

1 LUCE PROJECT ON RELIGION IN GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY

2 2012 REGIONAL WORKSHOP

3 The Role of Religion in Global Civil Society:

4 A Focus on The Middle East and Africa

5 January 21, 2012

6 Mosher Alumni House UCSB

7

8 **INTRODUCTIONS**

9

10 **Mark Juergensmeyer:** Welcome to this beautiful site for a continuing workshop that's  
11 sponsored by the Henry Luce Foundation – a series of projects for which we've received  
12 funding, on the general topic of religion and global civil society. And we've carved global civil  
13 society into different areas of the world: the first year we looked at Latin America; the second  
14 year on South and Southeast Asia; this year on Africa and the Middle East. In each case, we're  
15 looking at the intersection between the scholarly understanding of the transformations within  
16 these regions in which religion plays a role and the response of humanitarian and social service  
17 agencies within this general arena that we call global civil society that have to deal with these  
18 transformations. And so for the workshops – 2 a year, one in the region and one here at Santa  
19 Barbara (the regional conference this year was in Cairo a couple of months ago and now we're  
20 here at Santa Barbara) – we've tried to bring together an interesting mix of people. And if you  
21 participants are wondering why you're here and what you bring distinctive to the plate, it is  
22 because you are a little bit different from everybody else who is here. And you may think, "Oh,  
23 I'm different." Well yes, you're all different, that's the point. It's like putting together a really  
24 nice dinner party. You know, you try to think of an interesting bunch of people who have a lot to  
25 say to each other but who are not necessarily from the same field -- not necessarily from the  
26 same field in terms of discipline or ... even what you do professionally. In some cases, you are  
27 academics who do research and write books. In other cases, you are practitioners who are  
28 involved in social service and humanitarian organizations. In some cases, you're a bit of both.  
29 And that's deliberate. We want to have this interesting mix of people in order to engage in what  
30 we expect to be very fruitful conversation.

31

32 As I said, this is part of a larger project funded by the Henry Luce Foundation, some 10 or 20  
33 million dollars which has gone into an attempt to try to bring the study of religion into the  
34 consciousness of schools that train people for work in international affairs – the so-called  
35 APSIA-related schools that are primarily for the training of diplomats, of businessmen, of  
36 journalists, of NGO leaders, like the Columbia School of International Affairs, the Kennedy  
37 School, the Princeton Woodrow Wilson School, all of which have projects relating to some  
38 aspect of religion and international affairs. There are also a couple of other projects on a national  
39 level, one of which I've been involved in at the Social Science Research Council, on religion and  
40 the changing global culture, and the focus of that project was on rethinking secularism. That  
41 project is completed and the book called *Rethinking Secularism* has just been published by  
42 Oxford University Press. Craig Calhoun and Jonathan Van Antwerpen and I edited that book  
43 with interesting essays by members of that workshop, which, like this one, convened regularly,  
44 including Charles Taylor, Talal Asad, Jose Casanova – a very interesting mix of people, all of  
45 whom are represented in this – I think – really interesting book.

46  
47 So we're part of that project. But we do things a little differently in our workshop. We're also  
48 related to an on-going graduate program in International Affairs -- the one we established here at  
49 Santa Barbara, which is the only one in the country that is geared towards NGO leadership.  
50 Obviously not all of our students go into NGO leadership work. Others do a variety of things.  
51 They go into academics, they go into further graduate work. One of them – Paul Lynch, who's  
52 standing there in the middle, has become a videographer, and a very good one, as you'll see in  
53 some of the work that he's going to show for us in just a few minutes. But he's also taking your  
54 picture that will be a part of the video product of this workshop.

55  
56 This workshop has two kinds of products. None of them involve lengthy, written papers. What  
57 we've discovered is not only do people not enjoy writing these, people don't enjoy reading them.  
58 And as far as producing material for the classroom, often they're not the most useful or  
59 productive thing. And certainly in teasing out the ideas that we think are important for us to  
60 become aware of, what we've discovered is that face to face, a colloquy, an interaction, and  
61 discussion is really much more productive...

62

63 **Mark Juergensmeyer:** And now I'd like to ask each of us to introduce ourselves... Let me give  
64 an example. I'm Mark Juergensmeyer. I'm Professor of Global Studies and Sociology at the  
65 University of California, Santa Barbara and Director of the Orfalea Center for Global and  
66 International Studies. Most of my field work has been in South Asia, in India, in the general area  
67 of religion and society. But after the rise of Punjabi activism, I began to be particularly interested  
68 in religion and violence of religion terrorism, which is a lot of what my work has been about in  
69 the last 20 years or so. I've been primarily an academic, although there was one shining year  
70 when I was quite young when I worked with the Sarvodaya Agency under Jayaprakash in India,  
71 doing relief work on the famine of Bihar... I had an NGO background hidden in my past. So you  
72 see what you can learn in these really brief introductions? ...

73

74 **Paul Amar:** My name is Paul Amar. I'm an Associate Professor here at the Global Studies  
75 program. I'm originally trained as a political scientist but now basically I identify with every  
76 other discipline but Political Science. I work on Egypt and Brazil in particular and in general on  
77 Middle East and Latin American militaries and police politics as they intersect with social  
78 movements around public morality, gender, race, and religion.

79

80 **William Headley:** Hi, I'm Bill Headley. Presently I'm the Dean of the Joan B. Kroc School of  
81 Peace Studies at the University of San Diego in San Diego. I'm a sociologist by training, also a  
82 Catholic priest and member of the Congregation of the Holy Spirit, very largely a missionary  
83 community. And while much of my experience has been in Africa, I've had the privilege,  
84 particularly with my work with Catholic Relief Services, to serve in a number of countries. I'm  
85 now moving out of the deanship very shortly and I hope to take up and consider in a very serious  
86 way the interface between religion and peace. Thank you.

87

88 **Karel Zalenka:** My name is Karel Zalenka. I'm working for Catholic Relief Services, or CRS.  
89 I'm currently based in South Africa, covering also Namibia, Botswana, and Swaziland. I have a  
90 variety of experiences with Catholic Relief Services, mostly development projects, but more  
91 recently trying to strengthen or build democratic systems in Africa and other countries. I've been  
92 with CRS [for] more than 25 years and over those years, I worked in Asia, Africa, Middle East,  
93 Caribbean. So I have, I think, rich experience as a practitioner working for a faith-based

94 organization ... in different contexts, facing different and a variety of challenges in terms of  
95 religions, in terms of governments, and also and perhaps more importantly, with staff that come  
96 from different ethnic, cultural backgrounds... I got my degree from the Fletcher School at Tufts  
97 University in Boston and my degree was in International Economics. Thank you.

98

99 **Mark Juergensmeyer:** We should say that Karel was supposed to join us two years ago when  
100 he was working in Haiti when we were focusing on global civil society in Latin America and the  
101 Caribbean. And just days before our conference, things erupted in Haiti that changed his life and  
102 the lives of that whole country. And if you want to know what it was like to be there during the  
103 earthquake, Karel has some chilling first-person reports to make. Since then, he's moved to  
104 South Africa, so we had an opportunity to bring him back. So he's going to join us after all. So  
105 this is the workshop you missed two years ago.

106

107 **Laura Grillo:** Good morning, my name is Laura Grillo. I'm a Professor at Pacifica Graduate  
108 Institute, which is just down the road just outside of Santa Barbara. I'm also one of the chairs of  
109 the African Religions Group of the American Academy of Religions. As a historian of religions,  
110 my area of specialization is West Africa... I've lived and worked in Côte d'Ivoire in particular,  
111 and that's where I also based my field work. The questions that I'm bringing to the table have to  
112 do, then, with... indigenous African religions. How do they fit into this picture?

113

114 I also have a hidden background in [the] service and NGO world in that years ago, I lived in  
115 Kenya and worked for the All Africa Conference of Churches. Also, when I was a student at  
116 Union Theological Seminary in New York City, I worked for the National Conference of  
117 Churches, Office of Human Rights. In Nairobi, I was working as a consultant for programs of  
118 youth, women, and development. Of course, those were very different days. Those were the  
119 heady days of liberation theology in the churches and really the days before the religious scene  
120 was inflected with fundamentalism as it is today, and certainly not the kind of violence that is  
121 occurring now and that is shaping the world so prominently today.

122

123 **Jeffrey Haynes:** Thank you. Good morning, everybody. My name is Jeffrey Haynes and I'm at  
124 the London Metropolitan University, where I direct the Center for the Study of Religion, Conflict

125 and Cooperation. I've been interested in the topic of, broadly and generically, religion and  
126 politics for about 20 years. I do have an interest in Africa and the Middle East but I can't claim  
127 to have done extensive field work in either of those regions recently.

128  
129 I guess I'm here because... I'm very interested in the topic of how religion molds outcomes in  
130 broadly political contexts. My most recent book, which is due to come out shortly, is about  
131 religious transnational actors. So I'm also very interested in the International Relations side of  
132 things. I co-edit a journal called *Democratization*, so I have a sort of secular interest as well.

133  
134 And I'm actually in the U.S. at the moment not just to come to this very esteemed gathering, but  
135 also I'm about to spend two weeks in Washington, D.C. where I'm going to be talking to various  
136 people but particularly from the I.M.F. and the World Bank about the role of religion and  
137 development, which is also one of my interests. And particularly, why religion seems to have  
138 fallen out of the picture a little bit when it comes to those organizations' focus upon  
139 development. Ten, twelve years ago, it was different. So I have... shall I say, a scattered  
140 background with lots of various issues [that] I'm interested in. But I'm very pleased to be here  
141 and I'd like to thank Mark for inviting me.

142  
143 **Rosalind Hackett:** Thank you. Well good morning, everyone. Thank you so much for the  
144 invitation to come here, not just to a gathering on topics of deep interest to me, but to finally get  
145 me to Santa Barbara after all these years... My name is Rosalind Hackett and I'm currently  
146 Professor of Religious Studies and Head of the Department at the University of Tennessee,  
147 Knoxville. As you can probably tell, I'm not from there. I was actually trained in Britain as a  
148 historian of religion, but had the wisdom to take off for Africa to do field work as a graduate  
149 student and that really changed my perspective. And I think by virtue of living in Nigeria for  
150 about 8 years, I developed a much more ethnographic, anthropological perspective on things. So  
151 that will inform my remarks today.

152  
153 So I think I'm still very much involved with the academic study of religion, particularly – with  
154 Laura – promoting and developing the academic study of religion in Africa... I am the President  
155 of the International Association for the History of Religions, which is the worldwide body for the

156 academic study of religions. So that takes me to different parts of the world for conferences and  
157 promoting the field. So I can say I have quite an internationalist perspective, while still  
158 remaining an Africanist.

159  
160 But then... certain moments in life are major turning points, and I could say that my year at the  
161 University of Notre Dame at the Kroc Institute in 2003 and 2004 really got me thinking much  
162 more about the relevance of what I was doing and particularly pertaining to the relationship  
163 between religion and conflict and peace-building... And I will be talking today about a particular  
164 group that I became associated with following that visit in 2004.

165  
166 I also... will mention... the small NGO that I created with the help of my students, called the Jazz  
167 for Justice Project, which promotes the use of music and the arts in peace-building in northern  
168 Uganda... As of last year, we now have a formal study and service abroad program to northern  
169 Uganda through the University of Tennessee, called the Gulu Study and Service Abroad  
170 Program. So as I have aged, I like to think I've matured and developed a much more activist side  
171 to my scholarship. Thank you.

172  
173 **Fritz Lampe:** My name is Fritz Lampe. I teach at Northern Arizona University as an Adjunct.  
174 I'm also an ordained pastor with the Evangelical Lutheran Church of America. My connection to  
175 Africa goes through my graduate work at Syracuse University in the Maxwell School, where  
176 we... had access to the Kenyan National Archives from the colonial period. And so I spent a  
177 considerable amount of time looking at the historic record of contact and early development  
178 through the colonial eyes. And then did my work training in anthropology in western Kenya in  
179 an area that was opened up by the Church Missionaries Society just after the railroad went in to  
180 that region to open up Uganda to the coast...

181  
182 I think the thing that brings me here is, when the economy tanked, I lost a tenure-track position  
183 in a very small school that wed theology and community development. And the students of that  
184 program were international church leaders, many from Africa, who came for a 2-year applied  
185 master's degree program to look at community development and empower them, using a  
186 theological lens to engage in community development. So we taught research methods, we

187 taught analysis, and the whole bag so that they could provide a written record and proposal for  
188 future work in their areas... Teaching at Northern Arizona, I'm a part of a very applied,  
189 nationally recognized master's degree program. Many of our students also go on to be leaders in  
190 NGOs because of their internships and their ethnographic work... That's probably enough for  
191 now.

192  
193 **Jacob Olupona:** Good morning. I'm Jacob Kehinde Olupona. I teach at Harvard University.  
194 I'm in two schools there – the School of Divinity and the Faculty of Arts and Sciences in the  
195 Department of African American and African Studies. This is my sixth year there... I was a  
196 professor at the University of California at Davis, where I spent 16 years. And before coming to  
197 Davis, I taught at the University of Ife – Ile-Ife in Nigeria. I did my first degree at the University  
198 of Nigeria, Nsukka, and... my PhD at Boston University. A few years ago, I think in 1996, I was  
199 a visiting scholar here. I spent part of my Guggenheim Foundation Fellowship here. I was invited  
200 by my good friend and colleague, Claudine Michel, who is here. And Mark was also on board,  
201 and they almost stole me from UC Davis. I'm here because Mark asked me to come. I would not  
202 turn down any invitation from him to be part of the conversation.

203  
204 Well, my field is religion in Africa. I'm mainly in indigenous African religion and Christianity.  
205 And I'm glad I think this conversation is started. Listening to Laura reminds me of a note I just  
206 made to myself 2 [or] 3 seconds ago, where I said, "I'm worried about the marginalization of  
207 indigenous religion and institutions and their refusal to see their role in civil society-building,  
208 especially in creating values and citizenship." I think part of the problem has to do with  
209 monotheistic traditions in Africa, Islam and Christianity in particular - what I have referred to as  
210 "civil religion" in the past in my own research. How are we responding to this? I think this is one  
211 of the questions that I'm going to be taking up.

212  
213 Well, I turned 60 last year and it was a good celebration for me, as a Nigerian and as a Yoruba  
214 myself. And I realized when I returned to Nigeria for my celebration, that people see us as  
215 scholars as those who have been well-placed to respond to the needs of the society. And for the  
216 first time, I felt... well, while I have been fairly successful in my own academic work, I have  
217 been lacking in the other side of it. What have I been able to give back to my own local

218 communities? Because to see all those villagers come from, you know, Ute and over to Ife, just  
219 to celebrate my birthday, was quite...was shocking to me. I thought I didn't deserve it. But then I  
220 said to myself, "This has to be a new beginning. What can I bring to the table? What can I do as  
221 a professor of religion? What can I do to help and alleviate the sufferings of millions of people,  
222 at least in Nigeria?" And I'm sure those of you who have been following the news will know  
223 fully well that we have a lot of work to do as scholars. Thank you.

224

225 **Robert Dowd:** Well good morning. I'm Bob Dowd and I'm in the Political Science Department  
226 at the University of Notre Dame and I also direct an International Development Studies program  
227 which we just launched there about three years ago. That program is called the Ford Family  
228 Program in Human Development Studies and Solidarity.

229

230 My research has focused largely on religion and politics in Africa, more specifically on  
231 Christianity and Islam and their impact on political actions and attitudes. That research has  
232 focused largely in Kenya, Uganda, Nigeria, and, to a lesser degree, in Senegal. So my research is  
233 really focused on the impact that religion has on attitudes like tolerance – tolerance towards  
234 people of different faith backgrounds, tolerance of differences of opinion. It's also focused on the  
235 impact of religious involvement in political participation and civic engagement. The Ford Family  
236 Program... [is] devoted to integrating education, research, and community engagement at the  
237 grassroots level and... one research agenda we would like to focus on... is religion and its impact  
238 on development processes. There really hasn't been a whole lot of really great research. A lot of  
239 the research that has been done is impressionistic in nature and anecdotal and what we would  
240 like to do is bring some rigorous research to assess the impact that religious institutions are  
241 having on education outcomes and health outcomes. There's one research project that we're  
242 working on right now that's assessing the effectiveness of religious leaders as compared to local  
243 political leaders in waging public health campaigns in Uganda. The results should be pretty  
244 interesting. It's probably going to take a while for those results to come in. But I'm really happy  
245 to be here and look forward to learning a lot from all of the participants. And I appreciate the  
246 invitation.

247



248 **Waleed El Ansari:** My name is Waleed El Ansari. I teach at Xavier University. I teach Islamic  
249 Studies in the Theology Department. And Xavier, of course, is a Catholic institution, so I like to  
250 joke I'm originally from Egypt and came when I was two years old to the United States and my  
251 first formal education was at a Catholic preschool, so I feel right at home at Xavier. Actually, I  
252 was originally interested in economics when I was young because we would go back to Egypt  
253 during the summers off with my family and I would see a lot of poverty there. I saw we  
254 obviously had a lot of Muslim doctors and engineers, but apparently, we didn't have enough  
255 economists because otherwise we wouldn't be having all these problems. And so I was interested  
256 in economics for a while and actually started out in economics but then I met Seyyed Hossain  
257 Nasr at George Washington University. He's arguably the leading Islamic Studies scholar in the  
258 United States. My father was a professor at GW at the time and he attended his lecture to other  
259 professors at the university and he came home and I remember it very vividly. He said, "Waleed,  
260 I've met the most brilliant Muslim scholar I've ever seen in my life. You have to take classes  
261 with him." And so the correct response in Arabic is "hadher," which means "yes, sir." And I did  
262 and it was the first time I heard there was such a thing as Islamic physics, not just Muslims who  
263 do physics. And that transformed, really, my whole life. That's really why I got interested in  
264 Islamic Studies. And so my work is really on the intersection between religion, science, and  
265 economics, and what that implies for development – just and sustainable development solutions.  
266 And so on the one hand, my research focuses on the influence of religion, particularly Islam, on  
267 economics. But on the other hand, looking at violent forms of religious extremism through the  
268 lens of game theory and economics. So for example, I've written some things about modeling  
269 bin Laden and al Qaeda from a game theoretic point of view. So it's interdisciplinary in that  
270 sense. I think the reason I'm here is also because I happen to be from Egypt and I'm familiar  
271 with what's going on in the current background for the revolution and look forward also to  
272 learning from everybody here.

273

274 **Mark Juergensmeyer:** And of you look the last report, you'll see a lovely picture with Omar  
275 and I when we were in Cairo. We got to visit with the Grand Mufti of Egypt and that audience  
276 was made possible because of Waleed's relationship with the Grand Mufti and thank you so  
277 much for helping us with that. Very interesting audience. Claudine, good to see you. Thank you  
278 so much for coming.

279

280 **Claudine Michel:** Thank you, Mark. Good morning, everybody. Welcome to UCSB. My name  
281 is Claudine Michel. I'm not an official panelist at this conversation, but glad to be here. I was  
282 part of this conversation a couple of years ago when we focused on the Caribbean, but since I  
283 was invited to join you here, I'll say a few words about myself. I'm originally from Haiti and my  
284 training is in Comparative and International Education with a specialty in Francophone West  
285 Africa and the Caribbean. I did Family Studies in my education work and that's what brought me  
286 to studying vodou in Haiti and I haven't been able to put the project down for the past 18 years.  
287 So really looking at vodou and education values, vodou and society, vodou and citizenship...and  
288 I'm also a founding member of KOSANBA, a scholarly organization for the study of Haitian  
289 vodou and we've done quite a bit looking at vodou and politics, vodou and art, vodou and  
290 gender, vodou and economics, and so glad to be here. And let me mention that I have done some  
291 work with Direct Relief International with Thomas Tighe here, a couple of years ago after the  
292 earthquake in Haiti. And this was some of my most meaningful work, which reminds us as a  
293 scholar of Ethnic Studies – I'm a Professor of Black Studies here, been here 30 years – that  
294 really our work is about social and political transformation and change in society. We were able  
295 to work with some community grants and fund some projects – small cantinas, schools,  
296 educational programs. I also work with my colleague, Nadege Clitandre, with a small community  
297 library that she's created in Haiti. So very glad to participate in the conversation.

298

299 **Paul Flamm:** My name is Paul Flamm. I'm here as an observer. I'm a member of the  
300 Congregation of the Holy Spirit. For the last 12 years now, I've worked in Tanzania and Burundi  
301 with refugees from Burundi and from Democratic Republic of Congo and I've been involved in  
302 some peace initiatives and cross-border exchanges. So I'm very happy, very grateful to have  
303 been given this opportunity to participate, or to observe at this workshop. Thank you.

304

305 **Victor Faessel:** I've been introduced already. I'll just say my name is Victor Faessel. I'm the  
306 Program Director of the Orfalea Center. I've been watching this program roll along for the last  
307 three years and am sad to see it coming to an end, but it's nice to see this happening with such an  
308 esteemed group of scholars and friends.

309

310 **Thomas Tighe:** Hi, I'm Thomas Tighe. I'm the President of the Goleta Chapter of the UCSB  
311 Global and International Studies Fan Club. I'm the West Coast Chapter of the Claudine Michel  
312 Fan Club. The Nadege Clitandre Fan Club. And the CEO of Direct Relief International. I  
313 previously served as the Chief Operating Officer of the Peace Corps during the Clinton  
314 administration, where...traditionally, a lot of the Peace Corps officers served in Africa – about a  
315 third. And when the embassies were bombed in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, we had hundreds  
316 of people in those two countries. So I think the sensitivity that the Peace Corps always prided  
317 itself on having about the cultural embeddedness of everything hadn't really focused on  
318 the...how embedded religion was as part of that culture and that was a very sharp reminder, and  
319 still is. I think at Direct Relief, our organization is a support organization for locally run health  
320 projects all around the world in areas of poverty. So again, we tend to provide sometimes  
321 financial assistance, but often medical material assistance, to locally run people. And just doing  
322 that right, I think, requires an acute sensitivity to their lives – what they care about, the health  
323 issues that we focus on now, and particularly women's and children's health, a lot of the issues  
324 around access to health services for women...some of the reasons relate to culture and religion  
325 that are really difficult for any American to unwind. We don't try to. We just try to find someone  
326 there who's involved who can help see how the resources we have available can be put to the  
327 most use. So I learn a lot coming here. I work in a warehouse about three miles from here. A  
328 lawyer by training. I worked in Washington as a lawyer in the Senate -- U.S. Senate -- as a policy  
329 lawyer. So it's just been a privilege for me to participate for the last several years and meet some  
330 fantastic people. Thank you.

331  
332 **Nadege Clitandre:** Good morning, everyone. My name is Nadege Clitandre. I'm an Assistant  
333 Professor in Global and International Studies. It's my first year, so I'm glad to be a part of that  
334 department. My work focuses on issues of identity, migration, and transnationalism in the  
335 African Diaspora and the Caribbean. In particular, I focus on the role of Haiti in conceptions of  
336 the African Diaspora and in world history. I do have a non-profit background. When I was a  
337 graduate student at UC Berkeley, I started a modest non-profit organization that focuses on youth  
338 development and community development in Haiti, through the use of libraries and thinking  
339 about libraries as a way of developing community. I do have a relationship with DRI and I do  
340 want to acknowledge that the role Direct Relief International has played in the organization that I

341 started, which is called Haiti Soleil. I also remember two years ago the conversation we had  
342 around Haiti during the workshop on the Caribbean and Latin America and we did mention that  
343 the library project that we worked so hard with...worked so hard on was destroyed around the  
344 time of the earthquake. My interest in religion actually began around the earthquake. I've been  
345 thinking more specifically about the role of religion in rebuilding Haiti and what that means in  
346 terms of how people are thinking about their traumatic experiences. For those of you who have  
347 been to Haiti and who have a relationship with what's going on now, you will know that a lot of  
348 people are thinking about this idea around the end of the world and exactly what that means for  
349 them, spiritually and their spiritual connections. Also thinking about the place of vodou and how  
350 we are thinking about Haiti and conceptions of Haiti in general. Recently, someone submitted a  
351 film that is focusing on the National Cathedral, which was destroyed. So I'm really looking  
352 forward to this conversation so I can get a sense of how to think about what the National  
353 Cathedral means in Haiti and the destruction of that cathedral. Thank you.

354

355 **Mae Cannon:** Hi, my name is Mae. Mae Cannon. I am happy to be introduced to all of you and  
356 very thankful for the invitation. I'm very passionate about the opportunity to talk about religion  
357 in civil society and any opportunity that we have to work across disciplines and sectors, I think,  
358 is truly a great opportunity. So I'm thankful in that regard. I'm here representing World Vision,  
359 which is an international Christian humanitarian organization. I was recently hired to work on  
360 their behalf here in the United States, focused on the Middle East. So my position is the Senior  
361 Director of Advocacy and Outreach for the Middle East and my specific area of focus is the  
362 question of Christian engagement and the conflict in Israel and Palestine. I spent the last year  
363 working for an organization called Compassion International, living in Jerusalem and working  
364 with the Christian community in Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and the Palestinian territories. And I'm  
365 thankful to have followed in the footsteps of Jacob, having been at the University of California at  
366 Davis, which is where my doctoral work is very soon to be completed, I hope. So I'm  
367 empathizing a bit with people on that side of the room, and I'm glad that you're feeding me as  
368 well. So thank you for that. My doctoral work is in American History, with a minor in Middle  
369 Eastern Studies and my dissertation is about the historical engagement of American Protestants  
370 in Israel and Palestine. I have three Master's degrees in interdisciplinary subjects. That's my love  
371 of working across different disciplines. But my primary vocation has been in pastoral ministry,

372 so I'm ordained in the Evangelical Covenant Church and have worked domestically regarding  
373 social justice. I wrote a book about Evangelical engagement with social justice. And so that's a  
374 bit of my background. But I'm very, very grateful to be here. Thank you.

375

376 **Steve Eskow:** My name is Steve Eskow. I'm happy to be here. I had a strange reaction to a  
377 casual comment of Jacob's that derailed what I intend to say. He talked about "What do you  
378 bring to the table?" And what jumped to mind was that I bring to the table a background that  
379 begins with a father who never went to school a day in his life and a mother who had four years  
380 of schooling and a kind of fierce recollection of what it's like to be poor and what it's like to be  
381 supported by parents who are determined that life will be different for their children. I became...I  
382 moved out of the classroom early on and became an academic bureaucrat. I was a community  
383 college president for 20 years in New York State, part of the State University of New York, and  
384 concerned with internationalizing the community college. People who had been in a small  
385 community in upper New York State were being kept by the college – philosophically and  
386 practically – in that community with an ethos of community and not understanding globalization.  
387 Began to talk about and think about internationalizing the community college and that began the  
388 contacts with the church and the churches generally – a sharp break. For the last 15 years, I and  
389 my wife, who will be here later, have been engaged in a kind of ministry in Ghana, which has led  
390 to the formation of a new NGO which we will describe. And our organizational theme was  
391 generated by Katherine Marshall, who's been here several times, who has written about  
392 development and faith extensively and who has a section in her book called "Scaling Up." In that  
393 section, she points out that the church generally and almost always does work that is rich and  
394 important, but the work doesn't scale up. So we have been exploring the notion that rather than  
395 beginning with the church partnership or with a particular project, you think about the 3,000  
396 Presbyterian churches in Ghana and the 600,000 members as a network and we're exploring the  
397 adaptation of Manuel Castells' work in the Network Society to the possibility that these 3,000  
398 churches that serve 600,000 people on a Sunday can become a scaled-up development network  
399 and we'll be talking a bit about that when we do our presentation.

400

401 **Dwight Hopkins:** Good morning. My name is Dwight Hopkins and I'm Professor of Theology  
402 at the University of Chicago Divinity School and as my plane was leaving yesterday morning, I

403 could see the blizzard coming. So I just got out...in was in the cards that I should be here. So I'm  
404 very happy to be here. I can feel the sun. I teach courses on Africa and also Comparative Asia,  
405 Africa, Latin America, and some other courses as well. And also teach Comparative Theologies.  
406 My interest in Africa – I was just thinking and I was in elementary school in 1965 and I had a  
407 brother who was at Duke University in Durham. One of his roommates was from Nigeria or  
408 Ghana. I'm not sure. It was either Nigeria or Ghana. And he came home to Richmond, Virginia  
409 where I'm from. And I was off in the kitchen listening to them debating these issues about  
410 decolonization and global stuff. You know, 1965 was a huge year. And since that time, I've been  
411 very much interested – passionately interested – in Africa. And so when I went away to school,  
412 to junior high and high school in Boston for five years, one of the things we focused on there, in  
413 addition to the so-called “normative curriculum,” was on Africa. So we began to study Africa at  
414 a very young age. And then I went on to college and one of my emphases in undergraduate  
415 degree was on Africa and then after I graduated from college in Boston, I went to Harlem and  
416 was a community organizer for five years. Now until the President of the United States used the  
417 term “community organizer,” I'd never introduced myself as a community organizer. I said I  
418 worked in “service” in Harlem. But I was a community organizer. Old-school community  
419 organizer – not in the suburbs but you lived in the ghetto in Harlem, 122<sup>nd</sup> Street. During that  
420 time, our mission or focus was to link domestic issues of justice with Africa. So we weren't...I  
421 guess technically we were an NGO but we never saw ourselves as an NGO. We saw ourselves as  
422 hardcore community organizers, supporting Africa and linking it to local domestic issues in  
423 Harlem in particular. And then I was called to the ministry and went to Union Theological  
424 Seminary and my PhD dissertation was on South Africa and the USA. So my study on Africa  
425 culminated in the PhD and then taught at Santa Clara University, “just up the road a piece,” as  
426 my father would say, for about eight years, and then went to University of Chicago Divinity  
427 School. And then I decided that I wanted to get some more punishment, so I have a second PhD  
428 from the University of Cape Town in South Africa and the focus is Interdisciplinary Studies. So I  
429 have a long history, passion, some writing on South Africa and Africa in general. And very glad  
430 to be here. I've also expanded my teaching to comparative cultures between China and the  
431 United States in an interesting way. That's another way to come into Africa – studying China's  
432 global relationship to Africa and that has many levels, from Confucius Institutes to the economic  
433 piece, to loans, to labor relationships – it's a whole. So actually I go to China at least twice a

434 year. We're holding an international conference in Beijing in march this year. Just got back from  
435 Dalian for two weeks before Christmas, and Shanghai. So very much happy to be here, very  
436 much happy to be here. Thank you.

