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Is Global Civil Society Possible?

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In my essay "Civil Religion in America," first published in *Daedalus* in 1967, over forty years ago, which, unfortunately, quite a few people think is the only thing I ever wrote, I did discuss toward the end the possibility of what I called a "world civil religion." [1] Naïve though it may sound today, the idea of a world civil religion as expressing "the attainment of some kind of viable and coherent world order," was the imagined resolution of what I then called America's third time of trial, an idea later developed in my book *The Broken Covenant*.[2] The first time of trial was concerned with the question of independence and the second with the issue of slavery, but the third, as I then put it, was concerned with America's place in the world, and what kind of world it would have a place in. That "viable and coherent world order" for which I hoped, would, I believed, require "a major new set of symbolic forms." So far, I argued, "the flickering flame of the United Nations burns too low to be the focus of a cult, but the emergence of a genuine transnational sovereignty would certainly change this." A genuinely transnational sovereignty? Quite remarkably, just last October the Vatican released a document calling for just such a transnational institution to oversee the global economy and even tax banks to pay for its activities. Not surprisingly this idea was apoplectically rejected by the American right-wing, arguing that it sprang from an obscure section of the Vatican bureaucracy, that is, until in December Pope Benedict XVI affirmed his support

of the idea. This apparently utopian idea of any kind of transnational sovereignty is something we will have to think about later.

Whether I like it or not the idea of civil religion isn't going away, as I found during a conference at the City University in Hong Kong in December. To my surprise many young Chinese scholars see my work on civil religion in America as a kind of model for them to think about a Chinese civil religion, one that would draw from Confucianism, but not be an official state ideology as it was under the regime of Chiang Kai-shek, but rather an expression of civil society, as was my view of civil religion in America. And they were also interested in a Chinese civil religion that would be open to the rest of the world and perhaps participate in a global civil religion as an expression of a global civil society. On top of that I find a resurgence of the idea of civil religion here in America, where there are several significant publications on the subject, and one of my ablest graduate students, Philip Gorski, is actually writing a book about it. My, what we can learn from those we have influenced.

Returning to my original essay and its extraordinary vision of a possible viable and coherent world order and even a world civil religion might make it seem that that essay of forty years ago was hopelessly out of touch with reality—the resolution of the third time of trial being no closer today than it was then, perhaps even farther away—unless one realizes that the actual text of that essay was more a concern for the impediments to such a resolution than the utopian expectation that it was at hand. It was a severe criticism of an America that had gone badly astray in the Vietnam War and was not helping the world toward a viable and coherent world order at all. I included a long quotation from Senator J. William Fulbright about "the arrogance of power."

Still we can hope; perhaps hope is all we have. Times of trial in human history have often been protracted, have lasted a hundred years or more, and if ours seems to have no end in sight, we can still imagine the possibility, even the necessity, of a viable and coherent world order if our catastrophe—ecological, political, economic—is not to become total.

Perhaps I was overly depressed by the endless discussion of the definition of civil religion and the recurring tendency to think a civil religion must be the worship of the state, but I stopped using the term thirty years ago: you will not find it in *Habits of the Heart*, though many of the same issues were discussed in other terms. But whatever I thought of civil religion as a concept, hardly imagining that it would return here and in China around 2010 whether I liked it or not, the idea of a viable and coherent world order seemed ever more important to me in those intervening years. And it became ever clearer to me that for the creation of a viable and coherent world order a global civil society is surely an essential precondition. The biggest immediate problem, then, is the strengthening of global civil society, and it is on that that I want to focus today, but I will have some hints and suggestions that perhaps the religious communities of the world may have something to contribute to that global civil society, and that their participation may be essential for its success, so the idea of a global civil religion is still lurking in the background.

