

1 **Cairo Workshop**

2 **American University Campus**

3 **Tahrir Square**

4 **September 10, 2010**

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6 **[MARK JUERGENSMEYER]:** Well let's get started and let people join us when they can. I would
7 like to thank all of you for coming today even though I know it's a holiday. It's a sleepy morning after
8 a very busy day and exciting day in Cairo yesterday. We're delighted to be here. My name is Mark
9 Juergensmeyer. I am a professor of Sociology and Global Studies at the University of California,
10 Santa Barbara, and director of the Orfalea Center for Global and International Studies. I am also
11 director of a project that has been going on now for three years, sponsored by the Henry Luce
12 Foundation, on religion and global civil society. The Henry Luce Foundation is a private humanitarian
13 organization and the focus of this project is on the role of religion in international affairs. It's their
14 observation that those of us who study international policy and international politics often neglect the
15 role of religion - they don't take it seriously, they don't understand it. So, they are sponsoring this
16 project to help develop resources for college teachers who are teaching students international studies to
17 be more cognizant of the role of religion. That's our job at the Orfalea Center and with this project.

18
19 We're particularly concerned not so much with state policy as we are with the roles of international
20 NGOs, human's rights organizations, and United Nations groups - the civil society component of
21 global society. The question is: What is the role of religion in organizations like this? You may think,
22 "Well, we are just bringing relief aid to poor people in Somalia, what does that have to do with
23 religion?" Well, if you stop to think about it, of course, Somalia, like every society, is a religious
24 society. There are cultural issues, and when foreigners come, no matter how well intended, they also
25 bring their own assumptions, their own way of looking at the world, their own religious ideas, and
26 sometimes there are cultural conflicts that emerge in a situation that you think was simply for
27 economic or humanitarian purposes and didn't have anything religious about it, whatsoever. So, we are
28 trying to sensitize people who are going out to be leaders of organizations like this to the religious
29 ramifications of contemporary society. That is our main project and it's a global one. We have

30 workshops at the University of California Santa Barbara on this topic, but we've also had several in-
31 country workshops to focus on different parts of the world: In Buenos Aires we joined with a local
32 organization there to focus on civil society in Latin America; last year we were in Delhi to look at the
33 role of civil society in religion and civil society in South Asia and Southeast Asia; and today we are
34 here in Cairo to look at the role of civil society in Egypt and the Middle East. That's the general
35 agenda.

36
37 The format of our projects are always the same - the speech I'm just now giving probably will be the
38 longest one you that will hear today - we don't have speeches, we don't read papers. If you've brought
39 a wonderful paper to read, we're not going to let you. Instead we are going to ask you to just say a few
40 words that bring out some of the basic ideas, and then we're going to talk about it. So, this is an
41 opportunity for discussion. The discussion is primarily for the people who are the participants in the
42 discussion, the people seated around the table. But if those of you who are here as observers also have
43 comments, and you feel strongly about it, by all means raise your hand and we'll call on you.

44
45 If you are curious what these reports look like, we have a bunch of them. Victor Faessel, our program
46 director at the Orfalea Center is here and he has a bunch of those reports from previous workshops.
47 Dinah Griego is our coordinator of the Luce Project and she helped set all of this up. We want to thank
48 both of you, along with Paul, for being here and being part of our wonderful Orfalea Center staff.
49 Kendra Sarna is also here - she's a student here at AUC, but before that she was a part of our staff at
50 Santa Barbara and we are so happy to see you. We have a bunch of other UCSB faculty which you will
51 meet in a second.

52
53 Juan Campo, who is a professor of Religious Studies and is involved with Nancy Gallagher and Paul
54 Amar and the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at the University of California Santa Barbara, is a
55 familiar faculty member here at AUC. He was former director of the Education Abroad Program here
56 and Juan is our co-convener of today's events. I'd like you to please give us a word of welcome and
57 any comments you'd like to make.

58

59 **[JUAN CAMPO]:** Thank you very much Mark. (Welcoming of Egyptian guests in Arabic). I'm
60 welcoming especially our Egyptian guests today and telling them how honored we are to be here at this
61 time of such important change in Egypt. I know AUC from a long time ago - 35 years ago was when I
62 first came here. This part of Cairo is very much a part of my life. I was a graduate student when I first
63 arrived here in the time of Anwar Sadat and the peace process that he initiated after the 73' war.
64 Egyptians at that time were so excited about the prospects of a new era and new opportunities with the
65 ending of the war, and looked at America as such an important part of that time. It was thanks to
66 Anwar Sadat, I think, and Jimmy Carter, that I met my wife, Magda Campo, at a time of good will
67 between Egypt and the United States. I met Magda on the tennis courts here at AUC, where she was
68 coming for tennis lessons and I was just learning the Arabic language after getting a fellowship to
69 come here and so I had an intensive year of Arabic, but I also met this wonderful woman. Her home,
70 which she originally grew up in, was just a couple of blocks from here, just off of Tahrir Square, in an
71 area of Cairo known as Bab al-Louq. She was raised here and knows this area like the back of her
72 hand. Magda and I were married two blocks down the street in a church on Al Soleni Street. (Arabic)
73 Our first-born son was born in Cairo and his first year in life was also in Bab al-Louq. We've seen a lot
74 of changes over the years and a lot of hopes raised, but also a lot of disappointments realized.

75
76 Now you see a new kind of excitement in Egypt as a result of the changes that started last January and
77 in other parts of the country maybe even a little bit before January. Magda and I were just here last
78 summer in (Arabic) and everyone was sort of expecting that Gamal Mubarak would be the next
79 president. Most Egyptians we had talked to had basically accepted that as *fait accompli* and we didn't
80 see much hope. (Arabic) When we talked with those we met on the street and our friends we just didn't
81 get any sense that there was any prospects for any significant change in the country - people saw a lot
82 of problems, they were familiar with the corruption, the stagnation in the economic life and things. So,
83 when we began to hear about these stirrings in different parts of Egypt, starting more noticeably on the
84 25th of January, we were just so surprised by this. I think most people around the world were surprised
85 by the resources Egyptians were able to draw upon to bring about this significant change. The word
86 *sawrat* used to be part of the Egyptian discourse, this word "revolution" was there as a kind of a
87 memory of the 1919 Revolution, the memory of the 1951-52 Revolution; and then there were the

88 corrective revolutions, *sawrat al-tashhih*, underneath Sadat - the *sawrat*, the Revolution of Correction.
89 That was part of the past and then *sawrat* kind of lost its meaning in Egypt, except as a kind of
90 memory, and now it's been given a new life in Egyptian public discourse and in the hearts and minds
91 of Egyptians. That idea, *sawrat*, has many different dimensions to it that are just beginning now to
92 work themselves out. One is the political dimensions and, obviously, we've seen those. There are
93 social dimensions to the word *sawrat* and people are claiming and crying for social justice (Arabic
94 translation). There's also revolution occurring in the area of economic life and cultural life - we're
95 seeing the arts flourish in a way that they've never flourished before. In newspapers and magazines
96 there is freedom of expression now that hasn't been present in Egypt for a long time. And also there are
97 religious dimensions to *sawrat*, which is obviously a major concern for this conference.

98
99 With this idea of *sawrat* and change and raised hopes, there are also lots of worries and a lot of
100 questions. When I talk with people who were unsure about the revolution at first, pretty much from the
101 middle classes who weren't the ones that were going out in the street and demonstrating, they finally,
102 over time as they saw the demonstrators and the *Shabab El Thawra* succeed, became more open to the
103 idea that the change was going to be good. But now they are saying, "Okay, we've had the revolution.
104 So now what?" (Arabic phrase) Are we after the revolution or is it the middle of the revolution?
105 What's next? I think many of us, even in the West, have an idea that a *sawrat* happens and there is
106 major change in all areas of society and culture and politics and then you move into a new era. But as
107 you go back and take a more careful look at the idea of revolution, you find that revolutions take time
108 to work themselves out in a culture. Even a nominal revolution, like the American Revolution, took
109 years between the time of 1776 and the 1780s when the Constitution was finally passed. Of course, the
110 French Revolution and the Russian Revolution went on for a time too. I think that people are beginning
111 to realize now that *sawrat* is not an overnight thing completely, as it might be romanticized, and I think
112 the uncertainties of the ideas of *sawrat* are still working themselves out in the hearts and minds of
113 Egyptians today. Those are just my initial remarks, but hopefully we'll have more discussion about the
114 "And now what?" part of what's facing Egypt now and the religious dimensions that are involved with
115 that, as well as the political, gender, etc. related aspects.

116

117 **[MARK JUERGENSMEYER]:** Those are a few questions we want to pick up on, but before we do
118 so, I want to give everybody a chance to introduce themselves so we know who the participants are
119 around the table. Nancy, I'd like to ask you to start and just say a word about who you are, what you
120 do, and, if you want, a word about your perspective on this. We'll then move around the table.

121
122 **[NANCY GALLAGHER]:** I'm Nancy Gallagher and first I want to acknowledge our students here
123 from the University of California Education Abroad Program. I'm the study center Director of that
124 program and we're very happy to be here and look forward to participating in the discussion. I teach
125 History at the University of California, Santa Barbara - modern Middle Eastern History and also North
126 African History. I actually started life working in Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, and to some extent Libya.
127 After I finished my dissertation it was a hopeful time; there was Bourguiba in Tunisia and Sadat in
128 Egypt, and it seemed lots of things were about to happen. Except nothing did. It got worse and worse
129 and worse - in Tunisia first, and then Egypt. For years and years it just seemed dead somehow, and
130 Tunisian and Egyptian friends of mine continually talked about what's going to happen when
131 Bourguiba dies, what's going to happen when Mubarak dies? How long is it going to be? When is change
132 going to come? Everywhere in the world there seems to be things happening, but what about here?
133 Imagine for me in Tunisia, seeing the revolution, and then Egypt and then Libya; it's been just
134 incredible to witness all of this.

135
136 I can't resist mentioning my earlier experience in Egypt, as well, because I was here for the first time
137 during the time of Nasser and I remember seeing the Russians walking along the *corniche* here. It was
138 again a very different time and there were hardly any Americans here. The Six Day War had resulted in
139 most Americans being evacuated. I was working at the time in Copenhagen. My major, my Bachelors
140 of Science from UC Berkely, was in Microbiology and that's what I was doing in Denmark. I had
141 come down for a vacation with a Danish girlfriend of mine who had an Egyptian boyfriend, a student
142 here I think in Urban Planning at AUC, and the two of us were taken around to Saqqara, to Alexandria,
143 and all over the place, being introduced here and there. There were very very few foreigners here at the
144 time. We were introduced to the chair of the Arabic Studies Program and he said, "Oh, you find all of
145 this so fascinating?" I said, "Yes I think all of this is so wonderful." And he said, "Well, why don't you

146 come study here? We have fellowships we can't give away right now!" At that time a free graduate
147 fellowship you could just pick up was like a dream come true. In Berkeley those still are very
148 competitive and I kept that in the back of my mind but I couldn't just stay, I had a job. But eventually I
149 did some switching around and somehow got myself into UCLA and here I am. So, that's my story. In
150 terms of the way I see it now, there's a **(Arabic phrase)** – something has changed in the air, you feel it
151 as you go along. You know what I mean? **(Arabic phrase)** A lightness; there's some different quality.
152

153 **[MAGDA CAMPO]:** Hi my name is Magda Campo and I am Juan's wife, as he told you. I grew up
154 around Tahrir Square and I was born a year just before the revolution with Nasser. So I have known
155 Nasser, Sadat, Mubarak. So far, for the period of the 60 years, we have had only three presidents, and
156 there was one before Nasser, Muhammad Naguib, for one year. Nasser didn't like him, kicked him out,
157 and took over. When I ask my students at UC Santa Barbara how many presidents they have had since
158 1951, we had counted fifteen or fourteen presidents until today. As you see we have had three and a
159 half presidents so far, so that tells you something about the mood of the country, the way it was
160 dictated. Also you have to remember that Egypt has had a series of occupations, one after another - the
161 Mamluk, the Ottomans, the British, the French - everybody took turns coming. Of course, with every
162 occupation we've had influences and the occupier was very very keen at getting at the upper-class so
163 that the upper-class could support the occupier against the middle and lower-class. That's what
164 happened even with Mubarak, the United States paid mega money to Mubarak to keep the elite of the
165 army to be with the president against the people. To me that was a dictatorship *par excellence*. I used to
166 call him King Mubarak in my classes, because his son was going to take over and, of course, he saw
167 the example of Syria and the example of Qadaffi, whose son was about to take over, and he thought he
168 could continue the same system. Luckily, enough the people revolted.

169
170 Last year when I was in Egypt with Juan, I told many of my friends that I feel that something really
171 bad is about to happen to Egypt this year - and of course it was the revolution. But I wasn't sure what it
172 was that was going to happen, but luckily the revolution happened, and it had to happen, whether
173 people accept the revolution or not, things could not continue the way it was going. Of course,
174 revolutions take a long time and we do hope that it's going to be for the best. Also, in regards to

175 religion and politics, we understand that in the Arab countries religion and politics are hand in hand
176 most of the time. With Nasser and Mubarak it was more or less secular, trying to obey all the very
177 fundamentalist religious people in order not to destroy the *madaniyya*, like we say here. But we do not
178 know which direction the country is going to take. On the other hand, during the sixty years that I have
179 been knowing Egypt, I know that many religious groups came from Europe and the United States to
180 missionize here in this country and this was something that was not accepted by the government or by
181 the people, but power and money rules. As a result, many of the Coptics converted to a kind of
182 Protestantism and they became like Evangelists. Nowadays, I see that there is another movement where
183 many Christians from different Egyptian communities are gathering to read the gospel - something that
184 we've never done before, unless there was a priest present. So civilian people are taking turns to read
185 the gospel and explain the gospel. Of course, this infuriates the religious authorities and the priests of
186 the churches because they consider that this is something very sacred that has to be led by priests. But
187 it seems to me that a kind of Protestantism is taking over the country by storm because even some of
188 my nieces are in those groups and I can see the clash between parents and children who are doing this
189 and we'll see where this is going to lead to. Also in Islam, a new form of teaching the Qur'an has taken
190 form, for twenty-thirty years now, where women gather with other women and they become an
191 authority over reading the Qur'an and explaining it to each other. So, these are the new things that have
192 sprouted in Egypt, religiously speaking. I'll stop at that, thank you.

193
194 **[MARK JUERGENSMEYER]:** With your permission, I'd like to move next to professor Paul Amar
195 to continue our introduction of our UCSB faculty and also ask him to say something about the writing
196 project which the three of you are a part.

197
198 **[PAUL AMAR]:** Thank you very much. It's great to be finally back in Cairo after spending hours and
199 hours on a cell phone and Skype and following all of this since December when things started to heat
200 up. I'm a professor in Global Studies at UC, Santa Barbara. I've lived for about five and a half years of
201 my life in Egypt. I was first for a year at the **[indistinct]**, I was a film student and an acting student
202 twenty years ago and then I became a journalist for the Cairo Times, which is the ancestor of Al-Masry
203 Al-Youm, one the more progressive and visible newspapers of today. Eventually, I went to a year of a

204 Masters Program of Arabic Literature here, and then Arabic Language here at AUC, and then I did a
205 million other little jobs and things in Cairo. Then I did a Fulbright and research on issues of urban
206 culture, intersecting with policing and security institutions in Egypt, which was half of my dissertation.
207 Another half was comparing it to similar security policing and urban cultural issues in Brazil and
208 tracing how flows of security and police militarization and reform projects flow between Latin
209 America and the Middle East. So, I'm not particularly a specialist *per se* in religion and politics,
210 however, in all my articles and chapters of my books there is a treatment of, what I refer usually to, the
211 moralization of politics or evangelization of politics, which is directly related to the way that society
212 views issues of security and issues of citizenship and the law. There is all sorts of ways in which
213 politics becomes moralized, sometimes through what we call religion, other times its through security
214 discourse, other times it's through discourse of class and respectability about who is considered worthy
215 of being recognized in positive ways by the state versus those that are treated as a threat. I think there is
216 broader categories that we can talk about in relationship to the revolution that include notions of
217 religion but don't limit that category to just practices we think of automatically as religion, because I
218 think a lot of issues of class, of morality, and of the mobilization of repressive security practices
219 overarch and intersect with other social dynamics. So in that light, I have rounded up some very
220 interesting young scholars and activists and writers. All of these people are involved in either directly
221 mobilizing groups in the revolution or else writing about them and following them constantly. So,
222 we're lucky to have them here for part of these meetings – that is great and very nice of them to come
223 join us and to speak to us and take questions a bit. I think it's interesting for this project and also for the
224 future of both the Orfalea Center and also for these networks to really tap into what's going on here in
225 Egypt around issues of religion and politics and NGOs, which are the three themes of the Orfalea
226 Center's project. This moment in Egypt, I think, really represents several exciting new tendencies at
227 the intersection of those three dynamics. We have a proliferation of many different kinds of
228 “religious” politics, which overcomes the divide, in many ways, between secular and religious and
229 which also offer some really articulate notions of class empowerment and also a critique of the security
230 state and the morality state which Mubarak was identified with. So, whereas we usually think of
231 religious politics as reproducing, as Magda was mentioning, this hierarchical notion of class and
232 respectability, here I think we have the emergence of various points on the spectrum that overcome

233 those kind of morality versus religiosity and a class invisibility in that dynamic.

234

235 So, some of the people we have here now, include Ashraf el-Sherif, who is an adjunct professor at
236 American University in Cairo in political science. He won't present a full paper today, but he will be
237 talking principally about new trends amongst the Muslim Brothers and the Salafi Movements in Egypt
238 today, and how they are responding to, or deriving from, new youth tendencies and other dynamics that
239 have become very visible since the revolution. This is very important and increasingly interesting for
240 me because, of course, there is beginning to be a very visible divide, an unfortunate divide, between the
241 original organizers of the revolution amongst labor, youth and popular movements against police
242 brutality, and then the Brothers which have become uncomfortably close to the military council, and
243 that's produced what's becoming increasingly a bipolar kind of situation.

244

245 Then we have Amr Abdulrahman, who is a doctoral candidate at Essex University in Britain in politics
246 and the former political advisor for European Union here in Cairo, and absolutely one of the most
247 articulate analysts of politics in Egypt. He always breaks through any kind of box that we're used to
248 limiting ourselves to and he is also very much involved everyday in organizing in what's called the El
249 Kotla El Masreya, the Egyptian Bloc, which is a coalition of all the left and liberal, as well as some of
250 the more innovative religiously identified parties, that is basically standing against the democratic bloc,
251 which is the Muslim Brothers and allied parties. Increasingly, that's how things are dividing up it
252 seems. He'll talk about that as well as the kind of pluralization of issues of specifics sects, Not S-E-X,
253 but S-E-C-T-S, around issues of Islamic identity that are considered heretical and sometimes deviant
254 by orthodox trends and how this reveals a pluralization of different kinds of politics around religion in
255 Egypt.

