you deal with anyone? Those are to Red Cross

1487 what is defined as humanitarian situations. The second thing is that The World Council of  
1488 Churches is putting huge efforts into looking at the proselytizing issue with Hans Ucko who  
1489 coordinated that, and there are some websites. They got stuck at a certain point on definitions,  
1490 but there are...

1491

1492 **unidentified speaker:** Ongoing dialogues?

1493

1494 **Katherine Marshall:** I don't think its ongoing from what I hear, but certainly they put a lot of  
1495 effort into it and got a long way. I've also heard, that in the early stages of the tsunami there were  
1496 a few kerfuffles around orphans, as is often the case, and on the ground the groups that were  
1497 working worked out a code of conduct, but I've never been able to get my hands on it.  
1498 Supposedly it was an actual "do's and don'ts" around the specific Indonesian tsunami relief. I  
1499 don't think it came up as much in Sri Lanka and some of the other places, but those are at least  
1500 three places to start.

1501 **Mark Juergensmeyer:** But Katherine, the Red Cross has a cross in its logo!

1502

1503 **Katherine Marshall:** Yes but that's Switzerland, its not a cross. Red Cross is not religious,  
1504 that's one of their things.

1505

1506 **Mark Juergensmeyer:** I know but isn't that the whole issue with the Red Crescent trying to  
1507 create...

1508

1509 **Katherine Marshall:** They are trying to have a red crystal now so that it's not religious.

1510

1511 **unidentified speaker:** In many Muslims countries it is a red crescent...

1512

1513 **Katherine Marshall:** Well they established the crescent in Turkey, but the history of it - it ain't  
1514 got nothing to do with religion.

1515

1516 **[Cross Talk]**

1517

1518 **Mary Zurbuchen:** I think we are running out of time, but I just wanted to add the footnote on  
1519 Aceh and the orphanages - it was highly publicized across Indonesia right after the tsunami that  
1520 international aid groups were coming to establish orphanages so that children could be adopted  
1521 by Christians outside of Indonesia, thus losing their Islamic heritage or souls or whatever. I think  
1522 that is something that perhaps the groups themselves were very properly attentive to and that  
1523 would underlie why they asked you to carry your activities that way.

1524

1525 **Mark Woodward:** I would just like any of you to comment on this because no one here has yet.  
1526 As far as this proselytization issue is concerned, there is an 800 pound gorilla about right there  
1527 [points to the middle of room], and that's Pentecostalism, and it's certainly a very big issue right  
1528 now in Indonesia and I think it's a very big issue globally. The Catholics in Indonesia now say,  
1529 "You know what, we don't have any problems with the Muslims, but these Pentecostals are  
1530 driving us crazy!" They also don't conform to any ethical code of conduct that the World  
1531 Council of Churches would come up with.

1532

1533 **Panel Three: Luce Conference**

1534

1535 **Hilal Elver:** Ok, good afternoon ladies and gentlemen! We are starting this afternoon session,  
1536 the third session of our meeting. Here, we have this question: How does the changing political  
1537 climate influence the work of faith-based organizations? You can, if you want, be more specific  
1538 about this question, because more specific is better because specific examples will be helpful to  
1539 go into more details about this subject matter. From this list, I am starting with Lamia Karim; she  
1540 is an Associate Professor in the Department of Anthropology in the University of Oregon. Please

1541 **Lamia Karim:** Thank you. Okay, I am going to be as specific as I can. As you know I am an  
1542 anthropologist, so I am going to comment on three institutions that we have discussed about and  
1543 that are active at the national level. I am going to talk from my own ethnographic experiences in  
1544 Bangladesh, which is about 15 years.

1545 First, I want to look at state policies regarding Islamization. Second, the institutions I want to  
1546 look at are non-governmental organizations, or NGOs, and the third institutions will be  
1547 *madrakah*-based religious movements. Now at the national level let us examine some of the  
1548 policies of the Bangladeshi state. Bangladesh became independent from Pakistan in December  
1549 1971. Between 1972 and '75, it was a secular state under the quasi-nationalist party called the  
1550 Awami League, *however*, the term 'secularism' and how it translated at the level of the public,  
1551 was never really addressed. What it meant for the citizens of Bangladesh to call themselves  
1552 secular subjects, or subjects of a secular state, remained unanswered. Between 1975 and 1990 we  
1553 had a military takeover and we had 15 years of military rule. During that time policies and  
1554 practices with regard to Islamization were intensified. So I will give you a list of about 9 or 10  
1555 points that I think were critical in changing the landscape in which NGOs, religious groups, and  
1556 ordinary citizens were all participating.

1557

1558 First, was the removal of secularism from the Constitution and its replacement by *Bismillahi-*  
1559 *rahmani-rahim*. Second, in 1988, almost 13 years after the military takeover, the second military  
1560 dictator made Islam the state religion. However, all other religions were given their right to  
1561 practice their religion. So, again, there is ambiguity at the level of the Constitution: What does it  
1562 mean to call the state a religious state? A lot of answers remain unaddressed. The military  
1563 government also created the Islamic Foundation that, among many other things, did a very  
1564 critical thing- the Qur'an was translated into Bangla from Arabic in the early 1970s and was  
1565 made available to the masses. Ordinary people could now buy a Bangla translation of the Qur'an  
1566 and read the interpretation for themselves. They didn't necessarily have to depend on the clergy  
1567 to translate. The Zakaat Board was also established at the national level. You had the  
1568 establishment of an Islamic university that was open to students from all Islamic, or Muslim,  
1569 majority countries. Friday was made the national holiday instead of Sunday, which we had from  
1570 colonial times. Formerly banned Islamic political parties were allowed to participate in national  
1571 level politics. Between 1972 and 1975, the Islamic political parties had been banned. Now, they

1572 could publicly recruit people, have their meetings, and also try for public office. *Madrasahs* and  
1573 mosques were made tax exempt and *madrasah* education, especially what we call in the private  
1574 *madrasah*, or *qawmi madrasahs*, were allowed to grow unsupervised. There was a massive  
1575 growth of *qawmi*, or private *madrasahs* that were funded by money from the Middle East,  
1576 primarily from Saudi Arabia. There are unofficial figures saying something between 30 to  
1577 40,000 *qawmi madrasahs* are in existence in Bangladesh, but even if that is an exaggerated  
1578 number, the number is very high. You also have an unregulated flow of funds from the Middle  
1579 East to the Islamic NGOs as well as the Islamic political parties and the *madrasahs*, and then you  
1580 have subsidies to pilgrims, Bangladeshi pilgrims, to go for *Hajj* to Mecca. So these are some of  
1581 the changes that happened at the national level.

1582  
1583 At the regional level, this is also very important, whatever happens in Bangladesh is contingent  
1584 upon what happens in India, especially in West Bengal, our neighboring state. If the BJP comes  
1585 to power in West Bengal, you are going to have a rise in support for Islamic political parties in  
1586 Bangladesh, and I can talk a little bit about the history later on in the Q and A if you have  
1587 questions.

1588  
1589 At the transnational level, global contact with the Middle Eastern countries grew after the  
1590 independence of Bangladesh in 1971. In 1972, Bangladeshi migrant labor began to go to the  
1591 Middle East to work and they came in contact with the practices attached to Islam in the Middle  
1592 East. They found a new way of being Muslim and they brought them back when they came  
1593 home. Another thing is about NGOs and the state - the NGOs started relief and rehabilitation  
1594 work in 1972, but very slowly moved into development work. There are over 2,000 NGOs at  
1595 work that are directly foreign funded and they work exclusively with women and primarily  
1596 microfinance. If you look at this relationship between NGOs and the state, it is very important to  
1597 examine the role of the state under neo-liberalism. I say that the NGOs have privatized the state  
1598 and many of the state functions such as education, health care, etc. have been outsourced to the  
1599 NGOs. I can talk about this more if you have questions.

1600 Another important area that I think we haven't addressed, is that the NGOs were supported by  
1601 the state, the military state primarily, because they wanted to break up the left political parties in  
1602 Bangladesh. In the early '70s, as you know, India had a strong movement in left political parties

1603 and there was support for it on the Bangladeshi side. By bringing in a resource-rich institution to  
1604 work with the rural poor, you are sort of bifurcating the ability of the left to get the rural poor as  
1605 a constituency.

1606  
1607 Now, a couple of things to think about at the level of the public: one sees a large number of  
1608 women, who are educated and well-off, who have joined the Tablighi Jamaat movement in  
1609 Bangladesh. You also see a rise among educated young men and women, many of them educated  
1610 in the West, who have joined Hizb ut-Tahrir, which is now a banned Islamic group in the  
1611 country. And then third, you look at the leading feminists, many of them have NGOs and who  
1612 are extremely secular minded, and they are really at a great distance from the rural and urban  
1613 women. So I think these are some of the things that we can address. Lastly, the question I wanted  
1614 to ask you to address, perhaps as a group, is to think about not religious institutions primarily  
1615 based in scriptures and piety, but to think about how power operates within these groups. Thank  
1616 you.

1617 **Hilal Elver:** Thank you very much for Lamia Karim and our second speaker is Philip  
1618 Oldenburg. He is from South Asia Institute, Columbia University.

1619 **Philip Oldenburg:** Take the proposition of political change in the recent generation, say 30  
1620 years, and I stood back and looked at it and it occurred to me, as I mentioned earlier, that the  
1621 other side of the equation - now this is the impact of this on faith-based organizations - has to be  
1622 re-translated because the faith-*inspired* organizations of most significance in South Asia seems to  
1623 me to belong on the “political change” part. That has been the marker of political change in  
1624 South Asia. Perhaps the most important marker along with, of course, the market opening and so  
1625 forth in India. Maybe not the most important, but it’s a very significant change that you have  
1626 organizations such as the RSS and other Hindu nationalist organizations, or Hindu nationalists  
1627 more generally, in the Sangh Parivar emerging in India in a big way in the 1980s and 90s - now  
1628 in decline. I ‘m not sure in terminal decline, but certainly in decline. You have the rise of *jihadi-*  
1629 *salafi* parties and movements and so forth in Pakistan. You’ve had the emergence or the re-  
1630 emergence of the *Jamaat* now trying to be re-bottled in Bangladesh. You have a Buddhist  
1631 political party in Sri Lanka. Nepal is actually the one place I will probably leave out because it  
1632 doesn’t seem to follow all these things. It’s very hard to disentangle these two sides of the

1633 equation, this question that this panel is supposed to be addressing, at least for me.

1634

1635 That said though, if we just stand back and look at the issue of changing political systems, they  
1636 clearly differ, the countries of South Asia are not all changing in the same sorts of ways. And, in  
1637 fact, all of these countries are very large and they have discreet changing political systems *within*  
1638 each country, that may be in the provincial level, that may be regional, it may be right down to  
1639 parts of states, district-level. So to summarize those changes which are going on on average, who  
1640 knows what's happening? On average, over here it's becoming more violent, over there it's  
1641 becoming calmer. What is *on average* that stayed the same? Well, this is problematic. I'm going  
1642 to say that, in fact, it's much the same, but with that footnote, that, in fact, in various parts of the  
1643 region, and in each country and within each country, each country's region, there is back and  
1644 forth change of various kinds. In general, I think the one thing that *does* unite them is that there  
1645 is a relatively strong and autonomous...that is to say not affected by classes or outside forces  
1646 very much, the state, the bureaucracy, the military, and popular institutions that govern. They  
1647 may govern inefficiently, they may govern corruptly, but they are not without effect. There is no  
1648 country that is collapsing, there is no country that is even close to collapse, and I would argue  
1649 even with any statement saying that a country is failing. Yes, there are certain parts of countries  
1650 that are out of the control of the state, but that's been true throughout South Asian independent  
1651 history and those formerly disrupted areas have become re-integrated into the state authority in  
1652 the past, and I suspect that they will be back and forth with that, with some exceptions that have  
1653 continued forever. For example, the FATA areas of Pakistan are not so simple to integrate.

1654

1655 All of the societies, I think, and important for the political activity, are relatively open in a global  
1656 context. That is to say, it has a place even in military-ruled Pakistan. There was an openness, a  
1657 willingness for people to talk and to behave in certain ways, which is, I think, unusual. Of  
1658 course, by the time you get to the fully democratic places within India, for example, it is totally  
1659 an open society, which I think, in a very important way continues to be true. The only country  
1660 that I am worrying about at the moment is what's happening in Sri Lanka as the political system  
1661 seems to be moving towards capture by a family - talk about dynasty politics. You know, four  
1662 major political leaders are brothers. I don't know if there was anything quite like that before.

1663

1664 The impact of religious organizations: the alternatives to the extremists locally are weak, in  
1665 terms of religious institutions throughout South Asia. As far as I know *all* these religions are  
1666 very local, there is no global, no nation-wide church - the priests, the *mullahs*, are not objects of  
1667 great respect on the whole. It's not at all clear to me that the grassroots, religion-led, religious  
1668 figure-led kinds of things are going to happen very much in most of South Asia. I hope to be  
1669 converted to a different view, but I don't think so.