437

438 **Mohammed Bamyeh:** Good morning. My name is Mohammed Bamyeh. I am a sociologist at  
439 the University of Pittsburgh. I teach on social movements, politics, and culture, and cultural  
440 globalization in particular. My earlier work has been on the origins of Islam and the spread of  
441 Islam as a social movement. And I was interested after that in the questions of global  
442 spiritualities, comparatively speaking, and did some work on globalization afterwards, but more  
443 emphasizing the cultural aspects of globalization, rather than the economic aspects. And also,  
444 within that, the question of identities and solidarities and the role of spiritualities of various kinds  
445 and this world in which we live, also historically seen, and how that compares to the present. Out  
446 of that emerged another interest that is really at the core of my teaching and research, which is  
447 how civil society forms and kind of entrenches itself as alternative to the state. And that led me  
448 in various directions, including the study of anarchism, about which I just published a book. But  
449 not anarchism in the traditional sense of the word, but rather as kind of a namesake for the  
450 historical kind of autonomous self-organization of non-state kind of centers and nodes of social  
451 and political action in society, below and around the state level. And that kind of perspective  
452 seemed to me to be much more realistic than state-based conceptions of political history, and  
453 also of contemporary history, because the more and more I looked at the evolution of modern  
454 religious movements, the more I realized how they kind of respond to the total inappropriateness  
455 not just of dictatorship, but even of state form and its opposition on social life in general. So that  
456 is something that I hope we would be talking about throughout the day and I look forward to  
457 that. Last year, also I was...had the best year of my life. I had a sabbatical, which was good in  
458 itself, but I also happened to spend it in Egypt. Just before the revolution I moved there, not  
459 expecting anything to happen, of course. And then I had really a great, great, great experience  
460 that I...part of it, of course, involved observing how people transform, how people...the role of  
461 religion but also the role of all kind of non-religious nodes of social and political life. And I was  
462 very moved by that. So I'd like to share some of that experience with you and also I look forward  
463 to learning from everyone who is participating here.

464

465 **Mark Juergensmeyer:** Thank you very much. We were also to have Muli Peleg, who is from  
466 Israel and currently on the East Coast of the United States and one of the founders of the One  
467 Voice Movement for Israeli/Palestinian dialogue. Unfortunately, we just got news yesterday that  
468 his father is seriously ill and Muli had to rush back to Israel so he won't be with us after all. As I  
469 told you, our last workshop on this topic was in Cairo just a couple months ago. And rather than  
470 summarize it myself, I'd like Paul to show us a little video clip that summarizes in a few minutes  
471 some of what happened in Cairo when Paul and I and Paul Amar and Victor and Dinah were all  
472 there in what was a very enriching event. So Paul do you want to set this up while we pull down  
473 the blinds?

474

## 475 **SESSION 1**

476

477 **Paul Amar:** So it's great to be back at a LUCE workshop. We had a truly amazing workshop in  
478 Cairo that this film gives you a glimpse of and it was perfectly timed. It was an exciting moment  
479 in politics and the politics of religion, in that we were there at the moment when, basically, the  
480 revolution turned from being...basically the moment of youth, labor, and anti-police brutality  
481 movements... We were there the day of the first major mobilization against the military, in which  
482 you had the kind of split between those that were leading the revolution and the military. And of  
483 course,... then in the middle and always playing a complicated set of intermediary relations, were  
484 the Muslim Brotherhood, which had several trends and tendencies within it, many of them allied  
485 with youth. We also had huge mobilizations by Sufis, the guilds of Sufi leaders, we had protests  
486 and riots amongst imams that were striking against the state. Paul and I were swept up into a  
487 protest riot of imams against the state. And then large groups of Muslim Sisters that were  
488 breaking off from the Muslim Brotherhood and participating in the demonstrations that Paul was  
489 filming there. So the last workshop, we were right in the middle of really some exciting  
490 moments. As we were having our post-workshop drinks, we watched the large groups of Ultras –  
491 the masses of soccer fans that are kind of the militarized phalanx of the youth left in Egypt –  
492 pour across the bridges to Giza, where they attacked the Giza police stations, a video of which  
493 was mis-portrayed as the attack on the Israeli Embassy, which was non-violent, but the video of  
494 the youth attacking the police stations was used to show the attack on the Israeli Embassy. So  
495 anyway,... that was the conference last time. Unfortunately, you're not going to see history



496 changing all around you, but you're going to see...

497

498 **Mae Cannon:** You never know, Paul.

499

500 **Paul Amar:** You never know what could happen. I mean, as you know, UC is in the middle of  
501 some very Tahrir-like uprisings, but not this campus today. Anyway, so to introduce this panel  
502 again, the idea here is to talk for just a few minutes, particularly about the topic at hand, which is  
503 the role of religion in recent socio-political transformations. Talk for a few minutes and then it'll  
504 be an open discussion which I won't interfere in at all. So the first speaker is Mohammed  
505 Bamyeh, who is a professor in the Department of Sociology at the University of Pittsburgh.  
506 You've already introduced yourself, so I'll just do the most minimal of introductions. Rosalind  
507 Hackett, a Professor and Chair in the Department of Religious Studies, University of Tennessee.  
508 Jeffrey Haynes from London Metropolitan University and Jacob Olupona from Harvard  
509 University in Cambridge. So, welcome.

510

511 **Mark Juergensmeyer:** We were hoping for about 5 minutes or so for each of them so we're  
512 going to have to cut you short if you go on a little longer, so I'm sorry about that.

513

514 **Mohammed Bamyeh:** Okay, I have a lot to say, though, ...but we'll start at the beginning, about  
515 100 years ago. The past 100 years in particular has seen a profound transformation in the Middle  
516 East. I don't have time to go through that, but briefly, one of the things I would like to mention  
517 about the earlier role of religious movements and the anti-colonial struggle, that was really the  
518 first time in our history where you begin to see the... political activation of religious movements  
519 in a big way. In Algeria, in particular, and Libya are the two early theaters where already existing  
520 Sufi order – kind of organizations, if you call them that – were the first sources of mobilization  
521 against Western colonialism in its earlier form. But since then, or after that, you have a very long  
522 time where basically you have the anti-colonial kind of project. It's picked up by liberal secular  
523 forces and continued to be so until almost the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, where the religious  
524 dimensions of the anti-colonial project are picked up again. So I think when we talk about the  
525 role of religious movements, we have to have this historical perspective in mind and ask about  
526 what happened and at what point do religious organizations pick up a certain fight directly and at

527 another point indirectly?

528

529 For much of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, much of religious mobilization in the Middle East has become  
530 conservative in the sense that for the organizers -- the Muslim Brotherhood being a model, one  
531 of the main models, although not the only model of that kind of mobilization -- the main task was  
532 to preserve the cultural integrity of society. Part of that included [an instance] under colonialism,  
533 but not as early as a major or only point of focus. Part of it also involved contesting the state, but  
534 not always, not consistently. The focus was more general, rather, on social ethics, on mutual  
535 help on establishing institutions at the neighborhood level, and establishing all kinds of quasi-  
536 political or non-political kinds of sources of action on society. In the past 30 years in particular,  
537 we see the ramifications of that, where basically many societies in the Middle East -- again Egypt  
538 is really a paradigmatic example here -- become gradually Islamized. People, of course, as we  
539 heard in the video, are being described as being naturally conservative. That, again, depends on  
540 what you mean by conservatism, ultimately. What we see in the past three decades in particular,  
541 and especially since the Iranian Revolution and the beginning of the newest phase of  
542 mobilization of Islamic activism elsewhere, a gradual sort of re-Islamization of society and this  
543 Islamization of course takes new forms, the new kinds of ethics, and the new forms of solidarity  
544 also and new meanings of it become emphasized that are not -- arguably -- not necessarily a part  
545 of the historical character of Islam. But nonetheless, Islam becomes really the most effective as a  
546 slogan for mobilizing civil society, and for... those of you who are involved in Islamic Studies  
547 for the past quarter of a century have been told Islam was the only ideology that is capable of  
548 mobilizing people in large numbers in the Middle East... In 2011, last year, that proved to be in  
549 fact not entirely true. Although, of course, when you look at the recent elections, it was basically,  
550 whatever... post-revolution elections again, you have to think about what that actually means.  
551 But the revolutions themselves were not religious revolutions, ultimately. They expressed  
552 grievances that both religious and non-religious forces could agree on and in fact, the religious  
553 movements joined the revolutions later, in most cases, although quickly enough. And some of  
554 them, like the Salafis, in fact, did not join at all until very late in the stages of the revolution. So  
555 as revolutionary activism is concerned, the religious movements seem to be caught off-guard by  
556 the [indistinct] just happened to respond late, partially because they already have something else  
557 to do in society. They are already rooted elsewhere. They have something to do in the civil

558 society ordinarily. But... that is something they have been doing for so many years that prepares  
559 them very well to take up the question of political power later, much more prepared than other  
560 forces.

561

562 Now the political... this is the last [point]. I'm going to end on this point because I know the limit  
563 of time. The religion that takes over or may take over, of course, in a post-revolutionary situation  
564 like in Tunisia, Egypt, or Morocco perhaps – who knows what happens in Syria, eventually – is  
565 not the same religion that you see in the pre-revolutionary period. It is not the same ideology.  
566 One of the things that I'm absolutely confident of – and we can talk about that in detail  
567 afterwards – is that the Muslim Brotherhood, for example, of this year is not at all the Muslim  
568 Brotherhood of last year. There is a way for the political transformation that is happening... [to]  
569 also transform people themselves. It is impossible to argue that in such a high-tension and high-  
570 mobilization environment as a revolution that everyone will just stay with their own old ideas  
571 forever and not be influenced at all by the transformations that are happening. The ideological  
572 change, including the change of the meaning of religion and changing the meaning of the  
573 political concepts of religion, is part and parcel of the demands that are placed in a revolution – a  
574 new environment which is very different from the old environment, where the demands on  
575 religion were of a very different sort and did not involve the question of the state at all but  
576 involved something else that was closer to everyday life. So I will stop here and we can pick up  
577 that later, perhaps.

578

579 **Rosalind Hackett:** Thank you. Well hello again. I'm going to talk primarily about what I have  
580 learned working in northern Uganda for the last seven or eight years. And if you don't mind, I'm  
581 going to do a bit of show and tell by passing around a recent book that I co-edited because the  
582 group that I'm talking about is actually featured on the cover and the conference that took place  
583 in Uganda that gave rise to this book. So it's significant that the book goes around if you don't  
584 mind. When I first went to northern Uganda in 2004, I was struck by the neglect, the national and  
585 international neglect and lack of interest in what was an extreme humanitarian and political  
586 crisis. That is to say, the conflict – and I'm more interested in conflict – between the Lord's  
587 Resistance Army, an insurgent group, against the Ugandan government, led by President  
588 Museveni. But in the space of those seven or eight years, I find it amazing how this part of the

589 world has now been catapulted onto the world scene, thanks largely to the agency of an inter-  
590 religious organization, the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative. So I've been involved with  
591 this group one way or another, not least just getting some of my students placed as interns. But  
592 it's been very instructive for me to learn about how they formed themselves in response to the  
593 suffering of their communities, the Acholi, the Acholi peoples in the north of Uganda, and how  
594 they mobilized support, nationally and internationally. This flies in the face of how religious  
595 groups may often be – particularly locally generated religious groups – may be overlooked or  
596 misrepresented. In fact, some of the more secular oriented, critically minded scholars, some of  
597 whom have written on northern Uganda, tend to just give a passing reference to this group. And I  
598 think they're of comparative interest because if we look at the cases of Sierra Leone, Liberia,  
599 South Africa, and Nigeria to some extent, we see that religious coalitions – interreligious  
600 coalitions, interreligious councils – seem to be gaining momentum and also seem to be  
601 expanding their purview and their portfolios. This is certainly the case of the Acholi Religious  
602 Leaders Peace Initiative, which started out really just helping members of the mainly Anglican  
603 and Catholic communities but then... ironically gained permission from the President of Uganda  
604 to become legitimate agents in the peace process and... then they got more into advocacy,  
605 advocating for peace over justice, and then taking on the International Criminal Court for its  
606 uninformed and untimely intervention in northern Uganda. And now [they are] even taking on  
607 President Obama and the State Department for their overly militarized solutions and proposals  
608 with dealing with the Lord's Resistance Army in the region of northern Uganda, South Sudan,  
609 and Congo. So I think it's very important to use case studies that can be instructive, not just in  
610 terms of the local ecology and historical dynamics of peace-building and humanitarianism, but  
611 how such a group can from one month or year to the next be empowered or disempowered by the  
612 state or by international agents. So I find them to be a fascinating case study for illustrating the  
613 complexity and the evolving discourses and the vagaries of funding and then who's in, who's  
614 out, who collaborates with whom. There's a segue to Jacob's and Laura's concern about the role  
615 of traditional leaders. Traditional leaders are involved in this interreligious initiative, but they  
616 aren't named... They're not listed in the title. I find that to be somewhat significant. As someone  
617 who's very interested in Media Studies, I'm also interested in the framing – how the government,  
618 how this interreligious initiative plays the media to their advantage. So I would also argue that in  
619 this day and age, we have to pay attention to the labeling and the deviant labeling and the

620 representations and the misrepresentations because those are really very empowering and  
621 disempowering. And I'm going to say I look forward to saying a little bit more later about the  
622 use of the term, "faith." Thank you very much.

623  
624 **Jeffrey Haynes:** Okay, thank you. I want to be provocative and so I'm going to be provocative  
625 as a way of establishing myself in the group. The title, "What is the role of religion in the recent  
626 socio-political transformations?" I think it is a really important starting point, but I was interested  
627 from the film, from Mohammed's comments, and from Rosalind's comments, we've heard about  
628 Sufis, imams, Muslim Brotherhood, Salafis, Muslim Sisters, soccer fans – are they secular  
629 religious followers? We didn't hear anything about the Coptic Christians in Egypt, which is  
630 obviously a major issue when we think about socio-political transformations there. What would  
631 be the role of the 80 million strong minority there? The experts around the table are from  
632 Religious Studies, ...particularly interested in African traditional religions, Mohammed an expert  
633 in Islamic ideology, NGO people as well. I'm very concerned that we start off by understanding  
634 what we're talking about here because the problem we've got, I think, is that implicitly,  
635 religion's in one box, secularism is in another box and we're talking about how those boxes  
636 interact and overlap and what the secular world of politics, let's say, how that's affected by the  
637 world of religion. The implicit thing there of course is that they are separate worlds and I  
638 certainly am coming from a background which understands that's how the world is made up.  
639 Rosalind with her background in African traditional religions, I'm sure, would be much more  
640 skeptical about that kind of way of seeing the world.

641  
642 So the first thing is, what are we talking about here? Can we compartmentalize these things in  
643 the way in which I tend to do? What makes a religion a religion? What makes it separate from a  
644 secular organizing group? Is there a clear dividing line between religion and politics? I know  
645 these are obvious and, in many ways, simplistic questions, but I think they need to form a  
646 backdrop to what we're talking about. In the Middle East, in sub-Saharan Africa, have we seen  
647 religious privatization? Of course in the West this is an established fact about how our societies  
648 have developed. Are we in the West in the context of post-secularism? Does that term mean  
649 anything to the communities of sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East? If so, what does it  
650 imply for our understanding of the world? Do we still implicitly or explicitly see a linear

651 trajectory from tradition to modernity, which necessarily implies secularization? Some of the  
652 activists in the film seemed to me to be saying something like that – that religion would become  
653 less significant to how they did their lives because the issue is about jobs, welfare, education. It  
654 was secular issues, and religion should play a backseat role in those kinds of questions. I think  
655 I'm running out of time already. The Lord's Resistance Army – now there's an interesting label.  
656 What makes the Lord's Resistance Army religious? What makes them something that we can  
657 identify as a religious organization? Rosalind talks about Acholi religious leaders. How do they  
658 see the world? How do Acholi traditional religious leaders see the world? Do they see the world  
659 divided up into a secular and a religious context? What aspects of their religion inform their  
660 peace-making? So for me, the issue is endlessly fascinating. I haven't even gotten onto the topic  
661 of global civil society yet, which is another fascinating topic. So I'm very much interested in  
662 what my colleagues around the table have to say about these issues, but I would like us to be as  
663 far as possible concerned with terminology because it's very easy – and I'm guilty of it – to talk  
664 about these issues as though everybody understands what we mean. And I think that if we'd gone  
665 around the table and asked everybody how would they define religion, how would they define  
666 socio-political transformation, then we'd probably get 20 different answers. So that's my  
667 controversial starting point.

668

669 **Jacob Olupona:** Thank you very much. I'm now going to be provocative. But I'd like to raise  
670 one or two conceptual issues for our conversation here. The first has to do with the role of  
671 religion in civil society. Religion can be part and parcel of civil society like in other associations,  
672 organizations, human rights, and so on. Religion can also be a kind of an institution that is in  
673 opposition to civil society, not just the state but other members of civil society. I think it's  
674 important for us to look at that. Why this has become so important in African situations is where  
675 you have the conflict between ethnicity and religion, especially when it comes to identity  
676 construction. We have seen that when ethnicity fails, or African political leaders fail to invoke  
677 ethnicity to support a program or to sell an idea, they often turn to conservative forms of religion  
678 to build their constituency. If you look at the history of West African countries, in most cases,...  
679 they turn to radical, radical forms of religion – radical evangelism, radical Islam, in opposition to  
680 the state. Quite often, they play this card. At times, we may not know which is which. You may  
681 not know whether or not the president, in talking about his [indistinct] constituency, he's actually

682 also talking about the Southern Christian group that has been in support of him... I mean Nigeria  
683 has been in support of his ambition. So it is important for us to sort out these terms and to sort  
684 out the issues concerned.

685  
686 The third point I'd like to make relates to the situation in Nigeria. The theoretical issue there is  
687 this: on occasions and in situations where it is hard or where political leadership and religious  
688 leadership conflate, you have a serious crisis here... A classic example is the sultan. The Sultan  
689 of Sokoto was my guest a month ago at Harvard, who gave a well-endowed lecture there and had  
690 a lot to say about the Nigerian situation. So people are arguing that perhaps the silences that we  
691 are witnessing in Nigeria, from that part of the country, from northern Nigeria, mainly from  
692 northern Nigerian [indistinct], may relate to the fact that there's a conflict between Christianity  
693 and Islam generally in that country, in terms of who controls the state. So as bad as these are, and  
694 as bad as the situation is in Nigeria, we are not too sure whether what we are seeing is political,  
695 is economic, or even is religious. So that becomes a problem.

696  
697 Another point I'd like to make is, how do we relate to civil society or members of a civil society  
698 – institutions, including religious ones – who engage in a fight for justice but use violent means,  
699 especially in situations where they feel that they have not been successful in promoting peaceful  
700 transformation of the society? This may be a value judgment, but I think that it's important. And  
701 why [indistinct] justify violence in the conduct of civil society? There is an issue that we need to  
702 deal with as scholars. How do we respond to that? To people who said, "Well, our vote doesn't  
703 count. We have tried to vote. We have tried to change this government. We have tried to  
704 transform this society by peaceful means, but any time we vote, they rig the election and we are  
705 hopeless. We are hapless. So what do we now do?" I don't want to deal with specific cases, as  
706 such. I think this will probably come up in the course of our conversation. But I'd like to sort of  
707 add one more thing and then I will stop. That in modern Africa, the question we should also be  
708 asking is, why is it that religion has become so central to civil society? Why is it that even the  
709 state in engaging the populace have found out that it is important to engage members of the  
710 religious organizations and associations? And I have an example I always give in Nigeria, that if  
711 the president of Nigeria calls a rally in Abuja – you know, "I want to meet with my people" –  
712 and the president...or the leaders of three evangelical Christian associations call for the same

713 rally in the same place, what will happen? You will discover that very few people will go to the  
714 president's rally and virtually the largest group will go to the rallies organized by the leaders of  
715 these evangelical Christian organizations. So what does this tell us about the political  
716 mobilization and what does it tell us about the role of religion in the society? Unfortunately,  
717 unlike the Middle East, where the religious organizations have really, really been able to find a  
718 way of engaging the state in serious conversation, this is not the case in most African countries.  
719 They have not...and perhaps it has to do with the nature of religious culture there and the society  
720 itself because it's a highly pluralistic society. So the conflict between Christians and Muslims,  
721 for example, in countries like Nigeria... is a factor in how religion is mobilized in social  
722 transformation. Thank you.

723

724 **Paul Amar:** Thank you very much. So, we'll move to open discussion. Anyone on the panel  
725 want to respond to a comment of any other panelist to start off with? We open it up.

726

727 **Nadege Clitandre:** I actually just have a general question for Professor Bamyeh. I wanted to  
728 know if you could elaborate a little bit on your discussion around the Muslim Brotherhood. You  
729 talk about transformations and changing ideologies. Is it because it is about the changes as  
730 Professor Haynes talks about - secular - everything becoming more secular or is it more  
731 complicated than that?

732

733 **Mark Juergensmeyer:** Why don't we have a couple of comments before the panel responds.  
734 Get more people involved.

735

736 **Mae Cannon:** Well I would just follow up with that. I was intrigued by the comment about  
737 Islam being the most significant force to be able to mobilize popular movements. Specifically,  
738 my question has to do with the 1979 revolution in Iran because my understanding was that it was  
739 a popular revolution that then became very religious afterwards. And so, just as a follow-up to  
740 your question, I'd be interested to hear about that.

741

742 **Thomas Tighe:** I was just hoping Jeffrey was going to answer all the questions he posed  
743 because I thought they were great. Also, Jacob, your comments made me think of the element of



744 trust as it relates to political leaders versus religious institutions, versus other institutions and if  
745 the erosion of trust in political leaders we see in a lot of places, if there's kind of a zero-sum-ness  
746 to where that trust can be vested. And if it's in older institutions that fail, whether they be  
747 religious or political, you see the newness emerge and the desire to follow something. And I was  
748 just curious... Whether it's religious in nature, secular or whatever, there's this element of  
749 desiring leadership and trusting that they're going to have a path forward that you all seem to  
750 have a bit of a different take on in one way or another with the organizations, religious  
751 institutions, and political leaders that you mentioned.

752

753 **Paul Amar:** Just have this last question here and we'll answer.

754

755 **Karel Zelenka:** Thank you. First, thank you for very impressive presentations. I have a couple  
756 of questions or comments. First, it seems although the movie and your visit was only two months  
757 ago, based on my limited knowledge mostly from the media, I understand that the Egyptian  
758 revolution is sort of settling down into basically or is now involving two protagonists – the  
759 military and the Muslim Brotherhood, that the promises of multi-party system that would be a  
760 precursor of democracy is more or less recent history... The struggle now is between the Muslim  
761 Brotherhood and the military and... that there may be actually some collusion in terms of sharing  
762 power. And second, I understand that the significant vote that the Muslim Brotherhood has  
763 obtained was coming mostly from the countryside, that they tend to concentrate on the capital  
764 city, on Cairo, which is ... maybe 20% of the population of Egypt. I read some analysis why it is  
765 that the vote was so strongly in favor of the Muslim Brotherhood was that people in villages that  
766 had hardly any access to media or to basically any updates... voted because they knew people in  
767 the village, in the communities, regardless what their program was, what their platform would  
768 be... They just voted for them because they knew them as neighbors, as people who have been  
769 doing something in their communities, regardless of the sophisticated urban analysis and social  
770 versus religious and so forth. Thank you.

771

772 **Mohammed Bamyeh:** Mark, you had a question?

773

774 **Mark Juergensmeyer:** Oh, yes, it's partially for you. You had this very intriguing phrase in

775 your comments where you talked about the political transformations had led to a transformation  
776 of the people. And then you made reference specifically with regard to the Muslim Brotherhood  
777 and I was wondering quite what you meant by that. Did you mean a greater sense of citizenship?  
778 A greater civic responsibility? Or did you mean something darker than that?

779

780 **Mohammed Bamyeh:** Okay, I mean this is a very rich discussion. First of all, let me just go  
781 back to the Iranian Revolution because... I did not mean to imply that it was an Islamic  
782 revolution. It assumed an Islamic character later... There is a lot of literature about that by this  
783 point, which shows that basically the revolution took up an Islamic character, largely because of  
784 other factors that got activated later on, became important later on, such as the mobilizing  
785 capacity of the clergy, for example, such as the search for unified leadership and so on. And  
786 religious characters were in a better position to provide those elements of the revolution. But the  
787 revolution did not start because of Islam. It did not start because people wanted to establish an  
788 Islamic theocracy. But rather, basically, revolutions don't always arrive at their destination, so to  
789 speak. They get eventually somewhere else, depending on a large mix of factors. But the  
790 important thing about the Iran revolution is that it served as a lesson for future movements... In  
791 fact, I just wrote an article precisely about this point – the relationship of the Iran revolution to  
792 the learning process that resulted in the Arab revolution that's right now. Because you see many  
793 elements that are missing in these revolutions in the world that had been part of the Iran  
794 revolution. For example, the resistance. Often [indistinct] resistance to the idea of unified  
795 leadership. Even though you have a messianic type of atmosphere, you do not have any serious  
796 messianic type of leader. There is an idea of people-hood – the people as the ultimate source of  
797 legitimacy but there's no demand for any entity to represent this abstraction, which is people-  
798 hood, ultimately.

799

800 And these elements are really strange, especially if you see them in the context of the history of  
801 revolutions in general. One of the approaches that help us when we try to explain and answer any  
802 of these questions is to understand religious movements like any other movements as  
803 experimental movements, ultimately. That is, as movements that learn the art of politics, the  
804 language of politics by just doing it. And what they learn depends on how much the theater is  
805 open or closed to them. The question, for example, of the Islamic state in Egypt was not at all

806 discussed seriously. [Indistinct], when he denounced political Islam for being underdeveloped,  
807 that it had no theater of politics, he was right. But he was not actually talking about anything that  
808 was significant because nothing really depended on the absence of the political ideology... No  
809 state was being offered up to the Islamists to take over, therefore there was no need to develop a  
810 political ideology. Only now is this demand there and this is how you see, for example, the  
811 evolution of this political ideology. One of its key elements, strangely, is the idea of the civic  
812 state, which is a concept that in some sense theoretically may appear to be old but very, very  
813 quickly has become familiar just last year. And the first time I saw it in Tahrir Square, it was  
814 explained in a very particular way. A civic state was something that contested two other types of  
815 states. A religious state was one of them and the military state was the other. So it was neither  
816 military nor religious. These were other alternatives. And the surprising thing that I saw  
817 immediately almost afterwards is that the Muslim Brotherhood members – youth members in  
818 particular, themselves – were chanting for a civic state. And then someone from Al Azhar stood  
819 up and defended the idea of the civic state by citing Mohammed as being the first person in  
820 history to establish a civic state, rather than a religious state. I'm not saying these things just to  
821 say that these are the ideals that are going to be applied, but just to show how basically there is a  
822 very dynamic scene that we have and there is an experimentation.

823

824 One of the things that we know from European history that is worth learning about is the  
825 evolution of social democracy in Europe – the Christian social democracy in Europe. The ruling  
826 party in Germany is called the Christian Democratic Party. In Italy likewise and so on. In my  
827 earlier work on globalization, comparative cultures of globalization, political globalization, one  
828 of the things that I tried to argue is that Christian social democratic parties in the West became  
829 what they are precisely because of the political openness, relatively open political theater that  
830 caused the transformation and adaptation of their earlier kind of ideology and cultural traditions  
831 into suitable political language. That path was not available to Islamic movements until now. So  
832 whenever it was open, you saw a similar process of transformation of political ideology, and  
833 Islam in particular, in the direction of social democracy. The first... will talk about the Iran  
834 Revolution, but not as much about Turkey, for example. The transformation of the Islamic  
835 movements in Turkey into something that, because of different dynamics, were evolved in the  
836 direction of social democratic traditional conservatism. And this seems to be also the process that

837 may be happening as far as we see in Egypt. If we have time, later perhaps, I'd like to discuss at  
838 some point other experiences like, for example, Hamas and Hezbollah as different types...but  
839 similar, in fact, in unsuspected ways to what I'm describing now. But that's a long discussion.

840

841 **Rosalind Hackett:** Yes, I'd just like to add a comment or two in relation to Jeff and Jacob's  
842 comments. Jeff, the Ugandan case is instructive because the various parties or sets of actors are  
843 constantly challenging and negotiating territory and authority. There's a fraught history in  
844 Uganda, a very tense relationship between religion and the state, church/state. But now it's  
845 become religion as a state with Muslims, the Muslim minority challenging what they perceive to  
846 be a Christian-dominated state, particularly via the Born Agains and the Pentecostals over a  
847 domestic relations bill. So that's the backdrop. But with the newly empowered authority of the  
848 Acholi religious leaders, they now will prepare to criticize the government on moral issues such  
849 as corruption and bad governance and then the president says, "Stop meddling. Go back to  
850 looking after your flock." But every single politician is a member of the flock. So I think if you  
851 just would monitor how they go back and forth, you've got a very good example of the everyday  
852 problematizing of where religion and politics ends and begins. And with regard to the question of  
853 ethnicity, again it's interesting how the religious leaders have negotiated the ethnic trope because  
854 the war, which was technically over in 2006, is about ethnicity and marginalization. But at the  
855 same time, they are trying to protect their people, the Acholi. So it's a tightrope. And then we  
856 come to September the 11<sup>th</sup> and you add into that a global terrorist trope that President Museveni  
857 manipulates to his advantage in terms of raising international funds and lots of American money  
858 for military support. So again, this takes a very local conflict, catapults it onto the national and  
859 international stage. I feel like I'm very much in the shadow of Egypt here and Nigeria. I could've  
860 spoken on Nigeria because I've published a lot on that, but I chose to talk about northern Uganda  
861 precisely because... it's pretty stunning the way it went from being unknown and neglected to  
862 having Hollywood films being made about it and everything. So I find that rather fascinating and  
863 then of course some of you may be familiar with the role of a California-based set of students,  
864 filmmakers,... Invisible Children... who have intervened in a way which many would see as very  
865 problematic in the way they represented this war, favoring the child soldiers and abductees, when  
866 the issues and causes were much more complex and much more economic and political.  
867 Anyways, there's more I could say on that. Thank you.

868

869 **Jacob Olupona:** Well I agree with your question, that erosion of trust. It's at the root of some of  
870 these problems. There's always the desire to look for new things and new ways of solving these  
871 problems. What makes this very problematic in the Nigerian case is that it's religious plurality. I  
872 didn't say pluralism. Nigeria's 150 million. If Nigeria had been a totally Muslim state or country,  
873 there would have been a revolution long ago. But this whole conflation between ethnicity and  
874 religion makes it quite difficult.