256

257 And then we have Osama Al Mahdy, who is a reporter I follow religiously, from the Al-Masry Al-
258 Youm. His work is absolutely innovative and he takes account of the full geography of Egypt that is
259 outside of Cairo, in villages and rural life, and focuses on the politics of Islamic popular religiosity and
260 how it is viewed by new, more conservative, religious movements and the politicization of those
261 unorthodox and popular working class forms of Islam.

262
263 So we have these three here today and we also have some guests from University of California. Rasha
264 is working on popular movements amongst the youth and issues of spontaneity and technology and
265 myths around those and the Egyptian revolution, and also is very much an expert in the politics of
266 religion among the new youth movements. And Rahkma, I understand, is working on [indistinct] and
267 the new role of Al-Azhar in trying to catch up and portray itself as relevant to the new age of the
268 revolution, and not as a pawn of Mubarak, which is how it was seen for a long time. There will be
269 some other people coming, but I am thrilled to have absolutely the smartest members articulating the
270 revolution here today. So, thank you very much.

271
272 **[MARK JUERGENSMEYER]:** Thank you Paul. I think we want to have the opportunity for the
273 three guys who are involved in the writing project to say a word each about their specific projects.
274 Maybe a way to do that would be after the break and start with a general conversation that everybody
275 can be involved in to pick up on the theme that Juan raised in his introductory comments about the
276 nature of the changes in this last year. Yesterday when I was on Tahrir Square, I sensed that there was
277 really a kind of cultural clash between two different perceptions of what this change was about. From
278 the military regime's perspective, it was a transition of politics, but the mood of the crowd was really a
279 much greater transformation -that this is a real revolution, in the sense of a change in society and
280 culture and everything else. And I guess that's the question - is what we have seen in this last year
281 simply a transformation of power or is it a change in society and culture? And if so, what does that
282 mean? Do you want to pick up on what you said?

283
284 **[JUAN CAMPO]:** Yes, but I think we also want to hear from our Egyptian hosts too. I'm inclined to
285 look at this as a transformational revolution, not just simply a change of the heads at the top. Of course,
286 there are power blocks that are still very much present as Paul has indicated - you have the military
287 council and a lot of civilian elements too, corporate elements, that are present in this country that want
288 to see a status quo being maintained, and they're backed by the Saudis. It seems the Saudis have been
289 pouring money into the country to try to maintain some kind of status quo, partly to protect themselves
290 too. You also have this growing set of linkages being created between the military elites and the

291 elements in the Muslim Brotherhood that have been there. I thought for a long time that there is going
292 to be a new leader in Egypt after Mubarak, though it would have to be someone that was approved, not
293 just by the military, but by Islamic groups. It seems that is one of the tendencies that may be occurring
294 right now, and it may be revolutionary in a way we don't necessarily like because what I've heard,
295 again in informal conversations with Egyptians since we've come here at the end of July, are examples
296 of the ways in which the Muslim Brotherhood is infiltrating into the society with its influence and
297 anticipation of the coming elections. Just one example I heard in Alexandria, where a man who left a
298 profligate life as a drug addict and an abusive father and husband, developed a serious problem with
299 diabetes and had to have both legs amputated. Who paid for the operation? The Muslim Brotherhood.
300 The Muslim Brotherhood then offered him and his family a monthly stipend of a thousand pounds, or
301 some amount like that, plus gave him money to buy new furnishings for his apartment, including a
302 television set. The requirement was that if he's going to watch television, he could only watch religious
303 programs, of course with the expectation that he and his family would then vote for the Muslim
304 Brotherhood candidates, when, and if, the election should occur. That's just one example and this is
305 working in an urban context, but you hear other examples that this might be happening in villages as
306 well in the more rural context. So, this is the prospect for major changes coming ahead. We saw a little
307 bit evidence for this in the referendum that they held in February, where people were told that they
308 should vote for the referendum, and if they voted "no" they were *kafirs*, "unbelievers." If you're a good
309 Muslim, you vote for the way the Muslim Brotherhood wants you to. So, there is a religious element
310 coming into play in terms of the democratic processes that have been opened up since January. You see
311 those kinds of things, and that reflects change in a way that many of the civil libertarians and
312 secularists, in Egypt as well as abroad, would find very disconcerting, obviously, and having that
313 linked with the military force, I think, makes it even more disconcerting indicating that even though
314 you might have a democratization process going on, it might be suddenly frozen in place once a new
315 status quo is established. It's a more Saudi-friendly, Wahabbi-friendly perhaps, kind of status quo.
316

317 The other side, though, is maybe where there is more hope - and again I hope that some of the people
318 presenting today and tomorrow can help us with this - and that is what has happened with respect to
319 women. I think some of this came through in terms of the demonstrations in Tahrir and what you have

320 seen going on around the country in terms of women exercising leadership positions in a way that is
321 more visible than it was in the past. Yes, Suzanne Mubarak, who was sort of the symbol of Egyptian
322 womanhood for a while, at least in the West, is no longer in the picture. She's been backgrounded now
323 as a result of this and you have other women, who are more integrated into the wider Egyptian culture,
324 taking more leadership positions more visibly than was ever in the past. Again, anecdotally, hearing
325 my Egyptian brother-in-law say at this last referendum, he was just so impressed by how women
326 became interested in voting and he felt that for the first time in his life his wife voted and his daughters
327 voted. They wanted to go out and wait in line with all the other people at the local polling station in
328 order to be able to vote. That reflects yet another kind of dynamic in terms of what might be working -
329 the proliferation of different political parties. You could see that at Tahrir Square yesterday, where
330 each sort of faction was there, they call it [Arabic] – factionalism, in a way, but reflecting a kind of
331 democracy. Yes, it is kind of chaotic, because there is no consensus that's been formed completely
332 between the different groups, and different factions and coalitions are forming and disbanding as we go
333 through week after week, month after month. But, again, there is a dynamic aspect to that which was
334 not present in Egypt before. That again reaches from the level of the political down to the social. It was
335 a soccer fan club that was one of the foremost factors present at the demonstrations yesterday. You
336 wouldn't have imagined a political movement, with an activist sort of core, would emerge from the
337 [Arabic] sporting club. Can you imagine that in the United States? Rams fans or USC fans forming a
338 political group to demonstrate? Maybe that will happen, maybe they will take examples from Egypt,
339 who knows? But that's an amazing development and so it's chaotic in a way in terms of people who
340 like to think about status quo politics and organized political parties in certain electoral systems
341 working themselves out. It can be disconcerting for people who are looking for stability for all kinds of
342 reasons like business purposes, and wanting to see tourism coming back to the country, etc. But I think
343 it is something that we can look to optimistically while at the same time we turn an eye with concern
344 about these new coalitions that are forming on the right between religious groups and the military.

345

346 **[MARK JUERGENSMEYER]:** Would you guys like to comment?

347

348 **[ASHRAF EL SHERIF]:** Okay. Just to start with some opening remarks about the revolution - for me
349 the revolution, I mean if you want to talk about it in terms of political analysis, there were two main
350 decisive factors that caused the revolution, and the two of them have to do with the collapse of the
351 regime, the dysfunction of the regime. Number one: it's the collapse or the dysfunction in the political
352 economy of the regime. Simply put, the political economy of the regime could no longer function as it
353 used to. In the last three or four years before the revolution we had an unbelievable wave of industrial
354 labor strikes and hunger strikes and a rise of criminal activity and violence in popular neighborhoods.
355 On the other hand, is the question of the brutality of police force or the interior ministry. Sometimes we
356 would like to describe our revolution as a revolution of *karama*, a question of dignity, honor, and
357 respect related to the idea of police brutality, dehumanizing people, and stating that people that do not
358 deserve to be treated this way. Actually, in hindsight, one would say that in the last four or five years
359 signs were there and, of course, political scientists and social scientists always failed in forecasting, or
360 reading, of what's going on. In the last four or five years, there was a real lead-up to the revolution in
361 terms of the emergence of new social groups and new political actors, especially these social media
362 actors, civil society and community service actors, and others who have been mobilizing and
363 campaigning on the question of *karama*, dignity, and critiquing the dysfunction of the regime. And
364 *then* the regime collapsed and proved to be weaker than we have expected, and it collapsed very easily,
365 I would say. The regime is still there, but it's no longer capable of ruling the country as it used to. So,
366 what we have right now in Egypt, as our friend Amr Abdulrahman would call it, is a balance of
367 weakness. We have different fronts and each one of them is weak. We have the ruling regime, which is
368 still there and represented by the SCMF, the Supreme Council of the Military Forces. In plain terms,
369 the SCMF doesn't want real democracy in the country, the SCMF wants to stay and rule apart from any
370 other statement they may say to the opposite. When I say the SCMF wants to rule, I mean the SCMF
371 wants to maintain the kind of state, the kind of regime, the kind of foreign policy and economic policy
372 that used to exist under Mubarak. However, they can't truly put that in force because of the collapse of
373 the repressive capacity of the regime, the interior ministry to be specific, which collapsed symbolically
374 and materially. There is also the economic question. If the economic question is not handled, if there is
375 no new change in economic policies, then the country will always remain unstable. That's why I'm
376 saying the ruling regime is there, the SCMF - in their minds, their understanding of the January

377 revolution simply was not a revolution, it was, they call it in the closed-door talks, they say its not
378 [Arabic] it's [Arabic]- it's January "events" not the January Revolution, meaning that it opened the
379 door for them to get rid of Gamal Mubarak and his entourage. The SCMF, the army, think that Egypt
380 under Mubarak was doing very well until the year 2000. It's only the last ten years that things went out
381 of control. So the January "events" gave them the chance to get rid of Mubarak and his businessmen
382 friends and restore the country back to the old days of the 80s and 90s. That is their understanding.
383 They want to maintain the foreign policy, the national, economic policy, etc., with some cosmetic
384 changes in the top leadership. However, they cannot do that because they are weaker than before in
385 terms of repressive capacity and because of the simple question that, as we said, economic policies
386 cannot persist forever like that.

387
388 On the other hand, we have the revolutionary bloc, and I think the most important result of the January
389 events was the emergence of a revolutionary bloc in Egypt. It is not strong enough to come to power,
390 however, it's still strong enough not to be defeated or contained or repressed or ignored by the ruling
391 regime. People always talk about the main vulnerability of the revolution bloc in Egypt, which is that
392 there is a lack of leadership and a lack of organization. In politics, if you lack organization, if you lack
393 leadership, then you cannot really negotiate about politics and hence you can't come to power - which
394 is true. This is a disadvantage in the short-run, but in the long run I think it's kind of an advantage.
395 Why? Because it opens the door for some kind of unruliness in the street - the revolutionary street. The
396 revolutionary street is uncontrollable and we have an emergence of tremendous waves of protests,
397 politics of protest, and revolutionary groups in the street. There's a vacuum in the street, in which
398 everyone is acting and it's uncontrollable, really. Like, for example, what happened last night. People
399 say, "Oh the protests are going on very peacefully and they were nice, but what happened the last two
400 or three hours, the violence and so on, was really not something good and the revolutionary, political
401 movements should have made greater effort in controlling and keeping this in check." Actually, I think
402 this is really a superficial statement because this is impossible to do even if we want to do because
403 simply these revolutionary groups are uncontrollable. There are groups everywhere in the street and
404 unidentifiable, uncontrollable, and these were the groups, for example, effective on January 28th in
405 facing the Interior Ministry, the central security force, and in keeping the strikes, demonstrations, and

406 sit-ins going during July and August. For me, this creates a momentum of change – an euphoria – a
407 change in the culture of expression, of political expression - creating new political subjectivities among
408 people. This is really a very important historical transformation in Egypt, because Egypt has been one
409 of the most deep state-societies in the world, not just in terms of voting, or electoral politics, or
410 turnouts in elections, but also in terms of political taste - the idea of political expression and the idea of
411 going to the streets, taking to the streets, and expressing yourself and organizing yourself. We are
412 witnessing right now an emergence of a culture of organization, a culture of liberation, a culture of
413 self-expression, and the politicization of very important segments of society - politicization of the
414 *lumpenproletariat*, politicization of young people in the popular neighborhoods and, as was said, the
415 politicization of even these soccer fans. I'm actually writing a research piece on the [indistinct] of
416 soccer fans in Egypt and their kind of politics. For me, I call it a “politics of fun”, because they are
417 creating a tendency of anarchy in Egyptian politics, which is very unique and new. The idea of being
418 anti-power, anti-state, enjoying the idea of rebelling and challenging the power structure and power of
419 authority for no real political agenda except for that. I think that this is a really colorful development,
420 in addition to the emergence of a new vibrant civil society. Of course, social media developments are
421 really important, as well as the understated significance of the labor insurrection taking place in Egypt
422 right now - labor strikes and protests, which have always defamed in state media as being [Arabic]
423 which means they are really not concerned about the natural interest of the country, only concerned
424 about their own specific interests. I think for me this is really very important – these developments, the
425 emergence of new political actors, new social actors, a new taste, a new mentality.

426
427 In a nutshell, if I want to sum up the last month after the revolution, I would say the most important
428 developments are two issues. The first one is the weakening and the disempowering of the capacities of
429 the ruling regime in maintaining order - and hence this means bankruptcy in the long run. The other
430 development is the politicization of the revolutionary bloc in Egyptian society, which cuts across
431 classes and different groups which has never taken place in politics before - whether electoral politics
432 or politics of protests or even ideological politics. So, if you want to sum up my standpoint of what's
433 going on in Egypt right now, I would say that I have no worries about the collapse of the old regime.
434 It's going to collapse sooner or later, it's just a question of time. They have no project to market, they

435 have no goods to deliver, and they are losing capacity to control and repress. But for me, the real
436 question at stake is the buildup of the new regime, of the new system - this is probably the “Achilles
437 Heel” of the revolution in that they don’t really have a clear socioeconomic political alternative. But
438 it’s in the making and I think I am quite optimistic about this. Immediately, people have always been
439 talking about the Turkish model inspiring not just the Islamic movements in Egypt but in Egyptian
440 politics in general. The whole idea of the Turkish model is that Turkey is kind of a comparable
441 situation to Egypt - it’s a Muslim country, it’s a big country, it’s in the Middle East, it has close
442 relations with the West, it has, more or less, similar culture in terms of religious moderation,
443 religiosity, and the emergence of modern sector as well. However, it managed to build a modern
444 economy, a successful democratic state, a very moderate and advanced avant-garde Islamic movement
445 and *it is* functioning, and that’s why people are always referring to the Turkish model. But I think in a
446 matter of five to ten years, people will start talking about the Egyptian model - a new type of political
447 imagination, which are inspired by what’s going on in Egypt, politically and in general. Also, it comes
448 to the question of the Islamic movement and the Islamic bloc and their position *vis-à-vis* what’s going
449 on in Egypt - maybe I can continue talking about that later during the day.

450
451 **[NANCY GALLAGHER]:** You mentioned Turkey, and in Turkey they talk all the time about the deep
452 state, or what’s really going on there in Ergenekon. In Egypt too, you could say within the military
453 there might be a kind of deep state, although I haven’t heard that term mentioned particularly. But who
454 really knows what’s going on in the military here? Who really understands what they own and how
455 their economic infrastructure works? Their industries? Their hotels? Their clubs? Their land? Their
456 apartments? There is a whole military structure, which to me remains a mystery.

457
458 **[ASHRAF EL SHERIF]:** Yes I absolutely agree with you - that is a very important question and a
459 very important issue. Yes, we do have a very deep state in Egypt and this country has been ruled by the
460 intelligence service and by the SCMF and by the top military leadership. Actually, the only institution
461 in Egypt that has been untouched by the revolution is the intelligence service - untouched materially,
462 symbolically, it has stayed as it is. When you talk about the intelligence service, you are talking about
463 an unseen institution. An institution that has huge assets - financial, political, administrative assets -

464 whether its sent from outside Egypt, it has been in charge of at least the foreign policy of Egypt, the
465 national security doctrine, the national security policy of Egypt, and also the internal policies as well.
466 As I've said, it's unseen, so you can't actually talk about what's going on inside and it has been
467 untouched by the revolution and still in charge. I would say its playing dirty politics as well. I'm not a
468 conspiracy theory fan, but I can see their hands in politics and in questions like sectarian strife, and
469 favoring some political candidates in presidential campaigns and some political movements to the
470 disfavor of the others. As for the army, what we are talking about here is a very important industrial
471 economic actor in the country. It's a black box - for security reasons we don't have real research or
472 scholarship about the economic activities of the army. But there are some estimates that the army has
473 been involved with at least thirty to forty percent of the Egyptian economy, which is a *huge* proportion.
474 So, here we are talking about the army as an economic actor, as a business group, as a [indistinct]
475 group and so it has a genuine interest, not just in ruling as generals, but as businessmen, as oligarchs.
476 So I agree with you, this is a kind of a black box that up till now we don't have a real idea or
477 information or data about what's going on inside, but we have impressions and understandings. I think
478 for me that's really the real core of the regime. It's not Gamal Mubarak, it's not...it's not Habib el-
479 Adly, it's the structure which rules the country and imposes and colors the doctrines of national
480 security and foreign and economic policy. The moment these two policies, the foreign policy and the
481 economic policy changes, then in that moment they can talk about regime change. I absolutely agree
482 with you. When we talk about the army, we can say that the Egyptian army is based on the draft. It's a
483 professional army so it's not politicized so it's not involved in ideological sectarian policies like the
484 Syrian army or Libyan army. It's based on draft so there is a clear representation of the middle class,
485 economic interests, middle class tastes and mentality of conservatism. In terms of political taste even,
486 we can say that - again, this is an impressionistic understanding - the Egyptian army, rank and file,
487 maybe the middle level of officers and the soldiers, is more or less a kind of approximate
488 representation of mainstream Egyptian society in terms of the culture taste and political taste and so on.
489 So, maybe yes, they will find that most of them are religiously conservative, socially conservative and
490 so on. But I agree with you it's an important issue.
491

492 **[MAGDA CAMPO]:** You talked about the revolution that happened right now as a bloc. Don't you
493 think that during the past thirty years there was a silent revolution, in the sense that the people
494 themselves did not respect any of the rules and regulation that rule this country? I mean, anybody and
495 everybody was doing as they wished. To me, this is a silent revolution that led to a louder one. So
496 that's one question. A second question: I teach Arabic language at UCSB and I have been very
497 concerned about seeing all these private schools and private universities where Arabic language is not
498 taught at all. So to me, this is one way of destroying the Arabic language. How do you translate this or
499 how do you explain the fact that these schools have sprouted all over Egypt. Do you think that the
500 government has failed the system of education in Egypt, the public system of education?

501
502 **[ASHRAF EL SHERIF]:** On the first issue, I agree with you. I mean Egypt was a classic example of
503 no-rule of law, an absence of a state of law, and this reminds me of the communist regimes in Eastern
504 Europe where there was a famous saying that they pretend to pay us and we pretend to work in return.
505 So, it was the same like that with the Egyptian government who was pretending it was kind of rule of
506 law and we were pretending to that we were obeying it, but everybody was not really obeying the law,
507 including the law makers and the law enforcers themselves. So, yes, this was kind of a popular, not
508 revolution, but popular silent protest. This silent protest became vocal afterwards, in this year, mainly
509 because of the new culture, the emergence of new social actors, and political actors, social media
510 actors, the youth bulge in Egypt, and the declining efficiency of the repressive capacity of the regime
511 and the economic capacity of the regime. But, I agree with you on that.