1670 A religion as ethical system, it seems to me, has not been a break with what I think of as very  
1671 unethical actions. Here we have a Buddhist country, an explicitly Buddhist country and a  
1672 Buddhist government in Sri Lanka, doing things to the LTTE, which perhaps they richly  
1673 deserved, but nonetheless does not strike me as an example of compassion that the Buddha  
1674 would have approved of. I think we can talk about similar things in the other countries. There is  
1675 no emergence of a nation-wide faith-based organization of significance, as far as I can tell. Now  
1676 this is a problem because South Asia is so gigantic, that you have organizations that are hundreds  
1677 of thousands of people strong, perhaps even millions of people, but that is just a drop in the India  
1678 bucket, in particular, which has 1.2 billion people. Speaking as a political scientist trying to deal  
1679 with political change in India, I don't see the faith-based organizations, on the civil society side,  
1680 having the kind of impact that even their great numbers would suggest. As I said, just to return to  
1681 my original point, on the other side, on the political movement side, that is to say, religious faith-  
1682 based organizations, or *faith-inspired* organizations, have turned themselves into political parties  
1683 and movements, which have had an enormous impact. Thank you.

1684 **Hilal Elver:** Thank you very much. Our third speaker is Victoria Riskin. She is a board member  
1685 of the Human Rights Watch. Thank you.

1686 **Victoria Riskin:** Sorry, I have a little bit of a cold so I apologize for my deep and lovely  
1687 sonorous voice this afternoon. It's nice to be here again and to focus on this topic. I realized that  
1688 in thinking about it, as Human Rights Watch does its work in the region, very often our focus is  
1689 on what is happening to religious minorities. The human rights abuses that take place often play  
1690 themselves out around issues of power and control so that you find yourself looking at specific  
1691 cases where religious groups such as Buddhist monks or Muslim minorities or Christian groups  
1692 are – or even groups that are imposing severe and extreme interpretations of Shari'a law- are the  
1693 focus of a human rights investigation, of a Human Rights Watch investigation. The changing



1694 political climate has everything to do with the establishment of freedom or *lack* of freedom and  
1695 religion.

1696

1697 Everyone knows article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is that everyone has  
1698 the right to the freedom of thought, conscience, and religion and that includes freedom to change  
1699 his or her religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others in public or  
1700 private, to manifest his or her religious beliefs in teachings, practices in worship, and observance.  
1701 I just stated that because I think it's so core and that we are at a very powerful crossroads where  
1702 everyone looks to the East and sees this giant of China taking an important role on the world  
1703 stage. China maybe a good place to start the conversation because China has in its Constitution,  
1704 like many of these other countries, very strong and clear language about freedom of religion, and  
1705 freedom of assembly, and speech and so on, on the one hand - there seems to be an effort to put  
1706 the right language into the Constitutional documents. But, on the other hand, religious groups  
1707 represent a very clear threat to the power and authority of many states such as China. You have  
1708 in China 70 million Falun Gong who are banned, who simply cannot gather together without  
1709 being at risk of arrest and torture- or even someone who might be a lawyer who wants to  
1710 represent the Falun Gong.

1711

1712 You also have the whole issue of Tibet. While there aren't a lot of Tibetans, there's world  
1713 sympathy for the Tibetans and the way they're treated by the Chinese has not broken their  
1714 attachment to their Buddhist past. In the run up to the Olympics, there were demonstrations and  
1715 the crackdown was very severe. In a community that has a large number of monks or nuns,  
1716 gatherings in Tibet are strictly controlled and spies often placed inside the monasteries. You have  
1717 the Uyghurs in the western part of China - there was an uprising that Human Rights Watch  
1718 detailed, in which several hundreds of people were injured and many killed, and there was a  
1719 vilification of Rebiya Kadeer who is sort of like the Dalai Lama figure for the Uyghurs, but is  
1720 now outside the country. From the point of view of the Chinese state, when there are uprisings  
1721 around the country based on economic injustice and then you have a coalition of people built  
1722 around a religious tradition, religion represents a very serious threat to their ongoing power and  
1723 control. From what I understand, there are many what they call "house-churches" cropping up in  
1724 China, where people have religious gatherings in their living rooms and choose not to register. I

1725 think as the Chinese become more educated and more affluent, the ability for the government to  
1726 control religious activity is going to begin to breakdown. The same thing occurs in our findings  
1727 in Vietnam where groups of monks who have been critical of the government, have been arrested  
1728 and tortured. Thich Nhat Hanh was a very popular Western Buddhist leader who was invited to  
1729 come back and all that went well *at the time*, and I'm going to underscore this, when Vietnam  
1730 wanted to have better trade relations with the United States. He was invited back and started a  
1731 temple again, and then when he left, over time members of his community began to be arrested.  
1732 So whether it's in Burma, where the monks were cracked down on, I think the question that we  
1733 have to ask ourselves is, do we have a responsibility to do something about that? Does it matter?  
1734 Does the rest of the sort of Western-oriented, democratic free-speech countries have a role to  
1735 play and, if so, what leverage is there? And is this a turning point and do we need to be thinking  
1736 about that more deeply?" Thank you.

1737

1738 **Hilal Elver:** Thank you very much. Our last speaker is Surichai Wun'gao. He is the Director of  
1739 Peace and Conflict Studies, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok.

1740 **Surichai Wun'gao:** I am going to follow up on the last question of my colleague to get started.  
1741 Maybe I will bring in the question, what is happening in certain place like in the case of Burma?  
1742 What kind of responsibility do we have? It is a question not only for Westerners. I would say the  
1743 issue that put me here is how the political climate makes an impact on faith-based organizations.  
1744 I have five points to relate to this.

1745 First one is quite ambiguous when you talk about political climate- it is ambiguous and becomes  
1746 so dependent upon how people interpret it. Talking about faith-based organizations, some  
1747 Buddhists organizations in Thailand are so ritualistic that I'm not sure about faith, you see.  
1748 Religious values are not quite expressed in the practice and in the rituals. This is my first point.

1749

1750 My second point is that I cannot go apart from relating myself to my great experience. In the  
1751 '70s, my generation had gone through military coups and a student massacre. In that period, of  
1752 the late '70s, we witnessed a very small group of people among four religions: Catholic,  
1753 Buddhists, Islam and also Christians joined hands to start a group called CGRS – the  
1754 Coordinating Group for Religion and Society. At that time, they were very instrumental in

1755 highlighting the details of suppression in the context of politics during and after the coup in the  
1756 late '70s to the international public. I think that how a network of faith-based organizations  
1757 interpret the political climate in a way that can be meaningful. In that sense, I think I cannot say  
1758 in general, but how the nature of engagement is being seen in this context.

1759

1760 From here I go to my next point, that it is much more dependent on how faith-based  
1761 organizations situate themselves in the global and political and also, more concretely, how they  
1762 see consumeristic and market oriented globalization. My point here is to relate to my country, a  
1763 country where maybe 90% are Buddhists. The Buddhist circles may be differentiated: at least  
1764 one in the mainstream, very traditional and very centralized bureaucracy, where they are much  
1765 related to the state. Second, there are also other types who are more adaptive to the market. They  
1766 started their own television programs and make a lot of efforts in 'provocation', but not linking  
1767 to any social issues, they do not identify themselves at all [with those issues], but they are more  
1768 responsive to pacifying the people who have been busy with making money, in the sense that  
1769 giving some meditation courses. There are others who are more anti-systemic, in the sense that  
1770 they are alternative, looking beyond the consumeristic and also critical of power in the context of  
1771 what is happening in the development of Thailand as well as its relationship with the neighboring  
1772 countries. So there are these types of trends, even among the Buddhist circles themselves, but the  
1773 latter ones are rather marginalized.

1774

1775 My point before the last is that I cannot avoid saying that the recent developments in Thailand  
1776 and polarization politics. This recent period from zero sum politics, winner takes all politics,  
1777 state capture politics, has a real serious impact on faith-based organizations. Although there was  
1778 a struggle to put Buddhism as the national religion, written into the Constitution, but it was not  
1779 successful. Still the movement in this context is related to some nationalistic movements, linking  
1780 to the border issues with Cambodia for example. In that context also we see the strengthening or  
1781 hardening of religious positions in terms of political lines, within Buddhist circles, vis-a-vis  
1782 Muslim circles in particular after the violence in the South in the last six years or so. In that  
1783 context, polarization politics really have shrunk the spaces of civil society engagement but there  
1784 are different efforts to overcome this beyond those who are very internally engaged, but rather to  
1785 reach out – we see more promising efforts among the interfaith development groups, and also

1786 monks, as well as responding to the issues of stateless children with migrant workers on the  
1787 border with Burma, for example. Thank you very much.

1788 **Hilal Elver:** Thank you very much for all speakers. The first speaker, Dr. Karim, spoke about  
1789 Bangladesh and the relationship between religion and politics and secularism and how military  
1790 coup and religious resurgence right after, came to the political environment. The second speaker,  
1791 Dr. Oldenburg, dealt with the question of the changing political climate in the South Asian  
1792 perspective in specific countries. Dr. Riskin talked from the human rights perspective and the  
1793 freedom of religion and the protection of the minorities in South Asia, specifically China. Our  
1794 last speaker spoke about his experience in Thailand, predominantly in Buddhist societies, and the  
1795 role of politics in the context of Thailand. We have half an hour, be as specific as possible, in  
1796 your questions and comments. Be as short as possible so that we can talk more.

1797 **Barbara Metcalf:** Is it possible between Phil and Lamia to talk a little bit about the issue of how  
1798 much has been ‘top-down’ in terms of creating a type of political culture in which it is necessary  
1799 to invoke religious symbols? Because from Lamia’s talk, that’s what I really got, that it was  
1800 really the military doing that. I am also interested in just the facts of, whether or not Bangladesh,  
1801 for example, still has the kind of principles in its Constitution that Victoria was talking about.  
1802 Obviously India does, but I was just wondering if there was some sort of comparison there that  
1803 you two might make about the state structure.

1804 **Mark Juergensmeyer:** While we are fishing for information, I would like to ask Phil and  
1805 Lamia, but also Barbara and Caroline, about Pakistan. Coming in by car this morning, there was  
1806 this guy on NPR from Brookings who said Pakistan is falling apart, it’s in crisis, it is deeply  
1807 divided. He gave the example of the killing of the governor of Punjab. He said “Look at this! It’s  
1808 an extremist political branch and rhetoric fueled by religion, he got shot down just in a middle  
1809 class mall.” I was like, “Wait a minute, are you talking about the Congresswoman in Tucson  
1810 or...” [Laughter] But then his whole thing was that this was a state where, I thought, only 7 % of  
1811 the electorate voted for religious parties in the last election-

1812

1813 **Barbara Metcalf:** That was a fluke. It’s never been that high.

1814

1815 **Mark Juergesmeyer:** Right. Never been that high? So help me out. What's really going on?

1816

1817 **Barbara Metcalf:** Can I just say one thing? My first comment to Phil when we met was "I just  
1818 wish we could just spend the whole weekend talking about Pakistan."

1819

1820 **Hilal Elver:** We have one more question.

1821 **Thomas Uthup:** Yes, my first question is very specific to Phil. I wonder if Rajapaksa are  
1822 becoming much more nationalistic and if having this militaristic operation against the LTTE has  
1823 enabled him to marginalize the JDP, the militant Buddhist group.

1824

1825 **Philip Oldenburg:** Yes, that's a different set of issues. I've forgotten...

1826

1827 **Thomas Uthup:** Yes, it enabled him to marginalize that group in Sri Lankan society. My  
1828 question to Victoria: I've been seeing some debate because our organization is somewhat  
1829 concerned about some of the reactions from the countries in the South – which are often  
1830 castigated by the International Association of Religious Freedom, the US Commission report on  
1831 religious freedom – that while they may have less of a problem with freedom of worship, giving  
1832 people the opportunity to build [indistinct], the big problem they have is with the freedom to  
1833 proselytize, the freedom to convert, because this creates for the regimes themselves problems  
1834 with faith-based organizations who *are* pushing for laws against conversion- whether it's in  
1835 India, the Hindu groups, you know, keep pushing for laws against conversion. In many African  
1836 countries, of course, there is also this tension and you go back to the Article 18, which was  
1837 written at a time when the West was in power so that the assertion, which I don't necessarily  
1838 agree with, is that this is just a Western conception of freedom of religion and why should we go  
1839 with it?

1840

1841 **Jan Pieterse:** A question on the hypothesis related to Pakistan: to what extent are current  
1842 dynamics that have been unfolding over the past year been a consequence of the American war  
1843 in Afghanistan, the NATO war in Afghanistan, whereby the reasoning is, if you take the war into  
1844 Waziristan, into the tribal areas, the border areas, it is alright. Then we will we will retaliate in  
1845 your centers. We will retaliate in Islamabad and in Lahore because as you have breached, with  
1846 the complicity of the Pakistan government, surely, you have breached the social and political  
1847 contract that has existed since the beginning of Pakistan, with these are tribal areas, communities  
1848 etc. If you breach that, then we will breach your alignment. This is not simply Pakistan, this is  
1849 geopolitics and geo-culture.

1850

1851 **Mark Juergensmeyer:** Yes, because the Brookings guy was saying this is the reason for a  
1852 particular American presence. If you are right, then it is the American presence that has created  
1853 the problem in the first place.