875

876 I'd like to respond to Mark's comment on... citizenship and so on. What problem that I think we  
877 see in the African state is that at the time of independence in 1960, they were all concerned with  
878 dealing with ethnicity. How do we create a new nation-state that would make us move from this  
879 whole dependence on the ethnic basis of most of these leaders to a nation that will be very  
880 pluralistic and so on? They took religion for granted. They didn't pay any attention to it. Now by  
881 the way, the whole issue of civil society is an issue of using a new term to describe old concepts  
882 and ideas. There has always been civil society and most of the missionaries who came to begin  
883 their work on the continent also came from civil institutions and civil organizations and  
884 established schools and hospitals and responded to social welfare issues as they go about  
885 missionizing and converting people. But the nation-state didn't have a solid experiment in nation  
886 building... I spent part of my earlier research in the 70s and 80s on civil religion, when I was  
887 influenced by Peter Berger. I was one of his students. And I raised this issue. I found it very,  
888 very interesting that the basic concept that any functioning society must have sets of myths and  
889 rituals and symbols that will galvanize the people together, irrespective of the situation. And I  
890 think I did an article with Rosalind on this issue. Religion becomes science in our hearts if we  
891 know precisely what we're doing. I was able to pinpoint particularly the point when Nigeria  
892 failed in this whole experiment. And I showed in *Civil Rights of Passage* when the whole thing  
893 was overturned. So that failure of our leaders to be visionaries, ... because Nyerere's Ujamaa  
894 policy failed, should not make us condemn that. At least he had something. Nkrumah had  
895 something that he placed on the table. And Nkrumah used just metaphors and symbols to talk  
896 about nation building. That has stopped. Unfortunately, the military came and hijacked that  
897 experiment from most of the African states and that is what is one of the things that we have not  
898 been able to respond to. And in the so-called democratization process that came after the end of

899 the Cold War hasn't really been very successful. Because what we have... are still the old  
900 political, military leaders who just exchange their suits for the khakis that they used to wear. It  
901 hasn't changed. The same military that is still in charge in Nigeria. Thank you.

902

903 **Claudine Michel:** Jacob, I would like to ask you about the role of indigenous religions involved  
904 in this movement.

905

906 **Jacob Olupona:** Well I deliberately didn't talk about it because I'd like to leave that to Laura to  
907 discuss... What is unfortunate about the Nigerian situation is that they have fizzled it out of the  
908 equation. In most state ceremonies, at the national level, indigenous religion is not mentioned.  
909 The president will call on an imam to pray and the Christian to pray and that is it.

910

911 And this has been the situation. In 1960, at the beginning of this state called Nigeria, indigenous  
912 religion was taken seriously. In fact most of the chairs in African universities – Uganda, Nigeria  
913 – and so the first chairs in religions were established to teach indigenous religion. Mbiti will tell  
914 you I was not trained in African religion, but I was asked to teach it in [indistinct] University.  
915 That was the golden era of religious academic study and discourse in Nigeria. And because they  
916 have virtually removed it in Nigeria as an official part of the religious organizations and  
917 institutions recognized by the state, the battle has become very clear. The battle between Islam  
918 and Christianity – this is part of the problem.

919

920 **Dwight Hopkins:** Thank you for the panel and sharing. Actually, the question I had picks up  
921 from Jacob's. We're talking about the role of religion in the recent social and political  
922 transformations and so my question is when we look at the first part – the role of religion or  
923 religions – what is the relationship between the indigenous religions or traditional religions and  
924 the missionized religions in this question of the role? Has it been progressive or not? And maybe  
925 there's a coming together of some new form of religion, but I wanted to make a distinction  
926 between...not a sharp distinction, but can we sort out the distinction between indigenous religions  
927 and missionized religions? And on the other side of the phrase, "the recent social/political  
928 transformations" – are these recent social/political transformations... intentionally toward some  
929 type of Western modern transformation or are they trying to advance something else like ujamaa

930 or Nkrumah's peace or maybe in Uganda or maybe even some indigenous Egyptian peace? So  
931 basically what is the relationship between the indigenous and new forms from the West (if we  
932 can make that distinction) on the religion part, and the goals of the social transformation part?  
933

934 **Laura Grillo:** I was also picking up on this point about ethnicity and traditional religion. I was  
935 intrigued by your initial observation, Jacob... Nigeria is of course a famously ethnically  
936 heterogeneous country. But now increasingly the divide is between north and south, Christian  
937 and Muslim. Just wanted to note the irony that these so-called "global religions" are the ones that  
938 are fostering an increased fractured situation of division and in-fighting. But I was also picking  
939 up on something that Rosalind mentioned about the media, wondering to what degree the media  
940 informs the situation. I'm playing on the double sense of "informing," both informing people  
941 about how this in-fighting gets played out, but also by reporting on it in those ways, actually  
942 fostering and creating such a situation. I'm anticipating this may be the case because I see that  
943 has been the case in Côte d'Ivoire – that oftentimes, especially the foreign press represents the  
944 civil war as an issue of north/south, Muslim/Christian, when that isn't necessarily what's going  
945 on. Or that's certainly not the whole story.

946

947 **Paul Amar:** Mark, do you want to have the last question and then we'll have our responses?

948

949 **Mark Juergensmeyer:** Okay, Mohammed Bamyeh made a parallel between Muslim  
950 Brotherhood and Hezbollah and Hamas in terms of "it's beginning to become more moderate or  
951 become integrated into the political process." On a totally different level, the Boko Haram and  
952 the Lord's Resistance Army are at the other extreme of movements that are religious, political...  
953 Are there parallels between those two movements, even though one is Christian, one is Muslim,  
954 of course? But... is there a kind of anti-authoritarian, prey upon the implicit anarchy of the two  
955 countries that produced these kinds of religio-political phenomena and the – at least currently –  
956 inability of the regimes of those countries to really effectively deal with them? Most tragically,  
957 of course, an incident yesterday where 100 people were killed in northern Nigeria by an attack of  
958 the Boko Haram.

959

960 **Paul Amar:** So we'll sneak in a little question from Marguerite then we really do have to...

961

962 **Marguerita Bouraad Nash:** I actually would like to make a comment and get the reaction of  
963 the panelists. Looking at Iran and at the Egyptian situation now and the successes and also at  
964 Hezbollah and Lebanon, it seems to me that there is a common denominator – that all of these  
965 groups were very successful in getting to power and keeping the power because of their  
966 grassroots connection to the population and their ability to provide the population with services  
967 that normally are provided in the Western world by governments. But [they are] services that are  
968 not available there, and therefore they have reached the people. And the Muslim Brotherhood in  
969 Egypt, from Al Banna to the present, has been engaged in this social welfare. Hezbollah  
970 definitely has been engaged in the social welfare, that every time Lebanon got invaded – of  
971 course it’s the south that gets it – Hezbollah is the one –not the government – Hezbollah is the  
972 one that sends the bulldozers to clear the rubble, that helps with the building, that also, through  
973 all that, engages in the education. And isn’t that really sort of common to an awful lot of these  
974 organizations? I didn’t want to include Hamas because there are some other issues with regard to  
975 Hamas, but those three seem to have a common denominator of social services that are coupled  
976 with education that endears them to the common people all over.

977

978 **Paul Amar:** So we have to conclude in five minutes, so let’s start at this end of the table this  
979 time, Jacob?

980

981 **Jacob Olupona:** Okay, very quickly, I will probably say that at the local level, the chiefs, the  
982 priests, the indigenous leaders are... still agents of social transformation. They still control that,  
983 very similar to the point you made in Egypt – that what happens in the villages at the local level  
984 is very different from maybe what is going on in the city. So on one hand, there is that. However,  
985 the evangelical Christian associations, institutions, and Islamic [groups]... they are virtually  
986 targeting them. The last two chapters of my new book, which was based on Ilé-Ifẹ, the city of the  
987 Yorubas, sort of focused on that – how the leaders themselves at the local level are undergoing  
988 the kinds of cognitive dissonance in terms of where do they go. But part of it has to do with  
989 transformation constructed along the Western models also. So there’s a lot of influence coming  
990 from outside Nigeria, coming from evangelical groups outside Nigeria that is gradually,  
991 gradually changing the face of the nation. The Pentecostal charismatic movement... is the largest



992 in Africa, if not in the world. So we're dealing with a very, very serious issue here. Boko Haram  
993 is a terrorist group... Boko Haram is not as organized as these other groups that we are referring  
994 to. It's an invisible group that... is in quarrel with the state. And part of it has to do with the fact  
995 that Boko Haram was created by the political elite as talks during national elections to protect  
996 them. Now they have become something that they can not control anymore. And a lot of  
997 desperate groups have joined Boko Haram to fight the state. And this is precisely what is  
998 happening. I do not know what is going on in Nigeria right now, but I think the very fact that  
999 yesterday they targeted the police stations is an indication that they want to send a message to  
1000 Nigeria that they are probably not... after the Christians. Because the Christmas bombing was –  
1001 there they targeted the Christian church. And people say, "Well, this is a religious war now that  
1002 we're fighting." They've always been saying that they have issues with the state. However, there  
1003 are some sections of Boko Haram who would like to see the sharia instituted, who would like to  
1004 see an Islamic state installed in Nigeria. If you ask the state, "What is going on now? Who are  
1005 members of this Boko Haram?" they can't tell you because it's a diffuse group that is just  
1006 coming under the pretext of wanting to fight Nigeria and wanting to fight corruption and so  
1007 forth...

1008  
1009 **Jeffrey Haynes:** I'll just comment very briefly. Boko Haram...I mean one thing that seems to  
1010 categorize them or characterize them as distinct from other extremist groups that can be  
1011 characterized as religious in Africa is their willingness to use suicide bombing and terrorist  
1012 tactics. It may be that if we're talking about global civil society, we could sort of bend that term  
1013 to include the kind of Al Qaeda-inspired way of doing politics or way of doing activism, but I  
1014 don't know. The Lord's Resistance Army, I think, is a group which is more about ethnicity than  
1015 religion. I think the title "Lord's Resistance Army" is a bit of a red herring, really. Going back to  
1016 what I was saying earlier, I'd be very interested to know what, precisely, inspires them  
1017 religiously, as distinct from an ethnic focus. Iran, Egypt, Hezbollah, and Lebanon – I don't think  
1018 there's very much similarity between what occurred in Iran 30-odd years ago and the other two  
1019 cases, largely because the revolution in Iran was not about building on grassroots movements  
1020 that were religiously inspired, to my understanding. It was rather that there was a state imposed  
1021 upon a revolution by a group of people who managed to capture the state. My understanding is  
1022 that it wasn't built on a grassroots issue. The Muslim Brotherhood I think is distinct from

1023 Hezbollah largely because Hezbollah is seen primarily as a nationalist movement, rather than a  
1024 religious movement. There are links to Iran. We could make that link because, of course, the Iran  
1025 government is one of the key backers of Hezbollah. But whether that's due to religion or whether  
1026 it's due to the fact that Hezbollah is a group which stands up or seeks to defend – if that's the  
1027 right word – against Israel. It's interesting. I do come back in my own mind to this issue of  
1028 categorization with a lot of this stuff. And finally Muslim Brotherhood, as everyone in the room  
1029 knows, they've been around since 1928. They've suffered a great deal of persecution by the  
1030 state. And it seems to me to be classic sensible tactics – when the state persecutes you, you build  
1031 at the grassroots. I think the comment about the Muslim Brotherhood's support being...I won't  
1032 say "largely," but significant in rural areas and the fact that the rural areas were very often  
1033 absolutely disengaged from the revolution, this is...my understanding from many thousands of  
1034 miles away, this is an intellectually led effort in Egypt. So I think the three are very different and  
1035 I think the fact that we would all characterize them as religious and Muslim doesn't tie them  
1036 together in any profound ways.

1037  
1038 **Rosalind Hackett:** Thank you. Well Dwight, you were pretty rigorous in trying to tie up... what  
1039 we were talking about in relation to this particular panel. But it allows me to say this about my  
1040 case study. What I found revealing about the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative is that it's  
1041 clearly been easier for them. In fact, one of the two most influential religious actors – retired  
1042 Anglican Bishop Ochola -- at times sounds more traditional in terms of invoking traditional  
1043 cultural reconciliation mechanisms than a lot of traditional leaders, and his cultural knowledge is  
1044 unsurpassed. So the areas of non-inclusion of other religious leaders would be in terms of the  
1045 Born Agains or the Pentecostals. They... were reluctant to come up from the capital from the  
1046 south, the capital Kampala, to even intervene. They only came up after the war ended. But now,  
1047 just in the last few months, the Born Again Federation has actually joined forces with the – as  
1048 have the Seventh Day Adventists – with the Acholi Religious Leaders.

1049  
1050 And I think if we look at Nigeria, we could see similar evolution. That the Pentacostals -- and in  
1051 Ghana, too – sort of kept out, didn't want to be associated with the mainstream organizations, but  
1052 there's been more of a coming together now and... especially through the Christian Association  
1053 of Nigeria in trying to create a united Christian front against a perceived... Islamization. So those

1054 dynamics, I think, are interesting and important in terms of how they operate.

1055

1056 You're absolutely right, Laura. The media are not innocent in all of this... I don't really want to  
1057 speak so much for those involved in the NGO world, but certainly as a scholar, we have been  
1058 remiss in not paying more critical attention to the role of the media in making or breaking  
1059 conflict situations. I think that that is changing now. And, as to whether the Lord's Resistance  
1060 Army are religious or political or are they Christian or Muslim – it's all of the above. I mean I  
1061 heard several local leaders and scholars challenge Western academics for playing down the  
1062 religious beliefs and practices of the Lord's Resistance Army, which are Muslim, Christian, and  
1063 traditional. You have to understand that the local cultural environment there is very much  
1064 predicated on spirit possession. And this is a rebel movement which is driven by strong beliefs  
1065 about spirit possession. So we won't really know so much about this until Joseph Kony ever gets  
1066 caught and if he's caught alive... much of this will start to come out. But certainly what we know  
1067 so far is that one of the reasons why the security forces, the local army detachments have not  
1068 been effective in tracking down this rebel group is because they're afraid of them and they're  
1069 afraid of their spiritual powers. So to downplay that is to introduce a very secularist perception.  
1070 Thank you.

1071

1072 **Paul Amar:** Alright, final word from the panel.

1073

1074 **Mohammed Bamyeh:** [Indistinct] at the local level is very important, I think, in the prospects of  
1075 many of the movements that we are talking about. But also, as we discussed, [indistinct] for a  
1076 very complicated approach to localism and radicalism and that's an issue that comes up when we  
1077 discuss Hezbollah, for example. Just briefly, Hamas spends 85 to 90% of its budget on social  
1078 services. Similar things can be said about Hezbollah because the U.N. organization that studied  
1079 that evaluated the Hezbollah services as mentioned. They were more efficient than both of the  
1080 [indistinct] governments, less corrupt, also, that's very important. So the absence of corruption is  
1081 very important. In fact, Hamas is...in the [indistinct] of campaign, the one that won in 2005, the  
1082 issue of corruption was the most important issue – combating corruption in the government. So  
1083 the presence of local authorities, trustworthiness, basically, comparativity of that to the  
1084 corruption of the highest levels of governments, is actually very important in the prospects of

1085 those movements.

1086

1087 Also, when we keep in mind we have to have another factor that we need to pay attention to and  
1088 namely, when do these groups become militant? When social service engagement at the local  
1089 level eventually morphs into a militant kind of struggle at a macro level. Hamas – its origins can  
1090 be traced to 1971 but it becomes a militant, real fighting organization in 1987. Hezbollah had a  
1091 similar history -- 1974, early origins so to speak, although the name as not used. And then in the  
1092 early 80s it becomes a sort of militant movement that we hear about. These in Nigeria, likewise –  
1093 you can have earlier origins of mobilization at the local level and the organization does not exist  
1094 by that name, but the networks that form out of this local mobilization to take care of pressing  
1095 local issues eventually becomes the tools for a militant organization that fights... at the higher  
1096 level. So I can say, “Why does this happen?” Does this have to do with religion itself? Or does it  
1097 have to do with the fact that radicalism is actually produced by the states, by the authorities that  
1098 these movements themselves combat? This is clear, for example, in the case of Israel. I mean the  
1099 conditions of the occupation themselves, of course, radicalize the movements that originally, for  
1100 example, simply wanted to take care of a society that nobody else was there to take care of.  
1101 Lebanon, likewise -- the situation of occupation, civil war, and so on and so forth. Nigeria, and  
1102 so on. So a common denominator that can be observed is basically society comes together to take  
1103 care of itself at the local level. Not religion, so to speak, in that society. But it takes up a religious  
1104 language because it’s a familiar language to a lot of people, and then the networks that emerge  
1105 out of that local mobilization take on eventually – maybe or maybe not, depending on the local  
1106 situation – a radical or militant form later on, simply because of the fact that the larger powers  
1107 that had created the problems which those movements themselves originated to combat have  
1108 been producing, actually, the kinds of problems that they had produced, so to speak, (if you want  
1109 to go back to Foucault) produce the criminality that is fighting them.

1110

1111 **Paul Amar:** Thank you very much.

1112

1113 **SECOND SESSION**

1114

1115 **Nadege Clitandre:** The question we are answering in this session is “What role do religious  
1116 institutions play in supporting humanitarian activity?” And this question actually takes us back to  
1117 the first set of questions in the first session, specifically the question that Jeffery Haynes brought  
1118 up. And that is, “Is there a clear divide between religious and secular activities.” So the  
1119 assumption in the question is that humanitarian activities do not have religious and political  
1120 agendas. So I'm very excited about this particular panel because I have been thinking about this  
1121 very question within the context of Haiti post-January 12 and, in particular, the plethora of  
1122 humanitarian aid organizations who indeed have political and religious agendas in their  
1123 approach.

1124

1125 We have four panelists, and I will introduce them briefly. William Headley, who is the Dean of  
1126 the Joan Krok School of Peace Studies at the University of San Diego, Mae Cannon who is  
1127 Senior Director of Advocacy and Outreach for Worldvision, and Dwight Hopkins who is both  
1128 professor at the divinity school at the University of Chicago and founder of International  
1129 Association for Black Religions and Spiritualities, and finally Karel Zalenka who is the country  
1130 representative for South Africa at Catholic Relief Services. So we will start with Mae Cannon.

1131

1132 **Mae Cannon:** Well, I'm happy to jump in ... My name is Mae Cannon. I'm here on behalf of  
1133 Worldvision, which is the world's largest Christian humanitarian organization. We work in one  
1134 hundred countries around the world, and my work focuses primarily in the Middle East. This  
1135 question of what is the role of religious institutions in supporting humanitarian activities ... is a  
1136 very important one. I work for a Christian institution, and I also work for a humanitarian  
1137 organization. So I hope the answer to this question is that they're absolutely necessary and that  
1138 they play a very important role.

1139

1140 I have three primary points in the few minutes that we have about this question of the role of  
1141 religious institutions. One is as a Christian organization, and I think this is true regardless of the  
1142 faith of a religious institution, our theology undergirds our work. So our theology provides the  
1143 foundation for why we do what we do. It helps shape what we do, and it also shapes how we do  
1144 it. From a Christian perspective, our theology is based on the scriptures and what the Bible has to  
1145 say about God's concern for the world, God's care for the poor. And I would call attention to

1146 passages such as Matthew 25 in which Jesus says, “whatever you do unto the least of these you  
1147 do unto me” or Isaiah 58 ... that talks about God's heart for justice. So as a religious institution  
1148 our theology plays a significant role in shaping the work that we do. I also think it's vitally  
1149 important that we partner with religious institutions, particularly indigenous ones in the regions  
1150 where we work. These institutions play a significant role in identifying the need. They also play  
1151 an important role in mutual accountability, and they help shape the way that we do the work in  
1152 different contexts around the world. And this model of partnership is vital for us to be successful  
1153 and to not continue mechanisms of Western imperialism or colonialism where the developing  
1154 countries are doing work on the ground without taking direction and guidance from the  
1155 indigenous community in terms of how that work is done. And then also... humanitarian  
1156 activities need support and financial undergirding, and one of the main roles that religious  
1157 institutions play is by providing that support mechanism. So for Worldvision, for example, our  
1158 primary constituents are the American church. We work with 15,000 churches across the US.  
1159 And that work, we hope, promotes an idea of holistic engagement, spiritual formation, and  
1160 relationship building with partners that we have around the world. But then of course there's this  
1161 financial component where they are the primary supports for the work that we do.

1162  
1163 My last two comments in this regard in terms of the importance of religious institutions – I think  
1164 one of the great, great benefits of religious institutions engaging in humanitarian work is the fact  
1165 that there is great conviction and motivation for the work that we do – that the work that we do is  
1166 not just a vocation or a job, it's what we believe is the heart of our purpose in the world. And so  
1167 we are passionate about what we do. That can be for good and for naught, but we have great  
1168 conviction in the work which I think is a great strength. And that could mobilize people to  
1169 engage in responding to needs and to engage in activities of justice. One of the challenges that I  
1170 would encourage us to consider as a possible pitfall is what I would call this notion of  
1171 theological imperialism, where sometimes our religious beliefs and convictions can get in the  
1172 way and can cause mechanisms that are not the most effective in terms of our work on the  
1173 ground. And so I certainly think that that's something that I'm sure we'll discuss as we further  
1174 engage in this conversation. Thank you

1175

1176 **William Headley:** Thanks very much. I'm really a hangover from the previous question, namely  
1177 the broader one, "transformation of the role religious institutions played in civil society." The  
1178 December 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2011 edition of the Economist carried a briefing entitled, "Africa's hopeful  
1179 economics." A fairly reliable repository of economic information, the magazine gave an upbeat,  
1180 if cautionary, picture of Africa's growth. And buried beneath this in the article itself is a sheepish  
1181 apologetic note for labeling Africa "a hopeless continent." I'd like to go to a second point, which  
1182 is basically that ... despite the predictions of its demise, religion has experienced a phenomenal  
1183 growth in the South, more specifically in Africa in the last forty years. I'd like then to turn to the  
1184 Catholic Church. Here is a notable example of this – borrowing from the work of Toft's *God's*  
1185 *Century*, I further note that political theology, that's a refinement of Mae's remark about  
1186 theology, is a set of ideas that a religious community holds about political authority and justice  
1187 of a certain religious body as well as its religious independence – that is, where religion and state  
1188 enjoy substantially separate spheres of authority for a given government, enabling it to become a  
1189 transformative religious actor. Toft calls this "militant for peace and justice." I turn to the  
1190 Catholic Church and rely on the work of John Allen in his work "Future Church" to trace some  
1191 of the characteristics of the emerging Catholic Church in the future to suggest that it will in fact  
1192 be possibly one of those transformative groups. And there's three characteristics, and they all  
1193 address the question of the role of religion in the recent socio-economic political transformation.  
1194 First of all, the Catholic Church – and I could think that things could be said of other Christian  
1195 churches – is morally conservative and politically liberal. That liberal/conservative taxonomy is  
1196 a shift in our normal understanding of those. Southern Catholics, that is to say Africans, typically  
1197 hold conservative attitudes on questions such as abortion, homosexuality, and the family. And  
1198 yet when you enter into the realm of economics, politics, and military they are remarkably  
1199 liberal. To be very specific, they would be liberal on such questions as being skeptical of  
1200 capitalism and globalization, wary about the global influence of the US, they would be more pro-  
1201 Palestinian and by implications somewhat critical of Israel and so on it goes. The second point  
1202 that I would make in these characteristics is Catholicism – again this could be said of Christianity  
1203 – plays a strongly political role. In non-Western societies, religious bodies sometimes are the  
1204 only meaningful expressions of the discontents of civil society. With it and through it, protest  
1205 can take shape. Concern for the common good can be articulated. And finally, the third  
1206 characteristic I'd like to draw attention to is that the African Catholic Church's concern for the

1207 ad-intra is moving to the ad-extra, that is to say, the ad-intra refers in this instance to the internal  
1208 life of the church, ad-extra means engagement with the broader social questions of concern to  
1209 civil society. It's argued that the Southern, that is to say the African Church in this context, is  
1210 more focused on the ad-extra issues. Peter Fen, an Asian theologian at Georgetown University,  
1211 captures this transition well, even though he's speaking about Asia, it applies to ... other areas of  
1212 the South. He says conspicuous absence on the part of these theologians on the Western  
1213 theological preoccupations – such as papal primacy and fallibility of the Roman curia, Episcopal  
1214 collegiality – he said they're not concerned about any of that. What they're really focused on is  
1215 the kind of things that concern them – the alleviation of poverty and the relationship with Islam.  
1216 Finally, Peter Berger says that no important social phenomenon ever has just a single cause. I  
1217 will follow his advice and not try to argue, as I'm not here, one-to-one or cause-effect  
1218 relationship to the phenomenal growth of religion or the Catholic Church in Africa and its  
1219 transformation. But I do note that ... as the church has grown and religion has grown in Africa,  
1220 so also have the schools and universities, clinics and hospitals, as well as religious training  
1221 centers [indistinct 2 or 3 words.] I look forward to a sabbatical where I'll be able to look into this  
1222 more carefully.

1223

1224 **Dwight Hopkins:** Thank you. We're going to talk about the role of religious institutions in  
1225 supporting humanitarian activities. I didn't mention, but I'm a founder of something called “the  
1226 International Association of Black Religions and Spiritualities” which is comprised of 14  
1227 countries, Australia, the aboriginal Australians, Dahlites in India, Burackamin in Japan, Native  
1228 Hawaiians (we consider Hawaii an oppressed, colonized nation), Fiji, Brazil, Afro-Brazilians,  
1229 Jamaicans, Afro-Cubans, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Ghana, the USA, and blacks in  
1230 England. So we pretty much have Africa, Asia, Latin America, Caribbean, and Western Europe,  
1231 and are looking to expand beyond those regions and even those countries. The theme of the  
1232 group “Another World Is Possible.” What we have done is to create a network of networks, it's  
1233 not an organization. So we have two delegates from each country and every level of the group –  
1234 committees, chair, coordinators [are] half men and half women. So we don't go by quorum. We  
1235 say, do we have half men and half women, and then we can proceed.

1236



1237 The programmatic work of the group focuses on two things, primarily youth/student exchanges.  
1238 So we take youth and students from the network countries and fly them to other countries so that  
1239 they can see that another world is possible. So we may take Dahlites from India, and they'll go to  
1240 visit native Hawaiians. Or we make take Ghana or Botswana youth and students and have them  
1241 go to Fiji or UK. We've had people come from Zimbabwe – students who had never left their  
1242 country – and come to the US. We want to focus on young people ages 18 to 30, and students  
1243 and youth because they're the future of their countries, and they're the future of what a positive  
1244 globalization could be about. And so the question of religious institutions would primarily be  
1245 religious/spiritualities because we both include those who are Christian, Islam, but also the  
1246 various indigenous forms of spirituality in their countries, for instance Dahlit spirituality,  
1247 aboriginal sp, African traditional sp, etc. So it's “both/and” that is both spirituality and organized  
1248 religious institutions. In supporting humanitarian activities, the primary ways to focus it, there  
1249 are lots of ways to do it, and we are all doing good stuff around the table as we've heard. And I'm  
1250 sure we'll hear more of. But we are specifically focusing on youth and students, education  
1251 broadly construed, both in terms of taking classes in the countries they go to, more specifically  
1252 letting them be young people in another context. For example, ... the youth student delegation  
1253 has to be youth and student, male and female that go to other countries. So we've hosted, for  
1254 example in Chicago, the male and female youth/student [delegation] from Zimbabwe. They  
1255 attended classes, they went to different institutions, they went to the Bulls games, they went to  
1256 see a state representative from Springfield, they went to the only hip-hop church I know in the  
1257 US, at least in Illinois. It's called “the house.” It's literally a hip-hop church. And the pastor is  
1258 ordained, and they meet and it's a hell of a way to do church. It's another way of doing church.  
1259 But the point is, we let them be young people. So we also have serious engagement where they  
1260 can share their experiences with young people from the US, what does it mean to be youth and  
1261 student in Zimbabwe. And what happen is we are networking networks on top of networks.  
1262 Again, we are not an organization per se, but we're a network of networks. So this one concrete  
1263 example that we've developed to show how religious institutions ... support humanitarian  
1264 activities. ...  
1265  
1266 The second focus is women's advocacy. So we've have women from Botswana go to Brazil and  
1267 Jamaica and do advocacy on the part of women. We've found in dealing with the different

1268 leaders who are part of the 14 country network that particularly in the South, but also in the  
1269 North – the USA and UK – that when they touch the woman, they touch the whole culture in the  
1270 society. And so we felt we need to lift up and highlight, along with youth and students who are  
1271 the future leaders of the globe, network them together, but also talk about the level of culture in  
1272 the entire society that many women play in these countries. So for example, we had a woman  
1273 from Botswana who focuses on HIV/AIDS. She went to our two countries in Jamaica and Brazil,  
1274 and she did workshops. She met with national leaders... health leaders ... women's groups ...  
1275 youth and students. She taught class, did media, etc. And in Brazil, similar pattern. And ... as a  
1276 result of her meeting there in Brazil, a lot of the Afro Brazilian women [started] a group, a  
1277 network of their own because they could see another world is possible... So those are some  
1278 concrete examples of what we're talking about.

1279  
1280 Basically what we are trying to do is to build another world by laying the seeds primarily  
1281 through youth and students, but also with women's advocacy. And, again, we see a lot of  
1282 different international organizations doing great work, that's why we wanted a network, not an  
1283 organization. You have the World council of Churches and various other bodies like the World  
1284 Alliance of Reformed Churches which has changed its name ... We have the ... Council and  
1285 Parliament of World Religions whose global criteria for membership is to give a gift. We have  
1286 ecumenical associations that are all theologians, such as Liberation group. We can go on and on.  
1287 Rosalind is the chair of an international academic group. So we didn't want to start an  
1288 organization. We wanted to say everybody's doing great work. Keep doing what we're doing. ...  
1289 But how do we network the existing network, not to reinvent the wheel, but how do we put  
1290 people together, provide some resources, particularly on another world is possible and let the  
1291 youth and students see this and also give some extra support to women. We are funded by the  
1292 Ford Foundation, and we ... founded the group in January ... I was doing work before then, but  
1293 we founded the group in January 2006 in Capetown South Africa. So we are a new network and  
1294 still doing fundraising as you can imagine.

1295  
1296 We have produced a book. The book is called “Another World Is Possible,” and it's co-edited by  
1297 myself and Margie Lewis who is the first ... woman president of the United Theological College  
1298 of the West Indies in Jamaica... And we are working on a second book now called, “New

1299 Missions, New Arrival.” That is, how do people go to another country and not bring their  
1300 religion, but learn from the people that already exist there. Obviously in the real world it's a  
1301 both/and, but we want to make the point that is it possible for us to go to different places and not  
1302 bring religion and see if we can be missionized or be influenced by the local people there. So we  
1303 will see what happens with that. That book is being coedited by Ann Pattel Grave, an Australian  
1304 aboriginal, and Dr. James Massie who is a Dalit from India. Thank you.

1305

1306 **Karel Zalenka:** Thank you. You've heard the presentation of Mae and she has mentioned many  
1307 things that are applicable to most religious institutions, but particularly faith-based organizations.  
1308 She mentioned the motivation that is based on the foundations of the individual organizations'  
1309 religious institutions. In other words, it's the gospel, at least for us Christians. It's the gospel of  
1310 Jesus. She mentioned the trust the faith-based organizations enjoy in terms of their work,  
1311 motivation, and in a way fund raising efforts. And the ecumenical cooperation that exists across  
1312 a number of the faith-based organizations. So I'd like to concentrate more on practical aspects of  
1313 the support of religious institutions for humanitarian activities, and let me define at least the way  
1314 I understand humanitarian activities. They are basically emergency response as opposed to long-  
1315 term development and strengthening of partners and so forth.