512
513 On the second question: What I think was the most important failure of the Mubarak regime was the
514 question of education, and I think they did it on purpose. The Mubarak regime is an example of a
515 dictatorial regime, which didn't really have any kind of socioeconomic political project. It was a bad
516 bureaucratic regime - the whole idea was to keep things going as they are, without any kind of vision,
517 any kind of change. In order to do that, you must really make the education as it was - static, dogmatic,
518 judicial, and simply disconnected from any kind of outside sociopolitical project. Let me raise a
519 question: Every education system in the world has a philosophy, okay? What was the philosophy of
520 institutional education of Mubarak? Nothing, nothing. Even under the communist dictatorship regime

521 there was a kind of philosophy of education system to create loyal subjects, people who are real loyal
522 to the communist ideas, etc. etc. This was not the case here. There was nothing – vacant, bewilderment.
523 For me, I think that was really the most important blunder of the regime. On the other hand, because a
524 country like Egypt is too big to be controlled and ruled, there had emerged new types of actors, or
525 social classes or groups, especially in the last ten years, who are more cosmopolitan in culture and
526 economically linked to international political economy, which is more or less not really connected to
527 the Egyptian economy. These classes - the bourgeois, upper-middle class, upper-class groups,
528 connected into the international economic orders, especially in IT sector, communications sector, in
529 marketing, communication, business, modern business activities - these type of classes, or social
530 actors, they divide up their own culture, their own political and social communities and part of that can
531 explain the demographic divide that's been taking place in Egypt in the last ten years. There is also the
532 emergence of New Cairo, and the creation of new ghettos in the suburbs, a suburban Egypt. The idea of
533 the New Cairo was based on the idea of suburbs in American cities, like the old idea of the rich people
534 living in the suburbs away from what's going on in the Egyptian city. So it's simply creating different
535 Egypts, different cities, and, of course, this different rich upper-class Egypt needs a different education
536 and needs a different cultural life and different recreational life and different economic life. That's why
537 you had the new universities, the new schools, and they don't really have prejudice against Arabic *per se*,
538 but it's simply the idea that they belong to universal culture, which is the universal international
539 corporate business culture, and this culture has English as its universal language, American culture as
540 universal culture, and so they had to be part of that. So for them, they would say, "Well we don't have
541 a problem with Arabic, but it's irrelevant to our lifestyle and to our interests." That's why this was the
542 case.

543
544 **[MARK JUERGENSMEYER]:** We want to take a break in a second but Ashraf, I have to ask you
545 one question because you just said in passing recourse that this regime will crumble in time. But it
546 seems to me, just as an outsider, that this present kind of emerging coalition with the Muslim
547 Brotherhood gives it a legitimacy that is then combined with big oil money and with big economic
548 interest. It's like a marriage made in heaven - economic, cultural, political, military power, all woven
549 together. Why won't this regime last forever?

550
551 **[ASHRAF EL SHERIF]:** I agree with you that there is a dominant hegemonic class, which wants to
552 preserve its interests and has financial resources, has political clout, and is still in charge, it is still in
553 power. And yes, they are trying to orchestrate the persistence of the continuation of this hegemony. I
554 have a little reservation about the Muslim Brotherhoods specifically because I have a different
555 interpretation, understanding, and approach to what the Islamists are really doing in Egypt right now -
556 maybe I can save that until later. But your main question about why they cannot really stay forever:
557 They cannot even if they want. The ruling regime formula is biased to the favor of some
558 socioeconomic interests. Okay, but this cannot continue forever. The whole idea is that if you want to
559 rule like that than you have to maintain repression, you need to maintain depoliticizing the public
560 sphere in Egypt, you need to maintain an authoritative control over the public sphere. Simply, you need
561 to maintain killing-politics, because if you are allow democratic politics, if you allow political
562 pluralism, if you allow different social groups to organize freely and express their political interests
563 and articulate their political interests and they are trying to run for power, then you are risking losing
564 these interests. Actually that's a very likely situation because we agree that the majority of the people
565 don't want to be part of their economic interests. So, if you allow for democracy, in this case we see by
566 this unbelievable mobility in the streets, then you will lose. So the other option is what the SCMF is
567 doing right now, to postpone democracy as long as they can and you try to maintain a Mubarakism
568 type of politics, but simply they cannot do that. Why? Because for the simple fact that Mubarakism
569 collapsed in January. It tried to administrate the best that they can in terms of security repression, in
570 terms of physical repression, in terms of playing on the fears of the Egyptian middle-classes, in terms
571 of fears of questions of insecurity and instability over their fate. So Mubarakism cannot continue, or it
572 will continue in a very weak, vulnerable, distorted form, as it exists right now. Can you imagine the
573 SCMF, the military channel, the people who are ruling the country, they are now engaging in head to
574 head confrontation with some twenty year old peoples sitting in Tahrir Square, fighting on the garden,
575 the center of the Tahrir Square. That's very disgraceful, I would say, for the order.

576
577 **[PAUL AMAR]:** I think Ashraf's comments are incredibly illuminating and I just want to follow up a
578 little in terms of things that I wrote about in January and February that I'm still thinking a lot about.

579 You reminded me when you described this vision of the military return to this Golden Age of the early
580 90s - and I think only in their perspective it would be a Golden Age - but this project of building the
581 suburbs in New Cairo is kind of emblematic of that, of the 6th of October and this vision, which, of
582 course, the United States has abandoned by now, of building enclave suburbs for its consuming upper-
583 middle classes. We have that dynamic which is already contradictory because the military and its
584 contractors expand their power and expand their wealth in controlling the building of these, but then
585 the classes themselves that occupy them focus on basically linking themselves to global flows of
586 culture and capital, which then destabilizes the very kind of alliance that builds the infrastructure
587 themselves. So you have that contradiction and then - because if we talk about contradictions then we
588 could imagine change rather than a seamless alliance that we are talking about - but then another major
589 set of contradictions we haven't talked about yet, which I think is key, is that it's not merely a battle
590 between global international capital interests, which we identify with the west, and national militarized
591 contractors. But the fact that Egypt is now also a flourishing manufacturing country, full of factories,
592 again which are serving East Asia largely right? Which are connected to East Asian economies, Central
593 Asian economies, investors from all over the world, to Brazilian developers to Malaysian developers
594 too, so that there is an Egypt that is inserted into this utterly 21st century, which needs Egyptian
595 people, not just the upper-middle class consumers, but which needs labor, which needs youth. So,
596 99.9% of the coverage of the revolution thought that youth were rising up because they were
597 redundant, because they were forgotten, because they were useless, but I think that actually some of
598 that excitement is because they're now being sucked into these new forms that actually - of course, it's
599 very terrible conditions and it's a horribly dense network of exploitation - but they are part of a new
600 world which has a future. The return of manufacturing, a return of jobs, a return of agricultural
601 demand, the rise in price of certain kinds of commodities in Egypt that are being consumed in China,
602 India, and Brazil. That's another set of contradictions which doesn't match with their early 1990s
603 military vision of a country built on big infrastructure contracts with consumers and tourists channeling
604 money in. I think it's much more dynamic and religious discourse itself, based upon a 1980s middle
605 upper-class morality, also just doesn't fit that. So, there are reasons not to be pessimistic which, I think,
606 structurally we can depend on.
607

608 **[ASHRAF EL SHERIF]:** I absolutely agree. This actually answers the other questions raised here that
609 the attempts to resurrect or recreate the old Golden days of the 1990s and 80s is impossible. Impossible
610 on two levels, the elite level and mass level or popular level, because, as I said, there has been an
611 emergence of new and different type of business interests, different type of international economic
612 connections, different type of lifestyles and, as you said, the involvement of wide segments of
613 disgruntled, urban, labor force and this has effected the youth movement, which has been integrated
614 with different contradicting forms of international political economies. This opens the door for
615 contradictions and conflicts and the only way to resolve these contradictions and conflicts is political
616 mediation, political negotiation, which implies democracy - some kind of democratic transition, some
617 kind of democratic transformation. Because trying to keep these contradictions muted, as it used to be,
618 is impossible even if you want it. It's counterproductive to everyone, the rulers and the ruled. Yes, I
619 agree.

620

621 **[Break]**

622

623 **[MARK JUERGENSMEYER]:** We have a couple of new participants, Professor Sameh Farid from
624 Ain Shams University - thank you for joining us, it's a pleasure to have you here. We also have Ishak
625 Ibrahim from the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights - delighted to have you here. Paul Amar will
626 be our moderator for this session, and we will continue our discussion of the social impact of the
627 revolution and the transformation in Egypt.

628

629 **[PAUL AMAR]:** Thank you very much Mark. We will begin today with Amr Abdulrahman, who I
630 introduced earlier, and he can pick up on some discussions of the causes of the new revolution and
631 where these movements will be moving in the future. Thank you Amr.

632

633 **[AMR ABDULRAHMAN]:** Thanks Amar. I will just continue the discussion that was taking place in
634 the previous session. I have nothing specific to add. I will just be a little less flowery and energetic than
635 Ashraf and Amar and stick to the gloomy and dull part of the story that has to do with the measures to
636 manage the transitional periods - how to manage the period of the transition. What Ashraf rightly

637 called an equilibrium of weakness between the SCMF and between the revolutionary bloc could also
638 be described as a conflict between two dynamics - the dynamic of a revolution and the dynamic of the
639 *coup d'état*. What happened was an overlap where a convergence between two different logics - the
640 logic of revolution industry and the logic of *coup d'état* - to get rid of command work and, in the later
641 stage, Hosni Mubarak and get back to the Golden Age, as Amar and Ashraf pointed out. Back in the
642 90s, *everything* between the SCMF and the revolutionary bloc has been lost in translation since then.
643 So, when the revolutionary bloc talked about cleaning up the state apparatus, the army thinks about it
644 as trying to put out those figures they would like to get rid of, like Ahmed Ezz, the business tycoon,
645 like Fathi Sorour, the speaker of the former Parliament, and so on and so forth. So a lot of the turmoils
646 and contradictions that we are seeing in the transition periods can be traced back to this convergence
647 between the two dynamics, the dynamic of the *coup d'état* and the dynamic of the revolution.

648
649 What I would like to highlight very briefly, is how this contradiction between the two logics affected
650 the measures of the transitional periods, in other words, what are the impacts on the management of the
651 transitional periods? The problem was that the rationale of the SCMF, since the 11th of February, is
652 how to maintain its grip on power without being at the forefront of the political process. You have two
653 contradictory imperatives. One withdrew from the forefront of politics, to keep the army depoliticized.
654 This is something that is also in the back mind of the army itself because after the *coupe* of 1952 till the
655 crisis of 1954, between Nasser and the democratic opposition, which also has its own shadows within
656 the army, the ultimate imperative of the regime was to keep the army depoliticized, far from politics
657 and rule. This is one of the specificities of the Egyptian authoritarianism - that it is civic
658 authoritarianism with an army backbone, but the army itself was not involved in daily politics as such.
659 This imperative is still in the back of the mind of the SCMF - how to withdraw from the forefront of
660 the politics, from the political arena, but to maintain its own campaign power and start to tailor again or
661 to support their regime that is on the fringe of collapse now. This rationale inflicted itself in the
662 measures of the interim periods – that, is pending, or entrusting, the weakest institutions in the state of
663 running the tasks of the transition period which is writing the constitution and writing the new
664 legislations, which is the parliaments. So, the early elections worked perfectly for the army and fit
665 perfectly in this scenario. The early election would bring a fragment of power, a fragment of

666 parliament, which can be more or less described as an extension of Tahrir Square, that everybody
667 would be represented there – the Islamists, the former elements of the NDP, the new position,
668 everyone. So the parliament is a fragmented one and the army will retain the role of arbitrator. It will
669 intervene in order to decide on the decisive issues, however, this would be a kind of legitimacy that
670 will keep it a little bit far away from politics. The perfect solution, or the other alternative that was
671 sidelined from the very beginning, was the alternative of a constituent assembly - a constituent
672 assembly by election, based on election, not an appointed constituent assembly, but a constituent
673 assembly by election from a functioning institution of the states. For example, for the judiciary to elect
674 its own representative in the constituent assembly, constituent court, state council, etc. etc.,
675 professional syndicates to elect its own representatives in constituent assembly, the trade unions to
676 elect its own representatives and so on and so forth. So you get, more or less, an assembly of 100 or
677 150 that was proposed and raised by many factions of Egyptian opposition to the SCMF, but was ruled
678 out since the very beginning because the SCMF wanted to tailor a legitimacy that is different than the
679 legitimacy of the revolution. It didn't want to owe the revolution the very fact of itself being
680 empowered, it wanted a different social legitimacy - *that* was the referendum of the 19th of March. This
681 referendum ended up with a very weird roadmap that postponed the possible finding of a new
682 constitution to the parliament that would be highly fragmented and divided and then, of course, the
683 army would intervene. Another element of the Ofranic authorization appearing through the
684 management was also postponing any kind of decisive legislative elements where new legislations that
685 would reshape the political arena in the direction of more politicization, as Ashraf was talking about, to
686 the new parliament that would be, as we pointed out, a very divided and fragmented one. For example,
687 one is a new law on trade unions that will allow for the first time for real pluralism in the trade unions.
688 This is postponed. Now there is a legislation that's prepared by the Minister of Manpower and Labor,
689 and this draft of legislations was prepared six weeks ago and the army didn't want to issue it. It would
690 like to postpone it to the parliaments to be taken off in endless discussions. A new law, for example,
691 for organizing the elections of the deans of the faculties and the heads of the other universities, the law
692 is already finalized and the army itself still refrained from issuing it. A new law on professional
693 syndicates and new laws on the NGOs, it is the same result. A new law on the political parties came up,
694 and is actually, more or less, a copy and paste from the last one, even raising the threshold of the

695 signatures needed to approve the political parties to 5000 signatures. So, this means that the party
696 should be already functioning in order to give a license, not the other way around. Plus, for sure,
697 tremendous financial resources were needed to establish the party and electoral law, the electoral law
698 that governs the worst of the majoritarian system and the worst of the list system - like dividing the
699 ballot into fifty-fifty; fifty by the list and fifty by the individual; majoritarian, one seat, one candidate.
700 And this, as I have tried to explain, will insure them to have a parliament that has everyone
701 represented: elements from the old regime, Islamists - the Islamists for sure will have the biggest
702 minority, or the decisive minority, lets put it this way - plus a fiasco of the different opposition groups
703 and the civil elements is postponing the presidential election till indefinite periods. Nobody knows
704 about the presidential election because if the system continues to be a presidential republic, this means
705 that a presidential election will be the moment when the SCMF has to hand over power to a new
706 president. The date of this election is unknown. So we are in a situation where everything is so far on
707 hold and pending, waiting for the parliamentary election, which can only make things worse. This is
708 not the Turkish model as Ashraf was talking about, we are more approaching a Pakistani model where
709 we have fragmented opposition, strong Islamic oppositions in the streets, and an army oligarchy in the
710 background running the show. This suits the army very well. For sure, this doesn't speak against what
711 Amar and Ashraf talked about the structure and elements that will push the regime sooner or later to
712 collapse, and that will push the revolutionary camps, sooner or later, to the forefront. I'm just trying to
713 highlight another part of the picture that is the management of the interim period and what are the
714 chances of opportunities that have been lost and rooted out by the military, with the support of
715 Islamists. I'm not talking here about an alliance or a coalition between the Islamists and the army - this
716 is something that nobody can substantiate. But definitely there is an overlap of interests there for the
717 Islamists to be the biggest minority of the parliament from their presence, and also to have a state
718 legitimacy for the first time since 1954, and the interest in the army, as I tried to explain, to keep itself
719 in the background and rule from behind. This overlap rooted out the chance to have a clear road map
720 and a clear interim period, depending on the functioning institution of societies, but also and most
721 importantly, on the movements that launched it - this revolution is a part of, from the very beginning,
722 the youth movement, the labor movement, and the new intellectual strains of the civil society, like the
723 feminist movements, etc. etc. These three elements of the revolutionary camp have already been

724 sidelined and ruled out from the scene that they contributed to make up in the first place. For sure in
725 the parliamentary election these three trends will have no chance to make it to the parliaments, and we
726 will have a parliament that resembles more of the old regime than the new future regime that we are
727 hoping for. That can explain also the sense of resentment and the growing radicalism in the
728 revolutionary camp that we saw yesterday –the attack on the Ministry of the Interior, the attack on the
729 embassy. There is a growing feeling that cannot be articulated clearly, but you can sense it, you can
730 feel it on the street that they have been sold out in a sense; that with all the sacrifices that they
731 presented, they are now again sidelined and marginalized from an arena where they do not know the
732 rules of the game - how to play it, how to run for an election, these kind of deals that happen behind the
733 closed door. So, there is a sense of disappointment and resentment within the revolutionary camp, and
734 among the different components of the revolutionary camp, that still needs to be articulated. There is
735 no political force in the arena from the new political forces, from the new parties like the Social
736 Democratic Party, the Free Egyptians, and the one run by Naguib Sawiris. The task is how to articulate
737 the sense and energies of the revolutionary camp into a new political project that pulls an alternative to
738 the socioeconomic policy and the political forum challenges. This will leave us with a very shaky
739 position even after the election of the parliamentary that can only produce more problems – less than a
740 solution to this dilemma. I'm sorry, it's a little bit of a gloomy scene, but we need to see both sides of
741 the stories - the one that focuses on the macro level, that Amar and Ashraf presented, and the one that
742 focus on the micro, the nitty-gritty stages of the transition that I believe you have to take into account
743 also.

744

745 **[PAUL AMAR]:** Well, let's have a couple of questions and we will continue to tie in these themes as
746 other speakers join in.

747

748 **[JUAN CAMPO]:** Thank you very much for your rapid assessment of the situation and providing your
749 own perspective. I guess my first question is primarily related to the incident at the Israeli Embassy:
750 How much of this was a popular reaction against the killing of Egyptian soldiers, responding to that
751 event, seeing that the Egyptian government and its forces did not respond in a way that they felt
752 satisfied? Or how much was it an expression or a strategy on the part of elements in the popular

753 movement to put SCMF on the spot - to put pressure on them, to show them that if you don't do
754 anything, it's going to get worse in terms of us trying to embarrass you? So was it a strategy of
755 embarrassment for SCMF? Or was it a popular sort of nationalistic response to the killing of Egyptian
756 soldiers? Or maybe both?