1854

1855 **Barbara Metcalf:** It's like you're from Arizona therefore you need more guns...

1856

1857 **Mark Juergensmeyer:** Yeah, exactly.

1858

1859 **Jan Pieterse:** The American presence can be described as the arsonist-fireman.

1860

1861 **Richard Falk:** It's tempting to continue Jan's line of conjecture, but I wanted to comment on  
1862 Vicki Riskin's important question: What sort of responsibility do we have as a consequence of  
1863 religious persecution going on in these various countries? It seems to me, that the way to  
1864 formulate that issue is to ask one further question, "What forms of responsibility *can be* effective  
1865 in helping the situation?" Because, in some sense, part of what the Western world, particularly  
1866 the United States, has been doing, is to pretend that there is a coercive mode of liberating  
1867 societies that are subject to this religious persecution. My view is that this almost invariably  
1868 makes the situation worse. I think the real question to focus on is how do you translate empathy  
1869 for those who are being victimized by religious repression of various forms without engaging in

1870 interventionary behavior that is productive of sustained violence and having many negative  
1871 consequences for the target societies?

1872 **William Headley:** There have been several oblique references to Buddhism, I'd like somebody  
1873 to raise it up specifically as an informal or formal actor in this whole situation, in two respects:  
1874 one is the whole question of resistance. We saw it in Tibet, we saw it in Myanmar, where  
1875 American eyebrows were raised when this happened. We were shocked. We didn't associate this  
1876 with the peaceful, sacred haze that the Dalai Lama or Thich Nhat Hanh had put to us – the  
1877 meditation and the saffron robes – it just didn't match that. When you put that in some  
1878 perspective...what's it going to take to get our attention? We became suddenly aware of Islam  
1879 when we had an experience of aggression. What's it going to take to make us aware of  
1880 Buddhism? Two questions.

1881

1882 **Lamia Karim:** In response to Barbara's question, and something that Mark and others raised,  
1883 both in the case of Bangladesh and in Pakistan what you see is very much of a top-down effort  
1884 from the state level. If you look at Pakistan in the '60s under Ayub Khan, it was a military  
1885 dictatorship and it was a far more secular state. Ayub Khan in 1961 or 1963 passed the Muslim  
1886 Family Law, which made having more than one wife without her permission illegal, and there  
1887 are a lot of other provisions included in that. However, in 1972 when Bhutto, who was a highly  
1888 secular person, comes to power in Pakistan one of the first things he did was to make the  
1889 Ahmadis non-Muslims in Pakistan. And in '78, under Zia-ul-Haq, who was extremely Islamic  
1890 or extremely conservative, he makes the Pakistani state an Islamic state and then you have the  
1891 Hudood ordinance. These have been top-down efforts, however, these efforts are very much  
1892 linked to politics and democratization, because when you need vote banks, when you need to  
1893 curry favor with different political parties, that's when you are forming alliances behind closed  
1894 doors and you are making certain, what I would say, "unholy agreements." This has been the  
1895 landscape of politics both in Bangladesh, Pakistan, and to a lesser degree, the other South Asian  
1896 countries.

1897 **Philip Oldenburg:** Yes, maybe just to continue that - the fact is that a vote for the Islamic  
1898 parties in Pakistan at the time of military dictatorship in a somewhat rigged election, in particular

1899 in terms of the requirements, because they somehow managed to build a coalition and get 11% of  
1900 the vote. That's their high point and absolutely their highest point. Nonetheless, it is perfectly  
1901 true that there is a lot of alliance work going on in Pakistan from the top-down. One of the  
1902 interesting things to me, the Family Laws Ordinance, is it's a very liberal ordinance, in its time  
1903 certainly, and it's still there- even though you have an Islamic and *jihadi* influence allegedly in  
1904 Pakistan - it's still there. That suggests to me that while it is a top-down thing, once you  
1905 implement something Islamic it's very hard to remove it out of the political practice and the law.

1906 Let me talk about the Buddhist party, it's the easiest one. I have been doing my best to follow  
1907 what's been going on in Sri Lanka, I've seen no mention of the Buddhist party even raising its  
1908 head at this point. It's very much this patriotic nationalist business that is there. In terms of when  
1909 are we going to pay attention: Well, the monks in Burma were not attacking the army violently.  
1910 It seems to me that Buddhism's nonviolence is something that ought to make them feel guilty,  
1911 and I suspect that there are plenty of monks who feel badly with how the Tamils were treated in  
1912 Sri Lanka. It's not that Buddhist countries can't be violent, obviously not, but I don't know  
1913 whether we can see it in quite the same way as others- I don't think the examples are as strong.  
1914 But that's fine, I'm an outsider and somewhat sympathetic to them.

1915

1916 Pakistan falling apart and the government of Punjab: this is a point I wanted to make earlier. The  
1917 governor of Punjab who was assassinated, was assassinated because he defended the Blasphemy  
1918 Law. And he did it by seeking pardon for this woman who was accused of blasphemy. The  
1919 woman is a Christian, and as Bill pointed out, the Christians in North Pakistan are  
1920 overwhelmingly ex-untouchables. The original complaint that the people made about her was  
1921 that she touched their water vessels. In other words, this was not an issue of blasphemy, it was an  
1922 issue of untouchability that occurred. I think this is a nice footnote to underscore the point I made  
1923 earlier about religion in South Asia being practice and not necessarily belief in some of its most  
1924 important things.

1925 I have been hearing that Pakistan was falling – I was hoping, of course, that Pakistan would fall  
1926 apart in 1971, I worked for that. But since then, I have been hearing that Pakistan is falling apart  
1927 and it just hasn't managed to do it. The fact is that the Punjab, on the whole – I mean there are a  
1928 few suicide bombings and so forth – but it is *not* coming apart. The administration is working,



1929 maybe inefficiently and with corruption, but it *is* working. Things like population growth rate is  
1930 going down, all kinds of things are happening. The economic growth rate actually hasn't been all  
1931 that bad. And the Punjab is something like 60% of Pakistan and it will exercise hegemony over  
1932 as much of Pakistan as it can. It may lose control over North Waziristan, or leave it open, but it's  
1933 not falling apart and it won't fall apart in the near future. I don't know. Caroline perhaps has  
1934 something else to say. I haven't been there recently, but I don't think so.

1935

1936 I am in absolute sympathy that US-NATO actions in Afghanistan have provoked certain groups  
1937 in certain ways; but I am also very cynical about Pakistan. The Pakistan military, which *is* in  
1938 control of the Pakistan government, has milked the US government once we got ourselves in  
1939 there, so that many of these attacks are against the military. At least until they succeeded, after  
1940 which the military woke up and said "Hey, they're attacking us, we better..." and that is why the  
1941 military obviously, to my mind, is collaborating with the drone attacks – they can't happen  
1942 without the Pakistan military's active involvement. The interesting thing about these things is  
1943 that there is a great deal that is not an attack...it is not retaliating on the Pakistani people, they  
1944 targeted people and they are trying to mobilize people against the military and the military's  
1945 alliance. And the military is afraid of it.

1946

1947 **Mark Juergensmeyer:** The scenario of Pakistan falling apart which you hear all over the  
1948 American media, is that something being promoted by the Pakistan military to encourage the  
1949 American military?

1950

1951 **Philip Oldenburg:** I don't know...

1952

1953 **Philip Oldenburg:** The military is playing a very important game, and it has to do with India –  
1954 they want to retain India as their enemy. They want to retain their position along with the huge  
1955 chunk of resources of the Pakistan government. Their position as controllers of a national  
1956 security policy, they want to have this so-called 'depth' in Afghanistan, they're waiting for the  
1957 US to get out eventually, and that's the long-term game that they're playing. The Taliban - the  
1958 so-called Pakistan Taliban, which is a bad name- recognize that and feel they can outmaneuver

1959 them. And yes, the point about Pakistan falling apart, is what [indistinct] once said about  
1960 Bangladesh, but I think it's true about Pakistan: "Everybody expects Pakistan to go down the  
1961 drain, they don't realize that there's no drain big enough to accommodate Pakistan. It is too  
1962 huge...what I'm talking about when I'm talking about internal differentiation, you have to look  
1963 at the whole country. Most of the country is at relative peace and relative working order. A few  
1964 bombers does not make for a country falling apart. I just don't see it, I'm sorry. If the person  
1965 from Brookings was Steve Cohen, I might, but –

1966

1967 **Mark Juergensmeyer:** The thing that puzzles me is where does that [idea] come from?

1968

1969 **Philip Oldenburg:** I don't know.

1970

1971 **Caroline Meyer White:** What I experienced on the ground in Pakistan is that people's  
1972 awareness has completely risen in the last few years regarding all these terrorist groups. Four  
1973 years ago, if I came saying to the people, "What about all these guys who are being recruited  
1974 here and there?" They would have said, "No no no. This is not in Pakistan. This is somewhere  
1975 else." But *today*, everybody will agree. "Oh yea, it's going on, it's going on big time." All the  
1976 parentless children are being picked up by these guys as well.

1977 **Victoria Riskin:** But is that a good shift in awareness? Not a shift in reality but in awareness?

1978

1979 **Caroline Meyer White:** Yes, I think so.

1980

1981 **Mark Juergensmeyer:** The fear level has risen.

1982

1983 **Caroline Meyer White:** I don't think the reality has changed a lot, but yes they've come out  
1984 more. Now there are bombs in Islamabad and bombs in Lahore. Maybe there wasn't so much  
1985 five years ago. It's mostly that the general Pakistani public have become aware of it and I think  
1986 maybe that's why we see it differently.

1987

1988 **Mark Juergensmeyer:** Clearly the fear level is so high that no *mullah* would officiate at the  
1989 funeral [of Salmaan Taseer].

1990

1991 **Barbara Metcalf:** No one wanted to be associated with him. I think, in a sense, it would be very  
1992 easy to see something about religion as core to what happened in this case – Muslims must care  
1993 so passionately about Islam that they're anti-Christian, or something like that. But you have to  
1994 look at Salmaan Taseer as a kind of symbol of what he was, and as I looked around at the various  
1995 reporting- you all kind of know the story, right? He is shot, 24 bullets, the bodyguard does not  
1996 protect him. It's from within and there is this total distancing. Is there any civil society in  
1997 Pakistan? The lawyers were the big hope, but it was the lawyers who were showering the  
1998 assassin with rose petals. That's basically the situation that we're talking about, right? So, what  
1999 is this about? It seems to me it's very hard not to say that what Salmaan Taseer represented, in a  
2000 fundamental way, and it's glossed as secular – to say that someone is secular is like saying they  
2001 are *Dajjal* or the Anti-Christ. They're evil, they're satanic, all of the above. In fact, what Taseer  
2002 represents is that fabulously rich layer of Pakistani society in which everybody in the army,  
2003 everybody in politics, led by a totally corrupt prime minister who has no moral authority  
2004 whatsoever, has their house in Doha, their house in Qatar, their house in Switzerland, their  
2005 money. One of the links I clicked on was to an expatriate Canadian paper that showed Taseer  
2006 next to a woman with dyed hair and her sari falling off. And that kind of sums it up. We live in a  
2007 society where, as Caroline tells us, in ex-WNFP, 30% of the population lives as serfs, but still,  
2008 where you have this incredible divergence. So maybe, to come back to American policy, what  
2009 Biden should be out there is not saying, 'You've got to bomb North Waziristan even more.'  
2010 Until you start taxing, until you start reorganizing your society internally, you're going to have  
2011 this kind of thing that you're describing, people saying, "We have to find the moral order  
2012 somewhere." And you know, I bet when that guy said that we are all Taliban, he probably thinks  
2013 the Taliban stand for order and justice

2014

2015 **Mark Juergensmeyer:** ...and equality.

2016

2017 **Barbara Metcalf:** ...and equality.

2018

2019 **Caroline Meyer White:** It's not a criminal organization-

2020

2021 **Barbara Metcalf:** Weeeeelll, you know....

2022

2023 **Hilal Elver:** It's three o'clock. What are we going to do?

2024

2025 **Mark Juergensmeyer:** Let's keep going for a few more minutes.

2026

2027 **Victoria Riskin:** I was going to try to respond to what Richard said, because, of course, he asked  
2028 the \$64,000 question to which I'll give a \$2.95 cent answer. But to answer your question, is  
2029 freedom of religion, or assembly, or speech a Western concept? And are we in the business of  
2030 trying to shove that down the throats of people around the world? Which is a little bit going to  
2031 your question, right? So what I discovered in doing human rights work around the world, is that  
2032 it is usually not the victims who question the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it's usually  
2033 the people in power. So, the question then, is Richard's question: how do we move countries –  
2034 wherever they are in the world, in Asia, Southeast Asia – towards respect for religious groups, or  
2035 respect for human rights? Unfortunately we often do that in Western countries, maybe  
2036 particularly the United States, in a hypocritical way. We have such a long history of doing that in  
2037 a hypocritical way, of supporting governments if we like them and want to do business with  
2038 them. The answer, at least in the big picture, is we always have to start at home, and ensure  
2039 human rights inside our own tent. Not only the United States, but all countries who would adhere  
2040 to these principles and set a good example. Secondly, be part of a family of countries who say  
2041 this is how we see the world and it matters and then state that clearly. Sanctions have not been  
2042 terribly successful. We've put all the sanctions we can on Burma, and it makes it no difference.  
2043 So we have to start to massage the neighborhood. India now is a rising power, half-democratic,

2044 half with a whole slew of human rights problems that are domestic problems, but still with a  
2045 foundation in the rule of law and wanting to be an important world citizen with a sense of pride.