1316

1317 So what are the ... pluses of faith-based organizations that are basically arms of individual  
1318 religions? I would mention the most important one, and let's start with the local communities  
1319 where the emergency situation occurs. The religious institutions, and in this case I will talk  
1320 particularly about [the] Catholic Church, they have a more or less global presence. So what it  
1321 implies is that they understand the local environment. They understand the local leaders. They  
1322 are familiar with the most vulnerable people. And so it's much easier to support them in  
1323 responding, and this is a key. In other words, it's the community participation and response. It's  
1324 not really coming from outside. It is their effort that is supported by the mostly-international  
1325 faith-based organizations. What it also means if you are local [is] that you are very much  
1326 interested in a longer term impact of the assistance, and this is I would say in contrast to most so-  
1327 called NGOs or secular NGOs who basically are parachuted into conflict or disaster situations, as  
1328 long as there is funding. But they have no local roots. They very often do not understand the  
1329 local situation, but the religious institutions that have been present before ... work during the

1330 emergency and they will live in those communities after these emergency situations. They are  
1331 very much interested in sustainability of these efforts. And they are very much interested in  
1332 what's normally called “do no harm” behavior. In other words, not to exacerbate potential  
1333 conflict arising from the emergencies, and there may be a great variety of them in both man-  
1334 made and natural disasters. So ... that's the local situation.

1335  
1336 The second great feature of religious institutions is that most of them are transnational, and some  
1337 of them are global. And so in case of a major emergency – and major emergency's definition ...  
1338 is that it's a situation with which the local population, the local organizations or even the  
1339 government, cannot cope and they need outside assistance. So in this situation the transnational  
1340 organizations have a big advantage of drawing on resources from the whole network, from the  
1341 whole international system. And in the case of [the] Catholic Church, which is often called [a]  
1342 universal Church, it's a huge advantage because the assistance can be, or the resources (not only  
1343 financial and material, but also human resources), are drawn from the whole church or from the  
1344 universal church all the way up to the Vatican. And you might have heard about the popes', the  
1345 holy fathers', response to major emergencies. It's invariably ... financial contribution, but there is  
1346 always a message of solidarity and expression of interest and sympathy. So that's the  
1347 transnational character of the religious institutions intervening in humanitarian responses. And  
1348 then there is another advantage in fund raising, and that relates to the respect and trust that the  
1349 faith-based organization enjoys because they, by definition, because of their perceived moral  
1350 principles they are also more trusted in terms of accountability and doing a good job. In other  
1351 words, using the resources to the purposes that have been stated.

1352  
1353 Now I would also like to mention ... some of the negative aspects of religion playing a role in  
1354 emergency response. And the number one issue that I have encountered on many occasions is  
1355 access. If you are in a man-made disaster – in other words, conflict, war, civil wars – that can be  
1356 a problem because [it] depends on what side of the conflict you stand... That can be an issue, and  
1357 I could quote the example of the break-up of Yugoslavia where there were tremendous problems  
1358 because basically it broke down into three religions. Well, I should say two, but the Christians  
1359 were divided into Orthodox and Catholic. And Muslims, or Bosnians. In a way it was a  
1360 misnomer because ... [changes topic] the religious institutions providing assistance may

1361 encounter difficulties in terms of access. And then there is a question of their motivation. Why  
1362 would they be assisting the parties to the conflict regardless of their creed? For example, CRS  
1363 would be assisting Orthodox Serbs or the Muslims on the Bosnian side. So there's a lot of  
1364 questioning and explanation. And in some countries, at least based on my experience, even if you  
1365 present very strong arguments why you assist people on the basis of need and not creed you don't  
1366 succeed. It depends on the level of sophistication and level of education of your counterparts, but  
1367 sometimes it's very difficult. And I can give you an example from West Darfur where I actually,  
1368 in early 2005, set up the CRS emergency operation and dealing with the famous humanitarian  
1369 assistance department or hut in Khartoum. Just to get permits to work in Darfur was an enormous  
1370 task – explanation after explanation because motivation like helping people based on your  
1371 personal convictions, helping basically your brothers and sisters in need, doesn't count. So that  
1372 would be one – the access issue that is very closely linked particularly in countries where [the]  
1373 Islamic population is proselytization.

1374

1375 Then it's an issue of inclusiveness. And it relates to the ... motivation by certain types of  
1376 religions would be trying to help another needy people from another religion. Then there is a  
1377 competition for resources. And that applies not only for faith-based organizations, but also for  
1378 the secular organizations. The competition is becoming much more difficult because the  
1379 resources are declining. Well in a number of others [points] – subsidiarity is a big issue in  
1380 humanitarian assistance. And then the most important ... for particularly the graduate students is  
1381 to remember that the ultimate objective is to strengthen local partners. Always try to strengthen,  
1382 whether they are secular or religious, so that they can respond better and in a more timely  
1383 manner than the ... international organizations that come more or less as implants for certain  
1384 period of time. And when they leave it's the local organizations that carry the burden and should  
1385 be strengthened by us. Thank you.

1386

1387 **Nadege Clitandre:** So we'll open it up for questions and comments.

1388

1389 **Mark Juergensmeyer:** Mae Cannon talked about the theological imperialism and then Dwight  
1390 closed his comments talking about the need to be open to other religious perspectives. Isn't really

1391 hard to do, particularly if you have an evangelical background. How do you even recognize  
1392 when you're doing it? And how do you train people for such a task?

1393

1394 **Rosalind Hackett:** I had a question to the panel, but Dwight and Karel have really answered it.  
1395 So let me just ask Mae to say more about it. And that is talking more about how you create  
1396 agency among local partners (sustainability) rather than dependency... In the Case of Northern  
1397 Uganda, at the peak of the war, there were more international agencies there ... per square mile  
1398 than anywhere else in the world. And a recent book by Adam Branch is very critical and very  
1399 revealing of the failure of many of these interventions and the resentment on the part of the local  
1400 people, local actors. So can you say something about the ... self-critiques that you have and  
1401 whether those have evolved over time?

1402

1403 **Jeffrey Haynes:** I'd like to address Karel briefly and [indistinct] something that Mae said. This  
1404 issue of access, I think is really crucial. And it's a useful word in a sense because if you want to  
1405 give humanitarian assistance or indeed development assistance as a wider, more lengthy process,  
1406 you need to get to people that ... have a need which you can fulfill. I think it's very interesting  
1407 when you mention about the context of the Balkans and the conflict there in the 90's, and the way  
1408 that people would not have chiefly a concern with need as you say creed was a ... So my  
1409 question is a simple one – how do you get over that? Is it possible? And is it highly problematic?  
1410 And link that specifically to what [indistinct] does because if you're linked to a Christian or a  
1411 Muslim or another faith explicitly, how do you get to the others that need your assistance? How  
1412 do you overcome their suspicion, and so on? For both of you. Thank you.

1413

1414 **Jacob Olupona:** My comment is for Dwight. First of all let me thank you that you have found  
1415 very creative ways of using your time, [indistinct]... The association is called International  
1416 Association for Black Religion and Spirituality. Yet I am so happy that you have reached out to  
1417 different kinds of countries and places and people. How do they define their own identity vis-a-  
1418 vis your label? I'm very much interested in that. One of the fascinating things about your project  
1419 is (unfortunately that I have to come here to learn about it, and I thank Mark for that) that you  
1420 have created a forum for having a conversation that ... is not just scholarly (part of it is very  
1421 scholarly) but very practical. Our seminarians today are challenged to create students who are

1422 doing all these degree programs but who have to make sure that they are able to relate it the  
1423 larger issues out there – without naturally going to, say, business school or [indistinct school].  
1424 But [they] are relating theology to issues of health and poverty and so on. I'm not sure you're  
1425 thinking about it, but this is actually what is going on here. Thank you.

1426  
1427 **Robert Dowd:** Thank you... I'll make this very quick. One thing that I've just been thinking  
1428 about concerns what we might call a moral hazard, and this may concern something that might  
1429 be more appropriately called development assistance than humanitarian assistance. But it's a  
1430 question – “Do we think that religious institutions and faith-based organizations are subject less  
1431 to a moral hazard than secular NGOs in achieving outcomes?” ... Whether the outcomes concern  
1432 health ... or the promotion of democracy or human rights, if an organization is founded  
1433 especially to achieve a certain end, there's a moral hazard, right? They exist because this problem  
1434 exists. It seems to me that one of the distinguishing characteristics of a faith-based organization  
1435 or a religious institution is that they exist for reasons that transcend a particular problem – they  
1436 exist ... to achieve certain spiritual ends or religious ends. But they might also be devoted to  
1437 achieving human rights or to ... promote democracy or to achieve certain health outcomes. So I  
1438 guess I'm just wondering whether we think that faith-based organizations or religious institutions  
1439 might be more effective at achieving those outcomes because they exist for a reason that  
1440 transcends achieving those outcomes.

1441  
1442 **Mae Cannon:** So I'll try to be concise in responding to just a couple of these questions. One, to  
1443 the question of isn't that hard to do – this notion of theological imperialism and how our religious  
1444 beliefs can sometimes limit our ability to be effective on the ground. I think several quick points  
1445 in that regard – I think two things are critically important for religious organizations that are  
1446 doing development work. One is this aspect of theology which I discussed and this other  
1447 component is this idea of a historical understanding.

1448  
1449 So a lot of my work has focused on domestic social reform and the role of the Christian  
1450 community in the civil rights movement. And I've had the great privilege of partnering on the  
1451 ground here in the US following this notion which is an African notion of “sankofa” which is  
1452 this idea in history that we look at the past in order to be able to move forward into the future.

1453 And so if we have an understanding of ways that we have not worked effectively in the past, an  
1454 appropriate relationship and wrestling with that ... helps our ability to be able to check the way  
1455 that we're moving forward into the future. And that can express itself in terms of our spiritual  
1456 connection with God and the process of spiritual formation. My most recent book is on spiritual  
1457 formation and the integration of our relationship with God in justice oriented movements. I think  
1458 that that needs to express itself in humility – that we have a lot to learn and often we don't get  
1459 this right. So that also leads to the notion of repentance – that when we don't do it well[that] as a  
1460 Christian organization specifically, we want to have a posture of being able to ask for  
1461 forgiveness and to seek to correct the things that we have not done effectively.

1462  
1463 In terms of the second question about creating agency ... and sustainability rather than  
1464 dependence, I think that's a critical and very important question. Worldvision shifted our models  
1465 in 1999. Prior to that, we were funding local, indigenous communities, and we found that we  
1466 were really creating a culture of dependence. And so we shifted toward what we would consider  
1467 a more holistic model called area development programs or projects ADPs which are short-term.  
1468 So they have a very strict time-line associated with them and the whole purpose is to empower  
1469 the community to be sustainable through five aspects of development. We work with water and  
1470 health and education. We do economic development ... [and food.] And so that's certainly a  
1471 question that we ask ourselves regularly about how to not create a culture of dependency. And  
1472 the third question about overcoming suspicions – my work focuses specifically in Israel and the  
1473 Palestinian territories. We've been at work there since 1975 and interestingly, the recipients of  
1474 our work on the ground, the vast majority are Muslim. And when we shifted to the ADP model,  
1475 one of our core tenets is, wherever there is the most need is where we would be engaged the most  
1476 significantly. And so only one of our 15 ADPs in that region are in a Christian community. So  
1477 we work ... very closely with the Islamic community. And they have asked us why we are not  
1478 doing ore for the Christian community in Palestine. So we have found that the issue of building  
1479 trust at least in that context [...] we've been there a long time. We've partnered with the  
1480 indigenous community and we really work collaboratively in an interfaith way on the ground in  
1481 that specific region.

1482  
1483 **Dwight Hopkins:** In terms of the question of how to be open to other religions, in our case



1484 we're not denominationally-based or spiritually-based in a particular institution, but what holds  
1485 us together is the vision. So it's the question of the larger vision. And so whoever comes from  
1486 any specific religion or spirituality or self-cultivation practice that has transcendence to that self-  
1487 cultivation practice can buy into the vision. Obviously there are Christians involved, but there are  
1488 other types of indigenous spiritualities and also Islam. So again, what's the vision? The vision is  
1489 that we ... believe that another world is possible. That's really the basic driving motivation. And  
1490 then, how do we draw on the particularities and strengths – noticing the challenges of our own  
1491 religions, spiritualities, and self-cultivation practices. So we don't debate doctrine or creed. We  
1492 don't debate them, but people talk about them in our meeting in the work they do. But as far as  
1493 our network goes, it's the vision. So anybody in the world who feels another world is possible.  
1494 Who feel that youth and students are key to this, who support women's equality and 50%  
1495 representation – women hold up half the sky – at least those two basic things are open to do it.  
1496 We've had discussion on how to talk about doctrines, but it's ... sort of a secondary move in our  
1497 network because ... we may have worship, we may not have worship or anything like that. And  
1498 it holds together well.

1499  
1500 The other thing about how to be open to other religion, I hand chose each of the representatives  
1501 from the countries – people I've known since probably ... 1981. So they're people I've brought  
1502 into the group who I knew, and we trusted each other. And for us, the issues of doctrine and  
1503 debates and institutions were never the key issues. It's always about justice and love and  
1504 compassion throughout the last 20 or 30 years. And that's gone into ... from my own  
1505 perspectives, I'm ordained Protestant Christian, but my overall view is ... G O D is B I G. So  
1506 that's what I believe, basically. And no one has a purchase on that B I G of the G O D. And so  
1507 sort of live that lifestyle in this network, and I think people are very comfortable with that. So far  
1508 we started January 2006, and we haven't had any big fractures or debates over doctrines or  
1509 anything like that. So people are excited about the vision. And then they can talk about how their  
1510 particularities of religions and spirituality feed into that. That's the question. If we're going to talk  
1511 about Jesus, we're gonna talk about Muhammad, we're going to talk about Tao, we're gonna talk  
1512 about various spiritualities – Hawaiian, Dalits', aboriginal – how do ... all these things feed into  
1513 the vision?

1514

1515 Just quickly on Jacob's question – basically I use this “black” to get funding from Ford... And I  
1516 basically built ... an initial foundation proposal to visit all the countries. So I spent two to three  
1517 weeks in all the countries. It was a heck of an educational process, in mainly the rural areas of all  
1518 these countries. And so I said I'll go talk to people. And I thought two major people who might  
1519 struggle against “black” – because I wanted to change it. It was just a way to get the money  
1520 initially – would be the Australian aboriginals and the Dalits in India, but they were the two  
1521 strongest to keep it. And it was very interesting. When I was in Australia, at least in the rural  
1522 areas, they say black all the time, like “black mob” ... and some of these people look Italian and  
1523 Greek and ... they were black aboriginals. In the US they would be Italian or Greek. And so to in  
1524 India they said, domestically caste, but globally we go with race. For example, we went to the  
1525 conference in Durbin. So actually ... we just had a global meeting in May at the University of  
1526 Chicago Divinity School in 2011. And I again raised changing the name, but I got voted down...  
1527

1528 **William Headley:** I know we're rushing. I'll try to address Jeff's question about access a little  
1529 bit. Just one simple strategy sometimes is to get closer to what the objection is and to get more  
1530 precise about that. An example illustrates that. During ... the tsunami, we were having resistance  
1531 from the Islamic schools that we know had absorbed lots of orphan children. They would not  
1532 accept CRS food at that stage. We got a little closer to it, just talked calmly on the side – had  
1533 some tea together. We realized what they didn't like is CRS trucks rolling up with the big  
1534 “Catholic Relief Service” sign on the outside and taking the food out of the truck for them. But if  
1535 you came at night without the signs, they certainly needed the food and that worked fine. I  
1536 shouldn't tell this, but CRS is not paying my salary anymore so I can tell it. In that same context,  
1537 we were driving past a mosque which they had just repaired, very contrary to what they typically  
1538 do. And one of their gleeful employees said we're going to put up a big sign that says “rebuilt by  
1539 Catholic Relief Services.” I said, I don't think you want to do that.

1540  
1541 I want to address Bob's question just briefly about the moral hazard. I thought it was really good.  
1542 I think Karel gave a bit of an answer to that when he said they're on the ground ... They have to  
1543 be very much involved in the Catholic Church, to just give one example. Which is to say that  
1544 they're all involved with the cultic, the creed, the code part of all that. I think the problem comes  
1545 out on the other side of that. Which is to say, they can become so embedded that they can't hear

1546 the problem when it comes along. This happens in many denominations where they're so  
1547 engrossed and involved sometimes, in bed if you will, with the local government that they cannot  
1548 hear the problem when it comes. We see that more in justice questions, perhaps, than in peace  
1549 questions.

1550

1551 **Karel Zelenka:** I will also talk about access because of the question. Yes, it's an extremely  
1552 important question, particularly man-made conflicts. In the Aceh tsunami, it's different. It's a  
1553 natural disaster, so it's easier to negotiate. In man-made conflicts, sometimes you don't succeed.  
1554 And I'll give you three examples ... from my experience. One from Bosnia-Herzegovina. The  
1555 other is from the other side, from ... Serbia... and then Sudan.

1556

1557 In Bosnia, the issues were religious, although you will hear and read in various books and media  
1558 about the origins of the conflict or roots of the conflict as being political, economic. Yes, some of  
1559 it. But basically it broke down into three distinct religious groups. And they were fighting each  
1560 other. And the ethnic cleansing had nothing to do with economy or power. It had to do with  
1561 ethnicity... I'm sorry to say that, although I work for CRS, the biggest resistance came to us from  
1562 Catholics in Bosnia-Herzegovina when we were trying to supply the besieged Sarajevo. We had  
1563 to have convoys coming from Croatia, which is Catholic, but across the parts of Herzegovina  
1564 which is very conservative part of the country. And it's heavily Catholic, exclusively Catholic.  
1565 And they were the ones who objected most to our transiting the convoys. So despite negotiations  
1566 ... well the negotiations resulted basically 50-50 – you give us 50% of what you bring up. And  
1567 since our relief supplies came from the US government, we simply could not do this kind of a  
1568 deal. So there was no deal whatsoever.

1569

1570 Second, in terms of Sarajevo and also sorry to say that the UN that were a big player in the  
1571 whole war theater were not helpful and basically went along with the Serbs who had a dominant  
1572 position in that particular time. And whatever you would bring on an airlift to Sarajevo, 50% was  
1573 immediately taken to the Serb side, regardless the population's size. And on top of that, the  
1574 organizations like CRS and others ... who operated in the area in that time... had to submit  
1575 detailed distribution plans for all the relief supplies while the Serb side did not have to supply  
1576 anything. In other words, there was no certainty that the relief material didn't go to the military.

1577 But that's unfortunately ... beyond our control, and it was in the realm of the United Nations. So  
1578 what I want to say, sometimes you succeed, sometimes not. Or, when you have private supplies  
1579 like we had on the airlifts to Sarajevo, you take a loss and you prefer to deliver at least half of it  
1580 at least something rather than nothing. In the case of Yugoslavia which was related there were  
1581 Catholic communities that were stuck in the middle of Serbia during the conflict. And obviously  
1582 they were subject to a lot of abuse. And so we worked closely with the International Orthodox  
1583 [Christian] Charities NGO. And basically it was a mutual agreement that we would ... provide  
1584 items to IOCC, and they would deliver them within Serbia while CRS would then take care of  
1585 the pockets of Serbs in Croatia.

1586

1587 In [the] case of Sudan ... I mentioned the Darfur situation, and we had real problems. And there  
1588 are absolutely no Catholics in Sudan. It's a sharia state. There is a Catholic Church, and we work  
1589 through them. There is a bishop's conference. There is caritas. But there are no ... Christians. But  
1590 we ... set up operation, and in terms of access we had difficulties going to certain communities.  
1591 You might have heard about Janjaweed, which basically translates into "devil on a horse," and  
1592 they were the ones who basically were limiting the access. And so as we were more-or-less  
1593 stuck, and we knew that there was [a] really starving population. So what I did one day when  
1594 they were - I should not say attacking - but the local population, whenever they [janjaweed]  
1595 would be approaching - and you saw them because they were on horses - the local population  
1596 absolutely no horses. So I was waiting for them, although the local population disappeared  
1597 because they were scared to death. So we negotiated with them, and they turn out to be quite ...  
1598 they had a reason. They said ... "you come and see our villages, our communities. We have  
1599 absolutely nothing." So I actually went with them and look[ed]. And I asked to see what they  
1600 had. And they were right. They had absolutely nothing - nothing to eat, nothing basically to live  
1601 on. So what we did then was the agreement of USAID. We then decided to, on the way, we  
1602 would always drop off [a] certain amount of supplies to them. And access was negotiated. So  
1603 that's basically ... every situation is different in a man-made disaster. And you have to really go  
1604 ... basically you have to negotiate each case separately, and it differs from the previous one.

1605 Thanks

1606

1607 **Steve Eskow:** Several of the recent comments suggest the question and a comment to you,

1608 Karel. You spoke about emergencies and external humanitarian organizations somewhat  
1609 negatively – that they don't understand the local situation – they're parachuted in and so on.  
1610 Might the reverse be true? Might the fact that the institutionalized churches have become so  
1611 familiar with the local milieu and the local issues and so accepting of them that they need new  
1612 insights, new partnerships, with the USAID or with secular organizations that might bring  
1613 information about the new technologies, for example, and how they might make a difference in  
1614 the African economy? Is there another side to the business of the relationship of the secular  
1615 humanitarian organizations to the religious organizations that are established in those local  
1616 communities?

1617  
1618 **Thomas Tighe:** Thank you. I guess one of the questions that I had for you ... its framed as  
1619 “what role do religious institutions play in supporting humanitarian activities?” And I think the  
1620 flip-side is true too, what role do humanitarian organizations play in supporting or advancing  
1621 religious activities, whether witting or unwitting? And why? Because I think there's, for some ...  
1622 achieving humanitarian objective is the end unto itself, like our organization which is either all  
1623 faith or secular depending on how you characterize it. We work with everybody. But that's good  
1624 enough. But the dilemma ... that arises is that if the Catholics are the best fundraisers, but the  
1625 Muslims are actually the best providers of the humanitarian objectives, would you ever just give  
1626 the money directly to a local group? And the answer is obviously “no.” ... But they don't do that.  
1627 So I think there is another driving element beyond the stated humanitarian objectives because  
1628 you see this all the time. And I think therein the tension arises – what's the end? And what's for  
1629 some ... it's at least perceived or logically a means to a larger end. And I think therein the  
1630 dilemma arises.

1631  
1632 **Karel Zelenka:** Maybe I can take this question first. Actually, it's maybe a misunderstanding or  
1633 lack of information, but I can tell you that CRS works very closely with a number of Islamic  
1634 organizations and there is a direct transfer of money both ways. I can quote Islamic Relief from  
1635 the UK which is very famous and CRS has been working [with] them in many countries of the  
1636 world, and there are cash transfers. I personally have worked with a number of organizations in  
1637 [the] Middle East, Islamic organizations, and we've never had a problem transferring resources to  
1638 them. Particularly, again, in situations where CRS would not have access or ... CRS is

1639 operation[al] in very few countries of the world. Our main role is to ... work through local  
1640 partners. And although [the] Catholic Church partner would be considered ... as number one or  
1641 key strategic partner, it's not exclusive. And I can tell you, we have a number of partners in most  
1642 countries because ... also in the South, if you look at the globe, most countries where CRS  
1643 operates are where Catholics are ... sometimes a tiny minority. SO we could not really address  
1644 the needs working exclusively with them. So it is mutual, and it depends on trust relations with  
1645 these organizations. So, no, we've never had a problem of this [indistinct.] Now, the capacity of  
1646 them is a different story. If I know and can verify the capacity of the organization, it doesn't  
1647 matter to me whether they are Orthodox ... [or] Muslim ... [or] Hindu as long as they deliver  
1648 and they can account for the resources.

1649  
1650 The second question was ... I don't know if that sort of is but that really is the way and I am sure  
1651 that the other faith based organizations operate in the same way. I've worked very closely with  
1652 so-called ACT. It's basically Protestant churches working together and it's Action by Churches  
1653 Together. Maybe you've heard that abbreviation ACT. And I worked with them in Sudan. We  
1654 worked together in Yugoslavia, and again it's very much [an] open, inclusive environment.

1655  
1656 In terms of the inclusiveness of non-secular organizations, again I feel that ... there is a lack of  
1657 ... up-to-date information, but particularly in Africa the church organizations like caritas or ...  
1658 the other faith based organizations are very much open ... 360 degrees. They try to get as much  
1659 information, knowledge, and use the latest, particularly IT, technology as much as they can. So  
1660 it's not that they would be closed or that the only channel of information would be coming, so to  
1661 speak, from the Vatican. That may be the old days, but I think these days, and particularly South  
1662 Africa you have basically four or five major religions. You have Christians, Muslims, Hindus,  
1663 you have Jews, and you also have a lot of traditional African religions. And when you go to a  
1664 meeting, you need basically all representatives. And they are all treated equally. So it's very  
1665 much open, at least as far as I'm concerned.

1666  
1667 **Mae Cannon:** I think the question of how humanitarian organizations shape religious objectives  
1668 is a very important one. And I think one of the things that we do is we provide the opportunity to  
1669 address what the root causes are of some of the problems we see around the world. And so

1670 advocacy being advocacy in responding to social justice are things that the local church, at least  
1671 from a Christian perspective ... and you had asked, Mark, about the whole evangelical  
1672 engagement with this conversation. Justice, at least in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, from an evangelical  
1673 perspective is a challenging word. And so I think humanitarian organizations can play the role of  
1674 raising awareness, but providing opportunity to see the needs around the world. The opportunity  
1675 to demonstrate what we would believe is God's unconditional love for all people. And so as the  
1676 church seeks to understand the gospel, humanitarian organizations can provide the opportunity  
1677 for the gospel to be lived out in the world, which is certainly our hope as a Christian  
1678 organization.

1679

### 1680 **SESSION 3**

1681

1682 **Juan Campo:** The question that we're pursuing for this session is “How the changing political  
1683 climate influences the work of humanitarian organizations.” And this is a kind of mirror I see as  
1684 to the first session which dealt with how religion was involved with political ... transformations.  
1685 So let's begin with Sarah Blackmun-Eskow ...

1686

1687 **Sarah Blackmun-Eskow:** My work is mainly in Ghana, as you might have gathered, with some  
1688 awareness of what goes on in West Africa in general. And because I'm a doctoral candidate and  
1689 writing my dissertation, I don't have time to pay any attention to the rest of the world, to be frank  
1690 with you. But I can say a couple things about Ghana... The political climate in Ghana, as many of  
1691 you know, is so far steady, unruffled by wars or ethnic controversies. I always say that with  
1692 crossed fingers because you never know. Ghana was fraught with ethnic and other controversies  
1693 until 1992 when they got the new constitution, and presidents actually started to leave office  
1694 when they were supposed to, which I understand in Africa is quite unusual. I think what's  
1695 happening now in Ghana is a little disturbing politically and otherwise, and that is that Ghana has  
1696 the fastest growing economy in the world. It's growing at a rate of seven or eight percent of gross  
1697 national product, and it's a little scary thinking about what will happen to a country with 25  
1698 million citizens in the size of the state of Oregon when suddenly there's money everywhere. Part  
1699 of the reason for money, maybe the main reason for money, is the oil find in the Gulf of Guinea  
1700 and the drilling and pumping that started... The actual getting of oil started last December and

1701 you have to wonder how the politicians and the elite are going to handle this ... it could be a  
1702 curse, as we all know. The mineral curse in Africa is too well known to even really talk about too  
1703 much. But here's a lovely country that could become like the next Nigeria if the politicians don't  
1704 handle the situation gracefully. They're more likely to be graceful there than a lot of other places  
1705 in the world.

1706

1707 Now, I just wanted to mention something that's happening with the churches in Ghana that  
1708 maybe is happening elsewhere in Africa. The Churches have founded an organization that is  
1709 specifically made to put pressure on the government to handle the resources of the country in a  
1710 just and thoughtful and prudent way, which is certainly not happened in Nigeria and some other  
1711 places. Somebody that I know, Emmanuel Marty, who is a pretty well-known theologian here  
1712 and there, is the chair of this new organization, and I know that he's really committed to getting  
1713 churches, his own and others, to press the government for transparency and honesty and  
1714 especially justice to the poorest people in Ghana which touches me because the poorest people  
1715 are women – women in the countryside who have very few avenues to get out of what Jeffrey  
1716 Sax has called the poverty trap...

1717

1718 **Robert Dowd:** Thanks Sarah for getting us off to a great start ... [restates question] ... I've  
1719 interpreted the question to mean faith based humanitarian organizations or religious institutions.  
1720 And of course the answer depends on what we mean by the political climate. What about the  
1721 political climate is changing? Do we mean a change from an authoritarian regime to a more  
1722 democratic regime? Do we mean a political change in a sense that the state is strengthened?  
1723 Those are important questions.

1724

1725 In ... many countries of sub-Saharan Africa, faith based institutions have played a key role in  
1726 service delivery. Someone's already mentioned here that religious institutions have provided in  
1727 sub-Saharan Africa what the State typically provides in the West, anyway, and in parts of Europe  
1728 and in North America. And to a large extent that continues to be true where religious institutions  
1729 are providing health and education services. And the State, as a State strengthens, the big  
1730 question is, will the State displace these institutions? And ... what impact will that have on the



1731 delivery of health and education in these countries? I think that, as we move forward, that's going  
1732 to be a really important question.

1733

1734 When it comes to democratization, we know that there's been a certain degree of democratization  
1735 in certain countries of sub-Saharan Africa. And the question is, how will this affect the role that  
1736 faith based actors play in politics? In the country that I'm familiar with, Kenya, Christian  
1737 churches played, and Islamic institutions played, a very important role in promoting democratic  
1738 change in Kenya. But now that there has been some degree of democratization, we find that these  
1739 religious institutions are backing away from openly engaging in political activities. One Catholic  
1740 bishop told me, "Now there are political parties. We don't need to be as involved as we once  
1741 were. It's the role of political parties to influence government, and it's the role of political parties  
1742 to mobilize people. And we can back out of that and devote ourselves to more explicitly religious  
1743 affairs." So it's kind of interesting that this Catholic bishop was actually seeing a distinction  
1744 between religious affairs and political affairs, or at least overtly political affairs. On the other  
1745 hand there was a referendum recently in Kenya on a new constitution that was passed. And many  
1746 Christian leaders came out against that constitution. Why did they come out against that  
1747 constitution? Because of a couple of elements in it. One having to do with abortion. They  
1748 considered the language to be too open to interpretations that might lead to the legalization of  
1749 abortion. And so they came out against the constitution. Another reason they came out against  
1750 the constitution was because it recognized throughout the country ... Islamic courts which had  
1751 been recognized for sometime especially along the coast of Kenya which is about 95% Muslim  
1752 ... within about 25 miles of Kenya's coast. But the new constitution recognized these courts  
1753 throughout the country and provided some governmental support for these courts. So Christian  
1754 leaders came out against the new constitution because of those two key dimensions. They  
1755 considered them to be key dimensions. But the constitution also called for decentralization of  
1756 political power in Kenya. It called for local elections where there had been none before. It was  
1757 very popular, and Christian leaders put their own credibility on the line when they came out very  
1758 openly and very vocally against the constitution. So it's kind of interesting because it revealed  
1759 that people aren't just taking orders from their religious leaders in Kenya, and it's interesting that  
1760 this political change in Kenya ... we see religious leaders beginning to try to influence politics in  
1761 a different way, in a new way. And of course the big concern in Kenya is that the way that

1762 Christian leaders chose to state their position might create tensions between Christians and  
1763 Muslims in Kenya. So we see that a changing political climate is affecting the behavior of  
1764 religious, leaders, religious actors which in turn can affect interreligious relations. I think I'll just  
1765 leave it there for now and we'll turn it over to ...