757
758 **[AMR ABDULRAHMAN]:** Well exactly, I believe it's both. On one hand it has been always there,
759 the resentment against the Israeli actions are ancient. This is not the first incident. One of our daily
760 stories when we were students at the university in late 90s-early 2000s, was about trying to march to
761 the Israeli Embassy after the siege of Arafat in 2002. This is a well-known story and for sure related to
762 the very fact that Egypt has this long peace treaty with Israel since the Camp David Accord. That has
763 happened again. There is no way to tell, but it is perceived to be something that is publically rejected,
764 but this doesn't mean with certainty that the vast majority of the Egyptians would like to go to war with
765 Israel. I mean there is always a shadow here. That's why the Turkish Prime Minister is attracting more
766 and more appeal in the region, and especially in Egypt. I believe it was also related to the measures
767 taken by the Turks, like expelling the Israeli ambassador and this, for sure, triggered something. So
768 there is an old element, but there is also a new element. There is resentment against the SCMF and the
769 wish to embarrass the SCMF by anyway possible and the wish also to keep the spark of the
770 radicalization alive - either by clashing with the police, or by going to the embassy and at the end of the
771 day, again, to clash with the police there. This is the point. There is this sense, as I've tried to point out,
772 of marginalization that is growing and you'd like to articulate it - again it is different moving targets.
773 One of them was the killing of Egyptian soldiers at the borders, this definitely evoked all the criticism
774 on the performance of the SCMF in power since February up till now.

775
776 **[ASHRAF EL SHERIF]:** I have a question about the trade unions. As you explained, the new trading
777 law is going to be rejected by the SCMF. What are the prospects or potentials for the independent
778 trading unions and their relations *vis á vis* the official state federations of labor unions? How can this
779 be related and relevant to the overall political struggle in the streets or in parliamentary politics in
780 general?

781

782 **[AMR ABDULRAHMAN]:** Thanks for the question. For sure, the independent trade unions
783 movement is a new phenomena in Egyptian politics; one that is very promising to bridge the gap
784 between the usual allegiance that has been always involved within the public affairs and the wider
785 public. But the problem with the independent trade unions is that it has its own internal logic that
786 shouldn't be overlooked; we shouldn't project our own wishes on the trade union movements - the
787 trade union movement has its own internal dynamics. One of the very first internal dynamics - also, no
788 statistics available here, this is another problem - but by mere observation, it is still highly concentrated
789 in the public sector industries and that is where it is shrinking. When you talk about your material base
790 of the movement, it's already eroding. You talk about the new industry and zones, places like
791 [indistinct]. The trade union movement itself is almost non-existent, it's still very weak, it's still taking
792 place on a patronage basis, so it is not developed enough. I would say if the army actually rejected the
793 law on the independence and pluralism of the trade unions - I'm not expecting wide opposition by the
794 way. This may be a surprisingly disappointing answer, but from the mere observation, I don't expect
795 that wide an opposition. It may pass and then an exchange, the army now will have a trade union that is
796 run democratically. So we will have one trade union, but it will be run undemocratically and so on and
797 so forth. So, let's not project our wishes on the new movement of the trade unions. It will develop in
798 the future for sure, but by its own dynamics.

799

800 **[MARK JUERGENSMEYER]:** I want to ask you to come in and be involved in the conversation at
801 any point you want to, but is this a good time for you to make some comments, please?

802

803 **SAMAH KHALIL FARIED):** I have one question for you. Thank you for presenting and I want to
804 ask you about the clashes now between NGOs, especially the new patterns of NGOs, like the new
805 coalitions, the new agencies, etc. Now we can find some resistance for gathering or receiving some
806 donations to create new projects or to make some projects in the street. Now we have major resistance
807 from Islamic groups and from SCMF and now the majority of people hate all the NGOs, or rather, the
808 new patterns of NGOs. How can we go through with this problem in your opinion?

809

810 **[AMR ABDULRAHMAN]:** Well, I cannot advise what the NGOs can do. They are definitely better
811 suited than me to strategize for themselves. But again, in order to understand this bitterness, this goes
812 back to my initial remark, which had to do with the conflict between the logic of the *coup* and the logic
813 of the revolution. At the end of the day, the intervention of the army was to refurbish, to reestablish,
814 and to reenergize the already existing regime. This is a point that we should have in mind. When the
815 army stepped into the political sphere, it was to make the regime function again - not to change the
816 regime. One of the defining characteristics of this regime - that is the regime inherited from 1952, I'm
817 not talking about Mubarak regime, I'm talking about the regime that was established by the free
818 officers - was this opposition or concern about foreign funding to the Egyptian groups. Be it is through
819 the church, for example, there's an issue there. Be it through an NGO, there's an issue there. Be it by
820 the political [indistinct]between political groups and their international supporters, for example, the
821 communists in the 60's - there is an issue there. There is an issue about this shadow area that has to do
822 with the international prospects of internal opposition, and definitely when you have the army coming
823 back to politics by its own weight, for sure it will come back with this kind of mentality and that's why
824 a crackdown on NGOs was highly expected. That is one element. Another element is that the NGOS
825 are the weakest link in the chain of the revolutionary forces. When you talk about the youth movement,
826 the youth movement *can* mobilize in the street. When you talk about the trade unions, they have their
827 own base and factories and civil departments of the states. When you talk about the political parties we
828 know their constituency is Islamist. It is the NGOs which is the weakest link because it doesn't have a
829 constituency *per se*, it has beneficiaries, but not constituency. A beneficiary cannot really support
830 NGOs in an open battle with the state indefinitely. The only part that can support the NGOs in their
831 own battle, for sure, is their own donors - EU, US Aid, The Ford Foundation - but at the end of the day,
832 and that's why I don't see the situation that bad to be honest with you, we were expecting some kind of
833 crackdown on NGOs, but at the end of the day the army needs foreign funding from US aid. It depends
834 on US aid for its own militarization - 60% of the US aid money goes to the US Army, it doesn't go to
835 the NGO, it goes to the army directly. It needs the EU for any building in the country, especially in the
836 service sector: health, education, tourism, etc. So that's why I see this tension is likely to heighten
837 around the time of the election, but when the election passes, I believe everything can go back to
838 normal. Quite to the contrary, I would say that NGOs can reach better agreements, solid agreements,

839 with an elected government. It will not be up to the mood of the security apparatus to deal with NGOs.
840 The NGOs can negotiate better with an elected government. So I think this is a temporary turmoil with
841 what's happening between SCMF and the NGOs.

842

843 **[MAGDA CAMPO]:** Since we are dealing with religion and politics and all that, my question to you
844 is: Is there any opportunity in the future for the Coptic community? Can we have a Coptic president of
845 this country? Or can they have important appointments as ministers of whatever? I know Boutros
846 Boutros-Ghali was one of them, but it was one in a million. So what do you think about that?

847

848 **[AMR ABDULRAHMAN]:** Again, the developments in the country brings some positive and some
849 negative remarks. It is still very, very early to judge about the future between the Coptic community, as
850 such, and the state. Let's start with the positive developments: The positive developments, as far as I
851 see it, is that now we are seeing more and more problematization of the authority of the church within
852 the community. This would be a subject for very interesting research in the future that I'm already
853 working on. But the formula of the nation, or how the Mubarak era of the Egyptian regime handled the
854 sectarian issue was by entrusting corporatist institutions, in their religious fields, to tackle these issues -
855 like the Coptic Church, the [indistinct]and so on. Then they monopolize the religious discourse, and
856 that was the case with the Egyptian church. They were creating more and more problems for the Coptic
857 community itself, especially when it comes to the personal affairs, the second marriage, divorce, but
858 also when it comes to conversion. There are many interesting cases that we can talk about tomorrow or
859 in the second half of the session.

860

861 What happened in the streets opened a venue for new Coptic youth to participate in politics, not under
862 the banner of the church, but through new political parties and even new political movements. So even
863 the political movement that tends to define themselves as Copts, they are not following the church.
864 There is something called the Union of the Maspero Youth, and this is to memorialize the first open sit-
865 in for Copts in front of the TV building in early March after the sectarian strife in one village which
866 went south of Cairo, and then another strife in Imbaba. And that was an open sit-in by the Coptic
867 youth, copying the techniques of the revolution - open sit-ins, cutting the street, putting some state

868 institution under siege, talking to the media, mobilizing, lobbying in the [indistinct] It's exactly the
869 same techniques and tactics of the revolutionary youth. For example, not talking to the state security;
870 like one year ago when you had the sectarian strife, and a church representative walked to a state
871 security officer, not trying to lobby the government alone - they are for sure trying to lobby the
872 government - but they are trying to engage civil society and political opposition, and even some
873 Islamist forces. In the far south of the country, three weeks ago, and after a very limited sectarian strife,
874 a very limited one that didn't even make it to the media, I was surprised how the Muslim Brotherhood
875 was involved in mediating this - the Muslim Brotherhood as a political movement *with* the Church.
876 Why the pressure from the church community itself, which pulled and dragged the church to sit with
877 the Muslim Brotherhood? Because they are the ones that can solve the situation. So, now we have more
878 diversification of the scene going on within the Coptic community itself that can pose new alternatives
879 to the sectarian consciousness. But on the other hand you have, for sure, negative elements that has to
880 do with the rise of the more radical tendencies within the Islamic spectrum, namely the Salafis, and
881 even the more radical wings like the al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya - Ashraf is more experienced with the
882 Islamic scene than me, so correct me if I'm wrong. Then what happened after the revolution was that
883 there was a strong showing for these tendencies and there is a growing awareness that there are things
884 that can be said and can be done that were not visible before, that were not feasible, under Mubarak,
885 including, for example, raising the issue of conversion on the other side from a Copt woman who
886 would like to convert to Islam and then the Church would like to bring them back to the community.
887 The most bloody sectarian strife after the revolution in Imbaba happened at the background of a similar
888 incident, of a Coptic woman trying to convert and then the Salafi groups took the issue up and then
889 they started marching to the church, demonstrating in front of it until the end of the story. This may
890 have its own shadows on the decisions of the states. Of course, for example, one of the elements of
891 discourse for the Salafis is that Muslims in this country are discriminated against, not the other way
892 around. It's a very interesting, very interesting formula. So this may have its own shadows on
893 appointments, for example, on the Copts and the leading positions within the prosecution. If you have a
894 country with a major political group who would like to be ruled by the Sharia, I don't see it very likely,
895 for example, to see a [indistinct] Copt. This would be a very legitimate argument that this prosecutor
896 who would rule by the Sharia would like someone who is much more experienced in this. Or for

897 example, in the [indistinct] in the army after eight months of revolution, we have a SCMF of 22
898 members and we didn't see one Coptic member among one of them. Not even a single one. There may
899 be one, we don't even know who are members of the SCMF. There may be one Coptic member, but at
900 least they don't make him visible, he doesn't appear. So this is the two sides of the story, on one hand
901 you have a growing diversification and pluralism within the community itself, erosion of the church
902 authority, but on the other hand, this can be a little bit balanced and checked by the very fact of the
903 growing radical Islamist tendency coming from the Muslim community. The future of the relation
904 between the Muslim and Copts, in this country, will depend on how this dynamic between the two
905 tendencies will develop in the future

906

907 **Luce Conference - Cairo**

908 **Cairo Day 1, Part 2**

909

910 **[Ishak Ibrahim]: Speaking in Arabic**

911 **[ASHRAF EL SHERIF]: Translation**

912 If you want to sum up the main features or characteristics of the Coptic scene before the revolution, it
913 can be summed up with three main features. The first one is the very fact that the Mubarak regime has
914 marketed the idea that the only alternative to the Mubarak regime is Islamist rule or the Islamist order,
915 the discriminatory anti-Coptic Islamic order. So this made the Mubarak regime, notwithstanding all its
916 corruption and brutality and dictatorship, the only possible viable alternative that the Coptic
917 community can be comfortable with and this explains why the Coptic community was slow in joining
918 the movement of the revolution. Well, they may have joined as individuals but not as a community,
919 and certainly the Coptic church was one of the latest to join the revolution.

920

921 **[Ishak Ibrahim]: Speaking in Arabic**

922 **[ASHRAF EL SHERIF]: Translation**

923 The second feature refers to that fact that the Mubarak regime has always preferred to deal with the
924 Coptic church as an intermediary between the state and the Coptic people and this implied dealing with
925 the Coptic people as subjects of the Coptic church, not as Egyptian citizens. Of course, politically this

926 led to the fact that Copts became second-class citizens and were not engaging with Egyptian politics as
927 Egyptian citizens.

928

929 **[Ishak Ibrahim]: Speaks in Arabic**

930 **[ASHRAF EL SHERIF]: Translation**

931 The third feature here, which is kind of a result of the first two features, is the fact that the dealings
932 with the Copts as Christian subjects of the Coptic church and the power of the church in managing the
933 situation, in conjunction with the state, led to the discrimination of the Christian people, as a minority
934 in a society dominated by Muslim majority, who were simply ignored by the state and by the official
935 public sphere. So, basically we can say that the Egyptian state encouraged a state of denial on the
936 question of the discrimination of the Copts and this has to do with their own approach to the Coptic
937 problem.

938

939 **[Ishak Ibrahim]: Speaks in Arabic**

940 **[ASHRAF EL SHERIF]: Translation**

941 In this state of denial, it was kind of easy for the regime or for the state in the short run because if you
942 want to recognize the problem of the Copts then it means that you have to deliver solutions to the
943 problems of discrimination, which includes mainly three questions - the question of the appointments
944 of Copts into top government positions, especially in the sensitive fields of security, police and the
945 army, and also top university positions, in ministerial positions, and top state administrative positions.
946 The other issue is the building of churches; it's well known that building huge churches in Egypt is
947 always restricted by a lot of administrative red tape and restrictions. Thirdly, is the question of the
948 freedoms, the freedoms of the Christians in conversion whether from Christianity to Islam or the other
949 way around.

950

951 **[Ishak Ibrahim]: Speaks in Arabic**

952 **[ASHRAF EL SHERIF]: Translation**

953 The predominant feeling among the Copts after the revolution is fear. There is a lot of fear among the
954 Coptics, the Egyptian Christians, the Copts after the revolution - fear of the uncertain future, fear of the

955 Islamist takeover, and fear of a future which will not ameliorate or improve their underprivileged
956 position in Egyptian society.

957

958 **[Ishak Ibrahim]: Speaks in Arabic**

959 **[ASHRAF EL SHERIF]: Translation**

960 This fear results from two main developments that happened after the revolution. The first one is the
961 increasing intensity of the incidents of sectarian strife after the revolution, which increased in number,
962 in quantity, and also quality - an increasing intensity. Also, there is the question of the absence of
963 regulatory state institutions, which in the past used to play a role of putting the power of extremist
964 groups in check, or protecting Coptic rights - the rights of church building and protecting the religious
965 places of worship, the Christian places of worship. So the absence of governmental regulations, the
966 absence of state power, added more to the Coptic fears.

967

968 **[Ishak Ibrahim]: Speaks in Arabic**

969 **[ASHRAF EL SHERIF]: Translation**

970 Interestingly since the revolution, the Copts, for the first time probably, have started resorting to
971 violence against the Muslims or against other groups violating their rights. In the last seven months we
972 have had at least four incidents of Copts using weapons and using violence in acts of gangster-ism and
973 streets battles with Muslim groups in sectarian strife incidents. Actually this is very dangerous because
974 it implies that the Coptic question is put on a collision course with the rest of society in the future.

975

976 **[Ishak Ibrahim]: Speaks in Arabic**

977 **[ASHRAF EL SHERIF]: Translation**

978 The second factor, the second dynamic, which is fomenting the Coptic fear after the revolution, is
979 the Islamist discourse, the discourse of the Islamic groups. Although these Islamist groups are
980 espousing, they are claiming, that they are building modern political parties and they are
981 championing democracy, their discourse on the question of the Copts is still very pre-modern, and
982 still very Coptic unfriendly and deals with Copts as second class citizens, as a protected people
983 status. Of course, this aggressive unfriendly discourse is raising a lot of fears among the Christian

984 people especially after the intense mobilization of the Islamist in the July 29th mass protest in
985 Tahrir Square one month ago.

986

987 **[Ishak Ibrahim]: Speaks in Arabic**

988 **[ASHRAF EL SHERIF]: Translation**

989 Lastly, a positive development in the Coptic behavior after the revolution is the non-sectarian
990 behavior of Copts on political questions. For the first time in modern history, Coptic people are not
991 really acting in harmony with the Christian church leadership. They are protesting on political
992 issues as citizens. They are not demonstrating in front of the church, but demonstrating in front of
993 state institutions, they are approaching the state for solutions to their problems as citizens, they are
994 engaging with national political questions. This is really a very significant development, and they
995 also disobeyed the Christian church regulations on several incidents.

996

997 **[Ishak Ibrahim]: Speaks in Arabic**

998 **[ASHRAF EL SHERIF]: Translation**

999 What is really important here is the fact that the Copts believe right now that sectarianism cannot
1000 be faced by counter-sectarianism. It is better for Coptic interests to engage with politics as Egyptian
1001 citizens, to be integrated within the Egyptian political system as Egyptians, or equal status with
1002 other Egyptians, and to cooperate with Egyptian Muslims in approaching the different national
1003 problems, including the problem with the Copts. This was reflected in the fact that the Copts right
1004 now are opting for political Coptic organizations that work in conjunction with national political
1005 organizations and not just religious organizations.

1006

1007 **[PAUL AMAR]:** Thank you very much, that was amazing and gave us a lot of detail about issues
1008 that are represented usually in a very thin way even in the Egyptian press. So, that was very
1009 interesting. Do we have questions for Ishak?

1010

1011 **[MAGDA CAMPO]: Speaks in Arabic and then gives English translation:** I was asking him
1012 about the revolution in 1919, when we saw the two symbols of the cross and the crescent side by

1013 side, and the revolution of January 28th, where we saw the same symbols side by side. So I was
1014 asking how he would compare what happened from 1919 until today and what's going to happen
1015 after that.

1016

1017 **[Ishak Ibrahim]: Response in Arabic**

1018 **[ASHRAF EL SHERIF]: Translation**

1019 Actually, there are points of similarities and differences between the two revolutions in 1919 and
1020 2011. The main point of similarity was the fact that before the 1919 revolution and also before the
1021 January 28th revolution, there was a climate of increasing sectarianism in the society. We can
1022 remember in 1908 there was a Coptic congress and there was a counter-Muslim congress and there
1023 was this climate of sectarianism on both sides, Muslims and non-Muslims. There were increasing
1024 indications that Egyptian Copts were absent from, or discriminated against, Egyptian national
1025 politics. Actually to the lead up to the January 25th revolution it was the same situation as well,
1026 there was a lot of signs about discrimination against Copts and alienating Egyptian Copts from
1027 national politics. However, differences may be in the future at the conclusion of the revolution and
1028 the results of the two revolutions.

1029

1030 **[Ishak Ibrahim]: Response in Arabic**

1031 **[ASHRAF EL SHERIF]: Translation**

1032 The first point of disagreement was the fact that in the 1919 revolution, the revolution did not
1033 succeed automatically or directly. The main issue of contention for the revolution or the main point
1034 on the agenda of the 1919 revolution was national independence, liberation from the British
1035 occupation. This didn't happen automatically, it took several steps and was in a very gradualist
1036 fashion in order for it to happen. As for the January 25th revolution, it's still too early to judge the
1037 results and the consequences of the revolution.