2046 And I think that's where you work on – I'll use a lousy expression - the coalition of the willing.  
2047 When we have those conversations of how Burma is conducting itself, the neighbors who want  
2048 something from Burma say, "Well, let's give them some more time. It's okay. It's a little  
2049 corrupt." But we have to say it clearly, without, perhaps, sounding arrogant, just clearly. I don't  
2050 know, other views?

2051

2052 **Jan Pieterse:** We've got two minutes for quick point. One is WikiLeaks. In Pakistan, it is a  
2053 public secret that, while the government officially condemns the American drone attacks in tribal  
2054 areas, the government is colluding. What is WikiLeaks? It confirms through classified  
2055 documents that yes, this is indeed the case. Here the media is pooh-poohing that, "Ohhhh,  
2056 WikiLeaks is not important, nothing special is in there." Well, there is. Also in relation to  
2057 Tunisia. Second point. I totally agree with you that there is inequality; structural, profound  
2058 inequality with the Punjabi landlords, and landlords everywhere, and an illiteracy rate that is over  
2059 70%. It is the key problem. When geopolitics is at stake, who cares about killing the peasants?

2060

2061 **Hilal Elver:** It's very unsettling to finish with your comment. That's why I am going to allow  
2062 one last comment.

2063 **[Laughter and crosstalk]**

2064 **Mark Woodward:** This may be only slightly less depressing, but this is an observation: when  
2065 we are looking at Pakistan and Bangladesh, and Malaysia, what we're really seeing with these  
2066 state-sponsored "Islams" is that they seem to be pretty uniform across the board. They really  
2067 emphasize "symbols of Islamists" and because it is the only thing that they can institutionalize,  
2068 you get stuff like Hudood. You get a real-Shari'a centered type of Islam because that's the thing  
2069 the state can institutionalize. It's kind of hard to institutionalize Qawwali, or something like that  
2070 or the other forms of Islam. But Shari'a is pretty easy. The state can get its hands around Shari'a  
2071 pretty easily and make that a symbol. I find a comparison of these three countries to be extremely  
2072 intriguing and for some of you who know this much better than I do, it's kind of interesting that  
2073 they're all former British colonies, and what the nature of British colonialism might have to do

2074 with that...

2075 **[crosstalk]**

2076 **Mark Juergensmeyer:** But if you could just complete that thought, do you have even more  
2077 radical groups within each one of these countries that try to subvert the Islamic authority,  
2078 because now you have state Islam- Islam is the state, the state is Islam- therefore if you want to  
2079 be an authoritarian, you can't be secular because that's Westernizing. Instead, you become  
2080 *jihadi*, you become super-Muslim.

2081

2082 **Mark Woodward:** That might be the argument, I don't know. We haven't seen that in Malaysia,  
2083 but Malaysia's a funny case. But there would be an argument that if you want to be anti-  
2084 establishment, that becoming super-Islamic, like *jihadi*, would be one choice.

2085

2086 **Elizabeth Collins:** One is the issue of state control, but the other is the issue of inequality, and  
2087 inequality is not as bad in Malaysia as in the other two countries. What worries me is growing  
2088 inequality. Not just the 30% who have no land in Pakistan, but policies, and I'm thinking of  
2089 World Bank policies now, like in Cambodia, with the generals taking over the land and  
2090 concentrating control of the land. I mean throughout the world, there is a growing concentration  
2091 of power over land in gigantic plantations. All throughout mainland Southeast Asia, the Chinese  
2092 and Saudis are buying up land and putting it in plantations and moving small landowners off the  
2093 land and turning them into essentially serfs so that the fundamental inequality is growing. That's  
2094 what worries me.

2095 **Mark Juergensmeyer:** Look at China and the US. Whereas 50 years ago, the world is way more  
2096 unequal now...

2097

2098 **Philip Oldenburg:** Perhaps a note of hope. In Bangladesh in December of 2008, they had an  
2099 election in which the more moderate Islamic party won overwhelmingly against the party which  
2100 was linked to the *Jamaat*, which is linked to an Islamic agenda. The *Jamaat* has now been, as I  
2101 say, returned to its restraints. The leaders are being prosecuted for war crimes, which they  
2102 deserve as far as I'm concerned. I believe that secularism has re-emerged into Bangladeshi  
2103 discourse in a way, so there is a possibility of reversal, a possibility of change, it seems to me, at

2104 least in Bangladesh. I'm not giving up on it.

2105

2106 **Mark Juergensmeyer:** Wait a second. Lamia was shaking her head.

2107

2108 **Lamia Karim:** Maybe just one last thing. I have to respond. I think the trend you're seeing is  
2109 going to have a huge backlash. For those of us who live and study in the West, I think, it is very  
2110 important that when we do- when we think about these regions that are quite far from us - that  
2111 we really examine who we are talking to. Because when you hear some of the secularists speak  
2112 in many of these countries, or the feminist NGOs, or the leading NGOs talk about religion, you  
2113 get a very different interpretation of what's happening than if you were to go to the *mosques* and  
2114 to *madrassahs* or to ordinary people like you did and hear what they are feeling. Frankly  
2115 speaking, there is a silent revolution happening in Bangladesh and it's not secular.

2116 **Hilal Elver:** Well, thank you very much, all of you. [clapping]

2117 **Panel 4**

2118

2119 **Aashish Mehta:** Ok, I think we should begin. The topic of this panel: How does the work of  
2120 faith based organizations influence the political climate?

2121

2122 **Thomas Uthup:** Thank you very much, I hope my voice will keep you awake and not send you  
2123 to sleep. Let me begin by saying that this morning we've had a few discussions about  
2124 definitions, and it just reminded me of an article I read a couple of years ago by a lady at  
2125 University in Scotland. Unfortunately I can't remember her name right now, but this particular  
2126 special issue of the journal was about the issue of defining religion. She said that defining  
2127 religion was like defining bald. It's very difficult to define when you're bald and I, of course, saw  
2128 it as a special time because I was trying to fill out a form at the time and my wife and I were  
2129 having a discussion because she maintained that I should put bald and I said I should put black  
2130 and white on the hair color part of the form. So I'm not really going to get into definitions. What  
2131 I want to talk about here are really two parts, and the first part is just focusing a little bit on this  
2132 role of faith-based organizations and how they influence the political climate. I should point out  
2133 at the outset also, that my views do not necessarily represent the views of the UN Alliance of

2134 Civilizations, I am here in my personal capacity...just in case some governments are upset.  
2135 When you look at how faith-based organizations affect public policy, I like to look at how  
2136 religious values affect public policy and how people interpret religious values and then it has an  
2137 impact on public policy. There are offered three ways of looking at this from a very public  
2138 policy oriented sense.

2139

2140 The first is of that of religious values and policy formulation, and by policy formulation what I  
2141 mean is, what are the goals that public policy should have? And one of these is as a foundation  
2142 and social limit to such goals and I'm going to start with what sounds like a very silly example,  
2143 but it's the whole issue of eating beef in India. Cow slaughter was banned, but this has real  
2144 implications because in the past when India was suffering from hunger, you had a lot more cattle,  
2145 perhaps meaning you could feed people with it, but because of this particular religious value you  
2146 were not able to utilize that as food. But in today's time, with this concern about the  
2147 environment, you could also look at this as a way to promote the environment, because, of  
2148 course, raising cattle for slaughter is a lot more ruinous for the environment than being  
2149 vegetarian. Of course, things have changed in India. Last time I was in India, I was on a flight  
2150 and they came through and asked you, "veg or non-veg?" And we asked for veg, but we were  
2151 sitting at the front of the plane and by the time they got to the front all the non-veg was out. I told  
2152 my wife that it must be because people believe that when they are on the plane the rules don't  
2153 really apply, because you're not on Earth.

2154 The second part is also about, what is your world view and what are the goals that you have? I  
2155 think that an example of this, which is not necessarily humanitarian but much more explicitly  
2156 political, is what I call the transformation of foreign policy from what scholars have said is  
2157 "namby-pamby" Hinduism and non-alignment as the foreign policy approach of the Indian  
2158 government, to muscular Hinduism and a nuclear India at that point. Religious values and policy  
2159 implementation, I think one could look at the issue of abortion/female infanticide issue in India  
2160 where...when I came to the United States I was really puzzled by how controversial the issue of  
2161 abortion was because in India abortion was legalized in 1956, and from my memory in 1970s  
2162 they released a requirement that you had to have a male sign for it. Of course, now it has become  
2163 an issue where families, when they don't want to have daughters, they are able to very easily go  
2164 for an abortion if the fetus is female, which they determine through amniocentesis. The other



2165 aspect again of implementation is how free governments are, or how pushed they are, to institute  
2166 laws against proselytization, because what I've seen in India at the state and national level, is that  
2167 it's not that the government necessarily wants to have these laws against proselytization and  
2168 against conversion, but it's the push from these faith-based organizations, particularly the RSS  
2169 and the BJP and other groups, that impose them and to actually have these laws.

2170

2171 Third, the evaluation of religious values and evaluation of public policy: I think the example you  
2172 can see is that in the reform of the Pakistani *madrasahs*, and Caroline is not here but she and I  
2173 were talking about it earlier. As you know, one of the projects that we have is a project on  
2174 education about religions and beliefs, so I monitor news about education about religions and  
2175 beliefs, and one thing that has become apparent is that there is a lot of resistance in the Pakistani  
2176 *madrasah* establishment to the reform efforts being made by the government. Conversely, in  
2177 Bangladesh there have been a couple of World Bank studies that have shown that female literacy  
2178 has actually increased when they have female *madrasahs* because, just like in the United States,  
2179 some Catholic parents want to send their daughters to Catholic schools because there will be no  
2180 boys there. The same thing is true in Bangladesh, parents are more willing to send their  
2181 daughters to a *madrasah* which is a female *madrasah* because they think there will be no boys  
2182 and therefore there won't be any problems there.

2183

2184 I want to talk in the second part, very briefly, at the UN level, at how the work of faith-based  
2185 organizations has affected the United Nations policy. One is that many of the UN groups do  
2186 recognize that faith-based organizations play an extremely important role from WHO to UNDP  
2187 to UNICEF, UNFPA, and of course, to the UN Alliance of Civilizations – we do recognize that  
2188 faith-based organizations play a very important role, particularly in the peace building and  
2189 development arena. There's been a lot of push from religious organizations to have more formal  
2190 kinds of roles to play, but the challenge often is of recognizing who the right representatives are,  
2191 who the appropriate representatives are. I'll just give you a small example, the UN has many  
2192 NGOs which are accredited to the UN, but sometimes these organizations might be regarded by  
2193 people as being completely legitimate, but in the mainstream these religious movements might  
2194 not be regarded as being really acceptable. The Hare Krishna movement, for instance, they  
2195 would not really be regarded as being part of mainstream Hinduism by a lot of Hindus, and

2196 there's another group called the Brahma Kumaris – they are all recognized by the UN. So this  
2197 can be problematic.

2198

2199 Finally, I think that one thing that we at the Alliance recognize is that if you want to have this  
2200 kind of change, sometimes working at the political level is not necessarily very useful. It's much  
2201 more important and much more practical to work with local, grassroots organizations, so one of  
2202 the things that we're trying to do is to recognize innovative local grassroots organizations that are  
2203 working on bringing groups from different religions together. For example, I'll mention a South  
2204 Asian case: we have a project called the Youth Solidarity Fund which gives small grants to youth  
2205 groups that are working to bring young people together on a project. This year one of the  
2206 winners was a group from Bangladesh who was bringing together Muslims and Dalits. Young  
2207 Muslims and young Dalits were getting together to go and live in each others villages and  
2208 actually do things that would serve the entire village, like digging a well, and we thought this  
2209 would be a very good example for young people and for children to see that, despite their  
2210 differences, one being Dalit and one being Muslim, that they were actually working together. I'll  
2211 stop there.

2212 **Aashish Mehta:** Thank you. We'll now hear from Professor Barbara Metcalf from UC Davis.

2213

2214 **Barbara Metcalf:** Thanks, there was so much in that. I feel as if I could just take up all of these  
2215 wonderful things that Thomas just introduced, but let me just use one of his many interesting  
2216 comments, which had to do with beef eating, because it really is a reminder of how little we can  
2217 extrapolate from first principles, about what might be loosely called “core values” of a religion.  
2218 One might say it is well known that Hindu's regard eating beef as immoral, or something like  
2219 that, but that gives us no clue at all of how that actually has worked out historically, in terms of  
2220 mobilizing various movements, in terms of identity formation and so forth. For example, there is  
2221 extremely rich work done by an Iranian anthropologist on the discourses surrounding the anti-  
2222 Muslim *pogrom* in Gujarat in 2002, in which a core issue of the rhetoric that was used to train  
2223 untouchables in killing, because you have to learn how to kill actually, was that these Muslims  
2224 all eat beef, and if they can kill animals they are capable of killing humans and so forth. That was  
2225 a core rhetoric that they used, to in a sense, socialize these people into feeling that they finally  
2226 had some status and they could be a part of the larger Hindu community. So what looks like an

2227 enlightened value, for environmentalists, for animal rights, for all kinds of reasons, can also have  
2228 this other kind of meaning. I know an Italian anthropologist who now, out of solidarity, tends to  
2229 eat at least small amounts of meat.