1766

1767 **Richard Falk:** Thank you... I wanted to start by just quoting from the beginning of an article in  
1768 *Foreign Affairs* called "On Humanitarianism" written by Michael Walzer, distinguished political  
1769 theorist. And he starts what I found a rather remarkable sentence, two sentences actually,  
1770 "Humanitarianism is probably the most important 'ism' in the world today given the collapse of  
1771 communism, the discrediting of neoliberalism, and the general distrust of large-scale political  
1772 ideologies. Its activists often claim to escape or transcend partisan politics." I don't agree with  
1773 that, but it's a provocative suggestion that I think does touch very centrally the core of this  
1774 question of the changing climate because humanitarianism has become so important in part  
1775 because it's been appropriated for post-Cold War geopolitics. And that has made it very much  
1776 intertwined with some of both the humanitarian catastrophes that have been occurring in the  
1777 Middle East and Africa, but also it embodies the mixed motives that are associated with any  
1778 situation in which there is an important geopolitical dimension. And so humanitarianism  
1779 provides a cover for the exercise of hard power diplomacy. The Iraq war in 2003 was supposed  
1780 to liberate the people of Iraq. The same was more recently the case with regard to Libya. And I  
1781 want to quote one more sentence or two from Michael Walzer's article. And he's talking here  
1782 about the Libyan intervention. He says, "The intervention seems to have prolonged rather than  
1783 stopped the killing which is neither charitable nor just. I doubt that the United States and NATO  
1784 intended to dominate Libya for the sake of its oil, say, which was readily available before the  
1785 intervention. Their motives were and are humanitarian, but not sufficiently shaped by  
1786 considerations of prudence and justice." Now, I wonder ... I would just raise this question about  
1787 the claim to changing climate, is it ever the case that the motives of large states are sufficiently  
1788 pure that one can say that they are just humanitarian? ... It may be true in some disaster relief  
1789 contexts, but in the context where one's addressing a situation where there is conflict on the  
1790 ground and where the foreign policy of major actors, particularly the US, is at stake, if has an  
1791 interest in the outcome of what is taking place internally, in these societies. So I think that the  
1792 changing climate is partly characterized by this developing interplay between what I would call

1793 genuine humanitarianism and geopolitical humanitarianism. Humanitarian assistance activities  
1794 have to take place in that interstitial space between these two kinds of realities.

1795

1796 And this situation, I think, is accentuated in the Middle East by a series of other developments.

1797 One of them is the post-colonial reality that makes societies more and more reluctant to have  
1798 their internal problems solved by outsiders. In other words, I don't think we fully absorb what it  
1799 means to be dealing with a world of independent, sovereign states in the true sense – not just  
1800 formal independence, but existential, essential independence.

1801

1802 A second development ... that's very important in this changing climate is [that] the end of the  
1803 Cold War created a situation where governments and outside forces were not as disposed to  
1804 create strategic alliances based on a bi-polar world setting. They wanted more political  
1805 independence. Turkey is a very good example that was clearly willing to subjugate its foreign  
1806 policy and internal politics to the Cold War dynamics of being on the West. Now that there is not  
1807 Cold War, it's much more interested in being an independent political actor in the region  
1808 pursuing its own goals.

1809

1810 A third crucial development was the Iranian Revolution and its aftermath, which brought to the  
1811 center of both foreign policy objectives of the US (and in a sense of Europe) and the dynamics of  
1812 self-determination the issue of “is it compatible with Western interests and values to allow an  
1813 Islamicly oriented movement and government to emerge as dominant?” And the US never has  
1814 been able to come to terms with the Iranian Revolution and is now at the precipice of something  
1815 worse than the kind of tension that existed all those years. But this plays into the whole attitude  
1816 toward what self-determination means for the societies in the region. And this, of course, was  
1817 accentuated by the 9/11 attacks on the US that's made, to some extent, the region a war-zone in  
1818 the war against terror. Drones attack people in Yemen. So it makes the issue of the role of power  
1819 in relation to these humanitarian issues very prominent.

1820

1821 And then one has the final ... decisive climate-changing development, the Arab Spring itself, and  
1822 the degree to which the sequel to the Arab Spring shows the unexpected strength of Islamic  
1823 internal force partly because they did so well addressing the humanitarian agenda that the

1824 authoritarian, Western-oriented governments had failed to do. And this brings up the tension  
1825 between foreign policy objective in the region (one sees it in relation to Egypt) which are much  
1826 better served if the military stays in power, versus the support for democratic development [and]  
1827 human rights which are better served by respecting the outcome of elections. This tension was  
1828 tested in Gaza when Hamas won the elections... and proposed a ceasefire in the conflict, but are  
1829 continued to be called a terrorist organization because of these wider political developments. I  
1830 could say more, but I am conscious of my minder to my right.

1831

1832 **Juan Campo:** I'm sure there will be more time for conversation.

1833

1834 **Fritz Lampe:** Thank you... My focus as an anthropologist in my research in Kenya is on the  
1835 edges. The community I spend time with is in an area where one mission society made choices  
1836 about who they would evangelize and carved the region so that another mission society would  
1837 evangelize – who could go to the high school? Who could not? Where the borders for what  
1838 became provinces sliced right through the middle of this community. So in my work and what I  
1839 continue to probe are the edges of cosmologies – what does it mean to be human in relation to  
1840 something beyond human in the spirit world? What does it mean to be male? To be female?  
1841 What is status in this changing time and place? ...

1842

1843 In terms of the question ... I like to focus on the local, the specific, the micro. But in terms of the  
1844 question, I'm going to speak very broadly. ... When we think about political climate, we have to  
1845 take seriously the local. We've been talking about geopolitical quite a bit, or regional. ... We  
1846 have to think about the local as well as the regional, national, and international. And when we  
1847 think about the local, and the political of the local, much as in the same way as the place where I  
1848 spend time, we think about the role that education plays in changing, shaping, reshaping the  
1849 local. Who gets educated? How? When? We think about gender and what it means to raise up  
1850 one gender over another or to bring in a notion of what gender is and formulate that. And as a  
1851 third example – the youth – what it means to raise up, build capacity for youth in a society ...  
1852 where youth are not always the political leaders of the area. So I think that those are important.  
1853 That's ... the context of what I want to think about just for a minute. I think we have to pay  
1854 attention to Jacob's comments about the local agents and religious leaders broadly construed.

1855 Where I spend time, we have the public leaders and we have the private leaders. We have the  
1856 diviners and the prophets. We have the priests and then we have those who dispense the herbal  
1857 medications to women whose children are going to die if they don't receive them because of  
1858 witchcraft...

1859  
1860 Jeffrey's questions are still laying out there for all of us to think about, "Can we separate religion  
1861 from the rest of life?" And in the world that I spend time in, the answer is "no." They're very  
1862 much wound up in each other. So how does the political climate influence the work of  
1863 humanitarian organizations? It's embodied in that question of "What is religion? And what does  
1864 it mean to be political in those spaces?" Anthropology today is moving in an interesting direction  
1865 in terms of these questions. In the anthropology of Christianity, where I write, there's a move  
1866 towards engaging the theoretical frameworks of various belief systems of those who come and  
1867 those who embody the faith that's passed on to them. In the same way, people who are doing  
1868 work on the anthropology of development ... are also saying "let's look at the organizations and  
1869 institutions that are coming, providing relief, providing development resources. What is their  
1870 motif? What is their motive? What is it that brings them and carries them forward?" Some of the  
1871 things we talked about in the last session.

1872  
1873 In all of this, finally, as we think about local and global, and we think about political climate, one  
1874 of the questions that I struggle with, and perhaps some of you do, is the question of human rights  
1875 and universal human rights. Can those of us from the West have a sense of what should be  
1876 developed and in what way and by whom? And in doing so are we reflecting something of our  
1877 own cultural bias instead of starting with folk in the local arena. So those are some question ...  
1878 some observations, and I look forward to the conversation.

1879  
1880 **Thomas Tighe:** Thank you. How the changing political climate influences work of  
1881 humanitarian organizations? I'm sensitive to what Fritz just said that looking to the macro, my  
1882 thought is always macro is a bunch of micros stitched together. Santa Barbara's an example. It's  
1883 never been better for philanthropy. We just had a 700 million dollar hospital open. For some  
1884 people it's never been worse in 35 years for the local neighborhood clinics where the poor go.  
1885 That's here, within 10 miles. So these cleavages that you see around the world, I think, reflect to

1886 me an answer to the question and ... I think governments are contracting, not expanding ... for a  
1887 number of reasons. So I think that the social services and humanitarian functions, if you will, the  
1888 combinations of either governments of churches, religious institutions used to provide are going  
1889 to have to be provided by someone differently. And by someone different and differently than  
1890 they have been because the resources are contracting ... It's a dilemma as an NGO to step into a  
1891 gap that you see not being addressed by governments because of their inability or unwillingness  
1892 to do it.

1893

1894 And businesses, which have really attracted talent and gotten better ... at eking out profitability  
1895 in a global market ... they have no business reason to engage in deeply poor areas. You can't  
1896 make a business case for it. If you could, they'd do it and deliver services cheaply and efficiently  
1897 for all those virtues of capitalism. But we look at places and we think "where government is  
1898 contracting and where business is punting, that's where NGO's are probably going to have to be  
1899 because who else is going to be there?" So I think the big challenge looking forward is whether  
1900 organizations (NGOs), whether they have religious motivation and character or not, can perform  
1901 the humanitarian functions that they inspire to do. And it's an open question.

1902

1903 One of the things, I think, ... the other dimension's not so much a political trend but a general  
1904 trend is that this notion of getting to scale. And it doesn't matter if you're in government,  
1905 business, pitching a venture capital. And you see it as an NGO – that sounds like a great  
1906 program. How are you going to take it to scale? And one of the problems with going to scale is  
1907 that you scale problems fast and big too ... It's good. Scaling something up is good if it's good.  
1908 Scaling something up is really bad if it's bad, or if it's got an unknown problem that you don't see  
1909 until you get to becoming the sole provider for what makes seemingly perfect business case --  
1910 everyone's specialized, do your thing. You make bread. I'll bottle water. You do that. If one of  
1911 you messes up you've got everyone who has a problem when previously it was distributed...  
1912 Those ... are not necessarily political versus humanitarian organizations' challenges, but I think  
1913 they're really global challenges ...

1914

1915 In a way there's states, the official functions of government. There's businesses. There's religious  
1916 institutions, traditionally. And there's new-fangled NGOs in a sense. And there's competition

1917 among them and there's competition with any government – governments compete for different  
1918 things, businesses compete, NGOs compete. Although we love to invoke the word partnership  
1919 and we're all Kumbaya, the fact is that we compete for resources. And I think that religious  
1920 institutions, whether we choose to acknowledge it or not, they do compete with each other for  
1921 their followers. That is embedded within a lot of the religious beliefs. So I think those trends are  
1922 something that as a non-sectarian NGO that works with both the largest Muslim civic  
1923 organization ... and American Jewish world service and our colleague in the same association  
1924 including WorldVision. It's a really interesting time... I'm still waiting for Jeffrey to answer his  
1925 own questions, and I obviously cannot answer the one's I just presented. But I do think that some  
1926 of those influences are interesting to be figured out as we move along and at this point largely  
1927 unresolved. Thank you.

1928

1929 **Juan Campo:** So we welcome questions and comments from those in attendance...

1930

1931 **Dwight Hopkins:** Thank you for another exhilarating and provocative panel. I had two  
1932 questions, one around the human rights issue, and one around humanitarian aid and foreign  
1933 policy of countries. Have you run across, or how do you deal with your constituencies that might  
1934 have a different perspective on what we in the West call human rights? And if they do, how do  
1935 you deal with that? ... And two, it seems to me that Professor Falk mentioned the issue about  
1936 humanitarian aid linked to foreign policies of countries, and I wondered if somebody else could  
1937 pick up on that because I think it can't be disinterested, right? It definitely was not disinterested  
1938 during the Cold War, those of us who remember that period. And maybe it's magically changed  
1939 now. Those are two questions – the question of human rights ... and the second question, are  
1940 humanitarian initiatives linked to (directly/indirectly) to foreign ... policies?

1941

1942 **William Headley:** I don't want to gang up on Richard, but my question is directed at him also.  
1943 You applied the nice distinction between a genuine and a geopolitical humanitarianism with  
1944 regard to the State. Could we not apply the same principle to faith-based organizations? For  
1945 example, do I not, if I'm a Catholic or a Protestant aid agency going into an area where our co-  
1946 religionists are and I want to advocate, I do that with an understanding that maybe they'll be  
1947 sensitive to that. Or if I'm a Catholic organization ... while I'm trying to be very even-handed in

1948 distribution of goods, if Mother Theresa's group is running an HIV/AIDS program there they  
1949 might get a little more food than others. Isn't that true? And are you really saying anything more  
1950 than, when things are all considered, we don't do things for single motives? Are you saying any  
1951 more than that?

1952  
1953 **Laura Grillo:** I'm still sort of formulating my question. It stems off something that you said,  
1954 Richard Falk. If I understood you correctly, you were suggesting that in this post-Cold War  
1955 situation [that] we're dealing with a new kind of challenge of the non-alignment and respecting  
1956 sovereignty of nations in a different way that have to address their needs in different ways and  
1957 recognize that they are addressing their own needs differently. But I've been thinking about the  
1958 context that I know best in West Africa where I don't think that in this post-Cold War situation  
1959 ... I think that these non-aligned, independent nations are now becoming subject to a  
1960 recolonization effort. Not that their sovereignty is not being respected, and that this  
1961 recolonization effort is really following the interests of the global economy and the global  
1962 market, especially the hunger for raw material – gold and coffee and cocoa and oil and land... So,  
1963 I'm not sure where the question is. I guess I wondered, is the situation so different in the Middle  
1964 East ... and Africa or how would you parse that situation?

1965  
1966 **Mark Juergensmeyer:** This is prompted by Falk's comment, but it's a question for everybody.  
1967 You raised the question of whether governments are really capable of humanitarian aspirations,  
1968 and I'm enough of a student of Reinhold Niebuhr to say “absolutely not.” They are collectivities,  
1969 so they are governed by self-interest. But that's also true of humanitarian organizations.  
1970 Humanitarian organizations are on the one hand channels for genuine humanitarian impulses of  
1971 individuals, but as organizations they're organizations, which means they act out of self-interest.  
1972 And they act out of aggrandizement. And they act to promote, at least the ego, if not the profits  
1973 of those who are involved in them. And they want to enlarge their capacity in the way that all  
1974 organizations want to enlarge their capacity. So in that sense isn't there a real need for a kind of  
1975 government regulation and a kind of public media scrutiny that brings to accountability any kind  
1976 of organization? And if the changing political climate makes it more difficult for international  
1977 NGOs to do anything they want to within a particular region, is that necessarily a bad thing? Isn't  
1978 it time for them to be held more accountable within the countries in which they work?



1979

1980 **Richard Falk:** I'm grateful for the questions because I think they do touch upon some of the  
1981 ambiguities of my initial statement. What I was trying to express by this emphasis on the  
1982 connectedness of humanitarianism with geopolitics, in this historic period, particularly in the  
1983 Middle East, is that they've become more fused in certain critical situations. And particularly in  
1984 situations where ... earlier motivations are no longer acceptable. So that is what I meant by post-  
1985 colonial and post-Cold War. You can't talk about pursuing resources for their own sake ... You  
1986 can't substitute anti-Islam for anti-communist or anti-Marxist. So one of the things that becomes  
1987 very acceptable, very legitimizing in this period is the humanitarian discourse. And that's why I  
1988 think we need to have a certain degree of critical skepticism when that's used in conflict  
1989 situations. And the UN has developed this norm of responsibility to protect, to in a sense  
1990 obscure, the interventionary aspects of the undertaking. So I think that from the perspective of  
1991 the NGOs, what's important is to do their best in this changing climate to project an image of  
1992 autonomy. In other words, not to be seen, to the extent possible, as the agent of geopolitical  
1993 forces. And the UN, for instance, made a great mistake in Iraq by seeming to be part of the  
1994 enterprise of American occupation. And it may have been surprising to people here and in the  
1995 West that the UN headquarters were blown up, but there's also something to learn from that. So  
1996 that's why I think it's important to think about these contextual factors.

1997

1998 And it goes to the other part of your question about "Is this anything different... There's always  
1999 mixed motive." And of course that's true. What I wanted to try to convey was that these mixed  
2000 motives are somewhat more disguised in this historical setting because there's no acceptable  
2001 ideological way of talking about them, and therefore this recourse to the humanitarian discourse  
2002 is very misleading or can be very misleading. It's not necessarily misleading. It can be  
2003 misleading. I think there is a very important distinction between the situation in Africa and the  
2004 situation in the Middle East. And it was very different in the Cold War. And you raise a very  
2005 important set of questions about how the end of the Cold War affected sub-Saharan Africa versus  
2006 the way it affected the Middle East. And I'm not prepared to talk about it at the moment, but it's a  
2007 dramatically different setting. And part of the difference, I believe, is the strategic centrality of  
2008 oil politics in the Middle East. And if one wants to make a skeptical comment on recent  
2009 geopolitical behavior, it's notable that all the interventions in the Middle East of any consequence

2010 – Libya, Iraq, and possibly in the future Iran – are all major oil-producing countries. And what's  
2011 the difference between Syria and Libya so far as the humanitarian dimension is concerned? See, I  
2012 don't think you have to be a Marxist to say that oil is important in explaining where intervention  
2013 takes place and where it doesn't. I think the other part of what you said is extremely important,  
2014 especially in sub-Saharan Africa, that there is going on what one might call an informal  
2015 recolonization process involving non-Western actors as well as Western actors. China is one of  
2016 the principle culprits, I would argue, in sub-Saharan Africa. And so you have a different cast of  
2017 characters involved in this recolonization. If one wants to call it that, of Africa. Again, very  
2018 complex subject that deserves a lot more attention than I can provide.

2019  
2020 Mark's question is one that I agree with the implications of the question. In other words, certainly  
2021 as NGOs play this role that Tom defined in a very conceptually helpful way, accountability  
2022 becomes more and more important. So the trust is a part of what makes people confident that this  
2023 is a good way to use their own resources, and it creates more confidence in civil society solutions  
2024 to big problems. I would still maintain, though, in a maybe quasi-Niebuhr way, that one needs  
2025 to worry more about the accountability of States. And that just because States are not playing the  
2026 direct role, they have still an incredibly powerful set of instruments that can manipulate what  
2027 happens on the ground, and they are incredibly non-accountable under international law because  
2028 international law is only effective for weak States. It's practically irrelevant to the behavior of  
2029 strong states. And until that can be overcome, it is a fantasy to talk about the rule of law in  
2030 connection with the way in which world politics operates.

2031  
2032 **Mark Juergensmeyer:** The States have more power unless you're WorldVision.

2033  
2034 **Mae Cannon:** I'll respond to that point later.

2035  
2036 **Thomas Tighe:** I think a couple things that the linkage of humanitarian aid to... at least in my  
2037 own background experience as a US government official and having worked on the Hill knowing  
2038 that absolutely as a matter of law when funds are appropriated from the US Treasury and  
2039 provided even for humanitarian purposes it's conditional – absolutely conditional. And as I've  
2040 mentioned, Direct Relief does not take government aid. And we thought about it, but burdened

2041 with my own background the fact is if you get it and there's conditions that are enacted in the  
2042 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 in annual appropriation bills, they follow the money. So if it  
2043 goes to a country that fails to pay its arrears to the lending institutions, sponsors terrorism, [or]  
2044 the country is seen as trafficking narcotics, it's illegal to spend the money and it puts NGOs in an  
2045 awful position because typically those who receive government money, they don't read that stuff.  
2046 They say, with that money, I can do my mission that's pure. And this is a way to finance my  
2047 mission. Unfortunately, as a matter of law, technically when it's provided it's not – the  
2048 government cannot provide any US government money to an organization for the purposes of  
2049 doing that organization's mission. It's illegal to do that with appropriated dollars. By law, any  
2050 time the US government spends a federal dollar; it is by definition only for the purposes of  
2051 advancing US government interests. And it's conditioned upon those interests if it's withdrawn.  
2052 So I think for those reasons, we've chosen not to make that bargain. Although, in foregoing the  
2053 money, you also know you're also foregoing the opportunity to help a lot more people who could  
2054 be. As we see with the PEPFR funding that Karel mentioned, it was a big investment by the Bush  
2055 administration and largely perceived to be a humanitarian gesture and a correct one for a crisis.  
2056 You see now the pendulum swinging as the US government has very little influence in the States  
2057 that have undergone the Arab Spring, recognizing that soft power approaches are sometimes  
2058 better and at least a good compliment to hard power approaches. And they've now got influence,  
2059 so they've got to cobble together resources at the governmental level to exert soft power or some  
2060 influence in the events and it's got to come from a shrinking pot that has largely been devoted  
2061 disproportionately to Africa and particular diseases in Africa. It's going to be a tough situation.

2062  
2063 And as to mark's point, I think that we tried to show transparency. I worked in government.  
2064 Every email I sent was a public record for twelve years. So it's shocking to me that what is  
2065 considered transparency for an NGO in the US is that you file one form a year. We call it a 990  
2066 form, and three months after your fiscal year ends (and you can get an automatic three months  
2067 extension and no one understands it if you publish it.) In business there's quarterly earnings calls.  
2068 There's an industry that's looking at every investment, every personnel move. It's a little opaque  
2069 even at University of California. And I think that's coming much more aggressively towards  
2070 NGOs and properly so, because you can get a lot of money as an NGO by selling someone on the  
2071 mission and the purpose without actually ... on behalf of people in Africa, give me money. Now

2072 the person in Africa, on whose behalf you're asking money, doesn't know you just asked and  
2073 doesn't know you just got. So your accountability is to whom? It's certainly to the person who  
2074 gave you the money... but as long as you can give them an uplifting, fulfilling report back to the  
2075 person who gave you money, you'll get another round. But that, ultimately, is not answering the  
2076 question, "Was value for that money obtained by the person for whose benefit it was given?"  
2077 And that is an unanswered question. We report what we do, but, like in government, whether it's  
2078 UC saying "we need more money," I think a lot of people these days said "can't you do it  
2079 differently than you're doing it now, but why more? I've had to do it differently and lower costs."  
2080 and I think all those things come from the detail being exposed and the pressure certainly is  
2081 there.

2082  
2083 **Fritz Lampe:** About human rights, it's a dilemma that I, at least as a white male, face every time  
2084 I step off the plane somewhere in the world. So I don't have a good answer to your question  
2085 except I'll give a conversation. Ms. Cherie Moogle(??) had a conversation about female  
2086 circumcision in the central highlands of Kenya which is her home territory. And... she praised  
2087 those who attempted to "complexify" the issue and lamented those who came in from the outside  
2088 to tell Kenyan women and communities what to do. And [she] said ultimately this is a decision  
2089 that the people of this area have to wrestle with and work with. And I don't know if that's a cop-  
2090 out, but that was the guidance and counsel I got from someone who was deeply connected to  
2091 something that still is very much in the news.

2092  
2093 **Sarah Blackmun-Eskow:** I was taken by Bill saying we don't do anything for a simple motive,  
2094 because that's my whole life experience I think. Mark raised a couple of questions. He asked  
2095 whether the governments are capable of humanitarian actions. I don't know the answer to that. I  
2096 think that some might be and most are not.

2097  
2098 But I wanted to bring out for you what I experience in Africa as a kind of profound ambiguity  
2099 between the fear of being recolonized and the passionate desire to be modernized and  
2100 Westernized. The educated elite in the cities want to be modernized and westernized. And they,  
2101 because of the way African societies often work, they carry that desire to the rural areas, and  
2102 suddenly everybody wants to be modernized, and if there's a little bit of neo-colonialism in it

2103 maybe they can handle that as long as they can still cherish their cultural and religious values.  
2104 There are eight million cell phones in Ghana alone, which means that the market is saturated in  
2105 terms of families. But lots of people have two or three. So they're really westernized.  
2106  
2107 The other piece of it that I wondered about is ... he asked "Can the churches be humanitarian?"  
2108 He didn't ask that, I'm asking that. Do they have the will and the skill to do an effective job say in  
2109 development which is my greatest interest. Can a church organization, say at the grassroots, be  
2110 able to do development work in the community? Do they have time? Some of you who've  
2111 worked in Africa know that everyone is scratching for a living and nobody has time to do  
2112 anything extra. The humanitarian or philanthropic motive does not, in my judgment, exist in  
2113 Africa (the parts I know) the way it does here. People don't leave their job to do something  
2114 charitable or humanitarian. So I really... and what we're trying to find out now is whether  
2115 churches can take on a task of helping the development that requires both will and skill. And  
2116 where is the skill going to come from is a key question for us. And I want to observe that I don't  
2117 think anyone has mentioned the World Bank yet as the most overwhelmingly powerful, and the  
2118 regional banks, force in the world of development, impinging on a lot, not as much as used to be  
2119 but a tremendous amount of policy and programs that are funded through the bank.  
2120  
2121 **Robert Dowd:** Thanks. Just very briefly... First of all I think that really important question has  
2122 been raised by Tom. And I think that sometimes faith-based organizations get sort of a free ride.  
2123 The people give to them assuming that they're more effective than other types of organizations.  
2124 Well, they mean well. One thing that we need to work towards is really measuring the impact to  
2125 the extent we possibly can of faith-based organizations as well as other NGOs. Right now, we're  
2126 in a conversation that is Notre Dame's in a conversation with CRS in Uganda to develop ways of  
2127 working together to assess the impact the work of CRS in certain areas. A lot of organizations do  
2128 their own monitoring and evaluation, and there obviously is a moral hazard there. So I think  
2129 there's a lot of work to be done in assessing, monitoring and evaluating the impact of  
2130 organizations, especially faith-based organizations for which I have a ton of respect.  
2131  
2132 Trying to bring Mark's question down to the micro, micro level about interests and the incentives  
2133 of governmental leaders ... versus religious leaders when it comes to humanitarian activities.

2134 Right now, we're conducting a randomized field experiment in Uganda, and we're assessing the  
2135 effectiveness of religious leaders versus local political leaders and encouraging people to purify  
2136 their water at the household level and actually go out and purchase a chlorine based water  
2137 purification tablet. And we've given the religious leaders and the local governmental leaders (and  
2138 these are in different villages) we've given them coupons to distribute to whoever they wish. So  
2139 we're keeping track of who they're distributing the coupons to. And the question is, are the  
2140 religious leaders more likely to give them to people in need than the local political leaders. And in  
2141 some of the villages, there are going to be local level elections for the first time in twenty years.  
2142 So we're interested to know how the local elections are going to affect the way local  
2143 governmental leaders distribute the coupons, if at all. That's just an example of research. We've  
2144 got a lot to learn, and the methodology is far from perfect. But I think it's an example of the kind  
2145 of research that we need to do to try to assess the difference that religion is actually making in  
2146 delivery of humanitarian assistance, if you will. Or this is probably more like development  
2147 assistance. And also the impact that the political climate has on how governmental leaders  
2148 deliver such assistance.

2149

2150 **Juan Campo:** We have time for about three more questions. Rosalind?

2151

2152 **Rosalind Hackett:** Thank you. I have two quick questions for Bob and for Sarah. Bob, could  
2153 you give us an update on the aftermath in Kenya of the referendum? Have the Muslim/Christian  
2154 relations settled down given the tensions? And Sarah, I thought there was a little disconnect  
2155 between what you were saying about Ghana's economic successes and the way you represented  
2156 this in your website. If I remember rightly, you had as the subheading of your network "In poor  
2157 nations." And I wondered if any Ghanaians with their modernizing, progressive impulse  
2158 commented on that. Perhaps you mean in poor regions rather than poor nations?

2159

2160 **Mae Cannon:** I do not yet have the luxury that William does. I do still work for WorldVision.  
2161 So before I respond, you should know that. And they're going to ask me when I go back "how  
2162 did things go in Santa Barbara?" And I'm going to say "oh the weather was beautiful, and the  
2163 people were great. And Mark says that non-profits act out of aggrandizement, self-interest, and  
2164 increasing their capacity globally. But other than that, the people were wonderful."

2165  
2166 I do greatly appreciate this conversation, particularly the point that humanitarian discourse can  
2167 become a legitimizing means... and I also appreciate the distinction between governments versus  
2168 humanitarian organizations, even though Mark also said that WorldVision at least has the  
2169 capacity of a small government, if you will. But that being said... (now maybe this is a bit  
2170 idealistic, and at worst, maybe it's naïve) I do believe there is this increasing focus ... I can speak  
2171 on WorldVision's behalf ... that we're moving simply developmental and humanitarian work,  
2172 and we're starting to look at “what are root causes of needs around the world?” And we are  
2173 attempting to really listen and learn from and partner with the indigenous communities, and the  
2174 great effect of that is that if we do our justice oriented work well, guess what? Sometimes we  
2175 lose donors. Sometimes we're standing up on behalf of an issue that we believe is right and so it's  
2176 not about these things of emerging capacity and things like that. It's based on this theological  
2177 belief of what it means to stand beside people who are suffering from injustice and to work in  
2178 partnership with them. I hope I'm not speaking prophetically, because my focus is on the  
2179 Israeli/Palestinian conflict, and my position is a brand-new position. It was created only three  
2180 months ago. And one of the things it's saying is WorldVision US is no longer going to ignore this  
2181 issue. Our work in the region since 1975 has been developmental, but my position is in the  
2182 advocacy department, and I'm very purposely based on Capitol Hill. And being strategic and  
2183 learning from others who've gone ahead of us will be critical. We'll just partner with CRS and let  
2184 them go ahead of us in the game. I hope William will become my friend [laughs]. But I think  
2185 perhaps that's overly idealistic, but I think that's one of the things that encourages me about the  
2186 direction of faith-based non-profits, particularly WorldVision.