But first I think I have to raise the serious question, one not on the table in 1967, as to whether, like it or not, we don't already have a global civil religion. Harvey Cox raised this issue starkly in his essay "Mammon and the Culture of the Market," a contribution to my *Festschrift* published in 2002. In his first paragraph he says, "My

thesis is that the emerging global market culture—despite those who do not, or choose not, to see it—is generating an identifiable value-laden, 'religious' world-view." The market, Cox argues, is not seen as a human creation, but as a power beyond human control. In this view the market is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnipresent. All we have to do, as individuals or nations, is to bow down to it. Its demands are beyond question.[3]

Although many are suffering under the rule of this deity, those who celebrate it can be found all over the world, in China and India as well as the West, and, for the moment they seem without serious opposition. But if the worship of Mammon is the new global religion, it is not one that can create a viable and coherent world order or a global civil society that might make that possible. On the contrary, it seems to make our grave problems, environmental catastrophe and the greatest inequality in human history, worse, not better. Can we understand what is happening and can we see any alternative?

I want to use some statements of Michael Walzer as a foil for my argument. I have learned much from him, have taught some of his books, so it was with some surprise that I found myself raising serious questions about his book *Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad*. I was amazed to learn from him that humanity in effect does not exist. He writes:

> Societies are necessarily particular because they have members with memories not only of their own but of their common life. Humanity, by contrast, has members but no memory, and so it has no history and no culture, no customary practices, no familiar life-ways, no festivals, no shared understanding of social

> goods. It is human to have such things, but there is no singular human way of having them.[4]

And later in the book he writes, "Our common humanity will never make us members of a single universal tribe. The crucial commonality of the human race is particularism: we participate, all of us, in thick cultures that are our own."[5] This is especially news to me since I have spent thirteen years of my life writing the history of humanity in a book entitled *Religion in Human Evolution*. And I have argued that the fact that religion has characterized all human societies means that religion is a kind of common culture, religion in the singular as I learned from my teacher Wilfred Cantwell Smith, even though it is also, as is all human culture, at the same time indelibly particular.

What I would question in Walzer's position is the idea that the global and the particular are mutually exclusive, that one lives in one and only one community, which, were it true, would surely make the idea of membership in "a single universal tribe" impossible. I would argue, on the contrary, that humans have almost never lived in one and only one community, that we almost always, and in modern times necessarily always, live in many overlapping communities, and, under the rule of Mammon, none of them may be particularly thick. To affirm that humanity has no memory, no history, and no culture, seems to me remarkable at a time when there is widespread popular interest in human origins, in human evolution, and, since the pioneering work of William McNeill, in world history. And if the Olympic Games and, for much of the world, the World Cup, aren't global festivals, what are they? According to the Wikipedia 715 million people watched the 2006 World Cup.

Harold Berman has eloquently argued for the existence of world law, which necessarily implies at least the beginnings of world politics and world civil society.[6] While we have no world state, and wouldn't want one, the beginnings of world governance, which is not the same thing as a world state, we certainly have. A remarkable example is the fact that air traffic control and the rules for landing and taking off at airports, even the language used between pilots and controllers, are the same all over the world. Even more obviously, our global economy would be impossible were there not a plethora of rules, some legal, some customary, governing global trade and capital transfers. We will need to sort out what is ominous and what is promising in this growing array of world law and world regulation, but that world society doesn't exist and each of us is stuck in his or her particularistic tribe, as Walzer affirms, seems to me remarkably far from the truth.

That there is no world culture seems to me an idea that can come only from the reification of the nation state. World culture can be traced all the way back. The bow and arrow, for example, had been adopted everywhere except in Australia, long before history. Stith Thompson has traced motifs in folklore that can be found in every continent. There has never been a time when human culture has not been shared; we do not come in hermetically sealed boxes. Even the nation state is a cultural form that has been transmitted with remarkable fidelity over the entire world since the nineteenth century as the work of John Meyer and his associates have abundantly shown.[7] Wilfred Smith has traced shared stories and practices throughout the world religions, most of which themselves have been disseminated over very wide areas and have influenced and been influenced by those they have not converted.[8] Hinduism spread throughout

Southeast Asia, leaving, for example, a remarkable degree of Sanskrit vocabulary in modern Indonesian. Buddhism spread throughout East Asia, as well as Southeast Asia, and had a considerable impact on Chinese Confucianism, acting as a stimulant to the formation of Neo-Confucianism. Christianity and Islam have spread all over the world and mutually influenced all the cultures they contacted. Nonetheless global culture, which I would insist is a deep feature of human history, is not the same thing as global civil society or global governance. World empires, beginning with the Achaemenid Persian Empire in the middle of the first millennium BCE, have played a significant role in human history, but have never succeeded in becoming the universal empires that they aspired to be. Civil society is a relatively late idea, only emerging for the first time in the West in the eighteenth century.