2230

2231 Since I thought I was going to be last on this, I was really going to bring it around to Muhamad  
2232 Ali's initial elegant presentation, all of which I think on some level we all agree with. But I  
2233 wanted to really step back and urge the importance of never making any assumptions that you  
2234 know what core values a Muslim, a voluntary organization, an NGO, or whatever it is, might  
2235 have that's motivating it. I want to use the example of two very significant organizations in the  
2236 Indian context – in the Indian political context and the secular state. Those organizations are the  
2237 Jamaat-e-Islami, which you've already heard referred to in Pakistan as a key *jihadi* organization,  
2238 and in Bangladesh as the organization that sided with Pakistan against fellow Bengali's at the  
2239 time of the Liberation War, that was outlawed and that was now part of the alliance that was  
2240 defeated by more moderates in 2008. The Jamaat-e-Islami originated in Hyderabad, in the  
2241 Deccan of India, in the 1930s. Its ideologue is one of the most influential Muslims of the entire  
2242 twentieth century. If you go into any MSO, Muslim Students Organization, on any of your  
2243 college campuses in this country you'll have Maududi's writings available in English and in  
2244 Arabic. He is a key influence on Sayyid Qutb, who is the hero of Al Qaeda, just to give you an  
2245 idea of who Maududi is. So what is the Jamaat-e-Islami in India? Oh, I should say that the  
2246 Jamaat has completely separate organizations from 1947, there is no institutional affiliation  
2247 between Jamaat-e-Islami Hind and Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan, Kashmir, or Sri Lanka. So, what is  
2248 it in India? Well, in India it is a social service organization and an educational organization. At  
2249 their annual meeting they provide vegetarian food only so their Hindu brothers will feel  
2250 welcome. And I can't really tell you enough about the Jamaat, but here's a really crude shorthand  
2251 – they were very much influenced by fascism and communism in terms of institutional vision of  
2252 a vanguard of a small group of committed people, absolute purists. So you would *never*  
2253 participate, let's say, in the movement for Pakistan because the people who led that, the Muslim  
2254 League, did not adhere to the proper vision of the Islamic state. Jamaat is a core Islamist  
2255 organization. What is so interesting about that is either if you went from principles of Islam, or if  
2256 you went from principles of Maududi, you would never get to the point of understanding how the  
2257 Jamaat-e-Islami operates in India today. Phil made the generalization that the faith-inspired

2258 movements...isn't there something about faith being known to God alone? I don't know. I call  
2259 them communitarian in the Indian context. The communitarian movements, that is to say,  
2260 movements that are fundamentally geared to the interests of particular religious communities,  
2261 which are often Victorian, defined in terms of minority cultural rights and minority human rights.  
2262 The Jamaat-e-Islami, like the Jamiat-Ulama-i-Hind, never turned into political parties. So that's  
2263 my one example and the other is the Jamiat-Ulama-i-Hind. They go all the way back to 1919, an  
2264 old, old movement. The reason I mention them is that the Jamaat undergoes a huge  
2265 transformation in the democratic context of India and is a fascinating example of showing how  
2266 what you might take as core values are, in fact, produced in very precise political contexts.

2267

2268 I just published a biography of their foremost leader, Husain Ahmad Madani, during the  
2269 independence movement. These people, the Islamic scholars, are the people who were wholly  
2270 committed to the Gandhian movement. Madani is in jail with the Karachi Six in the twenties and  
2271 so on and so forth. If you read his stuff there are all of these neologisms like human rights –  
2272 minority cultural rights is only a meaningful concept after World War I, that's when it comes into  
2273 discussion. He's talking about the Haqooq-e-Insaniyat that early, that kind of notion. So it's more  
2274 understandable, in a sense, that the JUI continues in a pattern which is fundamentally the same as  
2275 the one I described for the Jamaat-e-Islami. There they are at the Gujarat earthquake, feeding  
2276 people and creating orphanages, which is controversial on its own, and so and so forth. Just let  
2277 me make one more final comment about secularism. Any of you who follow India, at all, know  
2278 about the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya, December 6, 1992. When, with government  
2279 blinders/assistance, the kind of movement that Phil was referring to, these Hindu communitarian-  
2280 types tear down a sixteenth century mosque on the grounds that the mosque was built on the site  
2281 of a Hindu temple and that temple was where the God Rama was born. Finally, almost nearly  
2282 twenty years later, a judgment came down adjudicating what would happen to this place, which  
2283 saw not only that criminal activity, but in 1948 an image of the God was criminally placed inside  
2284 the mosque as a lay to claim. What is fascinating is that in this shocking judgment, the decision  
2285 was to apportion the mosque into three parts, two of them to Hindu organizations, turning a  
2286 complete blind eye, in this society ruled by law, to issues of criminality. Now many people,  
2287 Muslims and Hindus alike, say, “Fine, who cares, let's just get this over with.” On the other  
2288 hand, the most indignant voice...oh, what I'm not telling you is why – on the grounds of a long

2289 cherished Hindu belief that the God Ram was born there. A matter of property, criminality and  
2290 law, has, if you will, been adjudicated on the grounds of religion/myth. The reason I think it's  
2291 really worth looking at this, is that if that is happening in, what are meant to be, the institutions  
2292 that uphold the rules of a secular state, the loudest and most articulate voices in favor of  
2293 secularism right now are the Muslim voices in India. Again confirming Victoria's point, that it is  
2294 often from minority groups that you get this.

2295

2296 **Aashish Mehta:** We'll now hear from James Donahue, the President of the Graduate  
2297 Theological Unit at Berkeley.

2298

2299 **James Donahue:** Thank you very much. I want to apologize in advance for not addressing the  
2300 question that is on the docket, in terms of this session. As I indicated this morning, I come to this  
2301 conversation not as an expert in South and South East Asia with a lot of experience, but as a  
2302 professor of social ethics and religion and culture and politics. I'm very engaged in these issues.  
2303 But I wear the hat, as I said, of an educator, of someone who over the last number of years has  
2304 been putting together a graduate program in religion and theology and culture, and what I'd like  
2305 to do is appeal to the roles that each of us around this table play as educators and try to articulate  
2306 or indicate what I see as some of the skills or qualities we would hope to cultivate in the  
2307 graduates of our programs. If our graduates, from your universities and the GTU, if they're  
2308 going into the world of religion, global civil society, working for NGOs, working in the  
2309 academy, working for the churches denominations, what are the skills and what are the qualities  
2310 that you would hope they would have to be able to do the work that we are engaged in? Much of  
2311 what I will say here is really picked up from the conversation today. What are the kinds of  
2312 distinctions, the kinds of issues that one needs to be able to navigate the waters of these  
2313 enormously complex issues?

2314

2315 I'm just going to name ten or eleven skills – not going to be long, not going into detail on each of  
2316 them – but I'll give you an idea of what I think, gleaned from what we have been talking about,  
2317 are really critical. One of the hats I wear is that I'm on the commission of the Western  
2318 Association of Schools and Colleges. I do a lot of assessment and outcomes work, and that's the  
2319 kind of stuff that drives us academics crazy, because the accreditors want to know about

2320 outcomes and how are you going to measure this. Well it's not an uninteresting issue when you  
2321 think about, how do you measure the outcomes and the goals, if you will, of those who are going  
2322 into this kind of work? There are a number of different issues at play here. Here is what I would  
2323 propose as a list of what are necessary skills to do the work that is in front of us.

2324

2325 First of all, and this has become loud and clear, we need to have a precision, or our graduates  
2326 need to have a precision, about terms and ideas – about religious terms, about social scientific  
2327 terms. You cannot make assumptions, as Barbara was just saying, that you understand  
2328 something. Nor can you make sweeping judgments or generalizations about religion or Islam or  
2329 culture. You need to develop a precision about terms, religious terms, social scientific terms –  
2330 that is absolutely essential.

2331

2332 Secondly, and this might seem pretty obvious and commonplace, you need to understand the  
2333 difference between theory and practice. You need to have theory, you need to have studied ideas.  
2334 At the same time you cannot substitute theory for practice. Good education in this arena  
2335 involves both theory and practice.

2336

2337 Thirdly, you need to develop an understanding of context – religious diversity, cultural diversity,  
2338 particularity – you need to understand context. At the same time context is not unrelated to  
2339 larger ideas, but at the same time larger ideas do not override the particularities of context. So  
2340 one needs to have the skills to be able to identify, define, and understand context.

2341

2342 Fourthly, you need to understand the nature of religious and cultural pluralism. I'll just mention  
2343 religious pluralism. There are issues for religious pluralism, for some denominations and  
2344 traditions the notion of religious pluralism comes easily. For others it does not, and we need to  
2345 understand why that is so. Why is it that some traditions have an easier time with coexistence,  
2346 with understanding that there are multiple religions at play, especially in democratic societies?  
2347 For some the cultural and religious reasons are significant as to why they aren't. So  
2348 understanding religious pluralism is absolutely critical.

2349

2350 One needs to have skills of conflict resolution and problem solving skills. You don't have to have

2351 a PhD in conflict negotiation skills, but much of our work is bringing together people around  
2352 differences and understanding how you navigate commonality and how you navigate differences.  
2353 How does that work? There's a whole body and corpus of literature and a whole field that  
2354 addresses this, which you folks know a whole lot more about than I do, but navigating these  
2355 religious differences and commonalities requires enormous skills in conflict resolution,  
2356 consensus building, etc.

2357  
2358 You need to understand what inter-religious dialogue is about. As someone who hears that word  
2359 about ten times a day, I find the imprecision that is used about that to be incredible. It's not a  
2360 "*Kumbaya*" moment where people just talk about what they believe and what they don't believe,  
2361 and I've seen a lot of groups that do this, but it's layered, it has to do with religion, it has to do  
2362 with culture, with values and many of the things you were talking about, Thomas – there's  
2363 different aspects to this. Actually it's very interesting – this is a little promotion for the center  
2364 here Mark – on page five of the recent Delhi conference, John Chathanatt has on the bottom  
2365 there, different ways of understanding what religion is: religion as cultic element, religion as  
2366 creedal element, religion as normative element, religion as community development. It's all of  
2367 those and depending on the context and the situation in which one is talking, there's going to be  
2368 different understandings at play in the discussion.

2369  
2370 Seventh, one needs a critical reflection of traditions and texts and holy texts and holy books –this  
2371 is absolutely critical. How do religious traditions engage in the work of critical evaluation, of the  
2372 tradition, of the history, of the experience and of the text? As you can well imagine, some do  
2373 that a lot more easily than others. That becomes a real point of controversy frequently because  
2374 for some it comes easy – you do critical reflection, you look at them in context, historical critical  
2375 method, all those kinds of things – for others, not so much. It is really important to understand  
2376 how those interpretive tasks, those critical skills, happen. We were talking a little bit over lunch  
2377 about this issue of proselytizing and evangelization and one of the things that came up, what we  
2378 were saying was, that for many, the point of proselytizing is not to convert necessarily, but it's to  
2379 have the purity of intention in engaging in the process of evangelizing or trying to convert. So  
2380 you measure it not necessarily in the number of converts you get, it's not an efficiency equation,  
2381 but rather on the purity of intention. This you want to begin to understand by looking at

2382 particular traditions.

2383

2384 Number eight: the relationship between religion and ethics. As a professor of ethics I do believe  
2385 that religious truths have to pass the test of moral and ethical reference. It's not sufficient to say  
2386 that I believe such and such, therefore it's right, therefore it's good, therefore it's just. There  
2387 needs to be some dimension of ethical testing for this. What the measures of that are is  
2388 complicated. It's a little bit the same thing as saying there has to be a rational component to  
2389 religious belief. Is it sufficient to say that faith is strictly based on the internal self-justification of  
2390 the claims that come from within a tradition? Or does one have to have some measure or test for  
2391 judging the adequacy of those particular texts or truths?

2392

2393 Ninth, one needs to understand the difference between social theory, ethics and theology –  
2394 understanding the problematic nature of religion. That's probably pretty obvious to all of us, to  
2395 see that religion doesn't cut one way, there is not necessarily agreed upon ways, it cuts many  
2396 different ways. But there's something inherently problematic about religion, and if you don't see  
2397 that, if you see it as a force of good or force of evil...when you look at some of the public  
2398 conversations they are so simplistic and mundane it's mind-boggling. People will say that  
2399 religion has been a force for evil in the world, therefore how can they possibly believe? The new  
2400 atheists say that. Or religion has been a source for good, so how can you possibly not believe?  
2401 Anyway, it cuts many different ways. The last point I want to build on is something that Bill  
2402 Headly said today, that religion these days is so layered. It's not just about religious truths or  
2403 religious beliefs, it's also about spiritualities, about values, ritual, worship, prayer, morality, it's  
2404 about a number of these different dimensions. Don't be deluded into thinking that religion is  
2405 simplistic and a one-layered reality. Anyway, I take that from our conversations today and from  
2406 my own thinking about how in the context of global civil society, focused on religion, we can  
2407 think about these issues. I would hope that the graduates, and those that are exposed to our  
2408 programs and our work and our thinking, would come out with a set of skills that might reflect  
2409 the best of what's possible, and also what is exactly necessary to navigate some very complicated  
2410 waters. Thank you.