1038

1039 **[Ishak Ibrahim]: Response in Arabic**

1040 **[ASHRAF EL SHERIF]: Translation**

1041 The other important point of difference is the question of the role of the religious institutions on

1042 both sides, Christians and Muslims, during the 1919 revolution and then this years revolution. In
1043 1919, the Coptic church was not as strong as it is now, and there was a kind of secular Christian
1044 elite which was representative of the Coptic people and was very strong and influential in politics
1045 and in negotiating and representing Coptic interests. They were represented in the Egyptian
1046 delegation, which led the negotiations for independence. They were always strongly represented
1047 with the ruling party and in the parliament and official political institutions. On the Muslim side,
1048 the moderate, centrist, mainstream Muslim religious institutions at that time, namely al-Azhar, al-
1049 Kahf and others, were really strong and capable of controlling the Muslim consciousness and the
1050 Muslim taste at that time. Right now, however, the situation is actually the exact opposite. On the
1051 Muslim side the official mainstream moderate religious institutions are weaker than before, so their
1052 ability to spread moderate centrist Muslim consciousness has been weakened. Instead you have a
1053 lot of informal religious institutions, mainly the Salafists informal networks, especially in the media
1054 and the mosques, which are less centrist and less moderate than the al-Azhar. On the Christian side,
1055 the Coptic church is almost hegemonic on Christian consciousness, and the future of the Coptic
1056 church is very cloudy because it has a lot of uncertainties that has to do with the aging leadership of
1057 the Coptic church. The pope is getting really old and his very long tenure in leadership has stamped
1058 the Coptic church with inflexibility and with rigidity. So, the future of the Christian church's
1059 domination over the Christian people in Egypt is still uncertain.

1060

1061 **[Ishak Ibrahim]: Response in Arabic**

1062 **[ASHRAF EL SHERIF]: Translation**

1063 The other factor is the foreign powers, the role of foreign powers. That's a third point of difference
1064 between the two revolutions. In the 1919 revolution, the main superpowers in the region were
1065 Britain and France, and their power was not that big. It was limited to political control, but they
1066 didn't really have social and cultural influence over the Muslim and Christian consciousness and
1067 behavior in the Egyptian society, which is completely different now. Right now we can talk about
1068 foreign powers who are really influential in shaping Muslim-Christian relations. We can talk about
1069 the United States. The United States has economic and financial leverage in terms of the USAID
1070 and the money it supports and provides to NGOs and to social organizations. On the other hand, we

1071 have Arab countries, namely Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries, which provides financial
1072 support, religious and cultural resources, and administrative support to a lot of Muslim groups in
1073 the country and hence it's in a very powerful position to shape the consciousness and the behavior
1074 of the Muslim groups in Egypt.

1075

1076 **[Paul Amar]:** Yes, Samah, would you like to ask a question? This analysis was incredibly rich and
1077 we thank you for it.

1078

1079 **[Samah Khalil Faried]: Question in Arabic and then translated in English**

1080 I'm asking about the role of Coptics in continuing the revolution now and if we can understand the
1081 situation of the Coptics before the revolution, where they are integrated or making deals with the
1082 old regime to get many benefits. But we can't understand now why Coptics can't push their
1083 situation towards the revolution or the continuing of the revolution. We have some indicators about
1084 the situation of the Coptics. First of all, in the days of the revolution the authority of the church
1085 obligated all the Coptics to not get involved in the revolution. So we found some individuals in
1086 Tahrir Square, but they are not expressing about the church or religious authority. This is first. In
1087 the previous election, we found that many Coptics said no for deleting the second statement in the
1088 constitution - they are acting like Islamic groups, they say yes for this second statement to have
1089 Egypt be an Islamic state. In the third indicator we found now that civic Coptics can't say frankly
1090 that they belong to civil society and they refused the domination of the Coptic's church authority.
1091 So now we want to know the real situation of Coptics in Egypt.

1092

1093 **[Ishak Ibrahim]: Response in Arabic**

1094 **[ASHRAF EL SHERIF]: Translation**

1095 To start with, we must remember that Coptic Christianity, or the church power, in Egypt is different
1096 from that in Islam, because in Islam there is no theology or theocracy, there is no power of the
1097 church, so is there a religious authority? I mean does the church enjoy religious authority? Yes it
1098 does, because of the difference between Christianity and Islam. As a result, the Coptic church by
1099 definition has a lot of spiritual, symbolic, and cultural power over the Egyptian Copts. Now the

1100 question of the Coptic commitment to democracy and to civil politics - this has to be understood in
1101 context. Sectarian Coptic behavior, i.e. the commitment to Coptic church leadership and dealing
1102 with politics in sectarian terms, is a product of forty years of sectarian governmental policies in
1103 Egypt since the 1970s, when President Sadat opened the door for the Islamic fundamentalist groups
1104 everywhere in the universities, in civil society, in the government, in education, and in the media.
1105 As a result the Copts had no option but to resort to the church as a way to protect themselves and
1106 represent their identity. The Coptic church played a positive role during that time period by
1107 providing a forum for the Christians to associate and to feel themselves as a community. The
1108 Coptic church built hospitals, medical institutions, schools, culture activities, recreation activities,
1109 education activities and others. Now these forty years of Coptic church centrality in the life of
1110 Egyptian Copts cannot be undone in a few years. It takes time, it takes a long time, and actually the
1111 Egyptian Copts are on the right road, they are on the way, because they have actually started
1112 engaging with civil modern politics after the revolution. To prove this, Copts have a considerable
1113 membership proportion, almost 20 to 25% in many of the emerging liberal political parties in
1114 Egypt, including the Democratic Front, the Liberal Egyptians Party and the Social Democratic
1115 Party, which are the main liberal and leftist parties in Egypt right now. So it's just a question of
1116 time.

1117

1118 **[Paul Amar]:** Thank you very much, I learned an amazing amount— a great analytical mind there
1119 on those issues that are usually so easily simplified by external researchers, especially, that have
1120 special interests and questions defined before they arrive. So, thank you, I'm so glad that we got to
1121 get know you and I look forward to continuing the dialogue. It was phenomenal. So we have one
1122 more speaker in this group, Osama Al Mahdy.

1123 **[video cuts off]**

1124 ...Al-Masry Al-Youm, which is probably the most prominent, new progressive newspaper covering
1125 the events of the revolution, and it focuses on a thorough research and journalistic agenda, keeping
1126 in touch with Sufi guilds as well as other new kind of Islamic movements, particularly among the
1127 popular classes. Welcome!

1128

1129 **[Osama Al Mahdy]: in Arabic**

1130 **[ASHRAF EL SHERIF]: Translation**

1131 He is saying that he is very happy to be here with you and talking about the Islamic movements in
1132 Egypt, whether it's the Muslim Brothers, the Islamic Group, the Salafists or the Sufis. Before the
1133 revolution, the Islamic movements had been subject to very harsh security repression, including
1134 surveillance and detention, arrest, and other forms of security repression. They didn't really enjoy
1135 the kind of freedom of action or performance except after the revolution. Before the revolution a lot
1136 of Islamic groups had the understanding that their mission is to apply Islamic Sharia in Muslim
1137 societies governed by *kaffir* states, states ruled by infidel, un-Islamic rulers and regimes.

1138

1139 **[Osama Al Mahdy]: in Arabic**

1140 **[ASHRAF EL SHERIF]: Translation**

1141 However, the Islamists after the revolution started thinking in different terms or different ways.
1142 Right now the question is not the question of negating or isolating yourself from the un-Islamic
1143 *kaffir* state as it used to be. Right now the question is the engagement with the existing power
1144 structure, the existing state, in order to bring the application of Islamic sharia into real effect. This
1145 will be done through negotiations with the military leadership and with negotiations with other
1146 political forces in the country.

1147

1148 **[Osama Al Mahdy]: in Arabic**

1149 **[ASHRAF EL SHERIF]: Translation**

1150 The Islamists are always famous for having something called *fiqh al-waqia*, which means the
1151 "jurisprudence of reality", which implies some kind of pragmatic adaptation to these three quarters
1152 of reality. The Muslim Brothers were always famous for this already. They have been always doing
1153 that before the revolution - engagement with existent electoral politics and running for
1154 parliamentary elections etc., etc. So, after the revolution, it was very expected and predictable that
1155 the Muslim Brothers will establish their own political party, The Freedom and Justice Party, and
1156 run for parliamentary elections as any other political party. The more significant development, or

1157 path breaking development, was the other Islamists groups, the Salafists and the Jihadis, and the
1158 Islamic group Jamaat al-Islamiyya. The Salafis had already established three political parties: Al-
1159 Nour Party, Al-Fadila, the Virtue Party, and Al-Asala Party, the Authenticity Party. After the
1160 release from prison of the famous Zomor family, Abboud El-Zomor made the Islamic Group, the
1161 Al-Jamaat Al-Islamiya, which made the group Hizb El-Benaa Wa El-Tanmia, the Construction and
1162 Development Party.

1163

1164 **[Osama Al Mahdy]: in Arabic**

1165 **[ASHRAF EL SHERIF]: Translation**

1166 So, along with the other Islamic groups, the Muslim Brothers, the Salafis, the Islamic Group and so
1167 on, the Sufis thought that, okay it's their time right now, they should have their own independent
1168 political activity and party activity as well. However, the situation for the Sufis was really
1169 problematic because the Sufis, compared to other Islamic groups, have always been questionable
1170 among the Islamists in terms of questions of their own faith and doctrine, their own practices of
1171 intercession and visiting shrines, and this behavior has been always accused and always critiqued as
1172 being unorthodox and being not religiously correct according to the other Islamic groups judgment.
1173 That's why it has been on antagonistic terms with the other Islamic groups. The Sufis thought that
1174 if they wanted to play politics, they could build on their most important asset - their popularity and
1175 their large number of followers. They claim they have 15 million supporters, which makes them the
1176 largest political group in Egypt in terms of numbers. So they thought, "Okay we should capitalize
1177 on this advantage", and simply you need to politicize your followers in every street, in every
1178 village, in every town. They opted for another alternative, which was cooperation with the
1179 secularist civil political parties, including the Naguib Sawiris, a liberal Egyptian party, the Social
1180 Democratic Party, and also leftist parties like the Progressive Unionist Party, the Neo-Nasserist
1181 Party, and the Al-Karama Party.

1182

1183 **[Osama Al Mahdy]: in Arabic**

1184 **[ASHRAF EL SHERIF]: Translation**

1185 The Sufis soon established their own political party, which was the Liberation Party, the Tahrir

1186 Party. The Sufis played a very important role politically because they have been used by the
1187 secularist political parties to discredit the Islamist's undemocratic credentials. The Sufis are
1188 noteworthy for their endorsement of democracy and civil state and on questions of the
1189 representation of Copts and women in the power structure and in questions of citizenship and other
1190 issues of democratic politics, and that is why they have played this important role in discrediting
1191 the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis undemocratic credentials. This clash of ideology between
1192 the Sufis *vis á vis* the other Islamist groups was most evident during the July demonstrations in
1193 which the Sufis decided to go to the strikes and demonstrations with the secularist parties,
1194 including April 6th and other secularist parties, and not with the Islamists demonstration.

1195

1196 **[Osama Al Mahdy]: in Arabic**

1197 **[ASHRAF EL SHERIF]: Translation**

1198 The Sufi's political activity had already been active in the dynamics and activity of the Egyptian
1199 bloc. The Egyptian bloc was kind of a loose coalition of different civil, secular, and non-Islamic
1200 political parties in Egypt and emerged as a counterweight to the Democratic Alliance bloc, which is
1201 basically the bloc dominated by the Islamists, the Muslim Brothers, and the Nour Salafist Party. So,
1202 the Sufis have been active in the workings of the Egyptian bloc, espousing an Islamic discourse of
1203 democracy and civil society and civil state. However, the Sufis are still uncertain, confused, or
1204 ambivalent, about their future political approaches or steps, like their juxtaposing themselves to
1205 what the Islamist parties in the Democratic Alliance bloc are doing. The Muslim Brothers and the
1206 Nour Salafist Party in the Democratic Coalition bloc have been cooperating with some liberal
1207 parties like Agata Party and Nasserist parties like Al-Karama, and developing some joint platforms
1208 and some common electoral activities. So right now Sufis are kind of soul-searching and asking
1209 themselves what can we do against that? How can we cooperate with our secular partners in the
1210 Egyptian bloc in order to counterbalance the workings of the Muslim Brothers and the Salafist
1211 parties.

1212

1213 **[Paul Amar]:** Thank you very much. There is no one else who can get inside these new
1214 transformations better than Osama. So lets open it up for questions. I think Ishak had a question for
1215 us?

1216

1217 **[Ishak Ibrahim]:** Do you suggest that some tension will happen between the Islamic Brothers and
1218 the Islamic movement in the next election? For example, will their be tension in Alexandria
1219 between the Salafist movement and the Muslim Brotherhood, and also between the Islamic Group
1220 and Muslim Brotherhood?

1221 **Repeats question in Arabic**

1222

1223 **[Osama Al Mahdy]: Response in Arabic**

1224 **[ASHRAF EL SHERIF]: Translation**

1225 Actually, the disagreements among the Islamists is quite common place in the Egyptian Islamism
1226 situation. Just look at the disagreements and tensions between the Muslim Brotherhood Party, the
1227 Freedom and Justice Party, and the Salafist Nour party. Although they are members of one
1228 coalition, they have their own disagreements and tensions. Also there are self-evident tensions even
1229 within the Salafists themselves. Some of the Salafists, like Al Dawah Al Salafiayh in Alexandria,
1230 the Salafist proselytizing movement, were the most important Salafists movements in Alexandria.
1231 They still think its religiously unacceptable to form a political party and to run for elections, and
1232 they still opt for the non-political option of changing society through spiritual, social, and religious
1233 proselytizing activities. Other Salafists disagree with that, such as the Islamic Group in upper Egypt
1234 who have a different take on politics. They decided that what they need to do right now is to run for
1235 the parliamentary elections, establish a political party, run for elections, and try to Islamize the
1236 society through their presence in politics.

1237

1238 **[JUAN CAMPO]: Question in Arabic and then in English**

1239 My question was dealing with the visions among the various Islamist organizations. They were
1240 present before the revolution and appeared again, perhaps more prominently, after. He mentioned
1241 the regional divisions that are present and there might be also ideological divisions, but I was

1242 asking him if there are class divisions, socioeconomic divisions, that are present among the
1243 Islamists - urban, upper class, middle class, peasant class, working class etc.

1244

1245 **[Osama Al Mahdy]: Response in Arabic**

1246 **[ASHRAF EL SHERIF]: Translation**

1247 There are two points here. First, in terms of ideology, the core of Islamist ideology is non-class
1248 based. There is the whole idea that members of the civil Islamic group might belong to different
1249 classes, however, there is always this ideology of religious brotherhood which puts them together
1250 in one unified organization based on, as he said, spiritual bonds of brotherhood, not on class-based
1251 alignment or solidarity. But, on the other hand, class differences are relevant - they do make a
1252 difference. In what sense? For example, if you compared the Salafist group to the Islamic Group,
1253 the Salafists are mostly middle class and there is a large representation of businessmen within the
1254 Salafist. Therefore, they have financial resources which provides them further with media
1255 resources, and so they are capable of advocating their standpoints and defending themselves in the
1256 media against any detractors and critics. Whereas the Islamic group is different, most of the rank
1257 and file of the Islamic Group is from the lower classes, most of them are poor, unemployed, or they
1258 have just been released from prison, and so they lack the financial resources, and hence the media
1259 resources, in order to publicize and defend their standpoint nationwide.

1260

1261 **[Lunch Break]**

1262

1263 **[Mark Juergensmeyer]:** Welcome back everybody. Now we have the wonderful dynamic duo of
1264 Saad Eddin Ibrahim and Barbara Ibrahim, which brings two complementary perspectives on the
1265 topic that is important to us - the role of religion in global civil society, political and social changes,
1266 and the role of NGOs. We are going to devote the whole session to the two of them.

1267

1268 Saad Eddin Ibrahim was involved in the first workshop that we had in this three years series. He
1269 graciously came to Santa Barbara, and at the time he did so, in part, because he couldn't go back to
1270 Egypt. The current regime was making things uncomfortable for him, as they did even more

1271 severely during the time he was in prison by the Mubarak regime. At that time it seemed like a
1272 hopeless situation, that we would always have Mubarak with us. How quickly things change, and
1273 how appropriate it is to have Saad Eddin with us now to reflect a little bit on the extraordinary
1274 changes that have happened in Egypt in this last year. Also, if you don't mind, tell us how this has
1275 affected you personally and what has happened to you in your experiences since. Welcome back!
1276

1277 **[Saad Eddin Ibrahim]:** Well thank you very much Mark, and I apologize for missing the earlier
1278 session. There are so many events taking place in Egypt nowadays! We just opened another
1279 conference, in the, organized by an Israeli-Palestinian fellow who organized that conference, and
1280 again, very similar to our theme here. That's why I guess I got confused, I couldn't have accepted
1281 to open two conferences in the same day?! How many times in a thousand would somebody get an
1282 invitation to open two conference, with similar topics, about the Arab spring? I was happy to find
1283 something to say in the other conference, which I'm not going to say here in view of the violence
1284 last night around the Israeli embassy. Those of you that have been in Egypt for a while know that in
1285 every spring in Egypt, and probably in the region, despite the pleasant, tender, weather in the
1286 spring, there is at least one week of Khamaseen. Have you heard of Khamaseen? It is very nasty, a
1287 lot of dust, and it is a nightmare for every housewife in Egypt because no matter how much she
1288 keeps cleaning her house, her apartment, in a couple of hours it is covered with dust again. So we
1289 had our Khamaseen, the only big violent event, at least on the side of the revolutionaries, which
1290 was last night around the Israeli embassy. This was unfortunate, because otherwise the Egyptian
1291 revolution has remained fairly peaceful and has made quite an impact throughout the world.
1292 Everybody was watching television, glued to their television, for the 18 days of the revolution. So,
1293 we wanted nothing to smear that image of a massive, genuine, popular revolution, peaceful, and to
1294 our credit, Barbara brought me back in the middle of the revolution, so I was at least an eye witness
1295 to the events. In the last third of the revolution, she herself spoke in Tahrir square and I hope she
1296 will be generous to share with you our experience and how she was there from the first hour of the
1297 revolution, which is unusual, but it was a fluke because she happened to be in a meeting in the
1298 Samir Amis Hotel! She saw the crowds coming and then she told me the story, she told me this is
1299 going to be different. I did not believe her at the time, but few hours later she was reporting from

1300 the square about how different it was, and she will tell you the real story in her own words. But
1301 what I would like to share with you is what I call divine justice. Divine justice, because in the same
1302 prison I was held for three years, in the same cell block, the same building, is where all the symbols
1303 of the Mubarak regime are now, including the two sons, including the Minister of Interior, the
1304 Minister of Information, everybody who was more or less an actor in framing me during my case
1305 between 2000 and 2003. So, its “ironic” a “historical irony” “divine justice” call it whatever you
1306 wish.