2187  
2188 **Jacob Olupona:** I'd like to follow-up on Thomas's last comment about accountability and US  
2189 government's double standard in monitoring NGOs and government activities [indistinct]. Some  
2190 of us in America, Africans who are in the diaspora, we often don't call ourselves Americans  
2191 because we've heard that we have no relevance in terms of what is going on here. Nigerians in  
2192 America, we have among us some of the richest in this country in the medical professions, in  
2193 academics, Nigerians are all over the place. But we are not involved in what is happening at  
2194 home because Americans and the American government does not regard us as Americans. In  
2195 other words, if we're Americans we'll at least be listened to we'll be able to make our own

2196 contribution to the involvement in African affairs because we know the place in and out. But  
2197 because it's not likely that we are going to be giving the kinds of information that they want and  
2198 they would like to have... it's become a serious crisis, a serious problem. Some of us, for  
2199 example, took the time to look at USAID in Nigeria, and the reference to PEPFAR, some time  
2200 ago in the talk... there have been total mismanagement of these [indistinct] precisely because  
2201 they have refused to in fact engage some of the Nigerian professionals who are in the position to  
2202 give them good advice. And then when people come back to say that we have failed in Nigeria,  
2203 Nigeria is corrupt, we ask the question "who are the people you are involved with? Who are the  
2204 people you have been talking to?" Including ministers and so on and so forth... And I don't know  
2205 the solution to this problem, but I'd like to raise it. India has used its diaspora very well. Other  
2206 countries have invited them to come, but when it comes to the African situation it is a different  
2207 story. And we don't know what to do. So unfortunately for us, we are betwixt and between  
2208 because when we enter the country [Nigeria], we are called Americans. And I say "why do you  
2209 call me American?" They say "Of course you are Americans. That's where you live." Thank you.

2210

2211 **Juan Campo:** I saw a hand up in the back.

2212

2213 **Eddie Saade** (observer): My question is actually about politically motivated faith-based  
2214 organizations that use humanitarianism as a means to an end. That end being governance. My  
2215 name is Eddie Saade. I got a Masters in global studies three years ago. I studied the Middle East  
2216 a lot. What interests me about that question, and the reason I'm asking is, I have difficulty  
2217 placing those types of organizations on... specifically because we talk about the fact that motive  
2218 plays a lot into humanitarianism, or are organizations or humanitarian organizations truly  
2219 altruistic and what are the motives behind them? So how would a humanitarian organization deal  
2220 with a politically motivated faith-based organization that wants to end up in governance?

2221

2222 **Juan Campo:** Time for the panelists to respond.

2223

2224 **Robert Dowd:** I don't know that much about the aftermath. I could tell you my impressions.  
2225 Rosalind asked about the aftermath of the referendum - the new constitution that passed. Just to  
2226 refresh your memory, the vast majority of Christian leaders came out very vocally in opposition



2227 to the new draft constitution, and essentially the Christian religious leaders have made their  
2228 peace with it. They're recognized the results. The Catholic bishops have said "we recognize the  
2229 will of the people, and we're ready to move on. And we recognize that there's a lot of good that is  
2230 in that Constitution. And in the meantime, I think they're working behind the scenes with regard  
2231 to the language they find problematic in the new constitution concerning abortion. The (kati)  
2232 courts issue, I don't know much about that, and it's something worth finding out. The great  
2233 concern was that the positions of Christian leaders in Kenya would sour relations between  
2234 Christians and Muslims in Kenya. I think that there have been real serious attempts for leaders at  
2235 the national level, Christian and Muslim leaders, not all Christian leaders, but some Christian  
2236 leaders, to come together with Muslim leaders in Kenya to make sure that the run-up, the  
2237 campaigns being wages in the run-up to the referendum on the constitution did not damage  
2238 relations between Christians and Muslims, which have historically in Kenya been very good. It's  
2239 really only in the last ten or fifteen years that there has been some tension between Christians  
2240 and Muslims. I know there have been some attempts at the elite level, the leader level, to make  
2241 sure that relations between Christians and Muslims don't go sour.

2242

2243 **Sarah Blackmun-Eskow:** Rosalind also asked something about our website that says something  
2244 about "the poorer nations." And I had said that Ghana... actually Ghana has been declared a  
2245 lower-middle class country, but that doesn't tell you where the money is going. It's still a society  
2246 the elite get most of the money and the poor get almost none of it. And the split is urban and  
2247 rural, as it is in many parts of Africa and other parts of the world. It also depends on how you  
2248 understand gross national product. A few years ago, about half of Ghana's GNP was remittances  
2249 from the West, from Europe and the US, not produced in the country – although a lot of the  
2250 benefits do go to people who live in the country.

2251

2252 I wanted to ask a question without answering it, just for your thoughtful consideration. Talking  
2253 about justice for people who have less power or no power in African societies, what do you think  
2254 about the position of gay men and lesbians in Uganda, Ghana, Kenya where the violence against  
2255 them, the rhetoric and the physical violence is escalating? I understand something about that, but  
2256 I'm still concerned (and I think a lot of Americans are concerned) that maybe this is a place

2257 where we need to put our oar in the water. But I'd just like to know whether any of you have any  
2258 observations for that phenomenon.

2259

2260 **Juan Campo:** Any other panelists like to also add their comments?

2261

2262 **Richard Falk:** Just a very short comment along the same lines as Sarah's comment, and it  
2263 relates to what was said about justice advocacy. It seems to me that there's a difference between  
2264 the advocacy role within the US, let's say, and within the countries that one's dealing with. I'm  
2265 not sure that outside political actors or outside humanitarian organizations should be instructing  
2266 internal political forces what constitutes justice. I think it's integral to the dynamics of self-  
2267 determination to work out what justice means within a given cultural space. And it's very  
2268 difficult to avoid the impression of colonial arrogance, particularly if one claim it has a scriptural  
2269 foundation because that sort of preempts discussion and disagreement and alternate points of  
2270 view. [It] seems to me very hard to exhibit humility, which seem the appropriate way to relate to  
2271 the struggle for human rights and things such as what Sarah raised. I think there are universal  
2272 norms that can be addressed, but when one tries to tell another society what is just that seems to  
2273 me dangerous territory. Whereas, if you're telling Congress what's just about the Israel/Palestine  
2274 conflict, I think it's the kind of territory [that]... may be dangerous, but it needs to be walked  
2275 upon.

2276

2277 **Sarah Blackmun-Eskow:** I think about the gay and lesbian justice issue along the lines that  
2278 people thought about female genital mutilation a few years ago, maybe ten years ago. That we  
2279 didn't like it, but we didn't know whether we should intervene. But we did. We made our views  
2280 known, and now it's illegal in a lot of African countries, which doesn't mean it doesn't happen.  
2281 But at least there has been some change in my mind for the good in Africa.

2282

2283 **Mark Juergensmeyer:** [no mic, indistinct] Richard, were you saying that we should be  
2284 concerned about these issues in other countries?

2285

2286 **Richard Falk:** I understood advocacy to mean something that one would try to reshape dialogue  
2287 in other countries through the authority of the presence of an NGO that was dispensing funds and

2288 doing other things. It seems to me... that there is a missionary problem that is embedded in that  
2289 undertaking.

2290

2291 **Thomas Tighe:** With respect to advocacy, which a lot of groups do very well, who are you to  
2292 advocate? Do you know you're advocating for them? There's a self-appointed nature that NGOs  
2293 can run a risk of. "So on behalf of people that don't know I'm speaking for them, let me tell you  
2294 exactly what needs to be done. And, by the way, give me money so I can do more of it." And if  
2295 you're compelling to the audience who is the funding audience, you can get a lot of money. A lot  
2296 of people did it on behalf of people in Haiti who experienced an unimaginable tragedy. A lot of  
2297 people did it in Sri Lanka and Thailand and made gobs of money never having done a thing  
2298 there. So if you get money on behalf of someone else who needs it, there's a high obligation. So  
2299 accountability is really important. And I think it's much easier in a way for a group that doesn't  
2300 have to answer to theological issues, like ours. I went to enough Catholic school, so I feel guilty  
2301 enough. [laughter] So I think it's a really important question of legitimacy because NGOs are  
2302 unelected. If you subject yourself to a truly democratic process... right or wrong, up or down,  
2303 you hope, however the majority of the election shakes out. NGOs come in sole on the basis of  
2304 the compelling nature of their marketing. So you could do horrible work for the people, and do  
2305 excellent work for the donating public, and win every time against an organization that does  
2306 great work for the people that no one knows about. It doesn't happen in business because if you  
2307 spend four dollars for a cup of coffee and people don't like it, they're never going to buy it again.  
2308 The nature of NGOs is that it disconnects the buyer from the consumer of the service. So if you  
2309 convince me (I'm the Ford Foundation) I'm going to give five dollars for the coffee for the  
2310 program... the coffee is going to be drunk by someone, not me. I'm going to make that judgment  
2311 based on the report that Dwight gives back to me. So the legitimacy to speak on behalf of people  
2312 ... creates a deep obligation. I think the level of transparency, accountability and legitimacy is  
2313 coming [indistinct]. Because right now, as a group that does almost no marketing, no  
2314 fundraising, we're beat every time by groups that do it better. I think on the merits, on the  
2315 outcomes, on what we can do, I think we'd win if they were looking for value, and on behalf of  
2316 the people served. But that's an interesting thing, and I think business can teach us. If people  
2317 aren't buying it, you're going to fail. And the same thing with politicians – there's a natural  
2318 desire, good or bad, to serve the people so you'll get re-elected. And I think religious based

2319 NGOs that deliver services, like Hamas, that's why they won. They delivered for the people.  
2320 Whatever – they're still a terrorist organization – but if you want value for the money in  
2321 delivered services, you can't complain when the people who don't think like you do it [deliver  
2322 services.]

2323

2324 **Karel Zelenka:** Maybe [this is] an afterthought to this discussion, and it cuts across practically  
2325 all NGOs, whether faith-based or secular organizations. There is one issue that is at the root of  
2326 the discussion, and it's been around for years and years. And that's the issue of standards.

2327

2328 In Kosovo, when the Serbs started this massacre in Kosovo, suddenly there were over 200  
2329 registered NGOs working in Kosovo competing for funds. The names of these NGOs were just a  
2330 pure fantasy, sheer fantasy. And most of them worked in the same sectors: shelter, water,  
2331 sanitation, health, gender, you name it. But how do donors, how does anybody, distinguish  
2332 among them? Whom to support and whom not? And the NGOs themselves have steadfastly  
2333 resisted efforts to come up with standards. Tom talks about business. Of course. If you have a car  
2334 company, you have certain prescribed performance standards that you have to meet, and they are  
2335 measurable. And people can look them up, and they can test it. But NGOs? You tell me, Sarah,  
2336 that you do this for the people, but how do I know how good you are? What's the result? No way  
2337 [would they do that.] And the same for WorldVision. Why would I give to them rather than  
2338 MercyCorp or Direct Relief? How do I know? Oh, they tell me they have this distribution, but in  
2339 the final analysis there is zero in terms of measuring performance. We just don't know. So we  
2340 offer all sorts of arguments, all sorts of results that we think are good, but it's all relative. And  
2341 that's what I wanted to say – if the academic community could come up with a way to measure  
2342 the performance because it varies. But I would say there are six or seven sectors that are the  
2343 critical sectors for humanitarian assistance.

2344

2345 **Waleed El Ansary:** One quick comment, Sarah, regarding female genital mutilation. There's a  
2346 position in Islamic law, the grand mufti of Egypt for example has come out and said that that's  
2347 anti-Islamic... So the theological arguments that would be brought to bear in that argument are  
2348 really completely different from the arguments that would come to bear on issues such as

2349 homosexuality. So the traditional Islamic position on that is really a “don’t ask, don’t tell”  
2350 policy. And we can go into the theological basis for that...

2351

2352 **Sarah Blackmun-Eskow:** There is the issue, and this is a very un-Protestant, un-Reformed  
2353 thing to say, whether a person has a right to enjoy his or her sexuality because female genital  
2354 mutilation pretty much takes that opportunity away from the woman.

2355

2356 **SESSION 4**

2357

2358 **Kathleen Moore:** I appreciate Mark inviting me to join you today. But the last question that we  
2359 want to consider formally here today is, “How does the work of humanitarian organizations  
2360 influence the political climate?” – sort of the flip side of the question that was considered before  
2361 the break. And I think there are many ways you could take a cut at that question but I want to  
2362 suggest there are a couple of things maybe we could ask our panelists and our experts here today  
2363 to consider. One is when you think about the work of humanitarian organizations and how it  
2364 influences politics, you might ask the question, “How do we minimize the negative tendencies  
2365 and influences blurring the lines between religion and politics?” and questions about partnering  
2366 between faith-based organizations or religious organizations and officials in their official  
2367 capacity or with corporate capital raise many of these issues about how to maximize the benefits  
2368 and the accountability of coalitions and networking, and at the same time minimize the negative  
2369 influence of blurring that line between religion and politics.

2370

2371 So this afternoon we have four esteemed panelists and we are going to go in the order from your  
2372 right to left, speaking first and going alphabetically, by the way, beginning with Professor  
2373 Waleed El Ansary. And please try to take five minutes each and we may have to cut you off. I  
2374 apologize in advance for my rudeness.

2375

2376 **Waleed El Ansary:** Well there’s a wonderful quote here on this blurring of the line that Juan  
2377 Campo had gathered from his latest trip with Mark to Egypt and I’ll just begin with this quote.  
2378 He says, “I heard in Alexandria about a man who led a profligate life as a drug addict and  
2379 abusive father and husband. He developed a serious problem with diabetes and had to have both

2380 legs amputated. Who paid for the operation? The Muslim Brotherhood. Then they offered him  
2381 and his family a monthly stipend of £1,000 – something like that – and gave him money to buy  
2382 new furnishings for his apartment, including a television set. The requirement was that if he was  
2383 going to watch television, he could only watch religious programs. And of course the expectation  
2384 was that he and his family would now vote for the Muslim Brotherhood candidates when and if  
2385 the election should occur.” And so this is very much an example. Talk about mixed motives and  
2386 blurring the line.

2387

2388 And today – I don’t know if you had a chance to check the news, but the government actually  
2389 made the official announcement for the preceding Parliamentary election. The Muslim  
2390 Brotherhood came in with 42.5%. The Salafis, which are even further right to the Brotherhood –  
2391 and we’ll talk more about them in a moment – came in with 32%. The Liberals came in with  
2392 16.5% and that leaves only 10% -- less than 10% -- for everybody else. So that kind of gives  
2393 you an idea that really the Islamists have a 75% -- about 75% -- of the Parliament now. And so  
2394 what I want to talk about -- and Jeffrey raised the question about the relationship between  
2395 religion and politics and how we should address these and I think he’s being very much like the  
2396 Daoist sage who’s remaining silent. He knows more than he’s saying. Really, this campaign  
2397 tactic that the Muslim Brotherhood has used has come under criticism from the scholars at Al  
2398 Azhar University.

2399

2400 Al Azhar University is kind of like the Oxford/Cambridge of the Islamic world. It was founded  
2401 in Cairo in 971. It’s even older than Oxford and Cambridge and it really represents the  
2402 intellectual capital, so to speak, of at least the Sunni Islamic world. And so the scholars at Al  
2403 Azhar have distinguished between an approach to religion and politics that takes the whole of the  
2404 community – the interests of the whole of the community into account, the common good – and  
2405 party politics. And they would say that this type of example that we just read is just an insult to  
2406 religion. It compromises the spiritual integrity of charity on one hand, and it really demeans  
2407 religion on the other. This is completely inappropriate. The Salafi groups have even said – and  
2408 the Salafi approach to Islam is really not even an indigenous Egyptian understanding of Islam.  
2409 Indigenous Egyptian understanding is represented by the scholars at Al Azhar University. The  
2410 Salafis kind of represent this foreign import of interpretation of Islam from Saudi Arabia. It’s a

2411 very truncated understanding of the tradition that eliminated basically the philosophical,  
2412 theological, intellectual dimension of the tradition, as well as the mystical dimension of the  
2413 tradition, and on top of all of that, it really has a kind of very compromised view of even the  
2414 legal dimension of the tradition, and we'll get into that. But the Salafis have even gone so far as  
2415 to say in their campaigning that it's acceptable for you to cheat in the election, to falsify the  
2416 election result, to basically vote more than once by paying these poor women in certain parts of  
2417 Egypt for their identity cards and then go in with the niqab so that you're not really recognized.  
2418 And then one of the monitors at the station, he thought, "I think I've seen this woman before.  
2419 She walked in exactly the same way!" And they found out that she had voted, like, ten times.  
2420 And so, you know, I'm not so convinced that that 32% number is all that legitimate. So they  
2421 were really using the mosque as a place to bring people in, to gather the Muslim community, and  
2422 basically tell them that if you don't vote for the Salafis, then you're committing a sin. And that's  
2423 completely unacceptable. And so Sheikh Ali Gomaa, the Grand Mufti of Egypt, who is also a  
2424 professor at Al Azhar, has distinguished very clearly between the role of religion and politics to  
2425 inform, provide a vision of the common good and that's completely acceptable. And this type of  
2426 party politics that is just despicable, it's really a disgrace. This is why the scholars at Al Azhar,  
2427 the Sheikh Al Azhar, for example, and the Grand Mufti of Egypt are completely forbidden from  
2428 being tied to any political party. The mosques are not supposed to be used for these types of  
2429 purposes. And so what we see in the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis are really elements of  
2430 very anti-Islamic approaches.

2431

2432 Now, that being the case, what is being done about this? Fortunately, we have the institution of  
2433 Al Azhar University, which really represents the source of spiritual and intellectual guidance for  
2434 the Egyptian people. The Muslim Brotherhood doesn't really do that. Yes, they're very good at  
2435 providing orphanages and hospitals and things like these public services that Tom has brought  
2436 up. But when it comes to spiritual and intellectual guidance, the Muslim community in Egypt  
2437 doesn't really look to them for that. And then of course the Salafis – that's really a very truncated  
2438 interpretation of Islam. So they look to the scholars at Al Azhar University to really provide that.

2439

2440 And just a couple of statistics in terms of how unfortunately the role of Al Azhar is not really  
2441 brought out as it should be in the press or in the media, at least within the West. And so just a

2442 couple of statistics on how important Al Azhar is. First of all, the number of undergraduate  
2443 students at Al Azhar University is 500,000. That's 500,000 students at Al Azhar University. In  
2444 their elementary school and junior high and high school, they have 1.5 million students. They  
2445 provide the imams for 80% of the mosques in Egypt. They provide the imams, the religious  
2446 scholars who lead the prayers and so forth, for 110,000 mosques in Egypt. So that represents  
2447 over 80% of the total. And the number of alumni of Al Azhar University is 10 million. So you  
2448 can imagine the political force that Al Azhar University has. When Al Azhar University gets  
2449 behind a particular position, that changes the political landscape completely... When we talk  
2450 about religion and politics and so forth, rather than talking about the Muslim Brotherhood and  
2451 the Salafis getting all the attention, really the institution that deserves the attention is Al Azhar  
2452 University and the scholars at Al Azhar University because that represents really a very moderate  
2453 understanding of Islam that's well-rooted in the tradition and that really provides guidance for  
2454 the way forward. And in July of 2011, Al Azhar... issued a set of guidelines for the new  
2455 constitution, indicating that of course all houses of worship of the Abrahamic traditions have to  
2456 be respected and that the minority communities would have complete freedom of worship,  
2457 minority rights of Copts and women, freedom of religion and opinion, and so forth and so on –  
2458 freedom of expression within the...common decency, no slandering of other religious traditions  
2459 as part of the guidelines, building strong relationships with surrounding countries in Africa. That  
2460 relates to some of the other things that we've talked about. A very, very important point is the  
2461 fiqh of priorities to achieve development goals. There's a branch in Islamic law that's really the  
2462 law of establishing priorities that established certain norms like prevention of harm takes  
2463 precedent or priority over pursuit of benefits and avoidance of harms to the poor takes  
2464 precedence over avoidance of harm to the wealthy, and so forth and so on. That has tremendous  
2465 implications for kind of policy implications, as things go forward. So I think, quite frankly, that  
2466 Al Azhar University is going to play a very critical role in helping – a necessary role – in  
2467 establishing a smooth transition. Unfortunately, it's not a sufficient role, given the rise in crime  
2468 and the unrealistic expectations of the economic turmoil that Egypt is undergoing. But at least  
2469 that is a very, very critical role for a religiously oriented group within Egypt.  
2470



2471 **Kathleen Moore:** Okay, thank you very much. Next we have Hilal Elver, who is the founding  
2472 legal advisor of the Ministry of Environment in Turkey, Research Professor in Global and  
2473 International Studies here at UC Santa Barbara.

2474

2475 **Hilal Elver:** Thank you very much. My position as a founding legal advisor was twenty five  
2476 years ago, and I was surprised [that] I still I am carrying this. Now, as you can understand, my  
2477 example is related to Turkey and the Turkish internal politics much more international politics  
2478 than how humanitarian, human rights organizations suddenly became international players in the  
2479 region, while Turkey's role is becoming more and more important. Many of you must know  
2480 from the international media in May 30, 2010,... in the relation to Free Gaza Movement, there  
2481 was a freedom flotilla started from Istanbul [that] ...tried to go to Gaza in order to interfere [with  
2482 the] blockage of the Gaza and in relation to the Free Gaza Movement. The Israeli forces stopped  
2483 this trip, and then they killed nine Turkish citizens. And this created an international, chaotic  
2484 problem between Israel and Turkey. There was a long time of cooperative states in the Middle  
2485 East, which is an unusual friendship. If you look at what was the reason, who did this, behind  
2486 this organization, there was a Turkish NGO which is – maybe you know – Humanitarian Relief  
2487 Foundation, which it was... established in 1990 as a human rights organization but more Islamic-  
2488 oriented association. In this period, in the 1990s, we had very secular political government.  
2489 Because of this reason, for quite a long time, this organization really suffered,... and did not get  
2490 enough attention, did not get any kind of influence in political environment. But what they did  
2491 during this period, they were in Bosnia, they were in Chechnya, they were in some [other]  
2492 places. They did make a lot of humanitarian help inside and outside of Turkey. It was almost the  
2493 earlier period that the Islamic-oriented human rights organizations not only working internally,  
2494 but they are taking over their job internationally in relation to countries that Islam is an important  
2495 religion or part of the Islamic culture – Middle East or Central Asia. But after 2002, the  
2496 government changed and AKP – The Justice and Development Party – became the governing  
2497 party. Then they, in power, become much more important and they were able to influence  
2498 politics internally and internationally. And then they were also coordinated with some kind of  
2499 humanitarian organization in the Middle East. This freedom flotilla was part of this kind of  
2500 friendship coordination and organization.

2501

2502 After this incident, there were three international commissions started. Turkey started their own  
2503 commission, Israelis started their own commission to understand what is going on, and the  
2504 United Nations Secretary General established one commission and the United Nations Human  
2505 Rights Council also looked at their own investigation, whether or not this was illegal action by  
2506 the Turks or illegal use of force by the Israeli government. As you can imagine, each government  
2507 tried to defend the case from their own perspective. Reports were very much misleading and  
2508 Israelis directly connected this organization with terror. They went too far. For instance, there  
2509 was a 2000 plot at LAX airport, which never happened. They claimed that this organization was  
2510 part of this plot and they were part of the Hamas organization, they were part of the Muslim  
2511 Brotherhood, and they really made this organization worse than it is.

2512  
2513 At the same time, this gives us a kind of example how [it's] possible [that] a national,  
2514 humanitarian, religious-friendly organization became part of international politics. And the  
2515 Turkish government right now, their relationship is frozen with Israel. There was a lot of  
2516 negative international reputation caused to Turks and the Israelis equally and at the same time,  
2517 what happened to Gazans...maybe there was a kind of PR which many people that didn't know  
2518 anything that's happening in Gaza, after this event they learned... there was a serious  
2519 humanitarian catastrophe going on, but at the same time, did not really change that much. Only  
2520 Israelis [will] easily will beat Gaza blockage, but nothing was significantly better. But then they  
2521 stopped a further kind of activity in relation to Freedom Gaza Movement because the Turkish  
2522 government was very reluctant to do it again. They had been doing before – not only Turkish  
2523 government, but international NGOs and also what Turkish government claimed they had no  
2524 relationship whatsoever. This organization is completely NGO, they can't interfere with  
2525 anything, they can not really make any kind of political influence over them. Partly true, but not  
2526 completely true. The Turkish government would have had even stopped this maybe, but they did  
2527 not, but at least after this first serious problem, they decided not to make anymore controversial  
2528 attacks, but... the controversial attack wouldn't be completely controversial if the Israeli  
2529 government wouldn't have used excessive violence. What I am trying to say, as you said –  
2530 minimizing influence of the humanitarian NGOs, especially in relation to religion, is extremely  
2531 important, but when there's a serious problem in the region and there's a strong clash between

2532 secularists and non-secularists internationally and nationally, it's absolutely impossible to  
2533 minimize that kind of negative impact of such organizations. I think I should stop here.

2534

2535 **Kathleen Moore:** Okay, and now we have the other half of the Sarah Blackmun-Eskow couple,  
2536 Dr. Steve Eskow, who is the Chair of the Board of the Pangaea Network and Director of External  
2537 Affairs at Ghana Telecom University College.

2538

2539 **Steve Eskow:** Our topic is to deal with the influence of humanitarian organizations on political  
2540 climate. I'd like to tell you 2 stories – one trivial and one large scale. Sarah spoke earlier about  
2541 the lesbian and gay issue. We and the Presbyterian Church of the U.S. are passionately  
2542 committed to support and equal, full citizenship for lesbians and gays. That position is visible  
2543 internationally and very visible to the Presbyterian churches of Africa. Recently, John Adam  
2544 Mills, President of Ghana, old friend and supporter of ours, announced in response to this  
2545 argument, that he would withdraw personally from any organization that supported lesbian and  
2546 gay rights. He would work to withdraw funding. That's the first episode. The question is, "Are  
2547 we influencing the political climate as a humanitarian organization? Or are we in danger of being  
2548 seriously influenced by the political climate?" We are interested, as we've been talking about, in  
2549 working with the 3,000 Presbyterian congregations of Ghana. Some years ago, we signed a  
2550 memorandum of understanding with the then-moderator of the Presbyterian Church of Ghana.  
2551 The present moderator, Dr. Emmanuel Martey, whom some of you know or know of, a graduate  
2552 of Union Theological Seminary, a brilliant scholar, author, excellent administrator, has  
2553 pronounced anathema on lesbian and gay relationships and has proposed breaking off relations  
2554 with the Presbyterian Church of the U.S. because of its position. What do we, as a humanitarian  
2555 organization, depending for our mission, our commitment to scale, to these churches? How do  
2556 we cope with this? Let me put that aside. I think the point that I'm trying to illustrate is that when  
2557 they're high-level, abstract discussions about influence one way or another, the conversation  
2558 takes a turn that I have difficulty with as a practitioner. In the world in which some of us live and  
2559 try to get things done, realities of the kind I've just described intrude.

2560

2561 Different story about a different episode: in 1997, Lord Carey of Clifton, then-Archbishop of  
2562 Canterbury, received a telephone call from Jim Wolfensohn, James Wolfensohn, who was then-

2563 Head of the World Bank. Jim Wolfensohn, an observant Jew and a very nice man, had just  
2564 learned, apparently, that churches in places like Tanzania and Ghana, are heavily involved in  
2565 development work and he wanted to meet with Lord Carey and the leadership of the church to  
2566 discuss faith and development. And Katherine Marshall, who was one of his chief allies in that  
2567 venture which generated millions of dollars and did much good work around Africa and around  
2568 the world, was one of his main tools. Is the World Bank a humanitarian organization? Ought we  
2569 to cultivate relations with the World Bank? Ought we to try to get support for the World Bank?  
2570 And if the World Bank – influential as it is – is committed to privatization...some of you know  
2571 about the so-called Washington Consensus and how the World Bank uses its influence in Africa  
2572 to remove the state and its activities from social development work and to privatize business and  
2573 industry. What I'm really suggesting here is that the relationship between humanitarian  
2574 organizations of the kind that we represent and sponsors and backers are intricate and complex  
2575 and raise ethical issues that go well beyond what some of us are able to cope with. USAID has  
2576 been mentioned here. USAID has a faith in development program that gives millions of dollars  
2577 to faith-based organizations doing work around the world. Is USAID a humanitarian  
2578 organization? Should we cultivate USAID? Or is it part of the problem? How do humanitarian  
2579 organizations, non-profits such as we are, relate productively to universities who are concerned  
2580 with globalization, concerned with international education, that have internship programs that  
2581 want to bring graduate students and undergraduate students into useful internships around the  
2582 world? Can we cooperate usefully with such university programs? What I'm hoping to get  
2583 from...to abstract from the proceedings of this conference – information, insights, and  
2584 possibilities that we can really use in our attempts to connect with the issues and the people of  
2585 Africa in new and productive ways.

2586

2587 **Kathleen Moore:** Thank you very much. Next we'll hear from Laura Grillo, who is Professor of  
2588 History of Religions at Pacifica Graduate Institute.

2589

2590 **Laura Grillo:** So I have the unenviable position of being the last speaker of the day before  
2591 cocktail hour and I'm counting on holding your attention by delivering a very sexy talk, quite  
2592 literally. My topic is female genital power in ritual and politics in Côte d'Ivoire. I want to talk  
2593 about the violation of female genitals and the deployment of female genital power as an act of

2594 global civil society. Also, I think it's appropriate that I'm the last speaker because I'm going to  
2595 turn us back to the first question of the day that really more appropriately fits the comments that I  
2596 have to offer, which is not so much about humanitarian organizations and how they influence the  
2597 political climate, but rather, "What's the role of religion in the recent socio-political  
2598 transformations before us?" So let me tell you the story of the social, political situation in Côte  
2599 d'Ivoire.

2600

2601 In November of 2010, after 8 years of repeated delays, Côte d'Ivoire held its most recent  
2602 presidential election. Alassane Ouattara narrowly won the majority, but the incumbent, Laurent  
2603 Gbagbo, contested the results and he refused to cede power. So after 5 months of a standoff that  
2604 ensued, the barely dormant civil war was reignited. Now even before the post-election turmoil in  
2605 Côte d'Ivoire, from the time of the eruption of the coup d'état, -- the first coup d'état in 2002 --  
2606 and through this almost decade-long turbulent period that's called "No Peace, No War," women  
2607 were the victims of violent, brutal, horrific sexual violence -- violence so heinous that it defies  
2608 contemplation. Both sides of the political divide were perpetrators of the assault on the civilian  
2609 population in general, but they especially targeted women. Maybe that's always the case in times  
2610 of war. Despite the fact that highly reputable humanitarian institutions such as Amnesty  
2611 International and Human Rights Watch documented this widespread sexual violence, including  
2612 rape of children, forced incest, sexual slavery, and other forms of horrific torture, the  
2613 international community rallying supposedly for democratic elections and "non-violent  
2614 transitional government," tolerated this impunity. And the news media largely ignored the  
2615 atrocities as well. Ironically, it was the killing of seven women, gunned down during the march  
2616 held on International Women's Day, a march held to demand an end to the post-election  
2617 violence, that finally grabbed international headlines. The event was filmed by participants and  
2618 circulated widely on YouTube and finally grabbed the headlines.