2411

2412 **Aashish Mehta:** We'll throw it open for questions now, or comments.



2413

2414 **Mark Woodward:** One quick observation on cow killing, and how far this can go. In the late  
2415 19<sup>th</sup>-early 20th century, there was actually something called the All India Meat Eaters Society  
2416 that was established because certain types of modernist Hindus were concerned that Hindus had  
2417 become effeminate because they did not eat meat like Muslims.

2418

2419 **Unidentified speaker:** Vivekananda was part of that.

2420

2421 **Lamia Karim:** Also one comment on beef eating and then a couple of questions. The beef  
2422 industry in Bangladesh rests on Bihari cattle, shipping cows from India to Bangladesh. Yes, if  
2423 the cows are not from India...

2424

2425 **[crosstalk]**

2426

2427 **Lamia Karim:** Now for the questions, first one to Thomas. What is the name of the NGO in  
2428 Bangladesh that is doing the work with Muslim youths? And then to Barbara, I was under the  
2429 impression about the Ayodhya judgment that it was in three parts, one part went to Hindus, one  
2430 part to Muslims and the third was going to be an interfaith dialogue.

2431

2432 **Barbara Metcalf:** No, no...

2433 **Philip Oldenburg:** They rejected the claim of the third group...

2434 **[more crosstalk]**

2435

2436 **Lamia Karim:** And then I would like you to speculate, based on what you know about India, to  
2437 what extent do you think India's rise to economic power, globally and regionally, may change  
2438 some of the ultra-right wing rhetoric and practices? Will it have some effect or not?

2439

2440 **Aashish Mehta:** Lets try and collect some more questions. Anyone else?

2441

2442 **Ria Shibata:** I have a question to Thomas about religions wanting a more formal position to  
2443 inject their voices in the public policy formulation. In reality, how do religions actually inject

2444 their voices, for example in UN policy?

2445

2446 **Thomas Uthup:** First, to the question asked by Lamia about the NGO youth group –  
2447 unfortunately I would not be able to tell you the name of the group, but if you go to the website  
2448 that I had shown earlier of the youth website and look at the youth solidarity point, or just do a  
2449 google search “youth solidarity point 2010 winners”, you can find out all of the winners and  
2450 there's a description of the project.

2451

2452 I think your question about the rise of India as an economic power is really very interesting  
2453 because I want to pick this up also about what you were saying about Muslims being the  
2454 defenders of secularism. I assume you're very familiar here with the work of Ashutosh  
2455 Varshney? His work on religious conflict has shown that most of the inter-religious conflict in  
2456 India has happened in eight metropolitan areas. I mentioned to somebody that the fact that India  
2457 is still sixty percent in the villages is actually something that is helpful towards continuing the  
2458 secular status of India. Because if you look at a lot of the support for the BJP and the RSS,  
2459 there's a substantial intellectual support for it, particularly in the university level, but also in  
2460 what Marx would call the *lumpenproletariat*, the urban areas who are a little bit educated.  
2461 Sometimes I'm concerned that with the rise of India as an economic power, that there might be  
2462 more of a push towards more right-wing approaches in the body-politics just based on the work  
2463 that has been done by people like Varshney.

2464

2465 In the case of Pakistan, one of the factors that was not mentioned, and we were talking earlier  
2466 about Salmaan Taseer, is this issue of age. It's actually the people who are older that tend to be  
2467 “more secular” and more willing, but many of the people who are younger are not necessarily  
2468 that secular. Again in this sense, India is supposed to have this youth dividend that is supposed to  
2469 happen, where a substantial portion of the population will be young. So are they going to  
2470 become less secular? It's a real fear, but on the other hand, what I also see is that there is a  
2471 considerable influence of the West and modernization. So there is this thing - why are we  
2472 fighting about this? At least for people of my generation, why are we fighting with Pakistan? Let  
2473 them do what they do. We should be more concerned with what is happening within our  
2474 societies.

2475  
2476 To the question from Ria about what is currently the opportunity for religious groups to  
2477 influence public policy. One way is to work through government. There might be certain  
2478 governments that are more open to working with religious groups. Let's not forget that the  
2479 Vatican is the only religious group, in a sense, that has an actual recognized presence at the UN.  
2480 I think that there is another level where religious groups can work, at least in being convened by  
2481 the UN at various events. For instance, the Alliance of Civilizations has these forums every year  
2482 and we have brought together religious leaders to talk about peace making and conflict  
2483 resolution, primarily working with religions for peace. So there's an opportunity to talk about, at  
2484 least setting the agenda in terms of bringing it to the forefront – what are the roles of religion in  
2485 conflict resolution and peace building? And, letting people know about what the groups are  
2486 doing. We also recognize sometimes groups that are doing innovative work in bringing people  
2487 from different religions together. This year United Religions International was recognized for  
2488 one of their programs called Peace Camp International, which is held around the world.

2489  
2490 **Barbara Metcalf:** I'm not sure I have too much to say, except just to underline that there have  
2491 been initiatives beyond the well digging to bring Dalits and Muslims together in India, going  
2492 back to the thirties. I mean there are some very old efforts. In the Indian context, there are very  
2493 old efforts because by every socio-economic measure, Muslims and Dalits have the most in  
2494 common. That might be a slight exaggeration, but there was a major initiative from the Prime  
2495 Minister four or five years ago which produced a report, the Rajinder Sachar Report, that  
2496 showed...again it really comes back to this theme that I'm really hammering hard on, and that is  
2497 that you cannot tell very much about Muslims, or Muslim behavior, by looking at abstract  
2498 values. It was widely considered on the issues of backward Muslim women, that backward  
2499 Muslim women were backward because they weren't allowed to have education by their  
2500 husbands, because they were the sixteenth wife, because they were subject to triple *talaq*,  
2501 unilateral divorce, and so forth. Of course, what this report showed instead was that when you  
2502 control for issues of poverty, the situation of Muslim women is basically the same as that of,  
2503 what in India are called OBCs, or the backward classes, people on the very bottom of the social  
2504 pyramid. Muslims are poor and they are also subject to discrimination. One argument that is  
2505 now made – this is a really indirect way of getting to your question, your excellent and

2506 impossible question - is in a sense, Muslims spokesmen are out there, and have been for the last  
2507 century, arguing in favor of the secular democratic state enshrined in the liberal state. But the  
2508 ethnographic work that's been done by... At another level, there has been an effort in recent  
2509 years for Muslims to push toward assimilation into the Hindu caste structure, which is really  
2510 what affirmative action is in the Indian context, because there have been moves to provide  
2511 compensatory discrimination as was provided at the time of independence. It was intended to be  
2512 for a short period and has become a permanent and expanding vested interest to Muslims as well.  
2513 In a sense, that is a counter-move to the vision of liberal democracy, as it is, in an ideal state  
2514 from people like Craig Jeffrey, has shown that one of the main benefits of compensatory  
2515 discrimination, in the Indian context, has been to embolden people. That it's had far more impact  
2516 on Dalits and their vision of hope for them, and to the extent that Muslims have been deprived of  
2517 that, who knows. But that doesn't tell you what will happen if there is economic development,  
2518 it's just that Muslims – at one time the wealthiest man in India was a Muslim, there are pockets  
2519 of wealth no doubt about it – but Muslims as a whole have been truly left behind by a lot of that  
2520 change.

2521

2522 **Mark Juergensmeyer:** Picking up the business of Muslims in India, because there is not only a  
2523 class issue - by the way there are Christians as well as Muslims who want to be untouchables -  
2524 but also a conceptual one, because the two things you said that seem contradictory are absolutely  
2525 right: that Muslims in Pakistan despise secularism, and Muslims in India like it. How can that be  
2526 true? And one answer is: different kinds of secularism. Totally different ways of thinking about  
2527 that term, and Charles Taylor showed well in the "Secular Age" that there are different kinds of  
2528 secular, or secularisms. Rajiv Bhargava, who was one of Taylor's students, was very adamant on  
2529 the point that Indian secularism has certainly never been American secularism and certainly not  
2530 *laïcité* in a French setting. Indian secularism simply means that you treat all religions equally,  
2531 and the state supports them all, even providing money for religious institutions, but it treats them  
2532 all equally. That's why when the BJP accused the Congress party of being "false secularists",  
2533 what they meant by that was that the Congress party wasn't treating all religions equally - it was  
2534 privileging Islam. So yes, Muslims in India want to be treated equally, everybody, particularly  
2535 people who are not treated like Vicki Riskin said, issues of human rights are particularly felt by  
2536 those not in power. If you're not in power and at the margins, of course, you want to be treated

2537 equally. Whereas in Pakistan, where it's a whole different situation, there the whole image of  
2538 secularism is identified with a kind of Westernized elite. And a kind of elite

2539

2540 **unidentified speaker:** “Godless,” “oppressive”...

2541

2542 **Mark Juergensmeyer:** yeah exactly, right...people who just stick up their nose and say, “Oh  
2543 you poor, traditional, religious types; we're much better than you.” And there's no question that  
2544 there's that attitude, perhaps rightly - there is this huge egalitarian gap in it and part of it does  
2545 have western educated, secularist images attached. So, the secularisms are quite different in the  
2546 two places.

2547

2548 **William Headley:** I just wanted to say to Jim, it was a nice summary toward the end of our  
2549 session. I'm not sure if you came in with it or absorbed it from us, but it was really quite nice and  
2550 very respectful. Barbara, her precision question right there; Elizabeth, her discussion of theory  
2551 and practice; many of us were addressing context and problems of religions. I even felt respected  
2552 in terms of spirituality. I have some friendly amendments and was wondering if you said it all.  
2553 You were speaking about them very quickly and I know you had a short amount of time, but you  
2554 went on to say that theory, the study of ideas, you don't think theory will cover all practice. Isn't  
2555 it the reciprocal true too? To understand your practice, in any kind of context, you need to have  
2556 some sort of theoretical framework.

2557

2558 **James Donahue:** Exactly.

2559

2560 **William Headley:** You talked about understanding the problem of religion; I thought of  
2561 Appleby's wonderful little book, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred*, which might be a helpful  
2562 comment there. Have you said it all? It came up in Mark's comment and the same person I was  
2563 referring to in my notes here - it's secularity. Is it simply enough to say today, be aware of the  
2564 context? Or do you need to include an appreciation or a struggle with secularity today? It's such  
2565 a prominent kind of discussion and I'd like to hear your comment on this: how I understand  
2566 Charles Taylor deals with it in his “imminent frame” kind of concept and what I understand of  
2567 that is, by Christianity itself, by forcing it to a particular external, moral order, then expose

2568 religion to a particular way to criticism, in such a way, that people have lost a sense of the  
2569 transcendent. I guess my question is: Secularity, does that need to be included? The other,  
2570 which I will not offer with so much wind, if you will, is the question of rendering: Do we not  
2571 also have to be ready to cross disciplinary boundaries to do this particular test? Of course, the list  
2572 could go on and on but could you comment just on those two?

2573

2574 **James Donahue:** Well, I resist the dramatic separation between religion and secularism,  
2575 especially when you begin to layer in things like spirituality, values, etc. The question is how  
2576 does one find the transcendent religious dimension within a secular context? That's where I  
2577 would pursue the inquiry. Not to say it's there, but to pursue the nature of the religious  
2578 dimension, what Taylor refers to as the transcendent dimension, in the secular context - not to  
2579 presume too much about it, but to go there and see that as part of the inquiry. I think the polar  
2580 separation of the secular and religious is really too simplistic frankly, so you find how these  
2581 merge together.

2582

2583 There's no sense that this is an exhaustive list, I would invite your additions to it completely. As  
2584 I was thinking that these were some of the more obvious ones, but there are other dimensions of  
2585 that. The other issue with the secular, and maybe I was trying incorporate that under the notion  
2586 of “the rational,” and where reason fits in – if you presume that reason becomes a test of the  
2587 adequacy of religious truth claims, then the question is how does reason function there? My  
2588 sense is that the ethical nature of reality is such that there is a rationality included in that. There  
2589 is a kind of calculus – is something destructive or not destructive? Is there suffering or not  
2590 suffering? Some of these things can be determined, you can at least make some judgments about  
2591 them, based on some rational assessment of them. Now that's not to reduce the secular to the  
2592 rational, I just don't want to get into too separated, or polarized sense, of these things.

2593

2594 **Katherine Marshall:** The question about religion and the United Nations triggered some  
2595 thoughts, because I happen to have been involved over the past decades in some of these issues. I  
2596 think the fundamental issue is, and it is I think part of this grappling with what does secular and  
2597 secularity really mean, can you – and my answer to start right away is “no” – can you divide the  
2598 world into people who believe and people of faith versus the rest, the sort of six billion versus

2599 one billion? I think it's a very phony and dangerous division. The fact is that in a large number  
2600 of global institutions, and in global civil society as well, religion is dramatically absent.  
2601 Somebody did a review – it's part of what the Luce grants are about – someone looked at, I think,  
2602 1,300 international affairs articles and found two or three that had religion in any way explicitly  
2603 in it. The World Bank library has no category for religion, even though I've been pointing this  
2604 out...