1307
1308 Moving on, when Barbara spoke in Tahrir square, she was asked where her husband was and she
1309 opened her phone. I was teaching in New Jersey and I could hear the shouting, yelling, and
1310 cheering, and later on I would understand that they were curious about why I was not there. Then
1311 the following day I was there and they thought of her as an American woman who can bring her
1312 husband across the Atlantic in less than 24 hours! Anyhow, other than this personal note that
1313 transpired, I’d like to just make three or four observations about what is going on in Egypt right
1314 now and to relate it to the discussion that I heard earlier from other young speakers. Last Saturday –
1315 and here I’m bringing a lot of threads together - a group of my prison mates, mostly Islamists,
1316 actually all of them, invited themselves to come and see me in our country home on the road
1317 between Cairo and Alexandria. There they were, twenty-five of them, from the Tora prison, which
1318 is where the young Mubarak’s are right now. Of course, for the whole day, exactly one week ago,
1319 we reminisced about the memories of the prison, how each one got there, and how they handled
1320 their experience. One of them, which is a heartbreaking story, was actually our senior in the group
1321 because he spent 31 years in prison! 31 years without being indicted, without being tried – 31
1322 years! So he gets imprisoned at the age of 21 and gets out of prison at the age of 54. His was the
1323 most dramatic of the stories, but another equally dramatic story was the guy who organized the get
1324 together, whose name is Sabra from Alexandria, and his crime, or at least his charge, was that he
1325 and his fellow “*ihadists*” had raided jewelry shops in Alexandria that were owned by Christian
1326 Copts. For that they got anywhere from 15 to 25 years of prison. When I was in prison, he and few
1327 of his fellows Islamists were in charge of the laundry mat, so they used to come every other
1328 morning to my cell to collect the laundry and bring it back. I was not allowed to speak to anyone

1329 except for these guys who were picking up the laundry. While they were picking up the laundry we
1330 would exchange a few words, and so I got to know a little bit about them, but, of course, they
1331 happened to know a lot about me from reading newspapers and so on. One day he said, "You were
1332 helping fellow Islamists in Imbaba to get rehabilitated by engaging them in microenterprises,
1333 giving them loans to start life on their own, and to avoid getting into violent actions." I said, "Yes,"
1334 and they said, "Why can't you help us the same way?" I said, "Well you seem to be doing alright
1335 with collecting the laundry mats, and all of that". They said, "No, but we have to support our
1336 families outside prison. You can help us by giving us some loans and you can also speak to the
1337 prison authorities, they seem to respect you" - which was also true. For some reason they had some
1338 respect towards me, even though they were the wardens. Anyhow, I checked with Barbara, who is
1339 of course my banker, because in prison you are not allowed to carry any money with you. She
1340 brought some money, which was kept in the prison safe, in my name, and every time I would
1341 withdraw the money it was known by the prison authorities why that money was being withdrawn.
1342 They blessed the idea of helping these other Islamists who had been imprisoned for several years
1343 before me. The prison warden said, "Anything that can keep these guys quiet and orderly is fine."
1344 All they cared about was order in their prison. So, to make a long story short, we gave them some
1345 loans, arranging between a thousand and three or four thousands pounds each, and they started
1346 different projects in prison - carpentry shops, blacksmiths, tailor shop, and then a cafeteria, a
1347 seafood cafeteria! That's really where this group from Alexandria became very involved. They
1348 made seafood and they served all the VIP's in prison, like the bankers, white-collar criminals and
1349 so on, who had a lot of money. They were the best customers of this seafood cafeteria, built and
1350 organized by these Islamists from Alexandria. These are the ones who came to the farm last
1351 Saturday, who shared some of their hopes to get involved in a normal life. Some of them had been
1352 just released three or four weeks ago, some of them were released three or four years ago, different
1353 times. Anyhow, we discussed all day, they stayed all day from 11 o'clock in the morning till about
1354 11 o'clock in the evening. They were so eager to engage, to talk, to share their plans and hopes,
1355 among other things. They wanted to get involved in politics, peaceful politics, ordinary "politics as
1356 usual." They asked for advice and I suggested a party that I personally like, which was established,
1357 or at least initiated, by a Coptic fellow by the name of Naguib Sawiris, a name that anyone who has

1358 studied in or lived in Egypt would have probably heard or will definitely hear. Naguib Sawiris is a
1359 very successful businessman who owns Mobinil and he established, or at least initiated, a party
1360 called Free Egyptians Party, the **Hizb Al-Maṣrīyīn Al-Aḥrār**. These guys, these Islamists, did not
1361 care that he was a Coptic, did not care that he was Christian, they did not care that he was a
1362 businessman - they were very intrigued and they wanted to meet with him and many of them
1363 wanted to join his party. Some of them also felt that that this would vindicate them from some of
1364 the crimes against Christian shops, especially jewelry shops in Alexandria, because most of the
1365 jewelry shops in Alexandria, or probably all over Egypt, are usually owned by Copts, or minority
1366 members, or Armenian Copts and so on, I don't know why. So, one way of vindicating themselves
1367 was by joining that party. As a matter of fact, many of them also managed to study while in prison
1368 and many, at least three or four of them, managed to get law degrees while in prison. Now they
1369 have law offices, both in Cairo and in Alexandria, and they were eager to partner with Coptic
1370 lawyers, again as show of unity. Egyptians like to talk about national unity, meaning the unity of
1371 Muslims and Copts. So these guys, former militants, former violent guys, who were sentenced
1372 anywhere from ten to thirty-one years, or at least in prison for that long, are now eager to start life
1373 or at least to restart their life and partner with secularist, including non-Muslims, in their business.
1374 Here is where freedom counts. Once these guys were free, once these guys could navigate in
1375 society, three or four things happened to them. One is to gain a new understanding of the nature of
1376 society and the state, and two, to show diversity among themselves.

1377

1378 I was eager to learn about one group that really disturbs me called the Salafists, and I have written
1379 in my weekly column in one of our daily's called Al-Masri Al-Youm about the Salafists. These
1380 Salafists, as I heard from some of our younger speakers earlier, seem to be in the thousands and the
1381 Sufis are even bigger. The Sufis I like and I enjoy because they give Islam a humane, soft, and
1382 gentle flavor. Muslim Brothers politicize Islam. Salafists were an enigma to me because as much as
1383 I have studied Islamic movements throughout my academic career, the Salafists, until six month
1384 ago, struck me as apolitical - they have nothing to do with politics. In fact, they are always citing a
1385 verse in the Qur'an that urges the faithful to obey God, the Prophet and the decision makers. So
1386 they are not political, they would not touch any opposition, they did not partner with the revolution,

1387 and they actually kept advising their followers to stay away from these irreligious revolutionaries
1388 and to keep their purity to themselves. However, once the revolution succeeded, once Mubarak was
1389 forced to step down, all of a sudden the Salafists got their appetite whetted for politics.
1390 Immediately, they became political, they prevented a Coptic governor from assuming his office in
1391 Canaan, one of the upper Egyptian governors. I heard one of their leaders advising secularists like
1392 myself to pack up their suitcases and to migrate to Canada or to Australia, saying that we have no
1393 place in this country, this country is going to be theirs and theirs for Islam. These are the Salafists.
1394 So I asked this group of former militants, my fellow prison mates, to educate me more about the
1395 Salafists and here is what they told me: The Salafists are people who originally went to Saudi
1396 Arabia and oil rich Gulf countries in the 70's, 80's and 90's because there was an oil boom, an oil
1397 bonanza. After 1973 Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries needed manpower, and labor, so where
1398 would they would get the labor from heavily populated countries like Egypt. So, many Egyptians,
1399 as many as 25 million Egyptians, had gone to work in Saudi Arabia between 1973 and 2010. The
1400 returning Egyptian workers returned with Wahhabi ideas, and I don't know if the term Wahhabi
1401 makes any sense to you - do you all know what Wahhabi is? Wahhabi is an Islamic movement that
1402 rose in the Arabian Peninsula and was named after Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the founder, in
1403 the 18th century. It was a very harsh, hard-liner, understanding of religion, very puritanical, and
1404 kind of a desert-like version of Islam. Many of the Egyptians who worked in Saudi Arabia were, of
1405 course, happy to be getting bigger salaries, wages, income and so on, and many of them wanted to
1406 extend their stay there. So, they became more loyal to the king, became more Wahhabi than the
1407 Wahhabis, and when they returned back to Egypt they came with those ideas and those contacts
1408 and connections and with resources that kept flowing from the Wahhabi organization in Saudi
1409 Arabia called Hai'at al-Amr bi al-Ma'ruf wa al- Nahi 'an al-Munkar. The translation of this name
1410 would probably take a long time, but it is an organization that commands virtue and prohibits vices
1411 – that is a very short translation. Anyhow, Hai'at al-Amr bi al-Ma'ruf wa al- Nahi 'an al-Munkar
1412 kept providing Egyptian Salafists with money, with resources, with contacts and so on. It is a
1413 movement, or the Wahhabi version of it, which is also apolitical - these guys were nearly apolitical
1414 for more than 35 years until the revolution succeeded and all of a sudden they became political.

1415
1416 So, all of this I've learned from tough former militants and from some of my own readings. They
1417 are one of the groups contending for power now, and if there is an election tomorrow for the
1418 parliament, they probably would either run their own candidates or would ultimately ally
1419 themselves with the Muslim Brothers. Our estimate, and estimates from the militants who came to
1420 visit me last Saturday, is that they probably could get anywhere from 30 to 40 percent of the seats -
1421 not the majority, but a plurality, because it will be the biggest bloc in parliament. Being the biggest
1422 bloc, they will definitely have a crucial say in framing the new constitution and framing the
1423 political life of Egypt in the next few years to come. And that is where a revolution is subject to
1424 being hijacked - these guys did not participate, but they are one of three parties that could hijack the
1425 revolution. The other two, who are not going to do it and on that I won't talk unless you ask
1426 questions, is the military council itself, the supreme military council that is ruling the country now.
1427 We have seen evidence that they might like to take advantage of the division, and some of the
1428 violence that took place last night, to extend their hold on power. So there is the old Salafists, along
1429 with the Muslim Brothers, as one potential hijacker of the revolution. The second potential hijacker
1430 is the military council itself, the supreme military council, and the third are the remnants of the
1431 Mubarak regime. Even though their party has been officially dissolved, the human beings who
1432 manned these parties, the NDP, the National Democratic Party, are still there. They make up what
1433 we call, or what Leonard Binder, a political scientist in California, called the second strata, the
1434 middle strata, that he traced historically in Egypt. He found that from 1923, the first election in
1435 Egypt after the 1919 revolution, that this strata, the so-called Nottams who were in the cities, in the
1436 country sides, the [Arabic word] had managed, regardless of what the regime is - Royal Egypt,
1437 Nasser's Egypt, Sadat's Egypt, Mubarak's Egypt - to have a substantial share of power. So that is
1438 the third possible hijacker, under different names, under different guise, they also, like the military
1439 council and like the Islamists, could hijack the revolution. Has there been a precedent for hijacking
1440 a revolution? Yes, there has, there was one - the Russian revolution. Between February 1917 and
1441 October 1917, there was a small group of communists, and being small they were called the
1442 Mensheviks in February. By October, they became the dominant group, the Bolsheviks, and they
1443 hijacked the Russian revolution. Anyone who has seen Dr. Zhivago, which I had seen in my youth,

1444 would get glimpses of how young patriotic Russians got ultimately marginalized and how they
1445 suffered from the same revolution that they helped to stage at one time. The other precedent is in
1446 Iran, a country closer to us. Again, between January 1979 and November 1979 the young Iranian
1447 Mujahadeen-e-Khalq, who suffered at the hands of the Shah, who lost many lives at the hand of the
1448 Shah - many of them had been hanged, many of them have been driven to exile - but they persisted
1449 and they kept staging uprisings against the Shah until they forced him out. However, the day he
1450 was forced out, the day he was forced to fly, ironically, to Egypt, came Ayatollah Khomeni from
1451 Paris and he and the Islamists took over in Iran and hijacked the revolution. So there are precedents
1452 of hijacking revolutions, and the Egyptian revolution, unfortunately, could also be hijacked. We are
1453 doing our best and trying to alert everybody of that possibility. We hope it will not be and we hope
1454 that the democratization process will continue unabated and that Egypt will become a model for the
1455 region. That is our hope and we are working for that and we are asking everybody who can help us
1456 safeguard the revolution from being hijacked. I will end here - thank you for listening and sorry if I
1457 took too long.

1458

1459 **[Mark Juergensmeyer]:** That was all very interesting, rich and fascinating and very useful. Is the
1460 Ibn Khaldun Center doing well?

1461 **[Saad Eddin Ibrahim]:** Yes, doing well and we could use some help. If you are living here in
1462 Egypt, come intern at Ibn Khaldun, which is my center. I'm sorry I did not bring my publications
1463 with me, but I will leave my contact information and you can come and visit us at Ibn Khaldun in
1464 the Mokattam Hills, overlooking the rest of Cairo. Even though the regime tried to destroy it also,
1465 we reopened it after I got out of prison and now it is working and we can use volunteers and
1466 interns. So if you have the inclination to get some hands-on experience come to Ibn Khaldun.
1467 Thank you.

1468

1469 **[Mark Juergensmeyer]:** Maybe we'll have a question or two for Saad Eddin, if anybody wants to
1470 follow up on anything he said.

1471

1472 **[Juan Campo]:** Thank you, Saad Eddin, so much for your exposition and overview about what has
1473 been happening, including your own personal experiences. I was curious, in terms of the possibility
1474 of the hijacking of the revolution, the role that you saw that outside powers might have in the
1475 hijacking process. You mentioned something about Saudi Arabia there, in terms of the Salafists, so
1476 that would it be one part of it I think. Another part of the question would be on the role of the
1477 United States, and whether you saw that there might be a possibility that one of those other non-
1478 revolutionary forces being aided from the United States side, opposed to the revolutionaries, would
1479 play such a role.

1480

1481 **[Saad Eddin Ibrahim]:** As I mentioned already, the Saudis have already played a role through the
1482 Salafists, even though the Salafists are Egyptians. As a result of their long detour during the oil
1483 boom, they have a very close connection, and they continue these connections, with the Hai'at al-
1484 Amr bi al-Ma'ruf wa al-Nahi 'an al-Munkar. The Saudis, of course, being royal and conservative,
1485 would like to conserve the status quo of the region. This has been the basic foreign policy of Saudi
1486 Arabia since 1960's, from the time of Nasser. If any of you have read Malcolm Kerr's book, *The*
1487 *Arab Cold War*, it traces back the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Some would even trace
1488 it back to the previous century, when Muhammad Ali sent his son, Ibrahim, to help an Ottoman
1489 Sultan to put down the first Wahhabi state. In fact, he was so successful he destroyed their capital
1490 Diriyah and eliminated the first Wahaabi state on behalf of the Turkish Sultan. Many Egyptians
1491 have forgotten that and it is probably only a footnote in most Egyptian history book. However, in
1492 the Saudi consciousness...when fellow Saudi members of the royal family who studied with us in
1493 the states, and even though they are not supposed to drink, drink very heavily and when they get
1494 drunk they often mention, what Egypt had done to their first Wahaabi state. They say that they
1495 would never allow that to happen again. So, Saudi Arabia being a status quo, conservative,
1496 monarchy doesn't want the revolution to succeed, at least not in the way that genuine Egyptian
1497 revolutionaries would like to see the revolution unfolding.

1498

1499 As for the US, you probably can speak better about the US than I can. But, very quickly, I was
1500 called to Washington during that revolution, once they realized it was a large scale thing. Two of

1501 Obama's advisors happened to be old colleagues of mine. One is actually from Stanford, Michael
1502 McCord, and the other one was from Harvard, Samantha Power. I have known them over the years
1503 because they were interested, in their academic life, in democratic transition in Eastern Europe,
1504 Latin America, and so on. Since I was also in that business of democratic transition, we had that
1505 long relationship. So, knowing me personally, and now being advisors to Obama, they asked me if
1506 I would come down - it takes about three hour by train to go down. I did go down, and that was
1507 literally the White House! There Egyptians were demonstrating outside the White House, and every
1508 now and then these two advisors would come out, talk to the demonstrators, and drag me in with
1509 them into their offices for consultation.

1510 Now, Obama remained hesitant in supporting the Egyptian revolution until, I think, the fifth day
1511 and then he began to demand that Mubarak come out with a strong statement about reform.

1512 Mubarak was very reluctant, made up some token statements, and the crowd was getting angrier
1513 day by day, and the demonstrations in Washington, by the fellow Egyptians living in the greater
1514 Washington area, were also demonstrating everyday. Then the so-called Battle of the Camel took
1515 place and some of the American correspondences, especially this guy Anderson Cooper, began to
1516 be almost like a spokesman for the revolution because he was roughed by the Egyptian security.

1517 Then a young Egyptian revolutionary by the name of Wael Ghonim spoke very movingly about
1518 how he was blindfolded and taken prisoner for 8 days. He had no idea what was going on and when
1519 he was finally released under pressure he told the story, and he was so moving because many of his
1520 fellow revolutionaries were killed in the early days in the Battle of the Camel, which everybody
1521 saw on television. It was a reflection of how, shall we say, deteriorated the thinking of the regime
1522 was. They try first to scare the kids with airplanes, breaking the sound barriers over Tahrir square
1523 using low flying planes. That didn't work, so they tried water cannons and trucks, trucks driving
1524 full speed in the square, running people down. It didn't work, so they tried the horses, and that
1525 didn't work, so they tried camels – the last one was the camels. Now anyone who studied
1526 anthropology or sociology or development knows that in the evolution of modes of transportation
1527 you start with camels, then horses, then vehicles, then planes - with the Egyptians, they did the
1528 opposite! They started with planes, the most advanced means of transportation, and ended up with
1529 the most archaic, camels. I think when the story was told by Wael Ghonim even Obama was very

1530 moved by that story along with the advisors who were from day one telling him we should. They
1531 were coming back to me with the counterargument from other members of the State Department or
1532 National Security: “What would our allies say if we dump our ally that has been with us for 30
1533 years?” My counter answer was, “Alright you supported them for 30 years, why didn’t you support
1534 the Egyptian people for just one year, for one month, for one week?” When Wael Ghonim came, I
1535 think that youngster was about 31 years old, that was actually even more moving and that seems to
1536 have tipped the balance of the argument in the White House and in the State Department. So, there
1537 are many aspects to the story of the revolution that I suppose anybody who is proud will have a
1538 piece to tell. We’ll leave it to historians to piece all of these together to give us the full picture.

1539

1540 **[Mark Juergensmeyer]:** Thank you so much, Saad Eddin, for this illuminating kind of overview
1541 of what has happened and, particularly, from your own personal perspective which is so important
1542 and so moving. Barbara, as you know, one of the things we are interested in is the role of religion
1543 in global civil society, in the way which it’s important not only politically, but also socially and
1544 culturally and the impact of religious and political change on NGOs and human rights movements.
1545 We are particularly hopeful that you would help elucidate this aspect of our project.