2619

2620 One of the points I want to make is that women haven't been only victims, though, because  
2621 women have been at the forefront of stands for peace and justice and consistently spearheading  
2622 the most visible demonstrations of protest against abuses of power and calls for basic human  
2623 rights. The Ivorian press actually recognize this. They've recognized the historic roots of  
2624 women's uprisings. When women took to the streets in 2008, just before the elections to protest

2625 the sharp rise in food prices, the Ivorian press likened that – their uprising – to a now-celebrated  
2626 women’s uprising in Côte d’Ivoire in 1949. At that time, there was a multi-ethnic coalition of  
2627 2,000 women – multi-ethnic coalition of 2,000 women – who made a 60-kilometer trek from  
2628 Abidjan to Grand Bassam, which is a colonial stronghold, to protest the arrests of African  
2629 Liberation leaders who had been arrested by the French colonial authorities. But what the local  
2630 journalists referenced only obliquely – and the foreign press really completely neglected – was to  
2631 make reference to the powerful ritual rhetoric that the demonstrators, these women  
2632 demonstrators, regularly make appeal. Because women appear smeared in white kaolin clay.  
2633 They’re wielding branches and they strip naked. Now that gets ignored. Failing to interpret these  
2634 cultural expressions, these religious expressions, offers a merely political reading of their  
2635 protests and misconstrues their real significance – the religious significance.

2636

2637 I just want to give you a little background on this. Historical record that dates back centuries  
2638 shows that throughout West Africa, from Senegal all the way to Cameroon, the generative power  
2639 of the female sex is understood to be potent and dangerous in the religious view. As the living  
2640 embodiment of the ancestors, women are guardians of the moral order. So they can ritually  
2641 deploy their genital power for blessing or for curses. Traditionally, women are the source of life.  
2642 So traditionally, they had to sanctify rulers in order for those rulers to enjoy legitimacy. For  
2643 example, from Mali all the way to Nigeria, when traditional kings took to the throne, they had to  
2644 be ritually invested with qualities – the female qualities. And in some cases, this went so far as  
2645 castration.

2646

2647 Now today, in the context of African indigenous religion, women still perform paradigmatic  
2648 ceremonies that draw on the power of their sex. They get naked and smeared in kaolin. These  
2649 elderly women dance, chant, and use waters with which they’ve washed their genitals and  
2650 sometimes waters mixed with other bodily effluvia, for libation. And with their well-worn  
2651 pestles, they pound the ground and they cross the village square or the prominent places to curse  
2652 any of those who would breach ethical mandates. Women are aware of the ritual potency of their  
2653 nudity and this conjuration of their sex. And they use it also to intercede in calamitous political  
2654 situations. In Côte d’Ivoire, their political activism has, therefore, appeal to this strong rhetorical  
2655 form. As I alluded to earlier, in 1949, when the women went down to Grand Bassam, once they

2656 arrived in front of the jail, they also stripped naked and danced and gyrated until the French, not  
2657 really understanding what to do with them, dispersed them with fire hoses. But more recently, in  
2658 2002, just after the coup d'état at the beginning of the uprising, at the urging of the Young  
2659 Patriots to resist the attack that ignited the civil war, Nana Kouayotano (?), a female chief of the  
2660 Baoule village ... organized five elderly women to execute the *adjanou* dance. This they call a  
2661 "mystical dance" and it's performed in the nude and they performed this dance for 7 days to  
2662 ward off this political cataclysm. Ultimately, though, the rebel soldiers got wind of what they  
2663 were doing. They invaded the village, they abducted the women, and all the women were killed,  
2664 save this one chief who escaped. The following year in 2003, the French intervened to broker a  
2665 coalition government. At that time, naked women blocked the French Minister of Foreign  
2666 Affairs, Dominique de Villepin, from exiting the French Ivorian Presidential Palace. And  
2667 furthermore, they urinated on the wheels of his car. That's genital power.

2668

2669 In February of 2011, just last year, several dozen *adjanou* dancers appeared in Treichville in  
2670 downtown Abidjan to protest what they called their children's arbitrary abduction by Gbagbo's  
2671 republican guard. And they brandished their kodjo, their underwear, to thrash the enemy. That  
2672 same month in Yamoussoukro, in the center of the country, the political capital, hundreds of  
2673 kaolin-smearred women occupied the late president Houphouët-Boigny's residence to perform  
2674 *adjanou* continuously to protest the deplorable state of affairs and what they considered the  
2675 occupation of a sacred site by the political forces, the military. According to the organizers,  
2676 theirs was a spiritual combat, conducted in a domain in which, "the strength and the power  
2677 belonged to women." So this religious principle, this indigenous religious principle behind these  
2678 acts extends beyond any one particular ethnic group, beyond nationality. It's not germane to Côte  
2679 d'Ivoire or to the Baoule... It's a pan-African idea, at least on the forest belt of West Africa. That  
2680 is that peace and justice requires spiritual jurisdiction and moral authority and political power  
2681 requires the exercise of both these things. And the common source for all these is women. So the  
2682 ritual performance of women in the political sphere has been a history-making act of civil  
2683 society, I contend. I think they are eloquently condemning political power left unchecked by  
2684 spiritual and moral authority. Their effort to call on female genital power in order to restore the  
2685 moral underpinnings of the state shows, I think, really brilliantly highlights the state's  
2686 widespread sexual violation of women and shows it to be even more reprehensible than the act

2687 itself is and even sets in high relief the government's critical missing ingredient. So it's in light  
2688 of this situation that I raised the kinds of questions that I did to try and bring the discussion of  
2689 global civil society in Africa to the case of African indigenous religions. What role do  
2690 indigenous religions play? How can we make appeal to powerful moral, spiritual ideas that still  
2691 have great currency in Africa and bring them into the discussion? How might the organizations  
2692 of which we are a part make use of them, give them leverage and relevance in this changing  
2693 political situation? Thanks.

2694

2695 **Kathleen Moore:** Thank you very much. That was excellent. We continue to be provocative  
2696 here, don't we? So now we open this for discussion and we'd like to take questions and we'll  
2697 collect three or four before the panelists can respond. So who's got the microphone?

2698

2699 **Mohammed Bamyeh:** Thank you. I really very much enjoyed the session and I have maybe a  
2700 lot of questions for each one but I know that time is limited. So I'll just restrict myself to a  
2701 couple key questions. One is for Waleed first. About Al Azhar in particular, and I think the rise  
2702 of the Salafis – while I agree with you, it is not indigenous to Egypt and it comes from outside  
2703 and all that – but there is one factor that you don't mention, which is part of the appeal of the  
2704 Salafis in the past 20 years or so may have something to do with the declining legitimacy of Al  
2705 Azhar itself, right? And it is not -- in spite of the statistics that you mentioned which are  
2706 impressive – one of the things that we know is that since 1961 at least, Al Azhar had become a  
2707 state institution and that in itself actually caused a decline in its moral authority. Not only that,  
2708 but also its historical endowments were taken away so that actually its economic independence  
2709 has been also sort of undermined, just like so many other institutions of Islamic higher learning  
2710 historically. In Egypt, some of the estimates that I have read – about one-third to one-quarter of  
2711 the land was held as endowment for the purposes of benefitting religious institutions historically.  
2712 In Nigeria in fact, half of the land in the [indistinct] period was actually held as such... and  
2713 Turkey likewise. You had really a very similar situation, so that religious kind of communities  
2714 were historically very independent from the state. And also the charitable activities as such, were  
2715 independent, and therefore also their moral authority in society was stronger and people listened  
2716 to them. One of the things that happens in the modern period is that as these endowments are  
2717 confiscated and these institutions become state institutions, people don't believe in them



2718 anymore, at least not in the same way as before. And thus Salafis, extremists, all that, arise  
2719 because there's no competition or the competition at least is not credible enough. So I'd like you  
2720 to comment on that a little bit if you can and whether this is likely to change in the post-  
2721 revolutionary period. And just a question for clarification, if you can just say briefly something  
2722 about the avoidance of harm, if you could describe its genealogy. I've been very interested in  
2723 that as well.

2724

2725 I have a question for Dr. Eskow about the question in particular of what makes a human rights  
2726 issue particularly resonant in a local area in particular. The example you give is really very  
2727 compelling but one thing I wonder is whether, for example, when we go to another area and  
2728 promote, say, gay and lesbian rights, whether that stand may do more harm than good. If there  
2729 isn't really a local organization or movement that is actually calling for those kinds of rights and  
2730 if this demand appears to be coming from outside, which of course opens up to appear as a  
2731 colonial ploy, even though, obviously we understand that it involves an emancipatory kind of  
2732 claims and demands that are legitimate in all other kinds of ways. But whether, basically, it is  
2733 kind of reasonable to just promote rights in the absence of... a credible enough force from the  
2734 local culture that actually speak the same language about those rights.

2735

2736 **Kathleen Moore:** And Mark, you had a question?

2737

2738 **Mark Juergensmeyer:** Yeah, I was also going to ask Waleed about the Al Azhar and its  
2739 influence along the line that Mohammed Bamyeh said and also wondering what happened to the  
2740 Sufis – where their vote went and whether they went to the Muslim Brotherhood and the 30%  
2741 Salafi...there can't be that many Wahhabis. This is an indigenous vote and where does it come  
2742 from and how is it going to shape out in terms of a coalition government? Is it automatically  
2743 going to be a Salafi/Muslim Brotherhood government or does the Muslim Brotherhood look  
2744 elsewhere for its coalition strength?

2745

2746 **Kathleen Moore:** Any other comments or questions?

2747

2748 **Sarah Blackmun-Eskow:** Laura, I was fascinated. That is quite a revelation. I think it's very  
2749 hard for Westerners to break through and be able to see what indigenous religion means to  
2750 people in Africa and then when you do, you find out that it's not like 9% of Africans practice  
2751 indigenous religions. It's like 99% do. Are you an anthropologist? Sounds like you might be.  
2752 Okay. You got it.

2753

2754 **Question from Audience:** Are you beating her up for that?

2755

2756 **Sarah Blackmun-Eskow:** No, I'm happy with that. I'm happy with that. My soul is of an  
2757 anthropologist. How do the appointed or elected authorities in Côte d'Ivoire take this  
2758 demonstration of female genital power? How is this handled or received in the culture, which I  
2759 assume is at least nominally, Roman Catholic?

2760

2761 **Kathleen Moore:** And I think, Jeff, you had a question over here.

2762

2763 **Jeffrey Haynes:** Thank you very much. I wanted to ask Steve about his comments about the  
2764 World Bank. Okay. You mentioned that the dialogue in the World Bank began...or the dialogue  
2765 from the World Bank to Archbishop Carey began in 1997 and you kind of implied to my hearing  
2766 that because the World Bank was heavily engaged in...let's call it neo-liberal economic  
2767 manipulation of economy, that it couldn't also be a humanitarian organization, let's say. So the  
2768 question I want to ask you is what would a World Bank that was a humanitarian organization  
2769 look like?

2770

2771 And the second comment is we heard from Thomas Tighe about the U.S. government and I think  
2772 he made it very plain that in a way the U.S. government can't be humanitarian unless there are  
2773 clear national concerns that can also be added to that. Is not the World Bank similar, in the sense  
2774 that its statutes will dictate that it can only use the money which it gains from member states for,  
2775 let's call it rational economic purposes or something of that nature? So I wonder whether to call  
2776 the World Bank or to imply that the World Bank's not humanitarian is in a sense not the right  
2777 issue because in a sense the World Bank can't be humanitarian, perhaps?

2778

2779 **Waleed El Ansary:** Sure. I'll start with Mark's question and then move to Dr. Mohammed's  
2780 question. As far as "where did the Salafis... get 32%?" I mean, well, part of it was cheating, as  
2781 we talked about before. It's really the influx of all the money that's coming from the Gulf. I  
2782 mean it's unbelievable the amount of money that's coming from Saudi Arabia and other places  
2783 in the Gulf that kind of gets used to co-opt popular imams and so forth and so on and so you  
2784 have this element there. I think this is one of the other roles that Al Azhar is really stepping up to  
2785 play and that is the importance of education. 45% of the people in Egypt are basically illiterate  
2786 and especially in the countryside where you have approximately 5,000 villages in Egypt. I think  
2787 about 20% of them do not even have a school. And so in that type of environment, the money of  
2788 the Salafis – they are the ones who really have the majority of that 20% of the mosques in Egypt  
2789 that are not under the scholars from Al Azhar. And so they use that as a platform, given the  
2790 external funding that they're getting, to develop this kind of political influence and unfortunately  
2791 because many of the people in these areas are not educated, they can't read, they use the length  
2792 of a person's beard as a proxy for piety. So really what the fact that the Salafis got 32% of the  
2793 vote does not mean that 32% of the Egyptian population is Salafi. It means that that 32% is  
2794 deeply religious and they're just being informed this is what they should do. This is why the  
2795 educational campaign...and quite frankly democracy can not operate that way. Democracy  
2796 presupposes that you have a reasonably sized middle class that's fairly well-educated about the  
2797 issues. When you have 45% of the people illiterate, you have the poor segments of the  
2798 population can be bought off from...or manipulated, let's put it this way. Not bought off directly  
2799 in that way, but they can be manipulated in all kinds of directions. And that's a really great  
2800 danger and so really the political crisis in Egypt is really reflecting a very deep educational crisis  
2801 in the country that...it's been neglected for many, many years.

2802

2803 As far as where did the Sufis go, I'm not sure what the surveys show about what  
2804 percentage...whom they voted for, but I'm sure they didn't vote for the Salafis, that's for sure.  
2805 And there are approximately 8 million Sufis in Egypt, by the way, so they represent a huge  
2806 political force in and of themselves. And many of the scholars at Al Azhar are of course related  
2807 to that. So there's really an educational campaign that Al Azhar is really stepping up to the plate  
2808 to combat this non-indigenous interpretation of Islam and a very truncated one at that, that

2809 represents a great danger to the Copts of Egypt as well. So this is really in everybody's interest to  
2810 make sure that that gets dealt with properly.

2811

2812 Now as far as your question, Dr. Mohammed, it's an excellent question. There has been, in a  
2813 sense, as far as the economic independence of Al Azhar goes, you're right that those  
2814 endowments were taken away, but quite frankly, those endowments... no longer generate  
2815 anywhere near the income that's necessary to support Al Azhar University. If you took all those  
2816 endowments back, I believe the statistics are that they would generate less than 10% of the  
2817 revenue that's necessary for Al Azhar to operate. So at this point, there's no question, from a  
2818 financial point of view, that Al Azhar University needs government support in order to continue  
2819 functioning. That being said, the last Article that they had suggested in their July...this last July  
2820 about the kind of guidelines for the constitution, they said that although we need the financial  
2821 support from the government, we need to be completely independent from them, precisely to  
2822 address some of these legitimacy issues. Now as far as the people go, as far as the mosques, the  
2823 imams in the mosques and so forth, this is really a question where they are still looking to these  
2824 Azhari imams for their spiritual and intellectual guidance. So although you might have at certain  
2825 levels the perception that, oh, well, you know, this is [indistinct] the scholars of the sultan, or of  
2826 the ruler,... you do have some of that for... certain figures. When it comes to the broader base  
2827 imams in the [indistinct] and so forth, it really isn't that situation and many of the scholars – the  
2828 top level scholars like Sheikh Ali Gomaa, the Grand Mufti of Egypt – enjoy incredible  
2829 popularity. Even before he was appointed as Grand Mufti of Egypt he enjoyed tremendous  
2830 popularity. That's one thing in the Islamic world – imams...religious scholars still have a little bit  
2831 of a role like celebrities, almost. So people like him enjoy tremendous popularity and influence,  
2832 regardless of what their appointments may be. And they're not tied to any political party, as I  
2833 mentioned before. But that's an excellent question and Al Azhar is seeking to kind of restore all  
2834 of that in the post-revolutionary period.

2835

2836 **Kathleen Moore:** Professor Grillo, did you want to respond to the question about how  
2837 government structures respond to female agency?

2838

2839 **Laura Grillo:** Well... let me answer it this way, your question: authorities who recognize these  
2840 acts for what they are, the cultural acts that they are, respond with sobriety and even fear,  
2841 trepidation, respect. In fact, the first time I heard the account of the story about de Villepin was  
2842 from a former government minister, Madame Bro-Gebe, who I was interviewing about women's  
2843 power in political situations...and the violence that had been perpetrated upon women and what  
2844 was being done about it, who was being held accountable. So they're aware. They're a part of the  
2845 culture. They're doing their own reading. Another recent, similar account that happened in  
2846 Cameroon I read reports about. The soldiers who were confronted with the mothers who were  
2847 doing this ritual act actually fled in fear of rousing the ire of their mothers. So it has considerable  
2848 cultural efficacy as a ritual act, as a political act. To the degree that the ritual acts then can be or  
2849 are ignored by the politicians, they do so out of self-interest. That's what I'm suggesting and in  
2850 this regard,... the fact that the international press overlooks these acts -- doesn't account for them,  
2851 ignores them -- does serve the interests of the state because the state of course wants to represent  
2852 itself as some kind of legitimate representative of the people and this is a very powerful  
2853 rhetorical way that people have to speak loudly in performative protest. So the state is  
2854 representing itself to the outside world as, you said, nominally Christian or nominally Muslim...  
2855 In other words, they continue to misrepresent themselves as representatives of a people that are  
2856 something more than just Christian, just Muslim, or a modernizing state on the Western model.  
2857 They're continually marginalizing indigenous religious values and ethics. And it's for this reason  
2858 that I'm trying to bring this back, front and center -- indigenous realities -- front and center to this  
2859 conversation and our consideration of the global civil society and religion in global civil society.  
2860 So the third dimension of this question and my answer to it is my own worry and fear that there  
2861 is a new generation that does not read -- even the indigenous population -- that does not read these  
2862 events for what they are and they themselves ignore their meaning. Those are people, especially  
2863 the young generation born in the city of mixed ethnicity, no more roots to village life, no longer  
2864 even speaking their own languages -- that don't really understand such acts and have bought into  
2865 that idea that these are kind of backward superstitions and they don't really understand them. I  
2866 see, insofar as that is true for them, especially young women are being systematically  
2867 disenfranchised of a mighty power that is their heritage.  
2868

2869 **Kathleen Moore:** And let's see, Steve, did you want to respond to Jeffrey's issue about is  
2870 humanitarianism really the right question to ask when we look at the...is that really the right issue  
2871 when we talk about the World Bank and its involvement in development?

2872

2873 **Steve Eskow:** As Jeffrey Haynes knows well, there are at least two principal views of the  
2874 World Bank and its motives. One is that it's an extension and an agent of the colonial powers,  
2875 that it's dominated by the U.S. and U.S. interests, that it's imposing on the poor countries of the  
2876 world a new kind of dependency. The other position is that even the self-interests of the rich  
2877 countries would be better served if poverty was lessened or eliminated in Africa and if Africa, as  
2878 a result of World Bank and other administrations of that kind, was able to remove or lessen its  
2879 poverty. So you do your own reading. My own hunch is that the World Bank saw in Africa an  
2880 opportunity to minimize or eliminate serious dependencies, serious poverty, and extend  
2881 capitalism in a productive and useful way. That's minority opinion. As I say, the majority  
2882 opinion is that the World Bank has been part of the apparatus of neo-colonialism and that its  
2883 motives are extending and enriching the already rich nations. So you take your pick.

2884

2885 **Paul Lynch** (observer/videographer): I had a question for Waleed El Ansary about Al Azhar's  
2886 view and sort of mandate, talking about the respect of the 3 Abrahamic religions and how the  
2887 Bahá'ís fit into that and also if you could comment a little bit more on the constitutional  
2888 reformation, dealing specifically with Article 2, post-revolution and how some of those factors  
2889 come into play.

2890

2891 **Richard Falk:** Yes, my question is also for Professor El Ansary. I was in Egypt about ten  
2892 months ago and spoke to a wide variety of people and not one of them anticipated the Salafi  
2893 strength. And now people come with very convincing explanations of why they're so strong. So  
2894 how do you explain this? And this included religious...people that were in touch with religious  
2895 movement. And the other question is, given this very interesting presentation on the absence of a  
2896 broader political and cultural perspective on the part of the Muslim Brotherhood, if they do in  
2897 fact... enter government in a prominent way, are they likely to look to Al Azhar for the kind of  
2898 guidance that you say is so prevalent in the society and how would that alter their political  
2899 profile?

2900

2901 **Jacob Olupona:** Thank you very much. I'd like to go back to the statement made by Waleed El  
2902 Ansary, not when you give your lecture relating to the "don't ask, don't tell" dictum as deposited  
2903 in the Quran. Very important question in view of the conversation relating to gay/lesbian issue in  
2904 Africa. I ask that because when this problem started in England, with the Church of England, that  
2905 was the position of the Anglican Church in Nigeria – "don't let us go near it." And they cited an  
2906 earlier case in the Lambeth Conference. When polygamy was the issue and Africa was the  
2907 victim, the bishops themselves said, "Don't let us go near it. We know it's going to disappear."  
2908 And that was the solution. But this time around, the American Church insisted that we must  
2909 discuss it and take a vote. That was the beginning of the crisis. So the "don't ask, don't tell"  
2910 reference – and I'm interested in that – seems to me the Anglican position... So I'm interested in  
2911 that because that may be a solution to a number of problems... I don't want Sarah to go home  
2912 without, at least, having some of us discuss our thoughts on this. We have also become victims  
2913 because we have been there to talk to the Anglican bishops and say, "Let us solve this problem."  
2914 Let me tell you now what they say. Within the country itself, within Nigeria or Uganda itself,  
2915 there are dissensions. There are Anglican bishops who do not like what is going on. Who would  
2916 like to be [indistinct] connected with the global Anglican communion? And they are very sad  
2917 that they can not...the young bishops can't go to Lambeth but they will expect that this should be  
2918 discussed internally first. We have not learned our lessons. This is what is going on. When it was  
2919 a shari'a conversation, one of the reasons why it was so difficult to solve in Nigeria was that the  
2920 moment the NGOs there and people started writing letters to these imams in northern Nigeria,  
2921 then they were so emboldened to say, "Aha! We're going to fight them. We don't want just to  
2922 hear from that." So there is a sense in which foreign intervention is very detrimental to the  
2923 conversation, be it shari'a, be it gay/lesbian crisis. But there are all kinds of things going on in  
2924 Nigeria. They found out there is a gay church in Nigeria – a gay church in Nigeria. So these  
2925 things were going on quietly and people were saying "Aha, what's going on here?" But the  
2926 moment it became an international issue, including Obama's statement a few weeks ago, I mean  
2927 a few months ago that he was issuing an Executive Order. I don't know if you know about this.  
2928 The Executive Order given by the President. I was shocked to hear that – that United States aid  
2929 would not be given to any African country that doesn't support same-sex marriage. These things  
2930 are detrimental to our foreign policy.

2931

2932 **Sarah Blackmun-Eskow:** I think he said that we wouldn't give any aid to countries that have  
2933 executed gays, which seems reasonable. Isn't it so that there are a lot of very conservative  
2934 Anglicans from the U.S. and England in Uganda, kind of stoking the fire?

2935

2936 **Jacob Olupona:** They are everywhere, that is true. I remember when one Anglican bishop  
2937 asked us in a conversation, "What is your response to this theologically?" I said, "Look, my duty  
2938 towards my neighbor and my duty towards my God. If I love God and hate my neighbors, what  
2939 do I do? My neighbors are going to be gay/lesbians. I live in America. Shall I hate them?" So in  
2940 other words, they are already thinking about this. It's important to allow an international  
2941 conversation to go on first before we take a stand on that. This is my point.

2942

2943 **Kathleen Moore:** Rebecca wanted to ask a question. I'm sorry. Rosalind. And then we'll have  
2944 responses from panelists.

2945

2946 **Rosalind Hackett:** Okay. Well I'm sorry to shift from sex and sexuality to terminology, but...it  
2947 seems very flat and boring but it's something that I'm passionate about and I'm going to throw  
2948 this out. Maybe nobody wants to take this up. Perhaps...I hope that perhaps Laura and Jacob  
2949 might support me on this. And there's no easy solution but I'm bothered by the f-word and by  
2950 the f-word I mean "faith." The way that "faith"... is being bandied around in international circles  
2951 even as if it existed in international human rights documents, which I don't think it does instead  
2952 of "religion." Now we know that "religion" isn't the best term, but at least it doesn't sound so  
2953 Western and so Christian. And you didn't call your program "Faith in Global Civil Society." At  
2954 least you called it "religion." But going back to the World Bank, I don't think they're the  
2955 primary agents of the sort of globalization of the "faith" word. I'm told that it's really journalists  
2956 to blame because... they didn't think that "spirituality" had a serious ring to it so they were  
2957 looking for... a synonym for religion and ended up with "faith." But the problem is for those of  
2958 us that work in Africa, "faith" does not work very well in terms of either a descriptor or as a sort  
2959 of operational term in conversations with indigenous religions. Now Dwight, I don't know what  
2960 you feel about this – whether the "faith" word comes up with your group – but to talk about,  
2961 Jacob, "Yoruba faith"... or "Navajo faith traditions" just doesn't work very well. So I'm just



2962 interested...I mean to me, words matter. I think to many women words matter, whether you feel  
2963 included or not by the labels that can be used to try to bring people together and mobilize people.  
2964 So that's my little spiel on the f-word.

2965

2966 **Marie** [question]: This might be boring as well. This is an observation, a question for  
2967 Dr. Eskow. A little louder? I became aware that World Vision was administering USAID funds  
2968 and I was curious about it and how it happened and why. And I had a chance to ask Rich Stearns,  
2969 who is President of World Vision U.S. how that happens. And he told me that after the budget is  
2970 set and they decide which countries they're going to send money to, they come up with programs  
2971 and so they have an RFP situation and so World Vision looks at that and they decide which of  
2972 these programs they are uniquely qualified... to administer. And so they handle the RFP situation  
2973 and get oftentimes – because they are uniquely qualified to do that in a lot of cases – they are  
2974 awarded that proposal. I'm wondering if you think that's a valid system.

2975

2976 **Steve Eskow:** Are you talking to me?

2977

2978 **Kathleen Moore:** Okay, yeah, let's take these questions. If we can go back to the beginning, I  
2979 think if we refresh our memory, Waleed, you were asked to explain the Bahá'ís, the  
2980 Ahmadiyyas, and the Salafis all in about 90 seconds.

2981

2982 **Waleed El Ansary:** Well, I'll try to be very quick. Regarding the Bahá'ís, the Egyptian  
2983 government's official policy, at the very beginning, was to recognize them as a religious  
2984 minority. That was the official government position. What led to a difficulty from the  
2985 government's point of view with the Bahá'ís was the national security issue, in relation to Israel  
2986 and the fact that the headquarters are there and then there were incidents of alleged spying and  
2987 so forth. So what complicated the relationship was not this government discrimination as such, as  
2988 it was a national security issue. Regarding Article 2, which states that Islam is the official  
2989 religion of the state and a source of legislation and that Arabic is the national language of Egypt,  
2990 how do we balance that with Article 7, for example, that states that all Egyptian citizens  
2991 regardless of race, religion, creed, are equal citizens before the law and how do you balance that  
2992 out? And, at least from the point of view of the scholars at Al Azhar, and really what the

2993 guidelines that Al Azhar recommended for the new constitution going forward, is to respect all  
2994 of the rights of the minority communities. Islamic law is very clear about that. And I'll give you  
2995 just one incidence. When the prophet of Islam had met the delegation of Christians from Nazran  
2996 in Medina, the Christians of Nazran – it came for their time to pray.... When it came time for  
2997 them to pray, they were about to pray in the masjid of the prophet himself and then some of the  
2998 companions of the prophet interrupted and said, "What are you doing?" And then the prophet  
2999 himself said, "Let them pray." And the scholars of Islamic law said that it's perfectly acceptable  
3000 not only for the Christians to have their own houses of worship, but for Christians to pray inside  
3001 masjid. And so that's just the kind of example...and scholars at Al Azhar will bring tons of  
3002 examples of incidents like that, that groups like the Salafis, with a very truncated understanding  
3003 of the tradition, ignore and misunderstand. And so how to balance those two articles – it is  
3004 possible, according to the scholars at Al Azhar.

3005

3006 Regarding Dr. Falk's wonderful questions about how do we explain the Salafi's strength on one  
3007 hand and will the Muslim Brotherhood look to Al Azhar on the other and modify their political  
3008 profile accordingly, the Salafi strength is really about economic influence – where the money  
3009 goes. That's really where it's at. If they did not have the financial resources behind them, coming  
3010 from Saudi Arabia, there's no way they could've gotten any of this kind of results.

3011

3012 **Richard Falk:** Why did no one notice that?

3013

3014 **Waleed El Ansary:** Oh yes. You know, I think that people were expecting perhaps the Salafis  
3015 to come in at 10% or something around those lines. So you're right. They came out much greater  
3016 than that, and really, I do sincerely believe some of that is just fraudulent. I think that's election  
3017 cheating. I think that some of it is, I don't want to make any jokes, but...part of that is that  
3018 [cheating] and that was a surprise to many analysts. But I think when you look back at it, it's  
3019 possible to account for that. But I really expect for that role to decrease significantly going  
3020 forward. I think this is a one-time thing and that as Al Azhar gets more involved in the picture,...  
3021 that influence will decline.

3022

3023 Regarding the Muslim Brotherhood and looking to Al Azhar, quite frankly, the Muslim  
3024 Brotherhood is not going to have a choice. Once Al Azhar takes a position, that's it. That  
3025 changes the whole political landscape. So whether or not the Muslim Brotherhood wants to listen  
3026 to Al Azhar, they are really not going to have a choice. Al Azhar is really the elephant in the  
3027 room and if it throws its weight one way or another, even the military has to deal with that. So  
3028 it's a huge influence, so I don't think they'll have a choice.

3029  
3030 Finally, regarding the collaboration with the Anglican Church Archbishop Williams was visiting  
3031 with Sheikh Ali Gomaa I think during the summer so I don't know whether they exchanged  
3032 notes on this particular issue, but let me just summarize very briefly the Islamic position on this  
3033 from a theological point of view, and I'll use an Eastern analogy for this. If we think of the dao,  
3034 the dao... of course has the yin and the yang that are complements to one another but the yin has  
3035 an element of yang in it and vice versa. And so in the divine order, from an Islamic theological  
3036 point of view, God's names and attributes are divided into names of majesty on one hand – the  
3037 rigor, God is the judge, the giver of death and so forth – and names of mercy or beauty on the  
3038 other –such as God is the infinitely merciful, the ever-beautiful, and so forth. And in creation  
3039 itself, the Quran says that God creates all things in pairs, as it does in the Bible and so forth, and  
3040 that these pairs in the human state, manifests itself in terms of the male state has both the yin and  
3041 the yang within it, as does the female state, but the male state has more of the yang than the yin  
3042 and the female state has more of the yin than the yang. Now the fact that the yin and yang...  
3043 attract one another, in the sense of attraction, that represents the attraction between the sexes and  
3044 that is the basis, ontologically, from an Islamic theological point of view, for marriage. The fact  
3045 that, however, we contain within ourselves both the yin and the yang, and therefore we can  
3046 achieve spiritual realization independent and outside of marriage, is the principle of monasticism,  
3047 as we have in Catholicism, for example. And so, therefore you can achieve spiritual realization  
3048 either through marriage or outside of marriage, but to have yin-yin and yang-yang is not being  
3049 dao-like. And therefore, that introduces a source of disequilibrium within the person themselves  
3050 and also cosmically. And so that explains the Chinese opposition to this, of the Confucian and  
3051 Daoist traditions, the Hindu tradition, the Buddhist tradition, you name it, across the board. And  
3052 so I think that Dr. Mohammed is absolutely right – that if we try to insert this as part of our

3053 political agenda and foreign policy, that just spells disaster, because it's going to be looked upon  
3054 as a colonial type of imposition.