It is worth noting that world trade, often the carrier of world culture, can be traced back into the deepest recesses of human history, but was growing in importance since classical times when China and India were linked in a variety of ways with the Middle East and Europe. After the European discovery of the New World, trade truly became global. The degree to which market economies were embedded in states and societies has been a subject of wide-ranging historical argument that I do not need to get into, but a principled independence of the market from state and guild monopolies was a feature of the early modern period, pioneered by Britain, but rapidly diffusing to other societies and making possible the emergence of modern capitalism.

The idea of an economy independent of the polity is already present in germ in Locke, for whom economic life precedes the social contract, whose purpose is to a considerable degree to guarantee the pursuit of economic ends with some security. But

with Adam Smith the idea of a self-regulating economy in which the invisible hand guarantees positive social outcomes even when economic actors pursue only their own interests, becomes a moral ideal and a practical project. We should not, however, forget that Smith thought such an autonomous economy could operate only within an ethical and political framework organized around non-economic motives, thus implying the need for an enlightened civil society and an enlightened polity. An economic liberal he certainly was; a neoliberal he certainly was not.

Developing only slightly later, but overlapping the disembedding of the economy, was the emergence of civil society or the public sphere, a realm of thought, argument, and association independent of the state, but leading to the formation of what came to be called public opinion, which politicians could ignore at their peril. Jürgen Habermas's early work, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere,* helped us understand this newly independent realm.[9]

I will use civil society as virtually synonymous with public sphere in a way that has become common in recent writings to refer to forms of communication and association that have been disembedded from the state and from established religions and are not directly controlled by the market. In the eighteenth century the main problem was to achieve independence from the state and state religion, and the institutionalization of human rights was the essential precondition for an independent civil society. The First Amendment to the American Constitution guaranteeing freedom of religion, speech and assembly is the legal basis that makes civil society possible and similar developments have followed, not without much struggle and backsliding, elsewhere ever since, even where such rights, though included in constitutions, are consistently violated in practice.

This again suggests that culture and even law have spread where institutions and practices have not as yet fully developed.

Civil society, though oriented to the discussion and advocacy of political issues, lacks the capacity to make binding decisions. Nonetheless it is closely related to another eighteenth century idea, the sovereignty of the people. It was Robespierre who first gave the idea of democracy a positive meaning after centuries during which it was usually a pejorative term. Democracy as a way of exercising the sovereignty of the people, gave civil society the right, not to make political decisions, but to elect those who would. This idea has now achieved global legitimacy even when it is often honored in the breach.

Most writing about civil society has taken the nation state as the basic frame of reference, though of late a discussion of global civil society has emerged. In principle human rights were often expressed in universalistic terms but in practice they were usually viewed as only applicable within nation states. Alejandro Colas has made the useful point that civil society was in principle international virtually from the beginning. Though it may have originated in Britain in the eighteenth century, it was already disseminated to the American colonies, whose actions in turn were widely influential on the continent, as were British practices. The emergence of civil society in France, therefore, was not some pristine innovation, but was deeply indebted to Anglo-American exemplars.[10] In fact, all the great modern ideologies—liberalism, nationalism, socialism—were international and involved not only cross-national communication of a variety of sorts, but many international associations. We may think of nationalism as antithetical to globalism, but nationalism has always been an international phenomenon. Colas cites the interesting example of Giuseppe Mazzini, the most important theorist of

Italian nationalism, establishing in 1847 the People's International League whose objectives he defined as:

> to disseminate the principles of national freedom and progress; to embody and manifest an efficient public opinion in favour of the right of every people to self-government and the maintenance of their own nationality; to promote a good understanding between the peoples of every country.[11]

While many have argued that the rapid growth of NGOs since World War II is an indication of the growth of global civil society, Colas suggests the limitations of NGOs in that they represent only limited memberships and are usually oriented to single issues rather than to structural problems, whereas social movements that cross national boundaries more closely approximate a genuine global civil society. His examples include socialism, feminism, and environmentalism.