1546

1547 **[Barbara Ibrahim]:** Well, maybe by way of a little background and information first. I am, in
1548 addition to being the wife of the accused, the founding Director of a center at the American
1549 University in Cairo that is addressing civic engagement and strategic philanthropy across the Arab
1550 world. We are less than five years old and we were considered rather quaint, I think, until January
1551 or so. Now, of course, everyone is very eager to know what we have to say and what kind of
1552 research and advocacy we’ve been doing. What it means is that for about the last three and a half
1553 years we’ve been studying youth activism, particularly in Egypt. We’ve been trying to get beyond
1554 some of the stereotypes and journalistic tropes about what it is to be young and to be an activist.
1555 We had a little bit of advance warning - when Saad said I went downtown in January 25th, it wasn’t
1556 just because I had a conference, although that was convenient, but because I’d been watching the
1557 Facebook pages, the 70,000 thousand young people that had signed up and said, “I will come and
1558 protest on that day”. I figured it was worth being there to see if this time there would be a tipping

1559 point, if this time it would happen. I think we at the center felt that it was really just a matter of
1560 time. I wanted to give you some of our insights or some of the research findings that suggested that
1561 to us, because it has quite a lot to do with faith and also with the way every young generation forms
1562 itself, I think, in response to the generation that has come before. Saad and I met each other in the
1563 anti-Vietnam war rallies, civil rights protests, black power movement days. Our activism was very
1564 much around those themes. It was completely secular, it was totally unpatriotic and we hated our
1565 flag, we hated our army, we hated our country for what it was doing. The first thing that I began to
1566 notice about the new generation of Egyptian youth, and I suspect we'll find that we can project that
1567 to other countries as well, was that their activism, their idealism, their hopes, were very much
1568 formed around patriotic visions and commitment to country. This was a generation that, unlike
1569 their parents, wasn't eager to get out as fast as they could. Their parents had been making money in
1570 the Gulf, they benefited from an open door policy in Egypt. So, if they couldn't find a job or a way
1571 forward at home when they graduated, they had that avenue of migration, mainly to the Gulf. But
1572 this was a generation that wanted to stay and wanted to do something about Egypt, so that was the
1573 first really interesting thing we noticed. The second was...I think it is fair to say that Saad
1574 represents the grandparents generation, the Nasser generation if you will. There had been a very
1575 secular vision of modernization, of nation building, technocratic fixes for problems and certainly by
1576 the Sadat years, that vision had failed us. It failed dramatically in the defeats of the 1967 War, but
1577 also more slowly in the way these centralized, socialist, bureaucracies became corrupted and
1578 became inefficient and didn't deliver prosperity and development for all Egyptians. By the time
1579 you get to the Mubarak generation, the kids that were 18 to 35 had lost faith with the secular vision,
1580 with socialism as it was practiced around them, and in fact with almost all of the "isms". But they
1581 had awakened to what they felt was the promise of authenticity, which was connected with their
1582 faith. Right back to the aftermath of the 1967 defeat in the war with Israel, you have the beginnings
1583 of this re-examination of why we threw over our old traditions, why we left behind Islam. Maybe if
1584 we re-embrace it in a new way we can return to the glories of the past. Certainly Israel, in an ironic
1585 counterintuitive way, was a role model for that, because a lot of young people said, "Look at Israel,
1586 look at how strong that tiny country is - it's because it is a country built on faith." You would ask
1587 them, "What about the billions in US military aid?" and they would dismiss that, "No, Israel can

1588 defeat us because it's a country built on faith."

1589

1590 So this is a generation that is re-examining everything through the lenses of faith. That doesn't
1591 mean that every young person is veiled and bearded, certainly, and I think you are all very much
1592 aware that there's a whole range and spectrum of interpretations. But, in general, this is a
1593 generation that has returned to origins and wants to authentically understand their roots and their
1594 faith. So what that means for them – and here is where I want to get beyond the stereotypes,
1595 because if you think about how Islamic revivalism has been understood, especially in the West, you
1596 either have a personal piety, in which everybody is going to the mosque and they're reading the
1597 Qur'an, they're letting their hair grow, and women are back in the home trying to be good
1598 Muslims. Personal piety will be one of the ways that this is understood, a withdrawal from the
1599 world. And the second way, or course, is that more aggressive, violent, political Islam that has so
1600 much dominated and stereotyped this return to faith. But what we were uncovering in our research
1601 was a really interesting middle way, or third way, where this young generation were expressing
1602 their faith, and that was in social service, community development, and a looking outward. In our
1603 interviews with young volunteers they would say things to us like, "I want to be a good Muslim,
1604 and to do that I must help to build a good society." That equation was spurring tens of thousands of
1605 young Egyptians to form youth founded organizations, to participate in them, and to grow a
1606 movement that was really rather under the radar - you didn't hear a lot about this.

1607

1608 We did a case study of the largest of these groups called Resala, have any of you come in touch
1609 with Resala while you've been here? They are on television and they are knocking on your doors -
1610 this is an organization that has ninety thousand Egyptian kids in its database, a fraction of them are
1611 active, perhaps, on a weekly basis. They have 38 chapters and wealthy Egyptians have given them
1612 land, given them buildings, and given them money, because they really believe in and trust the
1613 effectiveness and the seriousness of this social service NGO. Because it was founded by kids, a lot
1614 of what they do are services directed to young people. One that I particularly like is helping young
1615 couples who are very poor to marry with some dignity, because they have a trousseau and some
1616 household items to get started. So Resala youth will come around to us in middle-class

1617 neighborhoods, ask us what kitschy gifts, or second tea pots, or a set of dishes, we may have in a
1618 corner collecting dust. We will then donate those, they package them, and then give them to young
1619 couples getting married. They do very basic things as well, like food for the hungry, medicine for
1620 the sick, tutoring for young people, computer studies for the blind, and orphanages and hospitals.
1621 So, its not a radical understanding of service, in fact it's a rather charitable understanding of service
1622 - in that there are not particularly progressive - but in their fervor, in their idealism, and also in the
1623 scale to which this has reached, we felt that they were going to begin to have impact in the society.
1624 The other thing that it was doing, of course, was cutting across the segregation of social classes in
1625 Egypt, which had became more and more pronounced with gated communities, with a gini
1626 coefficient that had gone off the rails, so that you had the wealthier getting much, much, wealthier,
1627 and the middle-class falling back into poverty. And there was very little contact physically day to
1628 day with each other. It is very different than it had been in the 70's, when many of us first came to
1629 Egypt. By virtue of participation, these were young people who saw the problems of the country
1630 first hand and couldn't turn a blind eye to it the way some of the privileged elite, and certainly the
1631 ruling elite, were doing in this country. It also gave them skills, soft skills - how to organize, how to
1632 create consensus, how to form coalitions, how to discipline your personal desire to sleep-in in the
1633 morning and get out there and do what you promised to your co-NGOs that you would do. It also
1634 provided sociability, because most of the members of these organizations were not wealthy, they
1635 were not the elites at the American University in Cairo. They are the solid middle-class and
1636 working-class kids, who can't perhaps afford the cinema very often or to go to coffee houses and
1637 pay 8 pounds for a drink. So it was a place for them to meet and socialize and form relationships.
1638 Think about it, especially in a conservative society for young women, it was a legitimate place to
1639 leave home and be out in the world. Particularly for young women this was important - courtships
1640 happened, engagements and marriages happened, so there were lots of levels which people were
1641 motivated by to do this. But one of them, as I said before, was expressing moral virtue and building
1642 a good society. Now this contrasts with a much smaller, I would argue, minority of young people
1643 who were getting politically active in organizations like Kefaya, Youth For Change, Artists for
1644 Change, who were defying authority and the political structures overtly. The social services groups
1645 were, in fact, flying under the radar and doing that actually very consciously. They didn't want to

1646 go to prison and they didn't want to have to a run-in with the police, they wanted to change the
1647 society from the ground up. I've been privy to some amazing debates within families in which one
1648 young brother was a Kefaya activist and one young brother was a Resela activist and they would
1649 say between themselves that you can cut off the head of this regime, but nothing would change
1650 unless our institutions change and to do that we have to work on building the *ummah* brick by brick
1651 - this is the way they would put it. So, you had things happening at both ends of the spectrum that
1652 were very important, and you were getting practice with courage, with activism, with initiative,
1653 with organization, all of which I would argue came together on January 25th. We would also, and
1654 we are now documenting that with ongoing research, say that what gave the Egyptian revolution
1655 this time around it's very interesting character was some of these young people that hadn't been
1656 politically active and weren't there on day one, but joined subsequently and brought the social
1657 service spirit to Tahrir. The phone charging stations which had tapped into the electrical light posts,
1658 the medical services, the distribution of food and water, all of that was organized not necessarily by
1659 the political activists who were behind the catalyst for this, but by the other young people that
1660 joined in. So, that's just a little bit about an aspect tthat you won't hear about very often, and some
1661 of this research is on our website at the Gerhart Center at AUC if you would like to read more
1662 about it.

1663
1664 But you asked me about civil society in particular, so let me now broaden this out a little bit and
1665 think with you about civil society in the decade leading up to January 25th. Anyone who tells you
1666 that this was just all about Facebook or Twitter, or something that happened because the Tunisians
1667 rose up a month or two earlier, are really ignoring and doing a disservice, I would argue, to ten long
1668 years of building up institutions and practices within civil society in Egypt that were ready to make
1669 this happen. As I said before, they were breaking down fear barriers in the human rights movement,
1670 people were going to prison for what they believed in, they were standing up to authority, they
1671 were calling for civil disobedience, and certainly the Ibn Khaldun Center was in the front and
1672 center of a lot of that. The labor movement was particularly courageous, because these were people
1673 that didn't have a margin for losing a job, or going to jail. They were having sit-ins in their
1674 factories, women sometimes leading the way and taunting men to be real men and join them in

1675 places like Tanta and El-Mahalla El-Kubra. In the months leading up to this year, there were as
1676 many sixty separate labor actions per month in Egypt, and again, this was something that wasn't
1677 widely reported necessarily in the press. People were learning to do something that, I would argue,
1678 hadn't happened before and that was to connect the grassroots with the national critique of
1679 institutions. When Saad and I were first active in Egypt, he was working on human rights,
1680 international affairs, he was beginning to be critical of the regime, but he and I didn't overlap very
1681 much in the work I was doing on women in the labor force, community based development, and
1682 some of these youth based activism. But, over this last decade those organizations and mentalities
1683 have come together in a really important way, so that you had both analyses. You had organizations
1684 that might have started in Alex or Suez or Cairo, but they were reaching out, and you had a national
1685 movement that was not just about political change, but was about economic and social justice. So,
1686 bread *and* freedom - the ability to not be harassed on Facebook, but also food and fair distribution
1687 of resources for everybody.

1688
1689 All of that was happening over, I would say, roughly a ten year period and so when we saw that
1690 tipping point on January 25th, civil society was both part of what has brought us to that moment and
1691 saw us through, very much so, the next eighteen days. We were responding to local needs, we were
1692 helping neighborhoods form community watch groups, which you may well have heard about, like
1693 the Lijan al-Sha'biyah, which sprang up literally overnight when the security forces withdrew from
1694 every community across Egypt. In my very privileged, leafy, suburb of Maadi, people who had
1695 lived in the same building for 20 years were meeting each other for the very first time, bringing
1696 down their golf clubs and baseball bats to defend their neighbors from any interference. That kind
1697 of solidarity was organized by ordinary kind of people with civil society skills and experience and
1698 now is evolving into something that we hope will be more sustainable going forward. The other
1699 thing that civil society helped us to practice, which I would argue was critical to the success of the
1700 Egyptian revolution, was non-violent resistance - "Selmiyya! Selmiyya! Selmiyya!" On day one in
1701 Tahrir, one of the reasons I knew it was going to be different was not just that it was a mix of men
1702 and women and they were clearly educated and they clearly had strategy and tactics, but smalls
1703 groups of them went up to every single row of heavily-armed black security riot police and starting

1704 engaging them in a dialogue, a monologue I suppose in the beginning, about why this revolution
1705 was for them, why they should join the other side, why it was in their interest not to defend the
1706 state. They promised them that the protesters would never use violence on them if they didn't first
1707 use violence. We saw that throughout the 18 days as I walked around Tahrir when there were
1708 literally eight hundred thousand people there and you could barely move. If one person started
1709 shouting out, "Death to Mubarak!" or, "Let's hang the bastards!" someone would immediately
1710 come up, or a group would come up, and would engage them in discussion about how that wasn't
1711 what was going to make this revolution succeed - it had to remain peaceful. We had to bring our
1712 corrupt rulers to justice, but we had to do that through the rule of law - all of that was civil society
1713 practice.

1714

1715 What happened after February 11th, I would argue, has been a tremendous set back for civil society
1716 in Egypt, just as it has been a set back for women and for that gender-based equity that we had in
1717 the beginning days of the revolution. Why do I say that? Partly, I think, it is the fault of the media
1718 for whom the young revolutionaries are characterized as having no organization and no leaders,
1719 and, of course, to some extent that was true. There have been multiple young coalitions that have
1720 sprung up. How could there not be if there were a million people involved on the streets of Cairo?
1721 But that valorization of young, unorganized, spontaneous, protest has deflected attention from civil
1722 society and that has been aided by a leftover, a very unfortunate mentality, that the state and the
1723 police forces and the state media had promulgated even before the revolution, which is that
1724 Egyptian NGO's were really agents of foreign powers who were lavishly funded by foreign money,
1725 and therefore they were not patriots and not to be trusted. If you look at the charges that were made
1726 against Saad and his twenty-eight young associates, more than a half of them had to do with these
1727 associations with foreign donors and accepting foreign money. That discourse has been revived
1728 and is being used to discredit civil society groups and those that are organizing post-revolution.
1729 Unfortunately, in the minds of ordinary people, it sounds plausible. They are being told that the
1730 Americans are literally coming with briefcases full of cash and handing it out. The cover of
1731 October Magazine on July 31st, showed Ann Patterson, the new US ambassador, flying over the
1732 city with her bags of cash and Scud missiles, or something else, in her other hand. So, a very

1733 damaging, a very dirty campaign that we don't quite understand all the origins for, is being revived
1734 and is discrediting civil society. I wouldn't be surprised if the military council isn't behind some of
1735 it because, after all, what does the military represent if not control, discipline, and the antithesis of
1736 the freedom and the voluntary nature of association that characterizes civil society. They don't
1737 understand it; they don't get it. I'm sure remnants of the old regime and the police force are also
1738 behind some of this. The other problem is that we've been unable to, despite the fact that civil
1739 society has reached out to the martyr's families, organized huge fundraising for them and are doing
1740 stop-gap humanitarian aid, - the time has just been too short, the needs have been too great - we've
1741 been unable to really organize, to address the needs for bread and physical progress for the poor,
1742 the disadvantaged, and those who have been hurt materially by the revolution. Tourism in Egypt is
1743 roughly 20% of our economy, it's one of those sectors that is not just about the hotels, the travel
1744 agents and the revenue ticket taken in at a tourist site, it's about the guys that have the camels, it's
1745 about the people that sell the trinkets. It's one of those spill-over economies that has affected a
1746 tremendous number of people in Egypt, and it's down 50, to 60 to 70% because civil society hasn't
1747 yet been able to step in with concrete results, and certainly the government, which is more or less
1748 frozen, hasn't been able to. There is also a sense among the people who say, "What are these guys
1749 doing with their salaries and with this aid that is coming to them?" This is something I flag for us to
1750 all watch, because it's very serious. I was delighted to see that over thirty human rights
1751 organizations have gotten together, they issued press statements, and they're pushing back against
1752 this idea of them as foreign agents or the recipients of millions and millions of dollars. But, because
1753 most of them are in the center and are present here in Cairo that makes it even harder for civil
1754 society on the periphery to get traction with their publics and their constituents. I think I might stop
1755 there and take questions and see where we want to go with this.

1756

1757 **[Mark Juergensmeyer]:** Actually I'm curious, Barbara, is the climate right now good for NGOs?
1758 You can make a distinction between domestic and international if you want. And how do you
1759 expect things to be after the elections?

1760

1761 **[Barbara Ibrahim]:** I think there was an assumption, post-revolution, that our problems were

1762 going to go away *vis á vis* interference; that state security was no longer spying on NGOs and that
1763 we had a very progressive left-leaning economics professor from Cairo University as the Minister
1764 of Social Solidarity. Surely, this over control of civil society NGOs would get better on the local
1765 scene. In fact, that hasn't happened. Because of this public outcry over USAID and US embassy
1766 money, that minister has felt it necessary to start doing bank audits of NGOs. So now, instead of
1767 getting on with their work they're going to have to show what money they've taken in and how it's
1768 being spent, and that's extremely discouraging. There has always been a thread of xenophobia in
1769 Egypt. If you think about a country throughout a very, very, long history, that basically since the
1770 days of Cleopatra it has not been governed by its own people until the Nasser 1952 revolution, you
1771 might understand why there might be some historical roots of fear and suspicion of the outsider,
1772 and its very much alive and well today. Some other manifestations of it that you may have heard
1773 are that international election observers have been banned by our military authority. We are the
1774 first transiting democracy in modern history to deny international observers access to our first free
1775 and fair elections, which is a very bad sign. And two days ago we reinstated visa procedures for
1776 every nationality, which, of course, is the most stupid thing to do if you want to encourage tourism
1777 and make it easy for people to want to come to Egypt.

1778

1779 **[Juan Campo]:** Barbara you mentioned that development since February 11th has gotten worse in
1780 regards to NGOs and civil activist organizations, and you mentioned things have gotten worse for
1781 women in that context too. Could you elaborate on that for us a little more?

1782

1783 **[Barbara Ibrahim]:** I meant worse for women *and* civil society, not women within civil society.
1784 No, in fact, some of the Egyptian women's organizations have really been front and center, both
1785 before, during, and after, and they are doing that very well. What I meant is that the women who
1786 participated in this revolution paid high prices in this revolution, but then were excluded when the
1787 first constitutional framing committee was named. If you look at the cabinet, if you look at any of
1788 the appointments of this military *junta*, you see their comfort level with women is very, very, low -
1789 they probably just don't know any. But they're also seemingly unwilling to learn and so every new
1790 round of appointments is just about as bad as the one before. But this won't be all bad because what

1791 it has done it to rally civil society groups around gender issues and it's no longer the women's
1792 organizations that are the only ones who are shouting about this. Now you have all of the rights-
1793 based NGOs joining women's organizations in public statements, press releases, and protests or
1794 whatever is happening. I would say that, in fact, it has enabled us to come together around that
1795 issue a bit more than before. We don't know yet what kind of situation we'll have a year from now.
1796 We hope the military will have gone back to the barracks and we have an elected government. A lot
1797 of the new parties are undertaking to have a 30% of their candidates, or more, women - so that's a
1798 very good sign. Not the Brotherhood though.