3055

3056 **Kathleen Moore:** Thanks, I think if I'm not skipping anything, we have two more questions on  
3057 the table – the question from Rosalind about problematizing religion and the problem with  
3058 “faith” as a term, that when we use that, what do we make of that with respect to indigenous...?

3059

3060 **Laura Grillo:** Okay, so I say to that, “Amen!” Amen, let's not talk about faith. Let's talk about  
3061 religion. You know, it's worth stating overtly – that for a long time, African religions were not  
3062 considered religion, were not represented as such in the academy, certainly not by the missions  
3063 that taught Africans that “religion” represented faith and a doctrine, and that faith speaks more to  
3064 orthodoxies to which one concedes rationally and spiritually. African religions are praxis-based  
3065 religions. They're orthopraxis, not orthodoxy. You know, because Africans themselves have  
3066 been taught that their own ethnic traditions and the spiritual beliefs and values and practices are  
3067 not religion, this has a great deal to do with the very skewed kind of self-reporting about, “What  
3068 is your religion?” Well, people report their religion is one of the two possibilities – Christian or  
3069 Muslim – but they're not reporting... Statistically there's not an accurate, therefore,  
3070 representation of what the practice truly is about and what the beliefs really are and the myriad  
3071 ways and the complex ways that they are practiced simultaneously and synchronistically,  
3072 synthetically, etc. This... confusion about faith and religion is another reason, as I've been  
3073 suggesting and many of us have been suggesting all day, that the indigenous traditions get  
3074 marginalized in these wider conversations, and considering the role of religions and African  
3075 religions in the global situation, even though African religions are now very much world  
3076 religions, if for no other reason, because of the worldwide African Diaspora. And that the  
3077 African Diaspora on the continent, given the wars, the upheavals, the displacements, the refugee  
3078 situations that have caused populations to move en masse. We have, back and forth, so much  
3079 more commerce, not only in terms of transportation of peoples back and forth from Brazil to  
3080 Nigeria, for example, sharing...getting indoctrinated and re-indoctrinated and initiated and re-  
3081 initiated in traditions, but also widespread internet of these oral traditions and praxis-based  
3082 religions. So we have to consider that also – ...really a re-conception of what religion is and how  
3083 it's practiced and what its implications are on the ground and in the wider political sphere. And

3084 then finally, in terms of the disenfranchisement of women that I spoke about in Côte d'Ivoire, I  
3085 think women are being disenfranchised by both the state and by religion, to the degree that both  
3086 the state and religion are seizing upon these Western forms that are patriarchal and that privilege  
3087 men in so many ways.

3088

3089 **Kathleen Moore:** Thank you. Let me know if I'm overlooking anyone. The final question for  
3090 Dr. Eskow about government aid, about USAID money and budgetary decisions that are made, if  
3091 I understand this, that when the budget is determined and RFPs are issued and organizations like  
3092 World Vision respond to the RFP and apply to gain government contracts. That was your  
3093 question and what was his take on that? Do you understand what I'm saying?

3094

3095 **Steve Eskow:** Is the question how do I feel about that process?

3096

3097 **Kathleen Moore:** When you mentioned it earlier, it sounded like you didn't approve of that.

3098

3099 **Steve Eskow:** I sounded like I didn't think it was a valid process?

3100

3101 **Kathleen Moore:** That's the way I heard it.

3102

3103 **Steve Eskow:** I have a feeling I really don't understand the nuances of the question. Faith-based  
3104 organizations apply to USAID for support.

3105

3106 **Kathleen Moore:** All kinds of organizations. Not for support. For contracts for specific  
3107 programs that the government, the U.S. government has already decided need to be done for a  
3108 specific country.

3109

3110 **Steve Eskow:** And do I think the pattern of support that USAID offers is legitimate and valid, is  
3111 that what you're asking? I'm having trouble with the question.

3112

3113 **Mark Juergensmeyer:** Let's continue this discussion later then. Anything else you'd like to say  
3114 to wrap up the panel?

3115

3116 **Kathleen Moore:** Only to thank you very much to our host and fearless leader. Thank you all.

3117

3118 **WRAP-UP/REFLECTION SESSION**

3119

3120 **Mark Juergensmeyer:** We're not going to take a break right now because I assume you would

3121 like to get out a little bit early and what we usually do at this particular point in our workshop is

3122 have a couple minutes to reflect on a question that was first given to me by my third grade

3123 teacher. I think her name was Miss Davis, as I recall, and at the end of the class everyday she

3124 would look around the room and she'd say, "Alright, kids." She'd say, "What have we learned

3125 today?" And each of us would have to tell Miss Davis at least one thing that they learned today.

3126

3127 So I'll give you a couple minutes to think about this, but since I'm asking the question, I've had

3128 a couple minutes to think about it. And I think what I've learned today...a couple things. I've

3129 learned that certainly sub-Saharan Africa is different from northern Africa and the Middle East in

3130 so many different ways, not the least of which is the prevalence of oil and the presence of Islam.

3131 But I think the enduring thing that I've learned today is how hard it is to do good. The kind of

3132 complications that we've raised in our conversation – whether we're talking about state collusion

3133 with NGOs, whether we're talking about state and NGO competition, where NGOs move into

3134 places like Haiti, for example, with enormous power and influence and the government has very

3135 little power or influence to wield back, to the kind of open, almost "wild west" possibilities of

3136 particularly large American-funded NGOs in different parts of the world. But not without

3137 insensitivity on their parts, not without insensitivity to their influence but also to their

3138 accountability as Thomas Tighe was saying – the concern for accountability, the way in which

3139 organizations are open in terms of the way in which they operate. The degree to which they are

3140 organizations, as I said, and organizations tend to want to promote themselves. You know, there

3141 is a kind of expansionist character to organizations. And then that business that Mae raised that

3142 still resonates in my head – the idea of theological imperialism. But it could be ideological or

3143 cultural imperialism also, the kinds of assumptions about what is good and what is important and

3144 whether that resonates in the same way.

3145

3146 Are there some things – female genital mutilation, for example – that is just....that’s a universal  
3147 give, you’re against that? There should be no question about it. Issues of rights for everybody  
3148 regardless of their sexuality – is that just a given regardless of what other else you think about it?  
3149 Well, maybe. I remember years ago when we had a project. At this case it was my previous  
3150 institution, the University of California at Berkeley and the Graduate Theological Union. We had  
3151 a joint project with the Harvard Divinity School on... values in a comparative perspective. And  
3152 there was one heated moment when the area specialists among us were arguing for what sounded  
3153 to others as a kind of ethical relativism about what is right and what standards are correct. The  
3154 issue had focused on sati, the practice in India... where widows throw themselves on the funeral  
3155 pyre and they become goddesses in the process and are venerated within Indian society. But of  
3156 course the British looked in horror at this practice. And we were discussing that and... Hindu  
3157 scholars tried to defend it. I remember Peter Berger, a sociologist, getting up and saying, “Well I  
3158 don’t care about all of this talk. I don’t care what you say and what position you’re in. If there  
3159 was a funeral pyre piled in the middle of this floor and it was ignited and a woman started  
3160 climbing on it for whatever reason, what person here wouldn’t climb up there and yank her down  
3161 to save her life?” So I think that’s one of the issues that’s being raised. I mean there are things  
3162 about which we feel enormously strongly, we feel that’s universal, even though there is also the  
3163 sense that maybe that isn’t entirely right and maybe... cultural sensitivities should make us pause  
3164 at least in the way in which we engage with other cultures about this issue, if not about the  
3165 primacy of our own concern about the matter. How hard it is to do good, that’s what I learned.

3166

3167 **Sarah Blackmun-Eskow:** Don’t you have to know a lot to answer the question about sati? Like  
3168 what happens to Indian widows?

3169

3170 **Mark Juergensmeyer:** But even when you do know a lot – and the area specialists all knew an  
3171 awful lot – even after it’s all said and done, wasn’t Peter Berger right? That there wasn’t a single  
3172 one of us who wouldn’t climb up there and pull her back down? Well, the floor is open for others  
3173 to join in. Yes? Was that a stretch or was that to make a point?

3174

3175 **Dwight Hopkins:** Both-and.

3176

3177 **Mark Juergensmeyer:** Dwight, what did you learn today?

3178

3179 **Dwight Hopkins:** I learned a great deal, but just a couple things: one, I learned that it's a  
3180 beautiful thing to have people who have so many differences in one room and have a civil  
3181 conversation, and two, the necessity for this conversation to continue. The other thing I learned  
3182 was that it's important for us, who have so many different perspectives, to have, at some point,  
3183 some venue, some time, to talk more about what motivates us in what we do. And so to sort of  
3184 get past the words that we use, whether they're "secular," or "faith" or "religion" or "self-  
3185 cultivation." And the other thing I learned, I guess the third thing I learned is that from my  
3186 perspective, how everything we do, whatever we label, is very human, very, very human.

3187

3188 **Mark Juergensmeyer:** Shall I start calling on people?

3189

3190 **Jeffrey Haynes:** Let me get it over with. The first thing I've learned is that the term "the  
3191 ambivalence of the sacred" doesn't do justice to the array of complex positions that people in  
3192 groups acting apparently for religious motivations have. And the second thing I've learned is that  
3193 the very term "religion" doesn't do justice to what we've been talking about today. This isn't  
3194 really a comment on the issue about "faith" or "religion" or other terms. It's really that... [while]  
3195 we've had many, many different conversations today about many, many different things which  
3196 have all come under the rubric of the overall topic of religion in global civil society, we haven't  
3197 really talked about the "global," however. Our conversations have been much more about the  
3198 local, which surprised me. And I guess it confirms once again that we can talk about  
3199 globalization, but when it comes to activities and actors that we label "religious," it's really  
3200 much more about what goes on at the local level and the world faiths, whether we like that term  
3201 or not, aren't a very good starting or ending point for this kind of discussion. It's much more  
3202 about the indigenous, cultural, historical, and other traditions which feed into something like  
3203 modernity, which becomes highly important. So I've learned a lot. Well I think I've learned a lot.  
3204 I shall go away much more confused than I was this morning, but I don't know whether that's a  
3205 good thing or a bad thing.

3206



3207 **Robert Dowd:** I think one thing that I learned is that there's a lot that we don't know and I think  
3208 that just along the lines of what Jeff just mentioned, I think there's a bit of constructive  
3209 destruction here that needs to take place first. And just the relationship between traditional  
3210 religions and these African traditional religions and world religions – is there a difference, right?  
3211 And Laura raises that. But I'm just thinking of the reference to the women of Côte d'Ivoire as  
3212 nominally Christian – would they define themselves as nominally Christian? Maybe they would  
3213 but odds are they would see themselves as truly Christian, many of them, and many of them as  
3214 truly traditional at the same time. And so the world is very, very complicated out there and I  
3215 think that religious identities are very, very complex and nuanced. I think that also builds on  
3216 what Jeff just mentioned...

3217  
3218 I talked a lot about measuring impact and trying to assess the impact of religious institutions. I  
3219 think that it's extremely important for people who are working on those kinds of questions to  
3220 also be working with people who... have a greater knowledge of the cultural complexities that are  
3221 a part of the equation, so the anthropologists working together with the political scientists and the  
3222 economists and the sociologists. I think interdisciplinary work is called for here and too much of  
3223 the work has been stove-piped along disciplinary lines and so I think one thing that I've learned  
3224 here is the importance of interdisciplinary research. So thank you.

3225  
3226 **Jacob Olupona:** Thank you very much. I have learned quite a lot. One, that there are no easy  
3227 answers to these questions we have raised, and that it is important for us to continue to debate  
3228 them and to see to what extent our positions can change from the views we hold onto very  
3229 deeply. The second part of it is that we have been exposed to what are probably called the  
3230 intersections within intellectual academic work and the practical applications of those theories  
3231 and ideas, without necessarily thinking that the debate has been less vigorous than what we  
3232 normally and often are on the take in academic intellectual context in the classroom. And so that  
3233 issues of poverty, consumption, HIV/AIDS, development issues have been discussed.

3234  
3235 It then, for me, leads to another issue – that those of us who find ourselves in schools of divinity,  
3236 schools of theology, will have to re-think the way we do business, that it is no point just studying  
3237 New Testament and Old Testament without thinking about the relevance of these subjects and

3238 this academic pursuit to the life of people and the kinds of things we deal with. One of the things  
3239 I discovered in the Divinity School, Harvard Divinity School, is that students want to relate  
3240 whatever they are doing to all these issues of development, of health, and economic growth,  
3241 poverty, corruption, but they don't know how. Now quite often they have to go to another  
3242 school, like the Kennedy School or Public Health, to find professors to work with. And then they  
3243 are left with the idea that, well, the world is so polarized. These subjects, academic pursuits, are  
3244 so divided and there's no connection between them. I think in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the schools of  
3245 divinity and colleges of theology should really begin to re-think how they do business.  
3246 Somehow, most of them should be involved in what we are fond of calling "social engagement,"  
3247 even if it's a question of doing a project at the end of their take.

3248  
3249 And finally, I think the conversation has served me to re-think the importance of civil society. At  
3250 times, you have this feeling that has been so overused, but it's so interesting to see it in context  
3251 and to see how it has become even more important than what it used to be in the 90s. So even in  
3252 the late-90s and in the early century. When I got this invitation, I almost said, "Civil society  
3253 again?" I thought we had finished with that. But this has been very, very helpful for me. It has  
3254 been a learning process, too. Thank you.

3255  
3256 **Claudine Michel:** I told Mark during the break that this was difficult for me because I come  
3257 from Haiti, republic of 11,000 NGOs, but I'm grateful to mentor, colleague, friend, Jacob, who  
3258 first mentioned this conversation to me and Mark for inviting me. I learned a lot today. I also  
3259 learned that I wasn't off in some of my thinking because I don't do NGOs, you know, in terms of  
3260 my own specialty. I also learned there's a big difference between humanitarian help and all these  
3261 convictions and motivations that pushes us to do well, but also the institutionalization of those  
3262 NGOs in poor countries like Haiti and other parts of the world, where the local population is  
3263 displaced, where you have a foreign doctor getting paid \$1,000 a day and the local doctor gets  
3264 paid \$1,000 a month. So those are very complex issues that we're grappling with in the case of  
3265 Haiti, and it's a disaster of a magnitude that can not even be described. A 7-point earthquake  
3266 should not be killing 300,000 people and displacing a third of the population and us having a  
3267 million people still living in tents and unsanitary conditions with 200, 300 people sharing one  
3268 latrine. So it's a very complex situation, but there are people who originally came there to help

3269 but there's this institutionalization of that help that really needs to be re-thought and it's help that  
3270 re-shapes and re-colonizes in some ways. We have to pause and think about that.

3271

3272 I would say that a lot of points were brought home about NGOs needing to have some kind of  
3273 oversight and timeframe and accountability and those things are not there. I wrote this poem for  
3274 a little girl. Her older sister was raped and the last line of the poem is "How many cups of  
3275 revolution will it take for little Fela to throw away her whistle and dream of a new Haiti?" And  
3276 those whistles were given to those little girls to try to prevent rapes in those tents. I would say,  
3277 how many cups of revolution? How many more conversations will it take for us as academics to  
3278 really dream of this new world where our intellectual powers will help re-shape the world and  
3279 make a difference in people's life and be relevant, as Jacob mentioned? So I'm very grateful to  
3280 all of you for that conversation and all the work that you are doing. The commitment is real, I  
3281 felt it. So thank you very much.

3282

3283 **Fritz Lampe:** I echo much of what's been said. Of the things that I will lift up, one is the need  
3284 for interdisciplinary conversation, that's critical. The second is... when I teach Introduction to  
3285 Cultural Anthropology, talk about culture is something that... is this amorphous thing that is  
3286 dynamic. It's changing. It's in motion. It has all kinds of parts and parcels that people are actors  
3287 in and in some ways, the conversation we've had today has been a conversation about changing  
3288 culture – cultures in terms of NGOs thinking about different ways. What is our primary purpose -  
3289 - and perhaps stepping out with new language and new ways of being in the world and  
3290 academics as well. There's hope, I guess, in that. So that's...yeah.

3291

3292 **Rosalind Hackett:** Thank you. I've appreciated being at an event where the mix of academics  
3293 and practitioners...some of us in the academic study of religion can get nervous about being put  
3294 with religious practitioners because we may have been talking at odds, but I felt that we were  
3295 often not talking at odds, so I've learned a lot, particularly from the practitioners. In particular,  
3296 I'd like to say that I will take away the encouraging knowledge that there is actually more  
3297 humanitarian cooperation across religious lines than I thought there was. So I've learned that  
3298 particularly from Tom and Karel. So that will stick in my mind. Finally, I've learned that Mark  
3299 Juergensmeyer needs to be cloned.

3300

3301 **Thomas Tighe:** Well thank you all. I've learned from a previous meeting never to attempt to  
3302 speak after Claudine, so I'm applying that learning today. And really, I leave with a lot of  
3303 questions – all the ones that Jeffrey posed at the beginning and just the conversation about what  
3304 is humanitarianism, what is religion. And I think the conversation for me, talking about  
3305 indigenous religions versus [others]... I was thinking, "Well all the big ones are kind of exports,  
3306 right?" They start up in a relatively constrained area. So the legitimacy at one point is kind of the  
3307 market share you gain. And I hadn't really thought about it like that – why I was raised Catholic,  
3308 knowing where it started and growing up where I did, it doesn't make any particular sense if you  
3309 think about it. So I don't know really where to file that, except that it's given me a lot to think  
3310 about. And also I think I was struck by how easy it is to confuse function with purpose. So you  
3311 can look at someone who's doing something for a governmental purpose that looks exactly – and  
3312 is exactly, at a functional level (distributing food or providing healthcare) – the same function for  
3313 a completely different purpose by someone motivated... [by] their religious belief in this world.  
3314 And so it's very hard to dissect. If you look at two different people doing identical things – one  
3315 motivated for some other purpose – it doesn't make any difference at all. Again, I don't know  
3316 what the answer is, but I think at a policy level, what role government plays, how much they  
3317 should involve themselves in that purpose when it's religious, and not focus on the function --  
3318 it's left me more confused than when I came in and I'm thankful for that. So thank you all.

3319

3320 **Mae Cannon:** Well I was not disappointed. I'm very thankful to be around the table and am  
3321 taking away things from each of you. I look forward to going home and musing a bit and  
3322 reflecting on the different points of discussion that we've had but a few immediate take-aways: I  
3323 do still believe that NGOs do some good. Yes, I hope so. But I do take to heart some of the  
3324 conversation about what it means to have measurements and to have tools to evaluate  
3325 effectiveness and also the whole idea that humanitarianism can be used to legitimize actions that  
3326 are not good. I think that was a very helpful discussion for me personally. I'm also thankful to  
3327 Waleed and Mohammed because a lot of my work is in the Arab world. I'm going to Egypt in a  
3328 week and will be working with some of the community in rural upper Egypt in a little village  
3329 called Deir Abu Hennes and the population I work with in Egypt is the 1% or the less than 1%  
3330 that would be the Protestant or Evangelical Christian community there. And so to have a greater

3331 context of the revolutions and the post-revolution and that, from an Islamic perspective, was  
3332 very, very helpful to me. And then I'll leave with the exhortation of Richard Falk and hope that  
3333 I'm not leaving with this air of colonial arrogance. His terminology was quite striking so I will  
3334 reflect on that quite a bit as I depart from this place.

3335

3336 **Sarah Blackmun-Eskow:** I wrote down a lot of questions that I would like to look into, which,  
3337 to me, is the best kind of response to what went on there today, if I am stimulated. My husband  
3338 doesn't think so. He just wants me to finish my dissertation and get on with it, whatever it is. I  
3339 did also cull several names of people who might be my outside reader so don't be surprised if  
3340 you get an email proposing that. Thank you.

3341

3342 **Laura Grillo:** Well, first, I just want to acknowledge how deeply honored I felt to have been  
3343 included among you all. I've been so profoundly impressed by the work that people are doing  
3344 and the commitment and the depth of reflection and the heart that they bring to their work. So  
3345 it's been a real privilege to be part of this conversation. Also, I have to say I think I would like to  
3346 get back to Jeffrey's call earlier this morning to get back to terms because just to prepare for  
3347 participating in this conversation, I started asking myself, "Well do I even know really what  
3348 global civil society is?" and started reading about it. What does it mean now? What is the  
3349 conversation out there? How are these terms being used? What's the conversation going to be  
3350 like? And I think it's an intimidatingly contentious arena. But I guess I've learned to value even  
3351 more than ever what you're doing here at UCSB by... elevating the conversation and making sure  
3352 that you are training people to think globally because we are realizing how we can not rely on  
3353 statehood, nationhood. The ways that the world has been cut and divided before, it's a new game  
3354 and we all have to change our way of going about our business. That includes people like me in  
3355 the academic world. So thank you so much.

3356

3357 **Mohammed Bamyeh:** I don't know where to start. There is a lot that can be said. I think of this  
3358 event as a continuing conversation because I did catch many threads that I think we never  
3359 actually got a chance to finish, and I think that's typical. But one of those ideas that is worth  
3360 talking about a little bit more – and I have become much more convinced of it after this meeting  
3361 – is the idea of civil society itself. What does it mean?... There is a traditional way of thinking

3362 about civil society and I think most of us also subscribe to it. But there are other ways to think  
3363 about it, I think. One of the things that I have learned, again, last week...I'm teaching a new  
3364 graduate seminar on revolutions. So I decided to start it last week with Thomas Kuhn, *The*  
3365 *Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, for social revolutions. Then I remembered something that I  
3366 had learned already but I had forgot in the meantime, which is that one of the things that Thomas  
3367 Kuhn says is that the function of the paradigm is to make us not see reality, which could be right  
3368 in front of us for centuries. It allows us to get our work done but it also gives us a sense that our  
3369 work has to be defined in a particular kind of way so that it can be done. But that happens at the  
3370 expense of not seeing the rest of reality that could be just in front of us. And I think civil society,  
3371 seen in a particular way, makes us feel that there's nothing out there. If you think of it from the  
3372 point of view of European history, which is where we have the bourgeois European experience  
3373 that gives us a certain definition of what civil society is, or look elsewhere in the world, you get  
3374 disappointed because you don't see as much of it. On the other hand, if you define civil society  
3375 in a very different kind of way that's appropriate to a notion of autonomous, self-organized kind  
3376 of societies, then you see it as a very rich human experience throughout history and non-  
3377 bourgeois kind of environments, pre-capitalist perhaps, if that's an appropriate term, and even in  
3378 conditions that are never typically assumed to be identified with what we call "civic culture,"  
3379 such as, for example, tribalism. So this is, for me, part of a conversation that is to be continued  
3380 and I understand much more the significance of that potential conversation after today. I got  
3381 exposed to a lot of material that I was not aware of, of course about the traditional African  
3382 religions, of course, genital power, very interesting. But all kinds of things. And there is a certain  
3383 richness to the idea of thinking about what local religions, so to speak, also kind of thinking  
3384 about, say, the Black experience, for example, in a way that goes beyond kind of a typical  
3385 understanding of what Black is, and so on. So I feel enlivened, overall. Also, I think, this is an  
3386 invitation to continue this conversation and deepen it further.

3387

3388 **Kathleen Moore:** At first I wanted to say a couple of things. I don't think I've ever heard  
3389 Islamic jurisprudence talked about in Daoist terms, so I'm going to take that away with me. I  
3390 really appreciate that. Thank you very much, Waleed. And I think this is a case of what the  
3391 Prophet in his own land...I'm right here in my own neighborhood. I've stumbled upon -- thanks  
3392 to Mark for inviting me -- such a rich conversation going on about things that we all really need

3393 to know more about – how non-profit sector operates. Thomas, I’ve never met you before though  
3394 we must be neighbors. I live in Goleta where your organization operates. The terms that you use  
3395 have been fresh for me, not having any MBA background, but when you talk about can NGOs  
3396 perform the functions that they aspire to do and “getting to scale” and so forth, I think, “This  
3397 is...wow. I don’t even know what that means. I’d love to know...” Let’s have another  
3398 conversation about all this. So that’s great. I’m going to take away also Laura’s term about how  
3399 this has all brought to sharper relief the critical absence when government provides these  
3400 services and who is it...I think Tom also alludes to who is it that steps up when government no  
3401 longer serves the functions that we have come to rely on about...in a resource-rich world, how do  
3402 we distribute what we have? So I thank you for that.

3403

3404 **Mark Juergensmeyer:** Karel?

3405

3406 **Karel Zelenka:** Well I’m really humbled by the -- and I mean it – by the academic standing, the  
3407 articulation of issues. And it’s for me an extremely refreshing experience because when I go to  
3408 meetings where I am based or in most countries where I work, it’s very concrete, very practical.  
3409 If anything, it’s more or less prediction of future, but again, more in terms of needs and  
3410 responses. And here, I enjoyed the analysis, the thinking that goes with it. What I’d like to say is,  
3411 again on that same note, it’s for me amazing to see how many people of very high academic  
3412 standing are what appears genuinely interested in the fates and lives of people to whom they are  
3413 not related in any way, in any personal way. And it’s also refreshing for me because from where  
3414 I sit, normally, it’s quite depressing. I would say depressing despite all the resources and the  
3415 wealth that exists in most of these countries. The greed that has been unfortunately spreading and  
3416 increasing, and corruption that goes with it. They kill the future, in a way, and so it’s refreshing  
3417 to hear about civil society that, in my opinion, is... a bridge to a better future. Why I’m saying  
3418 that is that democracy that most countries at least in Africa are trying to build and to strengthen,  
3419 is in a way a guarantee of better resources, distribution. Also, that can lead to reduction in the  
3420 number of NGOs because if you have a functioning democracy that guarantees proper  
3421 transparent and fair distribution of resources and taxation, etc., that relieves the NGOs of their  
3422 task. In other words, there is no room for them because the government takes care of the basic  
3423 function, such as healthcare, for example... For example, PEPFAR has been designed to basically

3424 fill that gap because the governments do not take care of their citizens. So I've learned many,  
3425 many things... I will look forward to the transcripts because it was so rich and so diverse.

3426

3427 Last but not least, I'd like to mention that perhaps you should go more often to the field and  
3428 spend a longer time in the field to have what I would call "the reality check." Because your  
3429 language – very sophisticated, very elegant – really doesn't match the reality on the ground. It  
3430 will be very difficult for you to communicate with the reality on the ground and to reflect it. So I  
3431 would say it would be very helpful. I know it's costly, time-consuming, but certainly worthwhile  
3432 -- sort of the realpolitik, to understand. And sometimes the naïveté that exists outside the  
3433 area...and what I mean by that...for me personally it's fascinating. I never hear this kind of  
3434 discussion among my African colleagues or other nationalities' colleagues. In other words, the  
3435 sophistication, the looking for roots for why is it? Why do we do all this? In other words, it's  
3436 very often taken for granted and what's interesting is that the new generation of masters in  
3437 Africa, that is to say Chinese, who are abundant and proliferating in great numbers with a lot of  
3438 cash, they never get to discussing humanitarian aspects of their presence – strictly business. Very  
3439 shrewd and very, I would say, almost merciless business.

3440

3441 **Mark Juergensmeyer:** Next year we'll go to Beijing, maybe.

3442

3443 **Karel Zelenka:** Right. Thanks.

3444

3445 **Mark Juergensmeyer:** Steve and Bill and Waleed, just briefly, what did you learn today?

3446

3447 **Steve Eskow:** I learned that I need new hearing aids. That was the painful learning. I also  
3448 learned that I'm ambivalent about what Derrida called the "metaphysics of presence" – the  
3449 argument that education is rich only when people like us are able to be assembled for face-to-  
3450 face connection and collaboration and conversation. If the films that Paul and others will make of  
3451 this encounter can become a piece of curriculum that we can take to Africa and use in the  
3452 universities in Ghana and in the schools and in the churches, we will get full value for what  
3453 we've done here, which so far is confined to the lucky group of us.

3454



3455 **Mark Juergensmeyer:** Very good. Bill?

3456

3457 **William Headley:** I'd like to go last, if I could.

3458

3459 **Mark Juergensmeyer:** Sure. Waleed?

3460

3461 **Waleed El Ansary:** Thank you. I'd like to echo everything that we've heard earlier. It's really  
3462 humbling. I learned a great deal from Karel. I didn't know about the Muslim-Catholic interaction  
3463 to that degree, in terms of cash transfers and so much of the applied issues...I'm just echoing  
3464 everything that was said before and I guess I'll just say that E.F. Schumacher said that one of the  
3465 objectives of the division of labor is so that we can cooperate in service to – cooperate with and  
3466 in service to – others to break down our own egocentricity. And the division of labor that I find  
3467 among us is...I mean I just find it really humbling and beautiful. So it's also increased my  
3468 reading list exponentially.

3469

3470 **William Headley:** Thank you, and I will be quick. I find that I use general language and labels  
3471 all the time and that's a shorthand for what I know. It also hides and covers things that I don't  
3472 know, and today lifted some of those covers off, if you will. Development is an example. I think  
3473 I know it fairly well. I've lived it and worked it a little bit. I've been in the fields that he talks  
3474 about, though not the same ways as my colleague here. But I've heard others learning about  
3475 things in that field, but I have, too. World Vision into advocacy, moral hazard and what that all  
3476 means, accountability from Tom. Islam fascinates me today, I guess as many of us do, and I just  
3477 learned so much about that today – religion and secularism. I just really liked Richard's pulling  
3478 apart humanism, as he did in a very special way. So there was lots there for me to learn. But I  
3479 wanted to close on a special note and that's why I held off last. I have the distinction that none of  
3480 you others have. I am the senior partner of this effort. I've been here at every event. So I think  
3481 it's only right that I have the last word from our side. Obviously I'm very young, but that's  
3482 another question. I did say in my presentation – it wasn't picked up by anybody -- but some of  
3483 the material I've been reading suggests that religion has had an arising in the last 40 years. And  
3484 we can expect it in the future. Madeline Albright's candid conversation in her own book, saying  
3485 that she came into her field not very aware of religion, in fact trying to avoid it. She now says out

3486 of a Georgetown stance, that she can no longer do that. I think we're all going to find that in the  
3487 future. And I think we thank very much Mark, this kind of event, LUCE, whoever else it is, and  
3488 all the people who have been involved in this. The names are there for us to see, pictures and  
3489 photos done in this particular way. And so Mark, I think in a special way, there's no flowers, but  
3490 there's a really big thanks and maybe we could all share that somehow.

3491

3492 **Mark Juergensmeyer:** Thank you very much, Bill. And thank you everyone for giving this  
3493 wonderful summary of what we've been talking about. I see by the clock we are on time, under  
3494 budget, and how seldom can we say that about the organizations we're associated with?

3495

3496 **[END OF TRANSCRIPT]**

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