Mass communication, but particularly the internet, have made possible the organization of global public opinion to a degree unimaginable only a few years ago. Adam Lupel has described a remarkable event:

> On 15 February 2003 across North America, Europe, the Middle East, Asia and Australia as many as 30 million people took to city streets to express opposition to the planned invasion of Iraq. It seemed an extraordinary moment for global civil society, perhaps for the first time living up to its name. The anti-war movement appeared to accomplish in a day what four years of transnational activism against neo-liberal globalization could not. It brought together constituencies from East and West, North and South into a broad-based movement with a common clear objective: stop the US-led drive for war. The

> next weeks saw what was perhaps a Pyrrhic victory for global civil society. The protests no doubt contributed to the Bush Administration's defeat in the UN Security Council. But in the end they also contributed to the heightened sense that the United Nations and global civil society were impotent next to the hegemonic power of the United States. . .
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> Global public opinion, as best it could be determined, was overwhelmingly opposed to the war, and yet by most accounts war seemed inevitable from the very start. For all the advances in international communications and the spread of international law in the twentieth century, there remains no institutional mechanism to effectively channel the transnational communicative power of an emerging global civil society.[12]

Using this example in both its positive and negative aspects as a starting point, we can ask where we are. Granted that there is a global economy, global culture, global law, global civil society, even global festivals, why are global institutions both so promising and so weak? I will turn to Jürgen Habermas, Europe's leading social philosopher, for help, particularly in his remarkable essay of 1998, "The Postnational Constellation and the Future of Democracy."[13] Habermas organizes his discussion around the tension between two central facts in our present situation: 1) The nation state is the largest form of society that has been able to create a sense of common membership powerful enough to convince a majority of its citizens that they have a responsibility for all, including the least advantaged, thus giving rise to significant redistribution in what we have come to call the welfare state; and 2) the rise of the global neoliberal market ideology and practice has everywhere threatened the capacity of nation states to carry out the responsibilities

inherent in the notion of common membership. Habermas begins his essay with an epigraph from Robert Cox that sums up the present dilemma:

> All politicians move to the centre in order to compete on the basis of personality and of who is best able to manage the adjustment in economy and society necessary to sustain competitiveness in the global market. . . The possibility of an alternative economy and society is excluded.[14]

What Habermas is describing is a double disparity between economics and politics: economics is seen as the realm of the natural, not the social, whereas politics is the sphere of intentional social choice. But when nations are the sole locations of effective politics and the economy has become global, then the disparity in power between global economy and even the strongest state means that it is the economy that will in the end determine outcomes. In this situation Habermas asks whether "we can have a politics that can catch up with global markets" in order to avert the "natural" disaster that an uninhibited market economy seems to entail.[15] That idea is opposed by those who view the economy not as a human creation but as a force of nature, as something that can only be accommodated, never controlled, ideas that make global market culture into a god that can only be worshiped. Habermas sees this as an enormous challenge to citizens of all countries to form a global civil society: "Only the transformed consciousness of citizens, as it imposes itself in areas of domestic policy, can pressure global actors to change their own self-understanding sufficiently to begin to see themselves as members of an international community who are compelled to cooperate with one another, and hence to take one another's interests into account.." What we need, he argues, is "an obligatory cosmopolitan solidarity."[16] He stresses the need for a

"world domestic policy," because we are now living in a world, not in nation states alone, and the world market requires such a policy.[17]

The most fundamental question that Habermas is raising is whether a global civil society and some forms of global governance are possible, a civil society and governance that would not replace nation states but would place some limits on their autonomy, as the global economy already does. And here there is a question of what kind of people we are. Could we as Americans or Chinese accept the notion of common global membership such that we would be willing to give up something of ours for the sake of Mexicans or Vietnamese? It is at this point that I think we have to ask what are the cultural resources for thinking of global citizenship that would go along with global economics and moderate its excesses? Is abstract constitutional patriotism enough? It is here that we have to consider philosophical and religious resources for thinking about membership in global civil society, membership that would entail at least short-term sacrifice, though as we look at global warming and the growing numbers of failed states, the Tocquevillian idea of self-interest rightly understood is not to be ignored.