1799

1800 **[Dinah Griego]:** I was struck by a comment you made that young Muslims today are more
1801 interested in service, that to be a good Muslim means providing social service, reaching out and
1802 providing service. I noticed that comment when we had one of our workshops in India, where the
1803 Tablighi Jamaat also believed in salvation through service. I was just noticing these trends. Earlier,
1804 in the US, in the 80's, for instance, it was about taking care of ourselves and now you see this trend
1805 and I'm noticing it in India and Latin America - we didn't talk about that - but in Asia and now
1806 here: redemption through service. I was wondering if you can provide some insights into the
1807 underlying forces between that. Why this movement now?

1808

1809 **[Barbara Ibrahim]:** Well, clearly it is a global phenomenon, and I didn't mean at all to suggest
1810 that Muslims had a corner on it, because if you think of the service-learning movement across
1811 university campuses in the US, I think there are now well over a 1000 university members of
1812 Campus Compact, which means universities have made commitments to be service-oriented
1813 institutions. You're right, it's happening everywhere and I suppose it's partly about global youth
1814 culture and how ideas spread globally now. We are in a moment in which governments are unable
1815 to solve problems and to provide completely, in which freedom and autonomy and participation
1816 really are kind of anthems, and if you are going to be free and participate you are going to have to
1817 reach out. So, I assume, that that is somehow behind it - the failure of adults and institutions to do
1818 the job and the desire to engage. But, you are absolutely correct it's a worldwide phenomenon.

1819

1820 **[Dinah Griego]:** Something that crossed my mind is that perhaps we've been empowering the
1821 youth more, teaching them self-empowerment rather than the organization or institution or the
1822 government is going to take care of you. Rather than putting your faith in organizations, it's more
1823 about self-empowerment now. Do you think that might have something to do with it?

1824

1825 **[Barbara Ibrahim]:** Absolutely, and that you can trace right back to the new left, the anti-war
1826 movement, the women's movement, the environment movements, civil rights and all the rest. I
1827 think its interesting, if you at social movements theory and where that literature is today, they all
1828 take note of the fact that movements are now not happening within political parties, or political
1829 organizations, but they tent to be very loose, amorphous, thematic ideas that grab people, like
1830 climate change or women's rights or whatever. So it does seem to be a moment that we are living
1831 in.

1832

1833 **[Mark Juergensmeyer]:** Barbara, if the Muslim Brotherhood does well in these next elections and
1834 if it's supported by the military and there's this strong new direction, can you imagine any scenario
1835 that would be good for NGOs out of this? I can easily understand where women's movements
1836 particularly might have difficulty, but would developments groups, or groups concerned about
1837 global warming or maybe groups like World Vision that are Christian-based, but not controversial?
1838 Do you see where I'm going? Help us kind of think through the different kinds of impact that might
1839 occur in such a case.

1840

1841 **[Barbara Ibrahim]:** Well, I'm not a doomsday person who thinks that it would be the end of life
1842 as we know it if we have a Brotherhood dominated government - and I see you nodding, so I think
1843 you probably agree. Having said that, since they believe that Islam is the answer, they're not
1844 particularly looking outward for global solutions. They are going to, I think, understand ideas like
1845 global warming or women's empowerment as being western ideas rather than being human ideas. I
1846 think they are going to be probably very concerned with trying to control foreign funding or
1847 international cooperation within the country. In those respects, I would imagine we'll have a step
1848 backward and then I would hope that Egyptian people would get fed up with that and vote them out

1849 and we would enter a different era. But I'd really like Saad to comment because he would have a
1850 more informed opinion on this.

1851

1852 **[Saad Eddin Ibrahim]:** We have noted that after the backlash to the Salafists, initially when they
1853 asked all of their opponents to pack up and leave the country to Canada or Australia. The Muslim
1854 Brothers are, however, more savvy and far more shrewd, politically. They are located next to my
1855 center, their new headquarters is on the next street over to my center. Of course, the other street has
1856 a mental hospital, so we are between the Muslim Brothers and a mental hospital, a rehab mental
1857 Hospital, which is located in Mokattam. But the members of the Muslim Brothers who have come
1858 to speak at the center, in the last two months, have been going out of their way to assure everybody
1859 that they believe in the civil nature of the state and of society. There is no such thing as a religious
1860 state in Islam. Even the first Muslim state of the prophet Muhammad was based on a civil contract
1861 between Quraysh, which is the tribe of the prophet, between the prophet himself, and thirteen other
1862 non-Muslim communities in Yathrib, or Medina, and the areas around Medina. Basically the
1863 charter of the Medina, called the Medina Charter, is almost like the Magna Carta and states all the
1864 rights and duties of every community that signed that document which is called **Ṣaḥīfat al-**
1865 **Madīnah**. The word Medina and *maddaniya*, which is "civil", is a play on words, but it did have
1866 some traction. The **Ṣaḥīfat al-Madīnah** was the first document that organized rights and duties of
1867 Muslims and non-Muslims living in the same community, so they construe that as an early version
1868 of what we call today in the social sciences, *pluralism*. Islam, at least the political version of Islam
1869 as far as we can tell from those early years of Medina, was very civil, very civic, and it has
1870 organized and regulated relations between Muslims and non-Muslims on equal basis in all worldly
1871 affairs. Otherworldly affairs were left to religion, between the believer and God, but in wordily
1872 affairs, in everyday life, there was equality according to the Charter of Medina. So, they are
1873 invoking that. Now whether they all believe in it and how far the Charter of Medina is internalized
1874 and how much of it has been resurrected with modern vocabulary is something to watch out and to
1875 debate. But we are of the opinion that we hold them accountable to their word. If they say that, we
1876 take note and we ask them to reiterate and to reaffirm it on every occasion. So far they have been
1877 doing it. Of course, there will always be the cynics who don't believe them, and they think that they

1878 are doing that for political consumption. Even if it is for political consumption that means that they
1879 are like politicians everywhere, which is good news too, because politics is based on compromise.
1880 Politics in our definition is the art of compromise, so we like them to engage in the art of
1881 compromise because it brings them down to earth and makes them make deals, break deals, re-deal
1882 and so on. It humanizes them, it socializes them, it makes them more worldly.

1883
1884 The model of Turkey, under Erdoğan, has been invoked several times. As you all know the
1885 Erdoğan Party, which is the Justice and Development Party, is Islamic-based, but life in Turkey has
1886 not really changed drastically before the AKP, which is the Development and Justice Party, took
1887 over. In fact, Turkey is doing very well, and Erdoğan has made two or three trips to Egypt during
1888 the revolution and even now he's coming to Egypt to go to Gaza. The fact that Turkey has also
1889 took a very prominent role in trying to break the blockade of Gaza has elevated Turkey in the
1890 consciousness of many Muslim and many Arabs. So the Muslim Brothers are using the AKP as
1891 their model and this is very hard for Egyptians to take, to think that any country from the Middle
1892 East could be a model for Egyptians. But the Muslim Brothers are finding it very convenient to do
1893 it at this time.

1894
1895 **[Juan Campo]:** Just following up on this with some anecdotes. I have been involved in some
1896 conversations, and obviously the Salafists and the Islamists have said they would be so against
1897 alcohol consumption and things like that, and the fear is that they would be closing down the bars
1898 on Pyramid Road, etc. and kill tourism. The anecdotes I've heard back are saying, "But the Muslim
1899 Brotherhood are mostly business men". As soon as they realize, if that reality does come about and
1900 they have power, they would say, "Okay, let those business continue to operate", which still again
1901 is very much like the Turkish model where you have all that alcohol everywhere.

1902
1903 **[Barbara Ibrahim]:** I was thinking and just remembered a wonderful blogger that I highly
1904 recommend to you. Do you know the young Egyptian blogger named Sand Monkey? He uses
1905 language that's not necessarily to my taste, but I think that he's a very incisive analyst. This
1906 summer, when young revolutionaries were occupying the square in July and sleeping there and

1907 actually forming a new ideal society, he reflected on how in their attempt to build the new Egypt, in
1908 this microcosm of a few square meters, they were actually recreating and having to deal with all of
1909 the old problems of the society - it's a really interesting piece. He identifies the ex-pat Egyptians,
1910 who try to come back and take all the credit; how you bring in streets kids because you say you
1911 want to teach them how to read and write, but they end up doing your servants work for you. It's
1912 just a lovely, lovely, piece that I highly recommend.

1913
1914 **[Jason Durant]:** Hi my name is Jason Durant, I go to UCSB and right now I'm doing ALIN at UC.
1915 I want to do some research on the Muslim Brotherhood and I was wondering if you guys can give
1916 me any tips on how to go about that and how to start my research.

1917
1918 **[Saad Eddin Ibrahim]:** Well, as I said, their headquarters is next door to us, near Ibn Khaldun, but
1919 on the other side is the mental hospital. So if you come to Ibn Khaldun, we can take you to the
1920 Muslim Brothers headquarter and you introduce yourself and try to persuade them to cooperate
1921 with you and with your research. We can find a Muslim Brother junior to help you to get through.
1922 At least we can promise to take you to the headquarters and introduce you, that's what you want
1923 right?

1924
1925 **[Barbara Ibrahim]:** My question would be, which Muslim Brotherhood? Because there is so
1926 much factionalism going on right now, who do you want to focus on?

1927
1928 **[Jason Durant]:** I want to focus on the youth because from what I've been hearing, and from what
1929 I've asked around from some Egyptians I know, they say that there is a split in the organization
1930 right now between the youth and the older members in the Muslim Brotherhood and that is what I
1931 find interesting.

1932
1933 **[Saad Eddin Ibrahim]:** Take this name, Ibrahim al-Hudaybi, he is the great-grandson of the
1934 Second Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood. The founder was Hassan al-Banna, but the
1935 second who came after Hassan al-Banna was Justice Hassan al-Hudaybi, and this fellow, Ibrahim,

1936 is the grandson and he is at AUC, speaks impeccable English, and I think he will be happy to help
1937 you. Of course, in the process he will try to recruit you and to make you a Muslim Brother. So be
1938 prepared, especially because you look very Egyptian so you'll pass!

1939

1940 **[Mark Juergensmeyer]:** Paul or Osama, could you help us understand some of the division among
1941 the Muslim Brotherhood?

1942

1943 **[Osama Al Mahdy]: Response in Arabic**

1944 **[Saad Eddin Ibrahim]: Translation**

1945 He said yes, there has been some factionalism, especially along generational lines, and that
1946 precedes the Egyptian revolution of January 25th.

1947

1948 **[Osama Al Mahdy]: Response in Arabic**

1949 **[Saad Eddin Ibrahim]: Translation**

1950 That is very interesting. He said that from 2005, dissidents inside the Muslim Brotherhood had
1951 emerged along generational lines and this has increased overtime, including the time of the
1952 revolution, where the elders did not want to participate and which increased the suspicion of the
1953 young that the leadership had some kind of the deal with the regime that they were fighting. It also
1954 took another twist or turn, when one of the Muslim Brothers, a physician by the name of Abdel
1955 Moneim Aboul Fotouh, - who is, by the way, a fellow prison mate - declared himself a candidate
1956 and the Muslim Brotherhood did not support him, but the young Muslim Brothers had rallied to his
1957 support.

1958

1959 **[Osama Al Mahdy]: Response in Arabic**

1960 **[Saad Eddin Ibrahim]: Translation**

1961 One aspect or manifestation of the division has also focused around one of the dissident leaders of
1962 the Muslim Brothers by the name of Haytham Abu-Khalil and the dissident group called itself, or
1963 named itself, the "Authentic Line", meaning the line that is closer to the thinking of the founder of
1964 the Muslim Brothers, Hassan al-Banna. The assumption is that there has been deviation from that

1965 authentic line of Hassan al-Banna and they are determined to get back to the authentic line.

1966

1967 **[Osama Al Mahdy]: Response in Arabic**

1968 **[Saad Eddin Ibrahim]: Translation**

1969 He said the latest display of that division was yesterday. Yesterday the demonstration at Tahrir
1970 Square was shunned by the leaders of the Muslim Brothers and they had declared that they were
1971 not going to participate. However, the younger Muslim Brothers defied the leadership and came
1972 and participated. The same thing happened with the march on the Israeli embassy, across the river
1973 in Giza. They also participated against the will of the senior leadership. So there is definitely a
1974 growing gap between the younger generation and the elders of the Muslim Brothers.

1975

1976 **[Mark Juergensmeyer]:** Is this good or bad? Is the younger group more eager to participate in the
1977 democratic process or less?

1978

1979 **[Saad Eddin Ibrahim]: Asks Osama the question in Arabic**

1980 **[Osama Al Mahdy]:Response in Arabic**

1981 **[Saad Eddin Ibrahim]: Translation**

1982 He is mentioning the recent lines along which the division within the Muslim Brothers has
1983 deepened. One of them is whether the Muslim Brotherhood should turn itself into a party or should
1984 remain an advocacy movement. And if a party is to be formed, whether the leadership of that party
1985 would be subsumed under the Muslim Brotherhood leadership or will it be by the internal dynamics
1986 of the party itself, like elections and so on. This kind of thing was not settled because the leadership
1987 did not want to start a party a few months ago. They refused this idea of a party and refused the
1988 idea of a candidate for the presidency. However, in view of the young people's persisting and
1989 wanting to participate, they came around and they agreed to the idea of a party, and they said this
1990 party will be separate and they called it The Justice and Freedom Party. That was, in a way, a
1991 victory for the young Muslim Brother dissidents. In other words, after the leadership had adamantly
1992 refused the idea of a party or the idea of running a presidential candidate, they came around at least
1993 for the party, even though they have not endorsed a candidate yet. So there are these dynamics, and

1994 if I may add something that he did not say - my observation is that so long as the Muslim Brothers
1995 were under extreme pressure from this last regime, as well as the previous regime, of Sadat and
1996 Nasser, they remained very cohesive. Once that pressure was lifted, just like you have a boiling pot
1997 you take the lid off and then all kind of things come out. So my own reading is once the pressure
1998 was off and Muslim Brothers now are free to form a party, to have rallies, to speak their minds,
1999 then you'll begin to see this diversity within the Muslim Brotherhood itself. And my value
2000 judgment, even though he (Osama) refrains from making a judgment, I do not refrain and I say this
2001 is healthy. It is good that there is this diversity and there is this division because the Muslim
2002 Brothers are huge body, and more freedom of debate within the Muslim Brothers is better for the
2003 Muslim Brothers and better for the larger society.

2004

2005 **[Mark Juergensmeyer]:** This is what happened, of course, in India with the BJP, the Bharatiya
2006 Janata Party, which was formed out of very extreme right-wing Hindu nationalist groups. But when
2007 they became a political party and had to compromise and they had to deal with negotiation with
2008 other parties, they then acted like any other political party - they began to cut deals and they began
2009 to think about how they were going to fill the potholes on the roads and how are they going to do
2010 all these other things. Of course, on the other hand, you have the experience with Iran, a revolution
2011 where it seemed almost as if the revolution and the experience of power made them harder and
2012 more intransigent and more extreme. I'm not sure about the Tea Party in the United States, whether
2013 that kind of Christian right is being more conciliatory now that it has political power, it doesn't
2014 seem to show many signs of that yet. But there certainly is at least some models where politics can
2015 play a moderating role for previously extreme groups, which seems to suggest that all of the
2016 possibilities are open, which is, I guess, a way of concluding this discussion. Juan as a fellow
2017 convener, do you want to have any kind of summary comments? In the third grade the teacher
2018 always asked us at the end of class, what did you students learn today? So I'm going to put you on
2019 the spot and ask you what you learnt.

2020

2021 **[Juan Campo]:** Well, I learned a lot more about what's been happening right now than I've ever
2022 known before. I learned quite a bit during my stay here in the last month, but this has been a very

2023 informative conference and I really appreciate the good fortune we've had to have Egyptian guests
2024 participate in this, and colleagues having their voices heard is what made this successful. We hope
2025 these kinds of exchanges can continue in multiple other ways in the months and years to come as
2026 Egypt goes through this very important time in history. In a significant way, I think, also what is
2027 happening in Egypt will have an impact not only in the wider region in the Middle East, but even, I
2028 think, in the United States. We have already seen in state politics in Wisconsin that they are talking
2029 about what the Egyptians were able to do in January and February. It may set a model, not only to
2030 walk like Egyptians but to participate in politics and in civil society like Egyptians too. So let's hope
2031 for that.

2032

2033 **[Mark Juergensmeyer]:** We have an expression in American politics, to “go Egyptian”, and what
2034 it's coming to mean is stick to your guns and hold on to what you believe and stay in Tahrir Square
2035 until change has come about. We hope that “going Egyptian” continues to have this positive
2036 resonance and does mean a good thing about the role of religion and moral sensibility and political
2037 life.

2038

2039 **[Saad Eddin Ibrahim]:** Speaking of Wisconsin: First of all my in-laws live in Wisconsin, well
2040 some of them at least, and they were briefing us also on this evolution and dynamics of what was
2041 happening in Madison. One of the things that the Egyptian revolutionaries from Tahrir Square did,
2042 at least the middle-classes, the one's who could afford it, was to order pizza for their fellow
2043 Wisconsinians in Madison. To backtrack a little bit further, when the Mullahs after the 2007
2044 election, the fraudulent election in Iran, when the young Iranians revolted and the Mullahs shut
2045 down the internet, Egyptian bloggers put their own internet at the disposal of their Iranian
2046 colleagues. Again, this was a fascinating show of regional solidarity. These people don't know each
2047 other, but young people seem to have related to one another spontaneously and without any
2048 previous planning. So, just like Tehran, Cairo and Madison, Wisconsin there seems to be a thread, a
2049 generational thread, of empathy, sympathy and mutual support.

2050

2051 **[Mark Juergensmeyer]:** So it's not just an Arab Spring, it's a Global Spring!

2052

2053 **[Magda Campo]:** I think that the internet and text messaging and the Twitter helped with
2054 international sympathy, because with the touch of the button you can just call for pizza in
2055 Wisconsin and say, "Please charge it to my account," and that's the end of it. I think the technology
2056 has helped tremendously, I wonder if without internet and Twitter and text messaging how this
2057 revolution would have evolved?

2058

2059 **[NANCY GALLAGHER]:** Just one quick thing, there was a tendency in the States to ascribe the
2060 revolution to people like Gene Sharp, anything to suggest that the Egyptians didn't do it
2061 themselves. This couldn't have possibly been a homegrown revolution, the Arabs are not ready for
2062 a democracy, there is no concept of non-violence, people can't cooperate in a systematic way, there
2063 has to be divisions, something has to go wrong. And yet here was this model of a social movement
2064 happening that could be emulated at least throughout this region and probably even the United
2065 States. I think that the credit coming to Egypt has not yet been realized in terms of a model for the
2066 world.

2067

2068 **[Mark Juergensmeyer]:** We have another day of discussion tomorrow afternoon from two to four
2069 and we are going to focus on women's rights and feminists issues. Thank you so much to all our
2070 participants and all our student observers for this very productive day. Thank you Dinah Griego for
2071 all of your help in planning and arranging, and thank you Paul Amar.

2072