2605

2606 **Unidentified speaker:** To this day? Is that true?

2607

2608 **Katherine Marshall:** To this day, well when I checked last there was...

2609

2610 **Mark Juergensmeyer:** Does it have for Islam or Buddhism?

2611

2612 **Katherine Marshall:** Nope, nothing. In the fifty-year history of the World Bank...you know, I  
2613 go through indexes and there was *one* reference to religion. There's a huge gap in vocabulary on  
2614 the United Nations. I don't know about the early history, but basically from the year 2000 on,  
2615 there have been a lot of people saying there really needs to be a voice for religion in the  
2616 international system. There was the Millennium Summit, which was in many ways a spectacular  
2617 event, it was in August just before the Millenium General Assembly. There was this meeting of  
2618 spiritual leaders, which had over a thousand...I think there was about 3000 in the General  
2619 Assembly Hall for the first time ever. It was in many ways a catastrophe and set back the cause,  
2620 because of a variety of personality issues, but the idea of that was it was supposed to come up  
2621 with some kind of council of advisors. There has been a group ever since that has been arguing  
2622 for a Spiritual Council of the United Nations, which again is an idea that will go nowhere, but the  
2623 idea is that the security council should have a group of people who have the ethical and spiritual  
2624 grounding to advise. In fact, the United Religions Initiative, URI, which is based in San  
2625 Francisco, came out of the 50th anniversary of the United Nations and it too was saying if you  
2626 have a United Nations, you should have a United Religions. So there has been a lot of thinking  
2627 along these lines, there have been meetings of religious leaders for the past five years before  
2628 each of the G7/G8 meetings. My suspicion is that if you ask the leaders of the G7/G8 about this,  
2629 most of them have not a clue that there were these meetings. I think that from everything I've

2630 heard in South and South East Asia, there is nothing that is significant of a inter-religious nature  
2631 that has a regional base, though again there have been efforts to create that. I believe ACIA is  
2632 just barely beginning to think about a religious...

2633

2634 **Thomas Uthup:** Actually I've been part of a group at the Asia-Europe Foundation, which is  
2635 based in Singapore, but they have meetings both in Europe and in Asia, and they had a group for  
2636 three years called "Talks on the Hill" that was specifically dealing with inter-religious dialogue.  
2637 I just found out a couple of weeks ago that they have decided to cut that particular program out.  
2638 There is a move by some branches of Religions For Peace to actually establish a physical office  
2639 at the United Nations, which would try to be the vehicle through which the UN would be  
2640 advised. I don't know where it's going to go, or whether it's going to be successful. I think that  
2641 the issue about the Millennium Development, and this is the issue that I was talking about: who  
2642 represents what religion? It's that personality - so you have somebody who comes across to the  
2643 people in the room as a "windbag" or somebody who talks at an extremely high level spiritually  
2644 and people would be like "okay what does this have to do with anything?" But this is where the  
2645 issue of rhetoric comes in very handy, it is to have the people who can relate religious values and  
2646 religious rhetoric *to* the policy goals that the UN is trying to accomplish, whether it's security,  
2647 whether it's development, whether it's hunger, whether it's reducing AIDS, *that* would be most  
2648 useful.

2649

2650 I just wanted to pick up on a point Mark made about the secularism issue; it's absolutely right  
2651 that there are these many different kinds of secularisms, and one thing I found very surprising  
2652 was that France has a lot of this *laïcité*, but I was looking at public holidays in different countries  
2653 and France has something called "Assumption Day" as a public holiday. I don't think that's a  
2654 secular holiday. All I can say is as a kid, when I was in India, it was great because you get  
2655 public holidays off for Hindus, Christians, Muslims and also Buddhists and Jains, who are less  
2656 than one percent of the population. And then I came to the United States and even the Baptist  
2657 University of Baylor University didn't have Good Friday off.

2658

2659 **Philip Oldenburg:** I'm going back to the earlier discussion, and naturally I will start off with  
2660 meat eating. There is a wonderful book on the vernacularization of Indian politics, a study of the



2661 Yadavs of Agra and their political mobilization. The Yadavs are cow herders by tradition and  
2662 therefore vegetarians. In order to get Muslim votes they met with their vote brokers, and served  
2663 them a non-veg meal and ate it themselves. The power of the need for votes trumped their  
2664 vegetarianism. And I believe that story.

2665

2666 I am an optimist on the BJP issue and I've argued this for a very long time; the high point of  
2667 Hindu nationalism and the BJP's benefit from that was in fact the day of the destruction of the  
2668 Babri Masjid. From then on it was in decline. In November of 1993 as they held elections they  
2669 shifted from a Hindu nationalist program suddenly because they realized that they were going to  
2670 lose the states where they had previously won. The Gujarat *pogrom* was in fact, I think, the  
2671 death rattle of Hindu nationalism. I think there's been everywhere, in economic terms, the secular  
2672 downward trend of support for Hindu nationalism in the Indian parliament. But more important  
2673 was that the BJP never relied entirely, or even perhaps as a main factor, on Hindu nationalism for  
2674 votes. They relied on what they got votes for and what they still get votes for is for - integrity,  
2675 the party that is, on the whole, not corrupt and secondly, disciplined. A party we see that non-  
2676 dynastic, merit-based, disciplined and who can govern. That's what they were getting many of  
2677 their votes for. To equate the BJP with Hindu nationalism is a mistake. There are as many Hindu  
2678 nationalists in the Congress as there are in the BJP.

2679

2680 So then we go to Thomas' point about what, I would not call the *lumpenproletariat* but the  
2681 *lumpenbourgeoisie*, the young students, the youth who are without anything to do and turn to  
2682 fascist ideology and practice. I think that's over drawn, partly for this reason that I'm suggesting,  
2683 that in fact the vote is not coming from a particular group. Partly it is that India's economic  
2684 growth has moved a lot of these problem about where these people are going to get jobs. Now  
2685 they are all trying to become computer scientists and there's obviously not enough room for them  
2686 all. In fact, the BJP's strength and the Hindu national strength came from the middle trading  
2687 community, that's the real core of their strength. Those people are doing very well out of this  
2688 boom. In that sense globalization, whatever we may think of it, in terms of increasing  
2689 inequalities and so forth that is something that is obviously worrisome, but in fact this issue, I  
2690 think, is really a live one in terms of a *lumpenbourgeoisie*. The kinds of things that have  
2691 happened in Gujarat were state directed, this was the mobilization of particular elements who

2692 were, as you said, trained to kill, and given the means to do it, which they then produced. They  
2693 also had something of a backlash. So, I'm optimistic about the eclipse of that particular  
2694 thing...for whatever it's worth. That's my analysis on that.

2695  
2696 I just want to go back to the final point about the summit of religious leaders, being very  
2697 particularistic. When thinking about the 800 million Hindus, who can you choose as *the*  
2698 Hindu...you certainly can't have *the* Hindu leader? Swami Agnivesh doesn't cut the mustard that  
2699 way. There is no...

2700  
2701 **unidentified speaker:** And there's no Muslim leader, unthinkable—

2702  
2703 **Mark Juergensmeyer:** Why don't they all have Popes like us? (laughter)

2704  
2705 **Philip Oldenburg:** I mean I wish to be enlightened, if you will, about how many representatives  
2706 of the Hindu community would you be able to accommodate in your summit and what thing  
2707 would you expect to get out of it? And that's leaving aside Muslims, Buddhists, and any number  
2708 of other groups.

2709  
2710 **Barbara Metcalf:** Yes, and probably the person most of you would want to talk to is the living  
2711 divinity on earth, the Agha Khan, whose theology is so out of line, but he's so on target...you  
2712 mentioned it, the AK is perhaps the most inspiring series of projects anyone ever can find as far  
2713 as I'm concerned.

2714  
2715 **Thomas Uthup:** Just quickly to address this issue of the decline - on some levels I think yes,  
2716 they have declined and actually their reputation for integrity and corruption has also declined.  
2717 There is also, on the counter-level, for the first time you had a BJP government in Karnataka in  
2718 South India and that is not something that used to happen because the BJP was thought to fight  
2719 as a *Hindi* party.

2720  
2721 **Muhamad Ali:** I'll be very short, I just want to bring up the discussion about secularism, the  
2722 variety of secularisms. In Indonesia it's still quite controversial, still debated. What is Indonesia,

2723 is it a secular state or an Islamic state? You have diversity of opinions and movements for either  
2724 one, and for those who say, well Indonesia is an Islamic state because *pancasila* is already...you  
2725 have one pillar, for example, you have monotheism, belief in one God, that's an Islamic pillar  
2726 already, and then other religions have to adjust to this monotheism, including Buddhism,  
2727 Hinduism and Confucianism - you have to have one God and so on. I think that's very  
2728 interesting: faith-based Islam movements influence the state and then the state chooses a political  
2729 compromise, or common ground, at a national level. Then all other groups try to adjust to that. I  
2730 think it's quite unique to this debate about the variety of secularisms. And you have, of course,  
2731 [indistinct] seen as Muslim secular, you have Islam and secularism not necessarily as two  
2732 opposite things, it's really integrated. On the other hand, of course, people who don't like the  
2733 term itself say, "secularism- wow that's a Western term, so we don't like that." But in reality  
2734 they are secularizing themselves - so it's secularization and secularism. There's some distinction  
2735 also there that has become a public debate. I just wanted to mention this as one case that's quite  
2736 unique, how Islam and religion share the political climate, and then these political climates share  
2737 religions. Thank you.

2738

2739 **Surichai Wun'gao:** I feel it is very difficult to see how we can get out of the present crisis in  
2740 the context of the existing idea of states. When I heard Thomas talk about youth camps I felt  
2741 quite hopeful, but when he mentioned working only through the state representatives, I feel it to  
2742 be a bit problematic. When Jim was putting things together at that point, I think that maybe  
2743 human sensitivity can be included, not only in terms of concepts which often deal with and  
2744 become so easily trapped by dichotomies. So how can we bring the sense of crisis, which is so  
2745 much value-related crisis, maybe related to religious values, but not religion as it is mentioned,  
2746 today, in the sense of the great religions and all.

2747

2748 I was struck by the efforts to study, for example, a new international university called Nalanda  
2749 International University. Nalanda, a Buddhist university formed some four hundred years after  
2750 the death of the Buddha, and people said it was more than just India because many people came  
2751 including Chinese and many others. We talk about economic growth and that relates to national  
2752 identity and we are trapped by that. I think we cannot see the world beyond our national  
2753 identities and the summation of that. In that sense we need to consider a human identity that

2754 could go beyond, and the human sensitivity which we hope to cultivate if we look into our  
2755 interactions. So I think in that sense, your ten ideas...I'm grappling with how we can create a  
2756 sense of common crisis, not just a third world crisis. I think the crisis is also because of greed -  
2757 the structure of greed is everywhere, not only in the third world. And corruption is not only in the  
2758 third world, again, it is quite structural. So greed, delusion, and hatred, I think these are the real  
2759 trap, and beyond that I think these are very related to our religious ideas. So unless we grapple  
2760 with it, we will remain trapped with the national and seeing the totalizing concepts. I think this is  
2761 very much a burden for us, to sense the real crisis that is still going on. I think your challenge for  
2762 our vocation as educators also relates to intergenerational interactions. I see this in solidarity  
2763 with your youth work.

2764  
2765 **Thomas Uthup:** My slight amendment to the 6<sup>th</sup> point about inter-religious dialogue: I just  
2766 wanted people to know that there is also an interest in intra-religious dialogue. Many of you  
2767 know Krista Tippett, she has this program on NPR called, "Speaking of Faith." She had this  
2768 program about young Palestinian-Americans and Jewish-Americans getting together, and she  
2769 said one of the most surprising things was that the Jewish Americans, who were reformed Jews,  
2770 had never met or spoken with an orthodox Jew before this particular program. The second part  
2771 of this debate is about this debate about the word dialogue. Certain countries, and certain people,  
2772 seem to think that dialogue means that it is meant to change people's minds, that it's debate. But  
2773 properly understood by other countries, it is just that dialogue is being able to listen to each other  
2774 and talk with each other and understand where you are coming from, and it's not about change.  
2775 That could be another skill I think students would need to have.

2776  
2777 **Closing Comments**

2778  
2779 **Mark Juergensmeyer:** We are now going to participate in our closing comments. This is where  
2780 we eagerly look forward to hearing somebody wrap it all up. Well, that somebody is you. What  
2781 I've learned most, and maybe best, about conferences like this, I learned in the third grade. A  
2782 third grade teacher, Mrs. Beasley at the end of every day would tell us, "Ok children, what did  
2783 you learn today?" And we would all have to come up with one idea or one thought about  
2784 something new that we had learned. I'm not going to ask you what you learned today, but I want

2785 to ask you what new thing, or one thing that you thought differently, or one idea that came to  
2786 mind that this workshop helped you to frame in a way that is different or challenging.