Since we actually have since the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its subsequent elaborations something that can be called a global ethic, sometimes referred to as a human rights regime, we can ask how much help we can derive from this consensus, one that is not simply an ideal but that has significant legal weight, though by far not enforceable everywhere, not even in the original home of legal human rights, the USA.[18] And we can ask whether the questions raised by non-Western and non-Christian thinkers about the adequacy of an exclusive emphasis on human rights

can be answered, as well as the question whether an exclusive focus on human rights may not be part of our problem, however much in the end it must surely be part of a solution.[19]

Christian arguments for civil rights have always focused on the sacredness of the individual, created in the image and likeness of God, this emphasis has never stood alone. When Desmond Tutu was writing about human rights in a Christian perspective, after affirming the freedom to choose that must be guaranteed for individuals, he also affirmed the necessity of "a caring and compassionate, a sharing and gentle society," because many people are in fact, and for reasons beyond their control, not able to exercise the autonomous agency which is their right.[20] Even the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, though its focus is on the classic demands of liberalism, that is, freedom from interference with the autonomy of the individual, also contains concerns for the conditions that make that autonomy possible, such as a reasonable standard of living, education, rest and leisure, that can be seen as social freedoms, not merely freedom from external interference. Still in the discourse on human rights the autonomous individual is usually in the foreground.[21]

Let me make it clear that although I think the extraordinary primacy placed on the individual and the backgrounding of society is a problem, I don't think it is an irremediable problem, but one that we have significant resources at hand to rectify. I don't accept either the assertion that the emphasis on human rights is indelibly "Western" and so inapplicable in the rest of the world, or the assertion that such claims are characteristic of "modernism" and so inappropriate in a postmodern world.

Since human rights, emancipation, and enlightenment are a part of the modern project, ethically construed, they are shared by significant actors all over the world. They

are not the concerns of Westerners as opposed to non-Westerners (indeed they have Western as well as non-Western opponents) nor are they limited to the modern seen as a finite and completed period in human history.

But we must remember that the market, the individual as autonomous agent who is free to choose, the consumer, are also global, and that there is a relation between the global market culture that Harvey Cox warned us was taking on religious functions and the very tradition that named Mammon as the great alternative to God. We cannot get out of the conundrum by denouncing "European Universalism" as simply an ideological cover for the exercise of power over non-European peoples, as Immanuel Wallerstein comes close to doing.[22] European universalism has so often provided the ideological tools for resistance to European oppression that, again, we can no longer think of it in simple geographical terms. Even so, those who suggest that non-Western traditions have resources that would help ameliorate the radical individualism of the current human rights regime are not to be dismissed out of hand.

Let us consider Confucianism, because it is one of the most frequently mentioned alternatives to "Western" ways of thinking, and particularly to our radical individualism. Henry Rosemont has stated the contrast starkly when he wrote:

> For the early Confucians there is no *me* in isolation, to be considered abstractly. I am the totality of the roles I live in relation to specific others. I do not *play* or *perform* these roles; I *am* these roles. When they have all been specified I have been defined uniquely, fully, altogether, with no remainder with which to piece together a free, autonomous self.[23]

I am ready to go almost all of the way with Rosemont except that I would point out that some of those roles that fully constitute the person in early Chinese thought *require* that the individual act alone, if need be at the cost of his life, to stand for justice and human dignity, and that these values are as universal in Confucianism as they are in Christian or modern thought. Indeed the very next article in the same book where Rosemont's appears, *Human Rights and the World's Religions*, is by Theodore de Bary, entitled "Neo-Confucianism and Human Rights" and gives numerous examples of individuals who acted on those principles in imperial China.[24]

P. J. Ivanhoe and Tu Weiming have raised doubts about the term "role" in connection with views like those of Rosemont, that is, if we take the role as applying to empirical roles that the individual has experienced and internalized we might be led to the notion that the individual is "programmed" by society. But I think Confucians offer a different understanding of role. This is clear in many places in Confucian thinking, but quite obviously in the teaching which is most often referred to as "the rectification of names." Such rectification requires that the (empirical) ruler really be a ruler, that is one who conforms to the Confucian virtues of *ren* and *li*, and the same thing holds for the role of father and the other central roles. I think that is why Rosemont says "I do not *play* or *perform* these roles; I *am* these roles." To play a role would be to mimic an external conception of what one should be. But to be a role means that the role expresses the spiritually developed self who understands what the role should be, however badly it is played in the environing society. In this sense an ethical understanding of roles makes up the self, but the self is not programmed by external models but is responsible for carrying out those roles in an ethically exemplary way. In this way the first Confucian

commandment, to cultivate the self, is fulfilled, not denied, by this understanding of role. Actually the West, where it has become common to reject the notion of role altogether in the quest for a radically autonomous self answerable to no one, might be usefully instructed that a self without ethically understood roles is no self at all.

Let me return to the way Habermas poses the problem: how can we create a global civil society that will have the same capacity of citizens to identify with the plight of fellow citizens as already exists in nation states, and to his example of the immediate task of creating such a civil society that would include the whole European Union. [Here I have to interject an interview with Habermas that I quite recently saw on the web in which Habermas was almost apoplectic with rage in speaking of the current European political leaders who seem willing to sacrifice the very idea of a European Union, which he had greeted with such enthusiasm, on the altar of national economic self-interest. I suspect he had his own country very prominently in mind.] While accepting Habermas's framework, let me offer a couple of caveats: 1) Under the regime of the neoliberal market it is not always easy to get even the citizens of the same nation to identify with all other citizens (in the United States it has never been easy). 2) The situation in which such identification has been most effective has usually been war: we are all in this together because we have a mortal enemy that we must defeat. If we can't assume the ability to identify with all fellow members of civil society even in advanced democracies and the conditions that have made that possible have usually involved war, we can see that the task of generalizing such identification beyond the nation state will never be easy.

It is for these reasons that I wonder if Habermas's abstract constitutional patriotism will ever be enough. It is one thing to believe in abstract principles. It is another to mobilize the motivation to put those principles into institutional practice. Hans Joas has recently pointed out, following the pioneering work of Georg Jellinek, that, though ideas about human rights go way back in Western history, and include Classical, Catholic, Lutheran and Calvinist thinking, it was only when the American sectarian Protestants in the eighteenth century, mainly the Baptists and Quakers, were willing to insist on them that they got included in the American constitution.[25] Religious fervor is always problematic because it has so often been used for evil as well as good purposes, but it may be that only such powerful motivation could make human rights genuinely practical. And though Christianity has a big contribution to make, it surely is not alone. Confucians hold on the basis of the Analects of Confucius that "all within the four seas are brothers." Buddhists identify not only with all human beings but with all beings in the universe, natural as well as human—all have the Buddha nature. For millennia these deep commitments have been held but never effectively institutionalized. Can the world's religions now mobilize their commitments so that they can at last have genuine institutional force?

Moving to the next question as to whether human rights as vested exclusively in individuals are enough, we may ask whether Kantian moral universalism alone can provide sufficient guidance. Perhaps it will require substantive religious motivation to see that human rights without a humane and caring society will be empty, incapable of fulfillment. And there remains the question of some functional equivalent to the powerful mobilization of human aggression by nation states as a basis for solidarity.

Early in the twentieth century William James raised the question of the moral equivalent of war.[26] We have seen the use of war as a metaphor in such things as the war on poverty, the war on drugs, and so forth, but the metaphor never seems to be as effective as real wars. I suppose it would be too much to ask if we could mobilize a religious war against selfishness, ignorance, and sinfulness in each of us according to our own faith, in part because we have been fighting that war all along. In any case there are enormous threats on the horizon and a popular culture that seems more apprehensive than at any time in my life, with fear of the future replacing the certainty of progress. But anxiety and fear have often fueled extremely regressive movements and there is no certainty that they will move people in the right direction. There is also the great danger that anxiety and fear can immobilize rather than stimulate to action. It is a delicate balance.