2787

2788 I'll start off and tell you one of the things that I learned today, and that is I learned how the  
2789 questions you ask are sometimes the wrong questions, a bad question. This is what you always  
2790 learn in field work- that all the questions you have turn out to be bad. We had set this thing up to  
2791 talk about politics influence on religion and then religions influence on politics, but one of the  
2792 things that we found out, particularly when Mark was talking about state Islam in Pakistan and  
2793 Malaysia and the rise of BJP, is that it's not that simple. Sometimes even when religion  
2794 manipulates politics, politics is manipulating religion to manipulate politics. It is that these two  
2795 things are not as impermeable, just as in the mythological separation between religion and  
2796 secularism, there is sometimes an illusory separation between religion and politics. Katherine,  
2797 what did you learn?

2798 **Katherine Marshall:** Well, this was a very different discussion than the discussion that we had  
2799 in Bangladesh and actually in Phnom Penh as well. It depends a little bit on your starting point.  
2800 Our starting point was development, which came into the discussion here a bit, in the sense of  
2801 the issues of equality or inequality and the failures of development as a factor. But what I  
2802 learned, or what I'm starting to learn, because I'm really just beginning, is some of these broader  
2803 questions of how national politics is permeated by and influenced by, *and* influences, the  
2804 religious scene. That is, for me, a new element and a different starting point from a starting point  
2805 that has, as its assumption, that the critical challenges are improving welfare, starting with  
2806 education and health, extending life spans, cutting down the infant mortality etc. So that's my  
2807 point.

2808 **Mary Zurbuchen:** Many things came up for me today. I'd say that one of the things that came  
2809 up for me today was to ask a further question about our question on the role of religion in global  
2810 civil society, whatever global civil society might be. I started to feel, very keenly, the gap in lack  
2811 of representation, as you were talking about it earlier, of religion in international organizations  
2812 and in the international formats for dialogue. I feel like religion and religious organizations are  
2813 almost, by definition, ghettoized as having more to do with peace building and ethical value,  
2814 somehow giving us an aura of improved spirituality and shared humanity, rather than the things

2815 that they actually might be better at doing, which is looking at the critical questions of  
2816 development, of equality, of identity, and of change within their societies. These religious  
2817 organizations are profound authorities on many of these things. They are deeply imbedded in  
2818 communities of many different kinds and perhaps their representations should be reformulated in  
2819 terms of contributing in other dimensions rather than the interfaith dialogue and peace building  
2820 initiatives that often frame those discussions.

2821 **William Headley:** Thank you, I learned personally, and I think it came out in this meeting, about  
2822 how much we've learned about Islam and how little we've learned about Buddhism. I also take a  
2823 note of real encouragement. I think things like Katherine's call to coordination, Muhammad  
2824 Ali's search for the public core of Islam, Ria's gathering of Buddhism in Japan, all speak to me  
2825 of a reach toward, using the language of this conference, the cohesive, transformative roles of  
2826 religion and I yearn for that. It's very promising to me.

2827 **Ria Shibata:** I believe that religions are attempting to play a transformative role in the various  
2828 decision making processes in a global civil society, but the issue of how is still unresolved in my  
2829 mind. The one answer that I got was to influence/impact the decision making process of your  
2830 local government. So, in that sense, I guess, the quickest way is therefore to make sure that the  
2831 norms get adopted and legitimized in the local context. The question that I had in my mind, was  
2832 organizations like Soka Gakkai and Rissho Kosei-kai, who are trying to become involved in the  
2833 GCS, the global civil society, discourse, may not have much impact in actuality.

2834 **Surichai Wun'gao:** I have two points. The first point is these are new openings for all of us. I  
2835 heard from friends here about the efforts on many levels, even in the very formal UN structure. I  
2836 have a very strange image of Soka Gakkai from here. I think that there are other dimensions of  
2837 learning that we see are a part of these new openings, these structures are quite adaptive to  
2838 learning. In that sense I think that these are very positive. Yet in the opening Katherine  
2839 mentioned corruption, I think that religious circles are also very corrupt and I don't think  
2840 Thailand has a monopoly on that. The way that they respond to corruption issues in the world  
2841 was clearly stated by Katherine. I think there is a big gap about this opening. The second point is  
2842 that this is not only about knowledge. I think the knowledge gap was clearly mentioned by my  
2843 friend here about Buddhism, I think that's very telling. It's also about our senses beyond  
2844 knowledge. We may use spiritual, we may use other terms, but I think it's about how we ground

2845 ourselves...do we ground ourselves in our identity? Who are *we* talking about all these issues? I  
2846 think the world is more than just seeing each other in the existing rationale or the religious... I  
2847 think that the kind of identities beyond talking about nations is really necessary. So I just wanted  
2848 to mention that, thank you.

2849 **Thomas Uthup:** I hope not to take too much time. First, thank you for inviting me to be here  
2850 because it's been a real learning opportunity to learn from many of you working in these areas,  
2851 about the work that is going on with this whole area of religion and global civil society. It makes  
2852 organizations like us very happy that there is a committed core of people who are working on  
2853 this issue. Second, one thing that I thought was absent here was the linkage, and maybe it's  
2854 because it's there in other Luce programs, which is the question of conflict. We did touch on it to  
2855 some extent, but just looking globally - there's a report from the University of Heidelberg called  
2856 the Conflict Research Report, which ranks conflicts by levels of intensity. Out of the conflicts  
2857 with the most serious levels of intensity, there was 143 conflicts in 2009 and 137 were *within*  
2858 states. I would say from my reading of it, at least a third of those conflicts have the religious  
2859 dimension. Real or perceived doesn't really matter because perceptions are sometimes more  
2860 important than reality and that, I thought, was something we should pay attention to. The third  
2861 aspect that I learned was that this whole subject is extremely complex, as people talked about, it  
2862 depends on where you stand. It depends on what issue you're talking about. It might depend on  
2863 who you are. How Kristina is perceived vs. how Mark is perceived or how Ria is perceived; and  
2864 also our own subjective viewpoints, how Phil sees the BJP and how I see the BJP and how  
2865 Aashish sees the BJP may be very different. Thanks.

2866 **Barbara Metcalf:** I guess the main conclusion that I would draw from today is the luxury that  
2867 those of us who are primarily academics have compared to those of you who are actually trying  
2868 to think through how to work with a wide variety of organizations, how to integrate "religious"  
2869 and developmental organizations - because I am just overwhelmed by the complexity from what  
2870 I've heard today. I raised the question earlier of the unbelievable unintended consequences of  
2871 what these organizations think they're doing and what actually happens as a result of the  
2872 unintended consequences of working with one group rather than another. We didn't actually talk  
2873 a lot about Tablighi Jamaat in Bangladesh, though you had Lamia's extremely interesting  
2874 paragraph. There's this huge movement of millions and millions of Muslims, which in a sense, is

2875 predicated on not being part of anything, like civil society or public space. To somebody who for  
2876 a living is working inside a university this is anathema because they're basically predicated on  
2877 the notion that you don't need to know very much, right? Highly anti-intellectual, and yet when  
2878 you see how a rickshaw driver in the old city in Delhi, who used to beat his wife and spend his  
2879 money on liquor, now has straightened out and become a responsible person, you think that  
2880 maybe this organization may not be all bad. So that's what I mean. You just don't know what  
2881 these organizations are doing. So it's that complexity that is my rather unhelpful thought.

2882 **Aashish Mehta:** As an economist, and not a religious scholar, I suppose I'll have some  
2883 unhelpful thoughts. The thing that struck me about this was the numerous examples of how  
2884 control over information and misinformation has huge consequences and unintended  
2885 consequences, so that information or perception about how religion and politics collide has huge  
2886 political ramifications. When we talk about how the World Bank and international organizations  
2887 don't really deal much with religion, centrally and in an up-front way, and it seems to me that  
2888 part of the reason for that is because all the various stakeholders would not want to give up  
2889 control over how religion and politics actually get represented. So how do you move those  
2890 discussions into any sort of global sphere seems to be sort of intractable.

2891 **James Donahue:** One basic connected set of ideas: global civil society is a dominant reality,  
2892 **[Recording Interrupted]**  
2893 religion is a reality and what we've been trying to do is relate these two very complex spheres.  
2894 Let's continue to do so. I think this network, this project, has enormous importance for the world  
2895 that we live in and it's just really significant. My thanks for what has happened so far and my  
2896 encouragement to all of us to continue because these are the dominant realities that we face and,  
2897 yes, they're connected in some way. The other thought I had is that one word I haven't heard  
2898 today, a western word, is the word "justice." I haven't heard it at all. Again it does have a  
2899 western slant, I understand in an implicit sense we're talking about equality and a lot of other  
2900 things but the concept has not been explicitly named which strikes me as interesting.

2901 **Lamia Karim:** I think today reaffirmed for me some things I have known. First, politics and  
2902 religion is a toxic brew. Second, Muslims globally want what we in the West want for their  
2903 children – we want a better future and 50% of the population in most predominantly Muslim



2904 countries is over the age of 25. So we, at the level of global civil society need to address two key  
2905 issues: job creation and inequality.

2906 **Mark Woodward:** This is a somewhat difficult question, but one of the things I was struck by is  
2907 that a lot of the conventional analytic terminology that we have been using to talk about things  
2908 like civil society, religion, and politics, isn't really adequate. I don't really have a solution to that  
2909 problem but it seems that different people and different groups use very similar terms to talk  
2910 about very, very different things and that the absence of some sort of meta-analytic language  
2911 seriously gets in the way of understanding the complexities of the relationships that we've been  
2912 talking about.

2913 **Philip Oldenburg:** I think that I would endorse that particular point wholeheartedly. It's  
2914 something I certainly learned that sharpened my understanding- that I need to sharpen the  
2915 terminology that I use. The other thing - India is often said to be a yes-but country, that is, any  
2916 statement you make is answered by, "Yes! But..." The opposite is true, typically. I discovered in  
2917 this group that there are a lot of yes-but countries and yes-but issues that I constantly have to  
2918 remember. The other point that I would make that I learned - I think Lamia's remark that religion  
2919 and politics are a toxic brew- echoing a similar phrase, is politics a problem or solution? Is  
2920 religion a problem or solution? Can we say that if religion is the problem then politics is the  
2921 solution? Or that religion is the solution to the problems of religion? If it's a problem of politics,  
2922 is religion the solution? I can't say that I've made much advance at resolving that in my own  
2923 mind but I understand the dead ends that I could lead myself into by trying to think in those  
2924 terms.

2925 **Elizabeth Collins:** This is a challenging assignment. I would like to start with religion at its best  
2926 and then religion at its worst. Sorry for using the generic term there, but religion is at its best for  
2927 me when religious leaders or movements are able to articulate values that are widely shared- that  
2928 mobilize people to improve the world. I think that we have living examples and we have  
2929 examples in South and South East Asia: I'm thinking of Gandhi, Martin Luther King, the Dalai  
2930 Lama, Mahmoud Muhammad Taha. There are these people who make us, whatever religious  
2931 tradition they come from. That is religion at its best. Of course the Dalai Lama is still an  
2932 influence of that sort, but what frustrates me is that particularly since the 70's the entanglement  
2933 of religion and politics has brought us a lot of religion at its worst. Religion bringing conflict and,

2934 in particular, religion not addressing the issues that are the most important for us to think about  
2935 and actually do something about - I go back to poverty, all those people who don't have enough  
2936 to eat, inequality and a global climate crisis that's going to make these problems worse. That  
2937 context of us ending up with a lot of religion at its worst, to my mind, has something to do with  
2938 globalization and what globalization is and that's where we need that meta-vocabulary of sharper  
2939 analytic terms to understand why we're getting more of religion at its worst instead of religion at  
2940 its best.

2941 **Caroline Meyer-White:** Today has given me a greater headache since I still want to go and do  
2942 my work and now I have become even more aware of the complexities. That has confirmed to  
2943 me that working on a village level is what we as an organization must be doing because  
2944 otherwise we can't encounter all of this, as all of these issues change from one village to the  
2945 other. At the moment, if we want to get funding from the Danish government they are following  
2946 the trend, that I think is quite general, that they want us to work with advocacy and work on  
2947 making people aware of their rights and how they can reach them and so on. I'm sure that's  
2948 good. I'm sure that's the way to make real and positive change, but also from today, I get how  
2949 much more we need to be aware of what we're doing to really make it a positive change, because  
2950 that work is so much more complex than just going and building shelters.

2951 **Muhamad Ali:** Thank you again everyone. Just two sentences – one, I learned so much about  
2952 changes and diversity in not only religion as such, but the conceptions of religions, including  
2953 Islam. There is not only one type of Christianity, Buddhism, Islam and so on. Of course we know  
2954 that in scholarship but it is even more obvious in this discussion. The second thing that I have  
2955 learned is that we bring here scholarship as well as personal experiences, which, to me, cannot be  
2956 separated. We tried to distinguish between the scholar and practitioner but in fact we are  
2957 involved with our mind, heart, and body when we discuss these different issues. This is about  
2958 understanding interaction of mind, body, and heart as well as interaction of people's ideas,  
2959 goods, and so on.

2960 **Mark Juergensmeyer:** I learned one other thing which is how smart we were, that is Victor and  
2961 Dinah, to pull together this group of people...

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