Surely secular philosophies have ways of dealing with the fragility of solidarity, even at the national level, and the ease with which humans can be frightened into a negative solidarity against alleged enemies. But if, as I have argued, the religions may have capacities to strengthen and generalize a sense of solidarity so that it reaches truly global proportions, they can do so only in and through self-criticism. Let me say plainly what I have already implied: Christianity, and especially Protestant Christianity, has contributed significantly to the institutionalization of human rights and human solidarity—I have given the American example of the religious roots of the Bill of Rights, but I must add the significant role of Evangelicals in leading the social gospel movement that helped (with the assistance of Catholics motivated by Catholic social teachings) to create in the middle years of the Twentieth Century what became the beginnings of a welfare state in the US. Yet Christianity and especially Protestant

Christianity have contributed to an emphasis on individual piety that makes the secular notion of radical autonomy attractive. Max Weber saw the relation between the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Webb Keane has shown the relation between global Protestantism and neoliberal economics. It is in these regards that I have said that religion is part of the problem as well as part of the solution. And if Christianity can make a contribution to the creation of global solidarity only through self-criticism, such is the case with all the other religions, and secular philosophies as well. There is no way of sorting out the good guys from the bad guys in our present world crisis. We all need each other, but we need critical reason and profound faith reinforcing each other.

What the world requires now must go on at many levels, religious, ideological, political at the global, national and local levels. But one thing Habermas's scenario requires is very evident, however difficult to achieve. We must now turn the idea of being citizens of the world into a practical citizenship, willing to be responsible for the world of which we are citizens. I truly believe that there are millions of citizens of the world in every country, willing to make the necessary commitments. Whether they are anywhere in the majority so that the politicians will listen to them instead of pandering to the short-term interests of their constituents is doubtful. What we need is to turn a growing minority into an effective majority.

Because I see neoliberalism as the source of our deepest global problems it might be thought that I am opposed to it altogether. That would be as foolish at this point in history as to be opposed to capitalism altogether. What I worry about is the destructive consequences of the naturalization of neoliberalism so that it has no effective challenge. I agree with Habermas (and now, apparently, the Vatican) that world politics needs to

catch up with the world economy so that an effective structure of regulation can be created that will protect the environment and the vulnerable of the earth who are paying the price while only a few are reaping the benefits. If this is a political challenge it is also a religious challenge. I am convinced that religious motivation is a necessary factor if we are to transform the growing global moral consensus and the significant beginnings of world law into an effective form of global solidarity and global governance, in relation to an actually existing global civil society with a spiritual dimension drawing from all the great religions of the world.

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[1] "Civil Religion in America" has been most recently reprinted in Robert N. Bellah and Steven M. Tipton, eds., *The Robert Bellah Reader*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, pp. 225-245.
[2] Robert N. Bellah, *The Broken Covenant: American Civil Religion in Time of Trial*, Second Edition, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992 [1975].
[3] Harvey Cox, "Mammon and the Culture of the Market: A Socio-Theological Critique," in Richard Madsen, et. al., eds., *Meaning and Modernity: Religion, Polity, and Self*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002, pp. 124-135. The best treatment I have seen of what Cox calls the emerging global market culture is David Harvey's *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, Oxford, 2005.
[4] Michael Walzer, *Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad*, University of Notre Dame Press, 1994, p. 8.
[5] Walzer, *Thick and Thin*, p. 83. For a recent and much more balanced treatment of the relation between universalism and particularism see Michael Walzer, "Morality and Universality in Jewish Thought," in William M. Sullivan and Will Kymlicka, eds., *The Globalization of Ethics*, Cambridge, 2007, pp. 38-52. Matteo Bortonlini pointed out to me that in the same year that *Thick and Thin* was published, Walzer edited a book called *Toward a Global Civil Society*, Providence RI: Berghahn, 1994. It would be hard to imagine a book whose contents were more at odds with its title. Not a single one of the book's 26 chapters deals with global civil society; all remain concerned with civil society within nation states. Walzer mentions "international civil society" only in one paragraph in his Introduction (pp. 5-6) and then qualifies it by suggesting that the real decisions are made by states. In his own chapter in the book, "The Concept of Civil Society," (pp. 7-27) he describes civil society only within nation states, and even then emphasizes the particularism of its constituent associations.
[6] See, for example, Harold J. Berman, "World Law," *Fordham International Law Journal*, 18, 5, 1995, pp. 1617-1622, and "Faith and Law in a Multicultural World," *The Journal of Law and Religion, 18, 2, 2002-2003, pp*. 297-305. See also Daniel Philpott, "Global Ethics and the International Law Tradition," in Sullivan and Kymlicka, *The Globalization of Ethics*, pp 17-37.
[7] See, for example, George M. Thomas, John W. Meyer, Francisco O. Ramirez, and John Boli, *Institutional Structure: Constituting State, Society and the Individual*, Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1987.
[8] Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *Towards a World Theology*, Philadelphia: Westminster, 1981.
[9] Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into the Category of Bourgeois Society*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989 [1962].
[10] Alejandro Colas, *International Civil Society: Social Movements in World Politics*, Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2002, 49-58 and *passim*.
[11] Colas, *International Civil Society*, p. 55.
[12] Adam Lupel, "Tasks of a Global Civil Society: Held, Habermas and Democratic Legitimacy beyond the Nation-State," *Globalizations*, 2, 1, 2005, pp. 117-118.

[13] Jürgen Habermas, "The Postnational Constellation and the Future of Democracy," in *The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays*, Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2002 [1998], pp, 58-112.
[14] Habermas, *The Postnational Constellation*, p. 58.
[15] Habermas, *The Postnational Constellation*, p. 109.
[16] Habermas, *The Postnational Constellation*, p. 55.
[17] Habermas, *The Postnational Constellation*, p. 54.
[18] Jeremy Waldron discusses the tradeoff of liberty for security since 9/11: "But after a while we start to wonder what security can possibly mean, when so much of what people struggled to secure in this country—the Constitution, basic human rights, and the rule of law—seems to be going out the window." "Is This Torture Necessary?" *New York Review of Books*, 54, 16, October 25, 2007, p. 40. [40-41, 44]
[19] Hans Küng has been actively concerned with building a consensus for a global ethic, one that emphasizes human rights but includes social issues not easily defined as rights. He drafted the Chicago Declaration toward a Global Ethic, endorsed by the Parliament of the World's Religions in 1993 (for the text see Sullivan and Kymlicka, *The Globalization of Ethics*, pp 236-246). Küng has developed his thought further in his *A Global Ethic for Global Politics and Economics*, Oxford, 1998.
[20] Desmond M. Tutu, "Preface," in John Witte, Jr. and Johan D. van der Vyver, *Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective*, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1996, p. xiii. On this general point see Alasdair MacIntyre, *Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues*, Chicago: Open Court, 1999.
[21] An excellent discussion of the problems with an overly individualistic conception of human rights from an Asian perspective is Onuma Yasuaki, "Towards an Intercivilizational Approach to Human Rights: For universalization of human rights through overcoming of a westcentric notion of human rights," *Asian Yearbook of International Law*, Vol 7, 1997, pp. 21-81. Onuma avoids using an Asian perspective to defend authoritarian governments and acknowledges the validity of individualistic values when combined with social concerns.
[22] Immanuel Wallerstein, *European Universalism: The Rhetoric of Power*, New York: The New Press, 2006. I say "comes close to doing" because Wallerstein builds his book around the debate between Las Casas and Sepulveda in sixteenth century Spain over whether the American Indians should be treated as human equals or subordinated to Spanish coercion, thus indicating that the issues with which he is concerned had been European from the beginning. His solution rests in "a multiplicity of universalisms that would resemble a network of universal universalisms." (p. 84), which, though well intentioned, is a little hard to conceive.
[23] Henry Rosemont, Jr., "Why Take Rights Seriously? A Confucian Critique," in Leroy S. Rouner, ed., *Human Rights and the World's Religions*, University of Notre Dame Press, 1988, p. 177.
[24] W. Theodore de Bary, "Neo-Confucianism and Human Rights," in Rouner, *Human Rights*, pp. 183-198.
[25] Hans Joas, "Max Weber and the Origin of Human Rights," in Charles Camic, Philip s. Gorski, and David M. Trubek,eds., *Max Weber's* Economy and Society: *A Critical Companion*, Stanford, 2005, p. 371. [366-382] Jellinek's book, *The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens: A Contribution to Modern Constitutional History* was published in German in 1895 and in English translation by Henry Holt in 1901.
[26] William James, "The Moral Equivalent of War," first published, February, 1910, in William James, *Writings 1902-1910*, New York: Library of America, pp. 1281-1293.